

leadership as characterised by 'extraordinary incompetence and wrong-headedness' (vol. 5, p. 504). Of the Great Powers, only Austria-Hungary, since 1879 a partner in the Dual Alliance, seemed sound and dependable, but even that relationship came with a fair share of complications. As 1885 drew to a close, a serious crisis in the Balkans had brought an end to the carefully constructed Russian-Austrian-German alliance of 1881 and the abrupt end of the Franco-German colonial *détente* had provided a painful reminder of the precariousness of the Reich's position. Looking ahead to a volatile and potentially perilous future, the old man at Friedrichsruh grew increasingly glum. God had granted him an unusual measure of blessings, Bismarck wrote to his son Bill in July 1885, and yet he had to struggle against his lack of contentment every day (vol. 6, p. 648).

Lappenküper's volumes provide the reader with a rich seam of impeccably edited material on an impressive individual who possessed a huge range of interests, modes and moods. The chronological structure of the volumes allows those who read longer passages to get a real feel for what occupied Bismarck's mind and the daily flow of business across the Chancellor's desk. The editors' decision not to provide a subject index, though, makes it hard to use these volumes to explore a particular issue—such as Bismarck's views on parliamentary systems or the continuing importance of the Anti-Socialist Law. Bismarck's colonial policy is a particularly good case in point. The topic has recently received a fair amount of attention—Winfried Baumgart's collection of 350 sources on the acquisition of German colonies between 1883 and 1885, for instance, appeared in the same year as Volume 6 of the *Neue Friedrichsruher Ausgabe*—and Lappenküper assures the reader that the newly edited documents will throw new light on it. But short of reading through the summaries of all the 563 documents which cover more than 80 pages at the beginning of each volume, there is little that a student of colonial history can do to make full use of this edition.

The *Neue Friedrichsruher Ausgabe* is surely poised to be the definitive edition of Bismarck's collected works. It is a great and indispensable resource, but the editorial committee and the publisher should seriously consider the suggestions made by almost every reviewer of these impressive volumes to date: to provide a full subject index and, even more importantly, to make the meticulous editorial work that has gone into this project available in a fully searchable, electronic format. Now that the sound of Bismarck's voice is only a mouse-click away, it is even stranger that his writings should not be accessible in a similarly up-to-date fashion.

FRANK LORENZ MÜLLER  
*University of St Andrews*

doi:10.1093/ehr/cet219

*Imperialismus vom Grünen Tisch: Deutsche Kolonialpolitik zwischen wirtschaftlicher Ausbeutung und 'zivilisatorischen' Bemühungen*, by Hartmut Pogge von Strandmann (Berlin: Christoph Links Verlag, 2009; pp. 526. €49.90).

The short-lived German colonial empire has recently made a striking comeback as an important topic of the German research agenda. The current interest in German colonial history is partly due to the new perspectives and approaches of transnational, global and new imperial history. For example,

a fast-developing scholarship is concerned with the impacts of empire and global entanglement on the metropolis and nation-building.

Hartmut Pogge von Strandmann's book is situated in a historiographical tradition that dates back somewhat further than these current approaches. In the 1960s the author was a member of Fritz Fischer's research staff before transferring to the University of Oxford where he submitted his Ph.D. on the *Kolonialrat* (Colonial Council) and taught until his retirement. The colonial historiography developed in the Federal Republic of Germany in the 1960s and 1970s was mainly concerned with the metropolitan driving forces of German Imperialism such as capitalist interest groups as well as expansionist and nationalist organisations. Strongly influenced by the 'Fischer Controversy', this research tradition at the same time engaged critically with the structures and ideologies of Imperial Germany itself.

This present monograph is on German colonial policy-making, thereby placing its main emphasis on the *Kolonialrat*—of which no systematic examination has yet been undertaken. The *Kolonialrat* was founded in 1891 and met in sessions until 1907 and again, in a slightly different form, in 1911 and 1913. It was established due to the lack of colonial officials with any practical colonial experience and was expected to take on the task of an advisory council or think-tank. Although the *Kolonialrat* was not supposed to determine colonial policy or set the political agenda, but was only expected to provide solutions to problems as they arose, it nevertheless had a growing influence on the drafting of parliamentary law and governmental orders. Its members were mainly merchants, bankers, industrial managers and missionaries, and almost all were close to parties which supported the government, came from an educated bourgeois background and were members of the *Deutsche Kolonialgesellschaft* (German Colonial Society).

The study begins with a meticulous description of the institutional history of the *Kolonialrat* and its position within the complex of colonial policy-making institutions such as the *Kolonialabteilung* (Colonial Office), the *Reichstag* (parliament), interest groups and diverse colonial and nationalist organisations. By chronologically tracing in detail the meetings and debates of the *Kolonialrat*, Pogge von Strandmann simultaneously explores institutional reforms as well as most of the important and contended issues of colonial policy in general. He points out that, through the decisive support of the colonial office, the *Kolonialrat* contributed much towards abolishing the civil-military dualism within the colonial administration and helped to put the colonial troops under civil authority. The latter was a striking break with the tradition of conservative military policy in Imperial Germany. The *Kolonialrat* also strongly recommended the more professional education of the colonial officers.

As a result of the dominance of members with an economic background, most of the debates in the sessions of the *Kolonialrat* revolved around the interests of the European plantation economy and charter companies and thus were related to land issues, African labour, military security and the colonial infrastructure. Most resolutions demanded government investment in infrastructure as well as development of the colonial state for exploitation. The members shared a racist attitude of civil superiority and the few humanist voices were always outnumbered by unscrupulous European economic interests.

The author neither engages with the complexity of colonial rule and African agency nor with the impact of these factors on the metropolis. At times, the reader senses he or she has travelled back to the historiographical concerns of the 1960s and '70s. Only in his final chapter does Pogge von Strandmann take up the current debate on the continuity of German colonialism in National Socialism, especially in the context of expansionism in Eastern Europe. Nevertheless, the study offers some new insights into German colonial policy-making and is based on a wide range of under-used and interesting source material. Pogge von Strandmann's wide survey presents a detailed and extensive examination of the founding of the *Kolonialrat* and of its tasks and position.

T. BÜHRER

*University of Bern/SOAS, University of  
London/German Historical Institute London*

doi:10.1093/ehr/ctt199

*A Kingdom United: Popular Responses to the Outbreak of the First World War in Britain and Ireland*, by Catriona Pennell (Oxford: Oxford U.P., 2012; pp. 308. £65).

The way in which historians have depicted British responses to the outbreak of the First World War has changed markedly over recent years. An image once dominated by enthusiastic crowds cheering the coming of war and hastening to recruiting offices to get at the enemy has been replaced by a more nuanced picture in which reactions evolved through the summer of 1914 and varied geographically and demographically. Alongside Jean-Jacques Becker's work on France and Jeffrey Verhey's on Germany, chapters and articles by Adrian Gregory and Niall Ferguson have shown that the evidence in the UK supports a more complex and less 'enthusiastic' view, which Catriona Pennell fleshes out in this monograph. Fitting well with this growing canon of work, Pennell's study may not provide many great surprises to those who have followed the debate in recent years (though she does provide interesting details, analyses, and insights), but it should become the first port of call for those who are new to the subject or who want more detail than individual previous works have provided.

The responses Pennell describes form a complex picture of shock turning into acceptance of, and support for, the war. This is not to say that there was not any 'enthusiasm' of the type that the crowds at Buckingham Palace seemed to display, merely that this did not represent the dominant response across the nation's more than forty million inhabitants. After the shock of the declaration of war, Britons largely steeled themselves to the task ahead, reassured that, by defending 'poor little Belgium' and fighting German militarism, they were on the side of right and honour—particularly when refugees and stories of atrocities arrived from the Continent. Most people were convinced that the nation's cause was right and that the enemy were wrong, evil and dishonourable; these notions helped to rally people to the war effort but they made Britishness exclusive, creating internal enemies of German citizens or sympathisers (or those rumoured to be either) and those who did not take on their share of the sacrifice necessary to win the war.