Legal Fees and Lawyers’ Compensation

Emons, Winand (2017). Legal Fees and Lawyers’ Compensation. In: Parisi, Francesco (ed.) The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics: Volume 3: Public Law and Legal Institutions 3 (pp. 247-258). Oxford: Oxford University Press 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199684250.013.42

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This paper analyzes and compares different forms of attorney compensation, namely contingent, conditional, and hourly fees. Our focus is on the risk-sharing and incentive aspects these dif-ferent contractual forms give rise to. We find that depending on the special circumstances of the relationship between the attor-ney and his client each contractual form has its virtues. Our message is, therefore, that there should be freedom of contract between the client and her lawyer: let them choose the contrac-tual form that best suits their interests and the special features of their relationship.

Item Type:

Book Section (Encyclopedia Article)

Division/Institute:

03 Faculty of Business, Economics and Social Sciences > Department of Economics

UniBE Contributor:

Emons, Winand

Subjects:

300 Social sciences, sociology & anthropology > 330 Economics

ISBN:

978-0-19-968425-0

Publisher:

Oxford University Press

Language:

English

Submitter:

Winand Emons

Date Deposited:

11 May 2018 15:18

Last Modified:

11 May 2018 15:18

Publisher DOI:

10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199684250.013.42

BORIS DOI:

10.7892/boris.112857

URI:

https://boris.unibe.ch/id/eprint/112857

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