Beisbart, Claus (2012). How can computer simulations produce new knowledge? European journal for philosophy of science, 2(3), pp. 395-434. Springer 10.1007/s13194-012-0049-7
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It is often claimed that scientists can obtain new knowledge about nature by running computer simulations. How is this possible? I answer this question by arguing that computer simulations are arguments. This view parallels Norton’s argument view about thought experiments. I show that computer simulations can be reconstructed as arguments that fully capture the epistemic power of the simulations. Assuming the extended mind hypothesis, I furthermore argue that running the computer simulation is to execute the reconstructing argument. I discuss some objections and reject the view that computer simulations produce knowledge because they are experiments. I conclude by comparing thought experiments and computer simulations, assuming that both are arguments.
Item Type: |
Journal Article (Original Article) |
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Division/Institute: |
06 Faculty of Humanities > Department of Art and Cultural Studies > Institute of Philosophy |
UniBE Contributor: |
Beisbart, Claus |
Subjects: |
100 Philosophy 100 Philosophy > 120 Epistemology |
ISSN: |
1879-4912 |
Publisher: |
Springer |
Language: |
English |
Submitter: |
Claus Beisbart |
Date Deposited: |
07 Apr 2014 12:43 |
Last Modified: |
05 Dec 2022 14:28 |
Publisher DOI: |
10.1007/s13194-012-0049-7 |
Uncontrolled Keywords: |
Computer simulations, Knowledge, Arguments, Thought experiments, Reasoning, Extended mind hypothesis |
BORIS DOI: |
10.7892/boris.41833 |
URI: |
https://boris.unibe.ch/id/eprint/41833 |
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