Playing the Vertical Power Game. The Impact of Local Authorities in Cantonal Parliaments on the Financing of Special Schools

Arnold, Tobias (2017). Playing the Vertical Power Game. The Impact of Local Authorities in Cantonal Parliaments on the Financing of Special Schools. Swiss Political Science Review, 23(2), pp. 116-143. Wiley 10.1111/spsr.12247

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This study analyses the effect of local authorities in the Swiss cantonal parliaments on the allocation of special school costs. The empirical findings show that a higher share of local authorities in the cantonal legislature leads to a higher share of special school costs borne by the cantonal authorities. The effect is stronger for mayors compared to all members of local governments. Hence, mayors have a strong connection with their home municipality and use the political power of the accumulation of mandates for shifting undesirable costs from the local up to the cantonal level. This specific finding does not depend on the overall national constitutional framework, as the introduction of the NFA (Neuer Finanzausgleich) – in the course of which the federal state fully withdrew from financing special schools ‐ has not changed the magnitude of this effect.

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