

Defending a Kantian Conception of Duties to Self and Others

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In her article, “Perfection, Happiness, and Duties to Self,” Diane Jeske attempts to revive the philosophical discussion concerning the notion of duties to self and duties to others “by showing the interest of Kant’s view on the topic and by showing how we can build on and modify Kant’s suggestions.”¹ Specifically, Jeske claims to modify and build on Kant’s view in order to justify her three notions of direct duties, which she apparently takes to be insufficiently justifiable on purely Kantian grounds. She essentially argues that, by itself, Kant’s view is ill-suited to deal with specific aspects of duties to self and to others. As a result, Jeske uses an amalgamation of her view and Kant’s view to justify three types of duties: a duty to promote the perfection of others, a duty to promote the happiness of only our own intimates such as our friends and family members, and a duty to promote the happiness of our future selves.

The support Jeske offers for each of her three notions of duties represents an unnecessary divergence from Kant’s unamended ethical position. In order to accurately correct Jeske’s position regarding the supposed inability of Kant’s ethical position to adequately deal with specific aspects of duties to self and others, we must consider the relationship between Kant’s conceptions of virtue and happiness within the context of the highest good. The thesis to be defended here is that by examining Kant’s un-amended position regarding the relation between virtue and happiness within the context of the highest good, we are able to gain a clear understanding of Kant’s conception of the duties of self-perfection and beneficence, which can then be used to correct Jeske’s use of Kant’s work on ethics to help justify her three types of duties.

1. Jeske’s Justification of Her Three Duties

Jeske clearly states that her view accords with Kant’s view in places and is contrary to Kant’s view in others. The main focus of her discussion is to

build on and modify Kant's view in such a way as to support the specific types of duties that she proposes. With this goal in mind, Jeske offers an amalgam of Kant's view and her own view to justify her three specific types of duties.

Jeske begins defending her first type of duty, a duty to promote the perfection of others, by indicating that categorical imperatives issue in duties that apply to all moral agents. She states, "categorical imperatives are those that command some action regardless of the contingent subjective states of the agent...categorical imperatives can also be tied to the promotion of objective value. If a state of affairs is objectively valuable, then any agent in a position to do so has reason to promote that state of affairs; i.e., there is an agent-neutral reason to promote it. So an agent having an agent-neutral reason to promote a state of affairs is independent of her wanting to bring about that state of affairs. She ought to have that state of affairs as one of her ends."²

Jeske maintains that categorical imperatives are duties that apply to all moral agents and thereby supply all moral agents with a reason for action. The reason for action, here, is agent-neutral because it aims at an objectively valuable end; and since the end is objectively valuable, all moral agents should adopt it as their own, individual end. One such objectively valuable end, Jeske claims, is the well-being of human beings.³ While Jeske does not take up the task of defining human well-being, she does indicate that it involves the perfection of our natures, experiencing some pleasures or, at the least, the avoidance of pain and suffering, and the fulfillment of basic human needs.⁴ This conception of human well-being is objective insofar as it allows agents to evaluate the well-being of others from an agent-neutral position independent of their individual subjective tastes and desires.⁵ Thus, according to Jeske, "there is a categorical imperative requiring us to promote the well-being of ourselves and of others, where well-being is partially constituted by perfection of our rational and moral natures."⁶

We can see how Jeske is able to draw the conclusion that we have a duty to promote the perfection of others. She concludes that all agents have a categorical duty to promote the perfection of their own rational moral natures and the rational moral natures of others, since all agents have the categorical duty to promote as an objective end the well-being of humanity, and human well-being is partially constituted by the perfection of the rational and moral nature of ourselves and others. Jeske ends her justification for this type of duty by saying, "And so we can agree with Kant that we have duties to ourselves to promote our own perfection. But we have not seen a reason to deny that we also have duties to others to promote their perfection."⁷ Jeske is apparently successful in arguing that

we can build on and modify Kant's position to support the claim that we have a duty to not only promote our own moral and rational perfection but also the moral and rational perfection of others.

Among the constituents of well-being, Jeske includes pleasure, which she takes to be the defining characteristic of happiness. Siding with her interpretation of Kant, Jeske maintains that happiness is a purely subjective end, since it is up to an individual to determine what will make her happy. Consequently, Jeske thinks that well-being has a subjective aspect, happiness, because it involves experiencing pleasure of some sort. However, she maintains that we only have a duty to promote the well-being of humanity, particularly the perfection of natures and the fulfillment of basic needs of ourselves and others, which need not be the subjective end of happiness.⁸ This seems reasonable, since it is highly probable that if our individual basic needs are met and we are allowed to freely pursue the perfection of our own natures, then we will experience happiness along the way.

To support her second type of duty, a duty to promote the happiness of only our own intimates, Jeske argues that while we have a direct, positive duty to promote the well-being of all agents, we do not have a direct, positive duty to promote the happiness of all others, since such an end is merely subjective and thereby cannot be a dictate of the categorical imperative.⁹ However, if the other person in question is an individual's best friend, the individual should take the best friend's subjective ends as a reason for action, since friendship requires us to promote the subjective ends of our friends.¹⁰ Jeske contends: "I have duties to promote the happiness of certain other persons, namely my intimates: my friends and family members, at the least...to whatever extent my doing so does not conflict with my promotion of their well-being."¹¹ According to Jeske, then, we have a direct duty to promote the subjective ends of our own intimates, their happiness in particular, and this duty stems from the intimate relationship we have with them.

Regarding her third type of duty, a duty to promote our own future happiness, Jeske refers to Kant's claim that we cannot have a direct duty to promote our own happiness because each of us, due to our animal natures, naturally has our own happiness as an end, and we cannot have a duty to pursue an end that we naturally tend toward.¹² However, Jeske indicates: "we can notice that even if we are all inclined to promote our own present happiness, it is surely not the case that we are all inclined to promote our own future happiness. The happiness of myself at sixty is something that I may completely neglect or even hinder by smoking, drinking, and laziness."¹³ Jeske is apparently making the following argument. First, while we may have a natural inclination to promote our

own present happiness, we do not have a natural inclination to promote our individual future happiness. Second, since we have a duty to promote the happiness of our intimates and we individually have a more intimate relationship with ourselves than any others, and we are not naturally inclined to promote our own future happiness, we can conclude that we have a duty to promote our own future happiness.

In summation of her position, Jeske indicates that her aim is to revive the philosophical discussion concerning the notion of duties to self and to others by demonstrating how we can both build on and modify Kant's position regarding such duties. In so doing, Jeske offers justification for three types of direct duties: a duty to promote not only our own individual perfection but also that of others, a duty to promote the happiness of only our own intimates, and a duty to promote the happiness of our future selves.

2. Kant's Conception of Obligatory Ends, Happiness, and the Highest Good

Let us examine particular aspects of Kant's ethical position that are directly related to Jeske's position: Kant's conceptions of obligatory ends and happiness. Furthermore, to adequately understand the Kantian duties to self and others, let us also consider the relation between virtue and happiness within the context of the highest good.

Kant contends that a good will is the supreme good for human beings. While a good will is the supreme good and the only good without qualification, it is not the only end that moral agents ought to seek. There are other ends that we are morally obligated to pursue, which means that they are also duties, and the ends we ought to adopt must be established according to moral principles.¹⁴ As a result, obligatory ends are to be determined not by inclination, but solely by the moral law. What ends other than the development of a good will do all agents have a duty to adopt? According to Kant, we have a duty to adopt the following ends as our own ends: the end of self-perfection, the end of the happiness of others, and the end of actualizing the highest good.¹⁵

These three types of ends involve imperfect duties, since the maxims of ends implicated here do not prescribe specific actions, only the adoption of a purpose or end. For Kant, there are two general categories of duty, perfect and imperfect. Perfect duties require agents to engage in specific actions or omit particular actions, and they admit of no latitude in performing such actions. Perfect duties do not afford agents the freedom to decide for themselves when and how to fulfill the duties.¹⁶ Conversely,

imperfect duties merely prescribe general ends and allow for latitude in their fulfillment. For example, agents have an imperfect duty to promote the happiness of others, but agents are granted the freedom to judge whose happiness they should promote and to what degree. This freedom should not be interpreted as permitting agents to make arbitrary exceptions when fulfilling imperfect duties. Instead, we are only permitted to “limit one maxim of duty by another (e.g., love of one’s neighbor in general by love of one’s parents).”¹⁷ As long as our freedom in pursuing obligatory ends is limited solely by competing duties, the only other requirement is that we actively contribute to the realization of obligatory ends.¹⁸

The first obligatory end to be dealt with here is the end of self-perfection, which carries with it the duty of self-perfection. In *The Metaphysics of Morals* Kant divides duties of this type into negative duties to ourselves and positive duties to ourselves. Negative duties are duties of omission, and in the context of a duty of self-perfection we are morally forbidden to act contrary to the end of our nature. We are required to preserve ourselves in the perfection of our nature.¹⁹ Positive duties are duties of commission, and in the current context we are morally commanded to engage in actions that promote the perfect our moral capacities. We are to make ourselves more perfect than nature alone has made us.²⁰

Since the end of self-perfection is an obligatory end, it is also a duty, but it is an imperfect duty, prescribing no specific actions. While we are afforded the freedom to determine for ourselves the degree to which this end is to be fulfilled, our freedom is constrained by certain perfect, negative duties. In particular, there are specific vices, which are defined as actions based on maxims that inherently contradict the moral law, associated with the end of self-perfection that are to be universally avoided. The vices to be avoided are self-murder, the unnatural use of our sexual inclinations, the consumption of food and drink in such an excess that weakens our own capacity for self-determination, lying, avarice, and false humility.²¹

The second obligatory end is that of the happiness of others, which includes both the happiness and the moral well-being of others. The associated imperfect duty here is the duty of beneficence, which Kant also divides into a positive duty and a negative duty. We have a positive duty to promote the happiness of others according to our individual means.²² We have a negative duty concerning the moral well-being of others to “refrain from doing anything that, considering the nature of a human being, could tempt him to do something for which his conscience could afterwards pain him, to refrain from what is called giving scandal.”²³

As with the duty of self-perfection, the duty of beneficence does not prescribe specific positive actions. It only requires that we actively participate in the fate of others in such a way that we promote their happiness and moral well-being.

Regarding the ends of self-perfection and the happiness of others, Kant warns, "Perfection and happiness cannot be interchanged here, so that one's own happiness and the perfection of others would be made ends that would be in themselves duties of the same person."²⁴ We may ask why it is that we cannot have direct duties to pursue our own happiness and the perfection others. The reason is that we cannot have a duty to directly pursue our own happiness, because we all have natural inclinations to seek our own happiness. Duty often conflicts with our natural inclinations, since duty requires agents to limit their natural inclinations in the pursuit of fulfilling the requirements of the moral law. Kant maintains that what we inevitably and spontaneously will "does not come under the concept of duty, which is constraint to an end adopted reluctantly. Hence it is self-contradictory to say that he under obligation to promote his own happiness with all his powers."²⁵ We may also ask why it is that we cannot have a duty to directly pursue the perfection of other agents. The answer to this involves the notion that "ought" implies "can," from which it follows that we can only be morally obligated to pursue those ends that we have the ability to pursue. Concerning the perfection of others, we cannot be morally obligated to perfect others, since we lack control over their subjective wills. Furthermore, to have a duty to control the lives of other agents so as to ensure their perfection would necessitate the usurpation of their freedom of self-determination.²⁶ Hence, we do not and cannot have a direct duty to promote our own happiness or to promote the perfection of other agents.

The third obligatory end relevant here is that of the highest good. Kant uses the term "highest good" in an ambiguous way in his ethical works. For example, in the *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals*, Kant uses "highest good" to refer to a good will, while in the *Critique of Practical Reason*, he uses the term "highest good" to refer to happiness in proportion to morality.²⁷ However, Kant states that the term "highest" can mean either supreme or perfect, and he resolves the ambiguity by referring to the good will as the supreme good and happiness in proportion to morality as the highest good.²⁸ Consequently, the highest good as an obligatory end is defined in the following way. Kant writes: "Inasmuch as virtue and happiness together constitute the possession of the highest good for one person, and happiness in the exact proportion to morality (as the worth of a person and his worthiness to be happy) constitutes that of a possible world, the highest good means the whole, the

perfect good, wherein virtue is always the supreme good, being the condition having no condition superior to it, while happiness, thought something always pleasant to him who possesses it, is not of itself absolutely good in every respect but always presupposes conduct in accordance with the moral law as its condition."²⁹

From this passage, we can see that Kant employs two conceptions of the highest good: the highest good as happiness in proportion to virtue for one person, and the highest good as happiness in the exact proportion to morality. The first can be understood as an individual obligatory end, meaning that it is our duty to promote to the best of our ability the happiness of some individuals in this world. The second can be conceived of as a social or collective obligatory end that is aimed at happiness for all agents in exact proportion to morality, which exists as a possible world.³⁰ Additionally, that conception of the highest good is the whole, perfect good and the ultimate end of morality.

While pursuing the highest good, happiness is to always be subordinated to morality. Morality must be the sole determinant of the will and the happiness sought is at all times conditioned by morality.³¹ Kant notes: "Only with this subordination is the highest good the entire object of pure practical reason, which pure practical reason must necessarily think as possible because reason commands us to contribute everything possible to its realization."³² Contrary to what was established while discussing the first two obligatory ends, we can see that we have a direct positive duty to promote to the best of our ability the happiness of all agents, including our own happiness. We must remember that the sort of happiness that is a duty to promote is not happiness as a natural end, which is unconditioned and conditionally good, but morally conditioned happiness. When directly pursuing morally conditioned happiness for ourselves and others, we are to be mindful that our respective wills ought to always be determined solely by morality.

As we saw, Jeske considers happiness to be a purely subjective notion, and she explicitly states that Kant shares such a notion of happiness. However, Jeske understands Kant to offer an opaque conception of happiness, thereby failing to help us understand the duty of beneficence.³³ A close reading of *The Metaphysics of Morals* and the *Critique of Practical Reason* suggests that Kant does in fact have a clear, robust notion of happiness. It seems reasonable to claim, as Jeske might, that Kant's conception of happiness is at times difficult to pin down and at other times seemingly confused, since he apparently uses different terms such as "well-being," "pleasure," "bliss," and "contentment" as though they are synonyms for "happiness." More importantly, if we are not able to accurately understand Kant's definition of happiness and its relationship

to morality, we will inevitably misunderstand Kant's overall moral aim not to mention our duty of beneficence, which requires us to promote the happiness of others.

While Kant does in fact have a clear notion of happiness, he may be interpreted as offering not just one but two conceptions of happiness: happiness as desire satisfaction, representing material satisfaction with what nature bestows, and happiness as contentment, representing moral satisfaction that stems from virtuous action. Such a bifurcated interpretation is ultimately incorrect, since, in the *Critique of Practical Reason*, Kant explicitly restricts the definition of happiness as referring only to sensuous gratification. He writes: "Do we not have a word to denote a satisfaction with existence, an analogue of happiness which necessarily accompanies the consciousness of virtue, and which does not indicate a [sensuous] gratification, as 'happiness' does? We do, and this word is 'self-contentment,' which in its real meaning refers only to negative satisfaction with existence in which one is conscious of needing nothing...and, so far as I am conscious of freedom in obeying my moral maxims, it is the exclusive source of an unchanging contentment necessarily connected with it and resting on no particular feeling...Sensuous contentment (improperly so called) which rests on the satisfaction of inclinations, however refined they may be, can never be adequate to that which is conceived under contentment."³⁴ To this he adds: "Thus we can understand how the consciousness of...[virtue] can produce a consciousness of mastery over inclinations and thus of independence from them and...bring forth a negative satisfaction with one's condition, i.e., contentment, whose source is contentment with one's own person....This cannot be called happiness, since it does not depend upon a positive participation of feeling."³⁵ "Happiness," then, is defined by Kant as sensuous gratification that necessarily depends upon a positive participation of feeling, whereas "self-contentment" is defined as a negative intellectual satisfaction that is necessarily dependent upon virtuous action.

For Kant, the central problem of morality consists of two, often-conflicting maxims, maxims of virtue and maxims of happiness. The main problem with aiming directly at happiness is that it essentially involves the feeling of pleasure, which itself is a faulty foundation for morality. There are two reasons that the mere feeling of pleasure cannot be the foundation of morality. Seeking pleasure never has an end, since once one desire is sated, another desire fills its place, and we can never be sure that a particular action will always result in the same pleasurable state for all individuals who engage in the action. Mere feelings cannot stand as the

foundation for morality. Instead, Kant believes, pure practical reason can be the only sound foundation for morality.³⁶

Kant considers it to be the case that the correct use of practical reason is to seek virtue by subordinating the conditional good, happiness as our natural end, to the unconditional good, the manifestation of a good will through virtuous action. To act virtuously is to autonomously assert control over our own passionate inclinations and to subordinate them to the demands of a good will. Doing so requires the application of the supreme principle of autonomy, and thus we arrive at moral principles for action. Consequently, the only sort of happiness that we can truly deserve is a sort that is conditioned by the good will, which is the indispensable condition for our worthiness to be happy.³⁷ This qualification points to the fact that our worthiness to be happy is found only in virtuous action, which, paradoxically, is the willful act of surrendering our conditional good, happiness, to the pursuit of the unconditional good, virtue.

Kant cautions us about the pitfall of allowing ourselves to cultivate reason in such a way that it aims directly at enjoying life and natural happiness. If we do, we will inevitably get caught in a vicious circle like a eudaemonist who “can hope to be happy (or inwardly blissful) only if he is conscious of having done his duty, but he can be moved to do his duty only if he foresees that it will make him happy. When the reflective man has overcome the incentives to vice and is conscious of having done his often painful duty, he finds himself in a state which could well be called happiness, a state of contentment and peace of soul in which virtue is its own reward. Now the eudaemonist says: this delight or happiness is really his motive for acting virtuously. The concept of duty does not determine his will immediately; he is moved to do his duty only through the medium of the happiness he foresees. But if he can expect this reward of virtue only from consciousness of having done his duty, then obviously, consciousness of having done his duty must come first.”³⁸

To further understand why we cannot have a direct duty to pursue our own natural end of happiness, we may consider the following possible position. It might be argued that, in a way, we have a duty to pursue natural happiness, contentment, and virtue simultaneously, since to ascetically pursue virtue may result in akratically transgressing the moral law. Some people might be tempted to claim that we have a direct duty to pursue our own natural happiness and self-contentment, because we must cultivate a pleasant disposition toward doing our duty in order to ensure that we continuously act in a virtuous manner. This position could be supported by the fact that Kant understands pleasure to be an integral component of the virtuous life: “what is not done with pleasure but merely as compulsory service has no inner worth for one who attends to

his duty in this way and such service is not loved by him; instead, he shirks as much as possible occasions for practicing virtue.... Hence the training (discipline) that a human being practices on himself can become meritorious and exemplary only through the cheerfulness that accompanies it."³⁹

While Kant apparently agrees with the notion that the feeling of happiness should accompany virtuous action, he would maintain that we have an indirect duty to pursue our own feelings of happiness and a direct duty to pursue virtue. Indirect duties are not duties per se, since they are not aimed directly at a moral end. Instead, indirect duties are aimed at a means that is valuable in pursuing a moral end. To say that we have an indirect duty to pursue our own feeling of happiness is to indicate that our own natural happiness plays an integral role as a means to the end of becoming virtuous in that being physically satisfied with our material state makes doing our duty easier than it would be without experiencing feelings of happiness.

Nevertheless, we do not have a direct duty to promote the natural end of humanity, happiness, which is always subjectively conditioned. To have a direct duty to promote happiness as the natural end of humanity would be to aim directly at promoting the feeling of pleasure. But each obligatory end is determined by the moral law. Pleasure cannot be the foundation of morality, and happiness is essentially constituted by the feeling of pleasure. Hence, we cannot have a direct duty to promote the feelings of happiness of humanity per se. If we were so obliged, it seems that in having a direct duty to promote such feelings in others, we would ultimately fail to treat humanity as an end in itself, since such a duty would compel us to maximize pleasure and thus entice others to become or continue to be slaves to their inclinations.

The following passage from *The Metaphysics of Morals* can support this view: "But a human being's duty to himself as a moral being only (without taking his animality into consideration) consists in what is formal in the consistency of the maxims of his will with the dignity of humanity in his person. It consists, therefore, in a prohibition against depriving himself of prerogative of a moral being, that of acting in accordance with principles...inner freedom, and so making himself a plaything of the mere inclinations and hence a thing."⁴⁰ Here, Kant is explicitly referring to a duty to ourselves as moral beings, which entails a duty to humanity in each of us. While a duty to humanity in our own person differs from a duty to humanity in others, the implied negative duties apply to the entire category of humanity. In particular, the negative duty specified in the passage involves a proscription against treating humanity in general as a mere means. This means that we are to always

treat humanity in all persons as an end in itself, which is to respect the inner freedom of all persons to pursue virtue. If we were to have a direct duty to promote the pleasure of others instead of their inner freedom, then we would be tempting others to shirk their moral duty to first and foremost seek virtue in favor of seeking pleasure.⁴¹ Consequently, it seems that we cannot have a direct duty to promote the mere feeling of happiness in others, since if we did have such a duty it would not be aimed directly at morality but directly at pleasure.

Here we can rely on Kant's conception of the highest good to help direct our understanding. By promoting the morally conditioned happiness of others within the context of the highest good, we are actually contributing to the realization of the highest good by helping to making the route to virtue easier for others. The highest good as happiness in proportion to virtue, then, is the final end of morality, and thereby the final end of humanity. Morally conditioned happiness as part of the highest good is included in the direct object of morality, and thus morally conditioned happiness of all agents is both an obligatory end and a direct duty.

3. A Kantian Response to Jeske

A standard reading of Kant's ethical position shows that we have a duty to promote the highest good, which can be construed to include a direct duty to promote the perfection of others. We have a duty to promote the morally conditioned happiness of others, which involves a duty to promote the happiness of our intimates as well as others in general. We also have a duty to promote our own perfection, which, in light of the highest good, can be conceived of as involving a direct duty to promote our own morally conditioned happiness.

Jeske argues that self-perfection and the perfection of others are integral parts of well-being in general, and well-being is an objectively valuable end. Since self-perfection and the perfection of others are constituents of an objectively valuable end, Jeske contends that we each have a duty to promote our own self-perfection and the perfection of others. Kant explicitly agrees with the view Jeske advances, inasmuch as all agents are charged with a duty to seek their own self-perfection, and he can be understood as implicitly agreeing with her view insofar as agents have a duty to promote the perfection of others. While we cannot have a duty to ensure the perfect others, since we lack the control over them to do so, in light of the highest good, we can conceive of having a direct duty to promote the perfection of others by doing what we can to contribute to

their moral development and by helping them to avoid the vices associated with self-perfection. We need to always act from the moral law. By helping others in this morally conditioned way, we are helping them further their freedom from inclinations, thereby both aiding the progress of individuals toward their own moral perfection and contributing to the realization of the highest good. A duty to promote the perfection of others can be understood to be included in the duty of beneficence within the context of the highest good.

While Jeske agrees with Kant that happiness is a subjective end, she thinks that we do not have a duty to promote the happiness of all others. Instead, she argues that we have a duty to promote the happiness of only people with whom we are intimate. This duty is apparently derived from the intimate relationship we have with our own family and friends. Kant would partially agree with Jeske's position here, by conceding that we have a duty to promote the morally conditioned happiness of people with whom we are intimate. However, he would disagree that we have a duty to promote the morally conditioned happiness of only people with whom we are intimate. As we have seen, Kant believes that we are morally obligated to directly and actively pursue the end of the morally conditioned happiness of others, and, in light of the highest good, we are to directly and actively pursue the morally conditioned happiness of all agents, including our own happiness.

Lastly, Jeske contends that we each have a duty to promote our individual future happiness for the following reasons. First, we do not have a natural inclination to promote our individual future happiness. Second, since we have a duty to promote the happiness of people with whom we are intimate and we individually have a more intimate relationship with ourselves than any others, we must have a duty to promote our individual future happiness. Kant implicitly agrees with the position Jeske sets out in that we each have a duty to promote our own future happiness, but for different reasons than she offers. Kant explains that a duty of self-perfection, by itself, involves an indirect duty of self-love requiring all agents to obtain things that are "essential to the cheerful enjoyment" of life.⁴² When considering the duties of self-perfection and beneficence in light of the highest good, we can conceive of all agents having a direct positive duty to actively promote the morally conditioned happiness of both their present and future selves. From a close look at the obligatory ends of self-perfection, the happiness of others, and the highest good, we can conceive of the duties of self-perfection and beneficence as involving direct duties to promote the perfection and the morally conditioned happiness of all agents.

Notes

1. Diane Jeske, "Perfection, Happiness, and Duties to Self," *American Philosophical Quarterly* 33: 3, July 1996, p. 272.
2. *Ibid.*, p. 266.
3. See *ibid.*, p. 267.
4. See *ibid.*
5. See *ibid.*
6. *Ibid.*, p. 268.
7. *Ibid.*, p. 270.
8. See *ibid.*
9. See *ibid.*
10. See *ibid.*, p. 271.
11. *Ibid.*
12. See *ibid.*
13. *Ibid.*
14. See Immanuel Kant, *The Metaphysics of Morals*, trans. Mary Gregor (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 147.
15. See *ibid.*, p. 150; also see Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Practical Reason*, trans. Lewis W. Beck, 3rd ed. (Upper Saddle River, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1993), pp. 125–126.
16. See Immanuel Kant, *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals*, trans. Mary Gregor. (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 31n.
17. Kant, *The Metaphysics of Morals*, *op. cit.*, p. 153.
18. See *ibid.*, pp. 152–156.
19. See *ibid.*, pp. 174–175.
20. See *ibid.*
21. See *ibid.*, p. 175.
22. See *ibid.*, p. 202.
23. *Ibid.*, p. 156.
24. *Ibid.*, p. 150.
25. *Ibid.*
25. See *ibid.*
27. See Kant, *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals*, *op. cit.*, p. 10; Kant, *Critique of Practical Reason*, *op. cit.* p. 117.
28. See Kant, *Critique of Practical Reason*, *op. cit.*, p. 116.
29. *Ibid.*, p. 117.
30. See *ibid.*, pp. 121–126.
31. See *ibid.*, p. 136.
32. *Ibid.*, pp. 125–126.
33. See Jeske, *op. cit.*, p. 267.
34. Kant, *Critique of Practical Reason*, *op. cit.*, p. 124.
35. *Ibid.*, p. 125.
36. See Kant, *The Metaphysics of Morals*, *op. cit.*, pp. 141–142.
37. See Kant, *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals*, *op. cit.*, p. 7.
38. Kant, *The Metaphysics of Morals*, *op. cit.*, pp. 142–143.
39. *Ibid.*, pp. 227–228.
40. *Ibid.*, p. 175.

41. See *ibid.*, pp. 156–157.

42. *Ibid.*, p. 201.

43. I would like to thank David Reidy for helpful comments on earlier drafts of this paper.