

# Regional Nature Parks in Switzerland. Between top-Down and Bottom-Up Institution Building for Landscape Management

Jean-David Gerber<sup>1,2</sup> 

© Springer Science+Business Media New York 2017

**Abstract** In 2007 Swiss Federal legislation introduced Regional Nature Parks (RNPs). In this paper I treat the landscape as an object of political-legal regulation and focus on the governance of its uses. I use the constitutionality framework to support our analysis. Constitutionality refers to a form of institution building that stresses bottom-up natural resource management initiatives. Through a detailed case study I show that the interests of landscape users are not equally well protected by law. The success of the new parks model depends on a subtle balance between local self-organization and top-down control. The interests of the weakest actors, i.e., landscape viewers, can be supported only through strong backing at higher levels of government.

**Keywords** Constitutionality · Landscape · Regional Nature Park · Resource governance · First world political ecology · Switzerland

## Introduction

Swiss landscapes of special importance have historically been protected through top-down interventions (National Parks, inventories) (Mose and Weixlbaumer 2007). The introduction of a new instrument to Swiss Federal legislation – Regional Nature Parks (RNP) – in 2007 has introduced a bottom-up form of landscape protection (Hammer 2007). A RNP is a legal

structure aiming to protect large, sparsely populated areas characterized by the richness of their natural and cultural landscape.

The RNP legislation has garnered various reactions (Swiss Federal Council 2005a, b). On the one hand, some see RNP governance structures as allowing for inclusion of a larger number of local actors in decision-making processes, encouraging more pragmatic and realistic approaches to landscape conservation. Through made-to-measure conservation strategies, a fruitful alliance between sustainable and regional economic development, i.e., between use and conservation, could resolve contradictory claims. Simultaneously, such strategies would result from a more efficient and targeted distribution of federal subsidies.

On the other hand, critics have condemned RNPs on the grounds that the new model would promote competition between regions so that subsidies would flow only to the “best equipped,” penalizing those regions that could potentially need them the most. Such flexible forms of local organization would amount to withdrawal of the State from landscape conservation, with the RNP label serving only as a form of “soft regulation” prized by the promoters of weak States. Thus, incentives would come to replace binding regulations. The new project-based approach, in this view, would generate approaches that seek compromises between conservation and development based on the bargaining power of local actors.

This article addresses the questions of whether RNPs can adequately support the interests of weaker actors, in this case landscape viewers, in the face of more powerful economic interests (such as tourism, agriculture, infrastructure development), and whether, owing to their ambiguous legal formalization, they lead to the detriment of the national mission to preserve landscapes or in fact, actually fine-tune landscape conservation. I discuss these questions from an institutionalist perspective by analyzing institutions that regulate landscape uses. I treat the landscape as an object of political-legal

---

✉ Jean-David Gerber  
jean-david.gerber@giub.unibe.ch

<sup>1</sup> Institute of Geography, University of Bern, 3012 Bern, Switzerland

<sup>2</sup> Center for Regional Economic Development (CRED), University of Bern, 3012 Bern, Switzerland

regulation and focus on the governance of its uses. More specifically, I use the constitutionality framework (Haller 2010) to formulate my conclusions. Constitutionality refers to an “institution-building process that highlights natural resource management initiatives from below” with a special focus on the capacities of processes to generate a “sense of ownership” during institution building (Haller *et al.* 2016: 68). While “sharing power” is often described as a key factor in participatory management of natural resources (Borrini-Feyerabend *et al.* 2004), few studies focus on how local resource users influence institution building in the more or less benevolent presence of higher-level institutions. The constitutionality framework focuses on the social learning processes that take place among actors, and argues that there needs to be a balance in bargaining power among participants in order to be facilitate the crafting of better institutions regulating resource uses.

After presenting the theoretical framework, which leads to the formulation of four research hypotheses, I show why and how landscapes can be considered a resource. An actor typology shows that various users of landscapes are characterized by important power disparities. I then describe the Swiss system of RNPs as an introduction to the detailed case study focusing on the Chasseral RNP.

## Institutions and Bargaining Power

RNPs are normative institutions for environment management; together with powerful interests acting at different scales, they produce collective responsibilities, shape incentives, regulate uses, and define the contours of socio-political arenas where actors interact. In democracies based on the rule of law formal institutions reflect existing power relationships (McCarthy 2006). Switzerland is characterized by a legal system that protects very well the interests of the users of the physical landscape who can demonstrate strong property rights (Gerber *et al.* 2011). Consequently, the case of the Swiss RNPs provides an interesting twist to the constitutionality approach, whose first conceptualization took place in settings where predatory State actors play a central role in resource management. Unlike many situations in the Global South, in Switzerland the interests of the farmers are much better protected than those of landscape conservation-oriented actors. A similar configuration of power exists in other developed countries (e.g., implementation of Endangered Species Act in the USA; Bean 2006).

Analyzing institutions generates information on the leeway of actors in appropriating, shaping, accessing landscape resources. “There is a profound connection [...] between the modern usage of landscape to denote a bounded geographical space and the exercise of sight or vision as a principal means of associating that space with human concerns. This

usage undoubtedly relates to shifting modes of social appropriation and use of space” (Cosgrove 2003: 249). A landscape is an area of land that is visible to the eye from a vantage point. However, Appleton (1996: 22–5) notes that, as the term “vantage-point” indicates, “landscape establishes a relationship of dominance and subordination between differently located viewer and object of vision.” I focus here on political and legal strategies used by actors to appropriate this view. More specifically, I focus on actors’ political-legal strategies for appropriating landscapes given that resource conditions are ultimately dependent on how resources are appropriated and used.

## Constitutionality

“Constitutionality” is a concept first used by Haller (2010). It employs the exact opposite position to the concept of “environmentality” (Agrawal 2005). Inspired by Foucault’s concept of governmentality (Foucault 1978: 111), the latter theorizes on processes through which State-driven, top-down discourses on environmental protection create new environmental subjects. Constitutionality, however, focuses on institution-building processes from below; it provides a framework for conceptualizing the members’ positions toward participation, the strategies that they develop, and ways in which they appropriate new common-pool resource institutions that they help create (Haller *et al.* 2016). Constitutionality focuses on the nature of decision-making processes and their capacities to generate a “sense of ownership” toward new institutional rules among resource users. A central issue concerns whether solutions found in the institution-building process can respect, build upon or even integrate working local institutions. Constitutionality opens up the black box of local institution building, wherein power differences and corresponding political strategies play a central role in output production.

Local actors often do not remain powerless in front of “State grafting” as it occurs during globalization (Bayart 2008). On the one hand, local resource users are instrumental in using new political institutions and economic resources strategically in order to further their own ambitions. On the other hand, local social groups also partly unconsciously appropriate ideas, knowledge, cultural representations, and social practices of higher levels of State organization, leading to new hybrid representations or even worldviews (Li 2007).

I address how the introduction of the new RNP instrument of the Nature and Cultural Heritage Protection Act is to be interpreted from a constitutionality perspective. First, RNPs as they are defined in the law outline a new reference frame of action within landscape policies. These new Parks change the rules of landscape conservation and management, creating new constraints through a new logic of public intervention

(bottom-up initiatives, top-down labeling, and co-financing). Second, the new Park model offers actors opportunities to develop new political-legal strategies to defend their particular interests for a given resource.

In this paper, I examine the ways that actors engaged with the landscape use and appropriate new institutions. Constitutionality focuses on the pro-active strategies of local actors when they participate in the designing of new common-pool resource institutions. Four characteristics of these local regulatory arrangements must be considered when appraising their potential for long-term sustainable resource uses (Haller *et al.* 2016: 69). I use these four characteristics to formulate four hypotheses. I hypothesize that RNPs will improve landscape management if institution-building processes involve a leveling off of power differences among landscape users through the following mechanisms:

- H1: *Plurality of perspectives*. RNPs provide sufficient conditions for the different landscape users to contribute their own views on resource management issues to address and on institutional solutions to identify;
- H2: *State recognition of bottom-up initiatives*. RNPs offer enough flexibility to accommodate and support solutions devised by the different landscape users;
- H3: *Respect for existing local institutions*. The solutions provided for by RNPs respect, build upon, or even integrate existing local institutions that are considered important in the eyes of the different landscape users;
- H4: *Open platform*. RNPs are not management structures that work behind closed doors, but instead create a relatively open platform for local debate. These platforms are conceived in such a way that they can catalyze communication and promote social learning between the different landscape users.

On the basis of these four hypotheses, I discuss whether the new park model should be deemed a form of improved landscape regulation reinforcing the position of weaker actors or whether it leads to deregulation, whereby weaker actor interests are considered subordinate to more powerful regional development interests.

## A Resource-Based Approach to Landscapes

According to David Harvey, a landscape functions “as a vast, humanly created resource system, comprising use values embedded in the physical landscape, which can be utilized for production, exchange and consumption” (1982: 233). In the development of conceptual approaches to landscape, its usage “has varied from reference to the tangible, measurable ensemble of material forms in a given geographical area, to the

representation of those forms in various media such as paintings, texts, photographs or performances, to the desired, remembered and somatic spaces of the imagination and the senses” (Cosgrove 2003: 249).

The European Landscape Convention represents a milestone in the politico-legal defining of landscapes, as it is the first international treaty dedicated to a multidimensional approach to European landscapes. The Convention defines a landscape as “an area, as perceived by people, whose character is the result of the action and interaction of natural and/or human factors” (Council of Europe 2000). Without minimizing the natural and human factors that shape landscapes, this definition focuses on perceptions. A landscape is an area that is visible to the eye from a vantage-point (Cosgrove 1998: 189–222; Turner 1979), though one must keep in mind that “human sight is individually intentional and culturally conditioned” (Cosgrove 2003: 250).

As a conservation instrument, the European Landscape Convention aims to raise awareness of the value of living landscapes. In its preamble, it promotes a resource-based approach to landscapes: “the landscape [...] constitutes a resource favourable to economic activity whose protection, management and planning can contribute to job creation” (Council of Europe 2000, our emphasis). Etymologically, definitions of resources have an economic connotation (Zimmermann 1951). Resources are associated with the power that their owners can benefit from with sufficient access and control over them.

A resource-based approach to landscapes prompts the analyst to think about the various ways that actors (stakeholders) use resources and, consequently, the need to manage them, i.e., to coordinate these uses so that they do not place the continued existence of a resource at risk. Placing users at the center of the issue leads one to analyze the *political implications* of landscapes. Political implications have been analyzed based on the often disruptive effects of designating a natural space as a “park,” a concept whose historical development is related to the aesthetic appropriation of areas allocated for hunting, recreation, or conservation (Cosgrove 1995; Grove 1995; Neumann 1995, 1998; Haller 2013).

End users of the landscape resource – viewers – take advantage of one or several vantage points in order to appraise a geographic space as a landscape. Indirectly, the resource approach puts forward a multitude of other actors who hover around viewers: transport operators, access providers, conservationists, marketers, regulators, etc. Actors develop strategies within maneuvering constraints that societal rules, norms and values grant them. Understanding these institutions – the rules of the game (North 1990) – becomes essential from the moment that a resource is put at risk due to use conflicts and overuse. The formalization of landscapes in terms of resources leads to questioning in regards to its sustainability.

### Three Types of Landscape Users

To analyze the political and legal regulation of landscapes, I propose a simple actor typology as that of landscape users (Fig. 1). The typology identifies three roles in connection with landscapes: landscape viewers, providers, and users of the physical basis of landscapes. These roles are best described as *ideal types*, i.e., mental constructs resulting from a deliberate simplification and exaggeration of crucial aspects of the empirical reality (Weber 1968). By stressing certain elements common to numerous cases of a given phenomenon, ideal types serve as a framework for interpreting empirical data. While some match roles played by landscape actors better than others, these categories are not exclusive in reality: given actors can play several roles at once. However, as I show, depending on their roles, the legal protection of their interests will vary considerably.


If landscapes are areas that are visible to the eye, *viewers* are actors who use a vantage point to enter into a sensible relationship with an area. These include hikers, walkers, tourists, photographers, “nature lovers,” etc. Viewers are not a homogenous group and might have different expectations concerning the value of a given landscape (Hunziker *et al.* 2008; Droz *et al.* 2009). Viewers are often residents of locations away from landscapes that they appreciate. Typically, many of them are urban dwellers who enjoy using the scenic countryside for recreation. This represents the manifestation of a power relationship of viewers over the viewed in the definition of resources. As Mitchell states (2003: 243), “we need to understand that while the landscape is always physically somewhere, it is also socially constituted both there and elsewhere.” Nature-conservation NGOs often partly represent the interests of the viewers in the political debate, although in

practice the interests of scenic landscape and biodiversity conservation may diverge. Viewers rarely access landscapes on their own. They often avail themselves of the services of a provider who leads them to a landscape in exchange for payment.

*Providers* of a landscape are in a position to control a resource – be it through the control of access infrastructure, property titles (e.g., of a vantage point or point of access), copyrights, labels, etc. – and who profit from their dominant capacity to “sell” a landscape. Providers can be suppliers of access infrastructure (e.g., cable car operators), tourism offices, hoteliers, tour operators, commercial photographers, holders of label certifying product origins, etc. Through advertising, providers strive to influence or manipulate the expectations of viewers. They can also intervene directly in landscapes and shape them. They “produce” landscapes and promote their “consumption.” As guarantors of “traditional” – i.e., “true” – landscapes, they help “naturalize” landscapes that they design through interventions. As Cosgrove (2003) expresses it, we always learn to see landscapes “through the communicative agency of words and pictures, and such ways of seeing become ‘natural’ to us” (p. 250). Providers can be residents of areas either within or outside of a landscape. In principle, providers are also concerned with maintaining a landscape (to a certain extent) to ensure sustained income from viewers. However, in practice, competition among providers makes it difficult to regulate visitors’ flows. This leads to the paradoxical situation of scenic landscapes put at risk by those who make a living from them (Müller 2008).

When *users of the physical basis of landscape* have any awareness of the existence of a landscape, they view it at most as the outcome of a positive externality of their actions on elements of the environment. A landscape is a product of

**Fig. 1** Typology of landscape users (adapted from Gerber *et al.* 2007)



social relations with the land, expressed in the definition of use rights and land ownership, histories of settlement, processes of resource exploitation and conservation, and degrees of integration with the economic system of production. The activities of the actors involved in such social relations have more or less direct effects on landscapes. Among them, agricultural and construction-related activities play an obvious role in shaping landscapes.

### The Differentiated Protection of use Rights

The typology presented is based on the fact that the above-described actors do not secure control over resources using the same politico-legal instruments (Table 1). Law is one of the main sources of power for resource users in democracies based on the rule of law; actors develop political strategies to have their interests recognized and protected by law. Two main sources of politico-legal regulation can be identified: property titles and public policies (Gerber *et al.* 2009). The former protect the interests of individuals against those of third parties and against the State. The latter aim to solve a collectively defined public problem in the interest of the (voting) majority (Knoepfel *et al.* 2007).

In Switzerland property titles are legally protected. Users of the physical basis of landscapes can benefit in principle from this strong level of protection in defending their interests. Providers also benefit from the protection of property titles. They secure their ownership of a strategic position (points of access, vantage points, etc.), from which they can levy entry charges (means of transport, restaurants, etc.). Both types of actors also benefit from the protection of different public policies that support their interests (tourism, regional development, agriculture, infrastructure, etc.).

The situation is quite different for landscape viewers. There is no such mechanism as a property title to a landscape, as property only applies to a “thing.” The range of public policies directly targeting landscapes is also limited (the main one being the Nature and Cultural Heritage Protection Act). However, two main legal mechanisms support appropriation through direct landscape experience. First, viewers benefit not

only from the freedom of movement but also from the general public’s right to access all public and private pasture lands and forests for recreation purposes (guaranteed through article 699 of the Swiss Civil Code). This is a key asset of landscape viewers in Switzerland in comparison to settings where landowners have an unlimited right to exclude. Second, procedural law awards authority to NGOs that represent the interests of viewers through the *right of appeal*. However, the right of appeal of NGOs in Switzerland is subject to systematic attacks in the federal parliament by the defenders of landowners and developers (Flückiger *et al.* 2000).

As the interests of these three types of landscape users are often competing, they are likely to come into conflict with one another. In effect, the interests of users of the physical basis of landscapes and of providers are far better protected by property titles than the interests of viewers who generally only benefit from a right of landscape access, *but not from a right to prevent its modification*.

### Regional Nature Parks: The Case of Switzerland

The creation of Swiss RNPs took place in a Europe-wide shift in conception of large protected areas (Category V of the IUCN definition; IUCN 1994). This shift led to comprehensive, large-scale conservation of whole landscapes instead of selective, small-scale or segregating protection. It started with the designation of numerous biosphere reserves and nature parks, especially since the UNESCO Seville-Strategy was passed in 1995 (UNESCO 1996). The disparity within Category V is substantial and interpretation of the management categories for protected areas in Europe differ from those of other continents (Mose and Weixlbaumer 2007). Together with the rise of “sustainable development,” particularly since the 1980s and 1990s, protected areas are increasingly being viewed as instruments of regional economic development (Hammer 2007). France was one of the pioneers and has for decades been considered a model of regional policy promotion of protected areas.

In Switzerland, in order to promote new large-scale protection areas in addition to the single national park (dating back

**Table 1** The four main approaches to landscape regulation (adapted from Gerber and Knoepfel 2008)

Resource landscape regulation	<i>Direct:</i> Regulation addressing landscape issues	<i>Indirect:</i> Through the physical basis of a landscape
Public policies	<i>Mainly protective regulations:</i> European Landscape Convention, Swiss Nature and Cultural Heritage Protection Act	<i>All policies with a spatial impact:</i> Agriculture, tourism, land use planning, infrastructure, defense, etc.
Property titles	<i>Absence, but appropriation strategies through other means:</i> Control of strategic plots of land (e.g., viewing points), control of access, intellectual property of landscape representation (labels)	<i>Property titles:</i> Landownership, concession, easements, etc.

to 1914), a consensus emerged after several years of intensive and highly controversial discussion. Building on the French model, Swiss RNPs are clearly promoted as an instrument of regional policy in favor of marginal rural regions (Hammer 2007). A revision of the national Nature and Cultural Heritage Protection Act of 1969 (RS 451) was passed by the Parliament that introduced RNPs to Swiss legislation (in force since December of 2007). According to the law, “a Regional Nature Park is a large, partly populated area, characterized by the richness of its natural and cultural landscape, whose buildings and installations blend harmoniously with the landscape and sites of local character. Within a regional natural park: (a) the quality of nature and the landscape shall be maintained and enhanced; (b) sustainable business activities shall be encouraged and the marketing of the resultant goods and services promoted” (Art. 23 g, official translation). In the new Park model, the Swiss Confederation awards a Park label to the Park authority (Art. 23j). The Park label is awarded for a limited period and is subject to regular evaluation. The Swiss Confederation provides financial assistance to those Parks that fulfill the legal requirements (Art. 23 k).

In regards to RNP governance, the Parks Ordinance of November 7, 2007 (RS 451.36) stipulates that, “in relation to the establishment and management of the park, the park authority must: (a) guarantee the participation of the local population; (b) enable the participation of interested businesses and organizations in the region” (Art. 25, official translation).

The Swiss government is characterized by a form of “cooperative federalism” described as “the completion of federal legislation by the cantons, the implementation of federal programs by cantons and municipalities, and extensive finance – and revenue – sharing” (Linder 1994: 55). The new RNP model shares some similarities with managerial approaches that have increasingly been introduced to Swiss public administration since the end of the 1980s (Gerber 2016). This shift from administration to management (Hughes 2003) has influenced the perception of problems (e.g., the link between conservation and regional development), their political formulation (e.g., the need to introduce more competition between regions), and the definition of instruments (e.g., bottom-up rather than top-down) to be used to solve them. The new managerial approach aims to replace performance-inhibiting control elements of the political-administrative system through management systems, structures, and instruments inspired by the private sector. There are clear similarities between these new managerial approaches and neoliberalism, which openly calls for a lean public sector that should be cost-efficient thanks to market-oriented management (Roberts *et al.* 2005). Public administrations should model themselves on private businesses in order to guarantee that governments and administrations can provide citizens, often referred to as clients, services that they want (and pay for

through their taxes) rather than allowing public authorities to indulge in bureaucratic traditions (Osborne and Gaebler 1992). Neoliberalism supports a particular way of understanding public problems, of framing the mental interpretation of such problems and of imposing specific values (Jessop 2002; McCarthy 2006). It can also be linked with new forms of multiculturalism or regionalism, in which the affirmation of local identities favor the implementation of neoliberal concepts (Hale 2005).

In this article I focus on the rollback of the State and corresponding effect on the weaker actors, in this case landscape viewers. Correspondingly, the overarching question I address focuses on the way RNPs can better support these specific interests.

## Methods


The more research subjects are complex and contextualized, the more appropriate case study approaches are (Scholz and Tietje 2002). The case study in this paper focuses on a well-established RNP experience that began 15 years ago and guarantees that mechanisms at play will be more easily identifiable as is recommended by case study researchers (Yin 2009). In Switzerland property rights are very well protected by the Federal Constitution, but the interests of the landscape viewers also receive legal support through the general public’s right to access landscapes. Additionally, Switzerland has an important tourist industry based on the marketing of scenic landscapes, which makes landscape’s “quality” a central sociopolitical concern.

The data were drawn from various sources: general literature on the case; legal materials such as laws and regulations; contracts, charters, and internal documents produced by the RNP; participatory observation in one of the project-oriented commissions of the RNP (from 2010 to 2015); and six semi-structured face-to-face interviews carried out with major actors (representing the management of the Park, the three types of landscape users, and the public authorities).

## Case Study: The Chasseral Regional Nature Park

The *Chasseral*, a massif of the Jura Mountains, overlooks Lake Biel in the Swiss canton of Bern. Its highest point, at 1607 m, is situated in a triangular configuration formed by the cities of Biel, Neuchâtel, and la Chaux-de-Fonds (Fig. 2).

Agriculture is the main activity in the Chasseral massif (RNP Chasseral 2012: 19). Owing to the presence of inhospitable climatic conditions and steep slopes, farming practices are extensive, as they are in other mountainous areas. Forestry represents another important activity, as approximately 40% of the area is covered in forest. Today, the forest growth rate is



**Fig. 2** General map of the Chasseral RNP

twice as important as the exploited volume (RNP Chasseral 2012: 52). This has led to a progressive closing of forested pastures – a typical man-made ecosystem of the Jura Mountains – and to a loss of biodiversity (Chételat *et al.* 2013). In the upper section of the massif, numerous farm restaurants (“métairies”) carry out cattle-rearing and traditional cheese making in addition to offering catering or lodging services. In the valleys, these activities are complemented by polycultures. The hillsides surrounding Lake Biel are used for wine production.

Numerous hikers take advantage of the well-developed network of hiking trails on the Chasseral massif. Other activities include mountain biking, rock climbing, paragliding, hunting, cross-country skiing, snowshoeing, etc. Despite this appeal, the regional economy is not based on tourism, which generates very little added value as most visitors make only day trips to the region. However, part of the population and some sectors are partly dependent on tourism: hoteliers along the lakeside, farm restaurants in the Chasseral massif, farmers focusing on agri-tourism, cable car operators, and, to some extent, wine and cheese producers.

Competitive uses of the landscape resource have led to conflicts, which tend to increase with the development of tourism (Table 2). It is one of the central missions of the Chasseral RNP to offer solutions that help mitigate such rivalries.

## Institution-Building Process

According to procedures codified in the law, the creation of an RNP is the result of close collaboration among various levels of government. While labeling is clearly federal, as an RNP project must be approved by federal administrations, financing is a mixed process: a Park must be ascribed a certain budget that is mostly provided by concerned municipalities and private donors, with higher government levels typically topping it up. However, initiatives that lead ultimately to their labeling – and to their maintenance – clearly originate at the local level.

In 1997, the major extension of an existing quarry paved the way for a global approach to the management of the Chasseral massif: compensation measures for the extension of the quarry would help ease other major issues as well, such as problems associated with growing flows of motorized visitors to the massif. In 1999 and 2000, discussions on the introduction of the RNP instrument at the national level were becoming more concrete. Very quickly, to improve coordination between the different measures, it became obvious that a supervising organization needed to be established. While first proposals to establish an RNP came from a nature conservation-focused NGO, other major actors of the Chasseral massif were quickly included in the process. In 2001, the Chasseral RNP organization was established in the

**Table 2** Major landscape rivalries found in the core of the Chasseral RNP (Chasseral Massif)

Main rivalries	Conflict points
Rivalry 1: Management of vehicle flows	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- The saturation of roads and noise produced by motorized traffic disturbs visitors.</li> <li>- Farming road use by tourists and wild parking on pastures create rivalries. The same is true for forest roads where vehicles are not permitted in principle. The maintenance, and in particular the sharing, of this network are major issues.</li> <li>- Noise generated by traffic harms certain sensitive species.</li> </ul>
Rivalry 2: Management of visitor flows (hikers, mountain bikers, etc.)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Visitors place biodiversity as risk (winter: snowshoeing and cross-country skiing; summer: noise, human presence, trampling, and erosion).</li> <li>- Visitors and farming practices are in conflict with one another: waste, gates left open, and erosion vs. aggressiveness of calf-feeding cows.</li> <li>- Different types of tourist activity are in conflict with one another: hiking, mountain biking, horseback riding and hobby flying.</li> </ul>
Rivalry 3: Maintenance of forested pastures and of biodiversity-rich forests	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- When intensifying, agricultural workers tend to view forested pastures (a specificity of the Jura) as less profitable, rendering their maintenance for landscape protection purposes more difficult.</li> <li>- The preservation of some species requires the use of specific forest management measures (thinning, the preservation of older trees, etc.) that reduce profitability.</li> <li>- According to legal definitions, forested pastures are considered to be forests. This definition has direct consequences on subventions received by farmers.</li> </ul>
Rivalry 4: Integration of landscape issues related to local land use planning development strategies	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Nature protection organizations call for better control of urban sprawl through municipalities.</li> <li>- Regional and cantonal structure plans require better control of sprawl when municipalities revise local zoning plans.</li> <li>- Landowners resist the implementation of stricter building regulations.</li> <li>- The Charter of the Park has limited effects on land use planning.</li> </ul>

presence of its 150 founding members, including 11 municipalities, collective members (e.g., NGOs, private companies, and civic corporations<sup>1</sup>) and individual members.

Prior to the inclusion of RNPs in national legislation, the Chasseral organization followed a parallel path at the cantonal level: the goal was to simultaneously prepare a Regional Structure Plan (“plan directeur regional”) for the strategic development of the massif that would support the creation of an RNP, should the national legislation come into force. This allowed the Chasseral organization to obtain necessary funding to carry out a feasibility study, in particular through the Regio Plus program (Impulse Program for the Support of Structural Change in Rural Regions), financed by the State Secretariat for Economic Affairs, making it clear that the

intention is to employ protected areas as instruments of regional development (Hammer 2007).

Various stakeholders were involved in the process (cantonal actors of spatial planning, forest management and tourism entities, a conservation NGO, regional organizations, and two municipalities). As soon as the national situation concerning RNPs became clearer, the Chasseral organization abandoned the cantonal strategy to focus on the Park label. The Chasseral organization gave substance to its Park project through different preliminary reports that ultimately led to creation of the Charter of the future Park. In 2008, Chasseral Park became an official candidate and four years later, a Park designation was finally granted. During this time, 28 municipalities joined the organization after a positive legislative vote and formally signed a contract with the Chasseral organization to commit to contributing to the financing of the Park (at a rate of four Swiss francs per inhabitant and per year).

The drafting of the Charter was clearly a bottom-up process orchestrated by the Chasseral organization and by various actors of the region. In reality, this institution-building process

<sup>1</sup> In Switzerland, civic corporations (“Bürgergemeinde”, “commune bourgeoise”; both refer literally to communities of the burghers in the Middle Ages) are large landowners (roughly one third of all the forests belong to them). In the nineteenth century, town and village communities were split in two: while newly created political municipalities were in charge of the political rights guaranteed to all Swiss citizens, the mission of civic corporations was to manage real assets of the former communities (Gerber *et al.* 2011).

took place at several levels. First, the Chasseral organization was instrumental at the local level in federating different municipalities so that the new Park could emerge as a new structure supported by its member municipalities. Second, the Chasseral organization participated at the cantonal level in the preparation of the Regional Structure Plan, which paved the way for the creation of the RNP. Throughout this process, it worked closely with regionalized cantonal administrations. Third, the Chasseral organization was also involved in the process of defining RNPs, as it belongs to the first generation of Parks that announced their interest before the national legislation was passed. The Network of Swiss Parks was founded in 2007 in Chasseral shortly after the national legislation revision.

### Positions of the three Types of Landscape Actors within the Park

Chasseral Park is a private law organization composed of several entities. The *Steering Committee* is responsible for the strategic management of the Park. Eleven members are elected to represent municipalities, five are elected to represent collective members (as of 2015, a conservation NGO, the regional chamber of agriculture, farmers, hunters, and tourism service providers), and five are elected to represent individual members (the latter are individuals elected for their specific competencies). All three types of landscape users are represented in the steering committee. However, municipalities, which financially support the Park, can veto a decision, as they statutorily have a majority in the committee. Initially, several municipalities were reluctant to participate in the Park creation process, which was viewed as a way for conservationists and landscape viewers to obtain additional levels of protection. The composition of the steering committee is thus a product of political compromises.

A *Managing Team* composed of five persons, three permanent commissions (“Nature, landscape, and heritage,” “Sustainable economic development” and “Communication, culture, and education”) and several specific workgroups complement the organization. These commissions guarantee that the interests of different landscape users are represented. However, the Managing Team is directly accountable for its actions to the Steering Committee. Thus, by force of circumstance, decisions and actions are carried out consensually.

The members’ *General Meeting* brings together the 28 municipalities, individual members (approximately 180 at the time of the Charter’s finalization), collective members (approximately 90, including tourism organizations), nature conservation NGOs, large landowners, cantonal structures in charge of land use planning or regional development, professional organizations, and private companies. Therefore, providers and users of the material basis of landscapes are well represented. Viewers are represented through individual members or NGOs.

The General Meeting meets at least once a year and plays a very important role as it serves as an institutionalized arena wherein individual members, including individual users of the resource, can express their views in person.

## Results

Following the constitutionality concept, I hypothesize that RNPs should lead to improved landscape management when institution-building processes involve the leveling off of power differences between landscape users through four mechanisms: acceptance of a plurality of perspectives (H1), state recognition of bottom-up initiatives (H2), respect for existing local institutions (H3), and provision of an open platform for debates and decision-making (H4).

### Plurality of Perspectives

Empirical evidence shows that the organization of the RNP Chasseral provides the right conditions for the different types of landscape users to contribute their own views on resource management issues. However, some categories of landscape actors are in a better position than others to make their voices heard.

The interests of users of the physical basis of the Chasseral landscape (forest owners, farmers, hunters, quarry operators, etc.), as well as landscape providers (tourism associations, transport providers, hiking associations, etc.) are well protected by law. These actors must be included in any decision-making process as they have the power to stop the implementation of measures (“veto right” through their property titles). Most of these individuals are also represented through trade associations. The most powerful of this group do not collaborate closely with the Chasseral RNP as they do not need to.

Concerning viewers, empirical evidence shows that a distinction must be made between local (autochthonous) and external (allochthonous) actors. External landscape viewers use the resource without leaving any financial compensation for the associated region (except for the price of their orders in restaurants). This is true, for instance, of motorized visitors, cross country skiers (who pay a fee to supra-regional organizations in charge of marking tracks) and mountain bikers. In this context, an objective of a Park is to improve offers of overnight accommodation. However, while this can improve the compensation that landscape providers receive, it cannot improve the ways landscape users can express themselves in regards to the resources they legitimately use through their right of access.

External viewers are presented with only limited options to make themselves heard. As they cannot voice their opinions,

they can vote with their feet, i.e., by leaving. Otherwise, they can rely on the actions of associations that represent their interests. Owing to its actual composition, the Park does not explicitly try to integrate allochthonous landscape viewers. However, among the collective members involved, several NGOs are active beyond the borders of the Park at a cantonal or even national level. Some are even represented in the Steering Committee (e.g., the Pro Natura NGO, which focuses primarily on biodiversity conservation, but also campaigns for scenic landscapes). In a democratic country based on the rule of law, delegates of different administrations are to some extent expected to represent the broad interests of the (voting) population, including landscape viewers. It is therefore difficult to go beyond this simple view and to take real measures to integrate external resource users more closely.

### State Recognition of Bottom-Up Initiatives

The case study shows that the new RNP policy offers enough flexibility to accommodate and support solutions devised by the different types of landscape users. However, they have to take place within the limits of existing procedures. This gives the RNP a substantial role in terms of political impetus and contribution to the debate on the future of the region, but limits its intervention capacity.

The Park label system provided for by the law relies on the top-down accreditation of RNPs. Criteria are formulated at the top, and compliance is examined before a designation is granted. Consequently, the creation of an RNP is not merely a bottom-up process. Bottom-up initiatives are steered by general expectations formulated by higher levels of government. They provide a framework that limits local resource user capacities to maneuver. For example, the initial RNP project followed the same boundaries as the regional structure plan, whose borders follow lower limits of the forest (Fig. 2). However, it soon became clear that the national administration would not finance such a project. The entire municipal territory had to be included. This boundary shift changed the nature of the project. From a conservation project promoted through a conservation discourse, the Park became a regional economic development project.

Resource management obeys strict rules codified in law. Local solutions must be negotiated within this context. The mission of the Park is clearly to provide inputs in the form of new ideas or initiatives and to try to improve coordination between competitive uses of the landscape resource. Through the Park, resource users can also strive to motivate actors in charge to implement instruments that are available to them. For example, the Park has participated in formulating various plans (the Chasseral transport plan, the forest plan of North Chasseral, and the partial nature reserve of North

Chasseral). This system is flexible, but affords Park actors little room to maneuver outside of outlined procedures.

Crafting new arrangements that lead to better coordination – or even compensation – between conservation and regional development is a central mission of the Park. These two goals are not necessarily compatible, as the promotion of the region generates more activities (new sports, new recreational practices, increased flows of visitors, landscape uses for marketing purposes, etc.) that compete with one another, with the preservation of scenic landscapes, or with biodiversity conservation. While Park actors are constantly required to find new solutions, implementation and concretization typically extend beyond the responsibilities of the Park alone.

### Respect for Existing Local Institutions

Empirical evidence clearly shows that the solutions provided for by the Chasseral RNP build upon or even integrate existing local institutions. However, the Park is also a response to the limits of these institutions.

From the start, the development of the Chasseral RNP has relied heavily on some main collective actors whose activities structure the massif landscape. Among them, civic corporations have played a central role as key forest owners with several centuries of legitimacy. Farming practices have led to the formation of open settlements that have been typical of the Chasseral landscape over several centuries. The organization of these small farms has been characterized by strong forces of inertia (Egli 1991). Even before municipalities became involved, regionalized cantonal administrations initially provided necessary forms of technical competence. Thus, initial efforts in favor of the Park relied heavily on existing structures and benefited from their legitimacy. However, the Park's creation has also occurred as a reaction against these entities as a way to overcome their limits. There was a need for change and for adaptation (e.g., given challenges associated with evolving agricultural policies, growing quantities of visitors to the massif, the slow disappearance of downhill skiing due to a lack of snow, etc.). The event that sparked change was the extension of quarries for the cement industry.

An RNP is more than a delimited geographical space; it is a governance structure that is in charge of (some aspects of) landscape management. However, it is not a supra-municipal structure that replaces member municipalities, as no delegation of competencies from the municipal level takes place. The Park does not benefit from the delegation of competencies from higher levels either. Close collaboration with and support from cantonal and national levels guarantees a sufficient transfer of information and experience as well as improved mutual understanding. However, all existing actors ensure that Park actors do not gain additional competencies at their expense (e.g., in matters of land use planning). Other levels of

administration or government accept solutions proposed by the Park as long as they do not compete with their own prerogatives. Ultimately, negotiations concerning the creation of a new Park must present solutions that all levels of government (from local to national) can support, as all of them financially contribute to the Park. Consequently, a Park can only develop its activities in close collaboration with other actors or through gaps between their domains of responsibility.

### Open Platform for Debates and Decision-Making

The case study shows that the Chasseral RNP is not a management structure that works behind closed doors. Through its different organs, it provides a relatively open platform for local debate and is able to catalyze communication and promote social learning.

The most open forum is the members' General Meeting. Each actor who is willing to become a member can participate. Procedural rules help weaker actors and even allochthonous landscape viewers to express their views as well. Numerous landscape users have their interests represented through collective actors (trade associations, NGOs, etc.), which have more weight in decision-making processes and which can be members of other Park entities as well (Steering Committee, Commissions, etc.). The large number of collective and individual members involved in the organization shows that the Park successfully generated a "sense of ownership" among the population.

The main achievement of the Chasseral RNP as an open platform lies in the fact that it acted as a mediator between the interests of various resource users in such a way that, through social learning, it convinced all municipalities involved and enough users of the physical basis of the landscape *to become landscape providers* as well. In other words, the Park was able to shift roles among the three types of landscape users: farmers began to market their products as originating from the Chasseral region, associating their production with "their" landscape; forest owners collaborated with the marking of hiking trails; the main quarry operator helped create a zone of silence to protect a declining population of Hazel grouse (*Tetrastes bonasia*); municipalities presented themselves as members of the Chasseral RNP; etc. Even landscape viewers started to become providers when they organized into an association in defense of the Chasseral as a valuable landscape, thereby contributing to its marketability.

Of course, the Chasseral RNP itself became one of the main landscape providers of the region. Its legitimacy to local actors expecting a boost in regional development is afforded through all actions undertaken to promote the Chasseral landscape. For instance, the Park advertises the rich biodiversity of its landscapes such as the Lady's slipper orchid (*Cypripedium*

*calceolus*); it promotes trails that lead to traditional places of worship; it recommends local food products, arts and crafts.

### Discussion

RNPs were introduced in the Swiss legislation to improve the management of the landscape resource in populated areas with high scenic value. Although the constitutionality framework has mostly been used so far in contexts where conservation-oriented actors are more powerful than the users of the physical resources (mainly small farmers), this research shows that the constitutionality framework is particularly appropriate to analyze the role played by RNPs in landscape management as well.

This Swiss case study contributes to the constitutionality framework in four ways. First, it demonstrates that power is closely linked with the legally formalized protection of interests. For example, in a democracy like Switzerland, access to property titles provides decisive political power (Gerber *et al.* 2009). Therefore, as the example of Chasseral demonstrates, an extra effort has to be made to bring together a *plurality of perspectives*. As the case study shows, RNPs can prevent hegemonic appropriation of the landscape resource, but they have to find ways to deal with very asymmetric power distributions among various resource users.

Second, the example of RNPs demonstrates that *State recognition* is important, but that a cross-fertilizing of bottom-up and top-down-processes is even more significant. The Chasseral case shows that State recognition is a source of support (financing, competencies), legitimation (Park designation), and constraint (framework conditions). RNPs, as a form of institution building, develop at the meeting point between bottom-up and top-down initiatives. The State creates opportunities that can be used by local strategic action. Park initiators tried various models before focusing on the RNP instrument ("forum shopping"; von Benda-Beckmann 1981).

Third, the case study shows that the creation of an RNP cannot take place without *respecting existing local institutions*, but it also needs to overcome their limits. Existing structures offer different sources of legitimacy to the Park initiative (tradition, deep-rootedness of regional landscapes, competence, etc.). Simultaneously they are defending their position and are reluctant to delegate any competencies to the new Park. The question remains open whether too much respect for the position of all existing actors is not detrimental to the goals of an RNP. What seems to be a weakness (lack of command and control power) can also become a strength in a complex social environment where users of the physical basis potentially have the power to veto landscape conservation measures (e.g., through their property titles). It seems therefore essential to work with them rather than against them.

Finally, the Chasseral case study shows the importance of creating an *open platform* enabling social learning. Through the long institution-building process over more than 10 years, the position of the actors involved in the process changed. The development of a “sense of ownership” toward the Park led to a modification of the actors’ roles. A shift in the position of the different actors led them to become landscape providers. The actors create the Park, but the Park also modifies the actors in their intimate relationship with the resource.

## Conclusion

The discussion of the case study presents the necessary material to revisit the question of whether RNPs a form of neoliberal governance leading to weaker protection of the weakest actors – landscape viewers – in favor of economic forces, or whether they lead to their increased protection through improved landscape management.

My analysis offers a nuanced view of general interpretations of RNP instruments. Of course, RNP policies promote competition among regions. By supporting only the “best” projects, such policies tend to support those regions that already have enough resources to prepare the most convincing projects, thereby reinforcing inequalities in regional development. RNP policies also promote new forms of State intervention through soft law, whereby actors who choose to comply with requirements are rewarded with a designation. RNPs do not erase power differences between landscape users. In fact, they do very little to address power discrepancies between landscape providers and landscape viewers except requiring that they exchange with one another. Of course, RNPs pursue the objective of reconciling regional development and landscape conservation, which is akin to fitting a square peg into a round hole.

All of these issues are clear in this case study. However, the most interesting findings are likely found elsewhere. Local actors were able to react to ongoing debates surrounding federal legislation revisions, they identified opportunities that the new RNP represented in terms of the management of “their” resource, they convinced other competing resource users to attempt to obtain the new designation, and they used the platform provided by the new RNP to defend their agendas.

RNPs are the result of a top-down definition process, but they call for the creativity of the local actors to give substance to the project. It appears to be rather a mark of realism not to try imposing a nationwide one-fit-all solution. By so doing, the national State recognizes that all regions are different, that the process of convincing local actors is arduous, but necessary, that landscape conservation cannot only be imposed from the top. Through the Park designation, the national State can prevent particular interests from behaving hegemonically. Because cantons and municipalities are

required to financially contribute to the Park initiative as well, the national level achieves a distribution of costs that work in its favor, but it also increases the involvement of its cantonal and local partners. This leads to more communication and corresponding institutional innovation (e.g., Chasseral RNP organization).

In countries where property rights are strongly protected, a common sense of ownership to the landscape resource needs to emerge in order to counteract the action of individual users of the material basis of landscapes. RNPs achieve this by encouraging them to become landscape providers as well. This encourages them to promote landscape quality in their daily landowner strategies, e.g., paying attention to building quality, avoiding erosion, toleration of visitors on their parcels, etc. In other words, they are requested to internalize the costs of the potential negative effects of their actions on the landscape by providing compensatory measures. This has the positive side effect that they contribute to sustainability. The sense of ownership for the new Park institutions results in a sense of ownership for the landscape and indirectly leads to increased sustainability.

RNPs are the result of a national soft law project, but they do not contribute to a withdrawal or rollback of the State, as no deregulation took place. They provide the necessary incentives for landscape actors to focus on their common interests. (After all, many viewers also want to see farmland, forests, and functioning local economies.) The constitutionality approach encourages the analyst to appreciate the creativity and efficacy of local power allocation and to address consequences in the presence of higher-level changes in incentive structures. Delving into the contingency as well as complexities of local actors’ strategies prevents homogenous understandings of complex problems.

**Acknowledgements** I wish to thank Jill Belsky for her helpful comments on an early draft of this manuscript. Anonymous reviewers of this manuscript also provided very useful insights.

## Compliance with Ethical Standards

**Conflict of Interest** The author declares that he has no conflict of interest.

## References

- Agrawal A. (2005). *Environmentality: Technologies of government and the making of subjects*, Duke University Press, Durham.
- Appleton J. (1996). *The experience of landscape*, Wiley, New York.
- Bayart, J.-F. (2008). Comparing from below. *Sociétés politiques comparées*, No 1, 01/2008.
- Bean M. J. (2006). The endangered species act under threat. *Bio Science* 56(2): 98.

- Borrini-Feyerabend G., Pimbert M., Farvar M. T., Kothari A., and Renard Y. (2004). Sharing power: Learning-by-doing in co-management of natural resources throughout the world, IUCN, Gland.
- Chételat J., Kalbermatten M., Lannas K. S. M., Spiegelberger T., Wettstein J. B., Gillet F., Peringer A., and Buttler A. (2013). A contextual analysis of land-use and vegetation changes in two wooded pastures in the Swiss Jura Mountains. *Ecology and Society* 18(1): 39.
- Cosgrove D. (1995). *Habitable earth: Wilderness, empire, and race in America*. In Rothenberg D. (ed.), *Wild ideas*, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, pp. 27–41.
- Cosgrove D. (1998). *Social formation and symbolic landscape*, University of Wisconsin Press, Madison.
- Cosgrove D. (2003). Landscape and the European sense of sight – Eyeing nature. In Anderson K., Domosh M., Pile S., and Thrift N. (eds.), *Handbook of cultural Geography*, Sage, London, pp. 249–268.
- Council of Europe (2000). *European landscape Convention*, Council of Europe, Strasbourg.
- Droz Y., Mieville-Ott V., Forney J., and Spichiger R. (2009). *Anthropologie politique du paysage*, Karthala, Paris.
- Egli, H.-R. (1991). Entwicklung der Siedlungsstruktur im Vallon de St-Imier seit 1800. In *Geographische Gesellschaft Bern* (ed.), *Der Berner Jura* (Volume 57), Bern, pp. 127–142.
- Flückiger A., Morand C.-A., and Tanquerel T. (2000). Évaluation du droit de recours des associations de protection de l'environnement, OFEFP, Berne.
- Foucault M. (1978). Sécurité, territoire, population. In *Cours au Collège de France (1977–1978)*, Gallimard, Paris.
- Gerber J.-D. (2016). The managerial turn of municipal spatial planning in Switzerland. *Toward land policy? Planning Theory & Practice* 17(2): 192–209.
- Gerber J.-D., and Knoepfel P. (2008). The Swiss regional nature parks. *Mountain Research and Development* 28(2): 110–115.
- Gerber J.-D., Rodewald R., and Knoepfel P. (2007). The sustainable management of the landscape. *Journal of alpine research* 95(3): 64–74.
- Gerber J.-D., Knoepfel P., Nahrath S., and Varone F. (2009). Institutional resource regimes. *Ecological Economics* 68: 798–809.
- Gerber J.-D., Nahrath S., Csikos P., and Knoepfel P. (2011). The role of Swiss civic corporations in land-use planning. *Environment & Planning A* 43: 185–204.
- Grove R. H. (1995). *Green imperialism: Colonial expansion, Tropical Island Edens, and the origins of environmentalism, 1600–1860*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
- Hale C. R. (2005). Neoliberal Multiculturalism. *PoLAR* 28(1): 10–28.
- Haller T. (ed.) (2010). *Disputing the floodplains*, Brill, Leiden.
- Haller T. (2013). *The contested floodplain*, Lexington/Rowman & Littlefield, Lanham.
- Haller T., Acciaioli G., and Rist S. (2016). Constitutionality: Conditions for crafting local ownership of institution-building processes. *Society & Natural Resources* 29: 68–87.
- Hammer T. (2007). Protected areas and regional development. In Mose I. (ed.), *Protected areas and regional development in Europe*, Ashgate, Aldershot, pp. 21–36.
- Harvey D. (1982). *The limits to capital*, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, Chicago.
- Hughes O. E. (2003). *Public management and administration: An introduction*, Palgrave Macmillan, New York.
- Hunziker M., Felber P., Gehring K., Buchecker M., Bauer N., and Kienast F. (2008). Evaluation of landscape change by different social groups. *Mountain Research and Development* 28(2): 140–147.
- IUCN (1994). *Guidelines for protected areas management categories*, IUCN, Gland.
- Jessop B. (2002). Liberalism, neoliberalism, and urban governance. *Antipode* 34(3): 452–472.
- Knoepfel P., Larrue C., Varone F., and Hill M. (2007). *Public policy analysis*, Policy Press, Bristol.
- Li T. M. (2007). *The will to improve: Governmentality, development, and the practice of Politics*, Duke University Press, Durham.
- Linder W. (1994). *Swiss Democracy*, St. Martin's Press, New York.
- McCarthy J. (2006). Neoliberalism and the Politics of alternatives. *Annals of the Association of American Geographers* 96(1): 84–104.
- Mitchell D. (2003). Dead labor and the political economy of landscape – California living, California dying. In Anderson K., Domosh M., Pile S., and Thrift N. (eds.), *Handbook of cultural Geography*, Sage, London, pp. 233–248.
- Mose I., and Weixlbaumer N. (2007). A new paradigm for protected areas in Europe? In Mose I. (ed.), *Protected areas and regional development in Europe*, Ashgate, Aldershot, pp. 3–19.
- Müller H. (2008). *Freizeit und Tourismus*, FIF-Verlag, Bern.
- Neumann R. P. (1995). Ways of seeing Africa. *Ecumene* 2: 149–170.
- Neumann R. P. (1998). *Imposing wilderness*, University of California Press, Berkeley.
- North D. (1990). *Institutions, institutional change and economic performance*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
- Osborne D., and Gaebler T. (1992). *Reinventing government: How the entrepreneurial spirit is transforming the public sector*, Plume, New York.
- RNP Chasseral (2012). *Charte 2012–2021*. Version dated 03/29/2012. RNP Chasseral, St-Imier.
- Roberts S. M., Jones J. P., and Fröhling O. (2005). NGOs and the globalization of managerialism: A research framework. *World Development* 33(11): 1845–1864.
- Scholz R., and Tietje O. (2002). *Embedded case study methods: Integrating quantitative and qualitative knowledge*, Sage Publications, Thousand Oaks.
- Swiss Federal Council (2005a). *Botschaft zur Teilrevision des Natur- und Heimatschutzgesetzes 05.027*, dated 02/23/2005, Bern.
- Swiss Federal Council (2005b). *Botschaft über die Neue Regionalpolitik 05.080 (NRP)*, dated 11/16/2005, Bern.
- Turner J. (1979). *The Politics of landscape: Rural scenery and Society in English Poetry, 1630–1660*, Blackwell, Oxford.
- UNESCO (1996). *Biosphere reserves: The Seville strategy and the statutory framework of the world network*, UNESCO, Paris.
- von Benda-Beckmann K. (1981). Forum shopping and shopping forums. *Journal of Legal Pluralism and Unofficial Law* 13(19): 117–159.
- Weber M. (1968). *Economy and society*, Bedminster Press, New York.
- Yin R. K. (2009). *Case study research*, Sage, Los Angeles.
- Zimmermann E. W. (1951). *World resources and industries*, Harper and Brothers, New York.