

If there is disagreement among the participants on particulars, there is some agreement on larger issues. Until the late nineteenth century the Habsburg monarchy provided a framework for economic growth, expansion of the social structure, and cultural growth that benefited all of East Central Europe. After that time, under conditions created by forces that the monarchy helped to generate and organize, in part by the Compromise of 1867, the traditional sociopolitical foundations of the Habsburg monarchy and the compromise itself became obstacles to a more equitable diffusion of economic growth as well as to fully differentiated modern social structures. Most of the participants agree that the dissolution of the monarchy was inevitable, not according to any abstract notion of historical inevitability, but only within the context of comparative and systematic studies of European social-historical development. In this context the question of the inevitability of the monarchy's dissolution is shorn of its recriminatory overtones.

We are indebted to the editors and to the Slovakian Academy of Sciences for making the papers of the conference available to a larger readership, by which I mean not only historians of the Habsburg monarchy and East Central Europe, but all historians and social scientists interested in the process of "national awakening" among small nationalities, the transition from economically underdeveloped to economically developed societies, and the problem of coordinating national societies with international or transnational organizations. All of these are now global problems, for the investigation of which these papers provide comparative instances. The value of the volume is enhanced by a list of newspapers and periodicals mentioned in the papers and discussions and by an index of names of historical personages and authors. In view of its merits, the large number of typographical errors and typographically garbled sentences may be regarded as simply annoying. The editors and the printers faced a formidable task in producing a book of essays in four languages: German (21), English (10), French (8), and Russian (3).

Robert Musil observed that "the mysteries of dualism are at least as difficult to understand as those of the Trinity." The essays in this volume leave the mysteries of the Trinity un-

touched, but they do illumine those of the Compromise of 1867.

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YVES COLLART. *Le parti socialiste suisse et l'Internationale, 1914-1915: De l'Union nationale à Zimmerwald*. (Publications de l'Institut Universitaire de Hautes Études Internationales, Number 49.) Geneva: [the Institut;] distrib. by Librairie Droz, Geneva. 1969. Pp. xi, 373. 60 fr. S.

Collart's study asks why the truce of 1914 was broken only a year later, especially by people who had supported it with full conviction in 1914. He carefully analyzes all previous research theses, checks them on the basis of any and all available sources, rejects previous theses, and carefully justifies his reasons for new interpretations. The most important point is the meaning that Collart attributes to the Conference of Lugano, which was neglected in previous research. In this conference he perceives the indispensable connection for the transition from the truce to Zimmerwald. Collart's inquiry proceeds in three stages: an analysis of the truce, an assessment of the motives and the consequences of the Conference of Lugano, and the question why the change of climate took place in 1915, manifesting itself in the Zimmerwald Conference. The author attempts to show to what extent such decisions are determined by historical constants (constants of national and international development) and where and why certain variables are decisive for the choice of a specific course.

According to Collart the *salto mortale* of the Swiss truce of 1914 differs from that executed by the Social Democrats of the belligerent countries. It was justified more rationally than emotionally. It was dictated by the concern for the food supplies of a country largely cut off from international supply lines. With respect to Lugano Collart considers the duty of a small, neutral state, spared by the war, to work for peace and restitution of the International to have been the main motive for the turnabout that led from the truce to Zimmerwald. Collart is correct in concentrating not merely on the fact of this change but in inquiring after the tortuous ways and the various tempi by which it took place. The author is undoubt-

edly justified in selecting Robert Grimm as the key figure involved in this change of climate and in attempting to throw light on his career, hitherto not at all well known. Collart nails Grimm on the formula that the struggle for international peace is identical with forcing the national class struggle. I rather doubt that the change can be explained in so monocausal a fashion. Insofar as the truce was motivated by the material safeguards of the Swiss workers, it must have lost its *raison d'être* to the same degree that the working masses were pauperized and proletarianized by the unsolved distribution problem.

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BRIAN PULLAN. *Rich and Poor in Renaissance Venice: The Social Institutions of a Catholic State, to 1620*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. 1971. Pp. x, 689. \$13.50.

Drawing upon a staggering amount of archival material Pullan organizes his book around three institutions that dealt with poor relief in Renaissance Venice—lay religious societies, hospitals, and moneylending. First he traces the development of the Scuole Grandi from their thirteenth-century beginnings as flagellant societies to their prestigious status as quasi-public charitable institutions. By the fourteenth century each Scuola consisted of two orders, the poor brethren who received charity and performed the devotional acts of the society, including ceremonial scourging, and the rich nonflagellating brothers who dispensed charity and took part in the pageantry of public festivals. Typically Venetian, the Scuole offered something for almost everyone—religious merit and social prestige for the rich non-nobles who ran them, charity for the respectable poor who did the work, and, as always, support for the state, for the Scuole loaned money to the treasury and provided rowers for the galleys. Only the truly unfortunate were overlooked—prostitutes, beggars, vagrants, and needy foreigners who were, literally, outcasts, for they had no access to the all-important charitable societies. Hospital care, the subject of Pullan's second section, was likewise unavailable to them, since the responsibility for institutional care was left to private societies, which natu-

rally favored their own members. By the late fifteenth century, however, the swelling numbers of war refugees, syphilitics, and sufferers of plague and famine were forcing the attention of state officials and high churchmen. Pressed by her enemies Venice was anxious to earn divine protection by charitable acts, while Franciscan preachers and Christian humanists alike were bringing the claims of the poor and the unfortunate to public consideration. Besides, there was a perceived threat of public disorder if the poor were not regulated and provided for. On the whole the effort was to direct the poor into socially useful occupations. This led to a distinction between the deserving poor and the incorrigibly idle. In some ways the new poor laws of the sixteenth century replaced the older benign neglect with harsh treatment—Tawney's "new medicine for poverty" was not exclusively a Puritan discovery.

In the third section Pullan studies the Venetian experience with that typically late medieval remedy for poverty, the provision of cheap credit. While most of her neighbors were establishing public loan funds, the famous *Monti di Pietà*, Venice continued to favor another common medieval expedient, the licensing of Jewish moneylenders. Jews could also be tithed, taxed, and intermittently shaken down for contributions to the fisc. This inevitably caused them to pass the cost of doing business on to the consumer in the form of high interest rates; but after 1573, apparently to celebrate the victory of Lepanto, the Venetians hit upon the expedient of forcing the Jews to maintain a non-profit loan bank for needy borrowers, a kind of Jewish *Monte di Pietà*. This was not a sign of greater Venetian sympathy for the poor but rather that the state's relentless squeezing of the Jews had so dried up Jewish capital that it was no longer a significant factor to the treasury, so what was left could be diverted to loans for the poor.

Pullan's book suffers from lack of focus and excessive detail but it contributes much new material not only for the subject of poor relief but also for the history of Venetian piety, social and political organization, and the treatment of the Jews. With respect to its place in the current lively discussion of the origins of early modern philanthropy, it comes down on the side of continuity. Pullan shows that in