they formed a majority. Taken together these books are instructive of both the possibilities and the limitations of reconstructing the Huguenot world.

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In his very clearly organized book C. Kampmann reconstructs the long-lasting debate about the concept of the *arbiter* in European politics from the sixteenth to the early eighteenth centuries. Whereas the pope, based on his spiritual leadership, had been the classical *arbiter orbis christiani* during the Middle Ages, he withdrew in the sixteenth century to the position of a mere political *mediator*. Thus he fuelled the reluctance against the *potestas ecclesiae indirecta in temporalibus*, especially pronounced by Calvinists and royalists engaged in the religious wars in France. These authors rather styled the French king Henry IV as the new *Arbitre de la Chrétienté* for having pacified France. This idea became a guideline in French foreign policy in the seventeenth century. Most French authors designed the ideal *arbiter* as a very powerful and morally supreme king representing the ruler’s traditional virtues – wisdom, loyalty to treaties, love for peace – and attributed these qualities to the French kings from Henry IV to Louis XIV. But public opinion changed in the 1670s. After Louis XIV’s aggression against the Netherlands and the Empire, Dutch and German authors perceived the French idea of universal peace guaranteed by the king of France actually as the disguised claim for universal monarchy. Linking the concept of *arbiter* with the older English view that the king of England was *the bolder of the balance of Europe* they promoted William III as the new *arbiter of Europe*. After 1710 the *arbiter* disappeared from European political debates especially because the means of peacemaking changed. Peace treaties were no longer imposed by a powerful *arbiter*, but negotiated at peace congresses by all parties involved. Conflicts were no longer considered to be justly solvable, but just to be evenly balanced.

Kampmann’s results are based on 402 mostly panegyric or polemic pamphlets in Latin, French, English or German (and two in Italian, but none in Dutch). Moreover he offers some archival evidence that the concept of *arbiter* influenced French and English diplomatic strategies. Yet he only occasionally refers to the kings’ real activities as *arbiters* in international conflicts and he does not really link them with the discourse. So he neglects to explain, for example, why the Emperor or the king of Spain never were subjects of this discourse. In addition, his frequent use of the term ‘Öffentlichkeit’ (‘public sphere’) which appears in many combinations (‘English’, ‘French’, ‘European’, ‘learned’, ‘political’) lacks conceptional and empirical treatment: did the pamphlets have any echo in the periodical press? How were the relations between official propaganda and oppositional pamphleteering? By neglecting these aspects, Kampmann risks limiting his well-written story of the *arbiter* to the realm of courtly panegyric and diplomatic rhetoric.

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