



An indisputable “holy trinity”? On the moral value of equality, diversity, and inclusion

Journal:	<i>Equality, diversity and inclusion: An international journal</i>
Manuscript ID	Draft
Manuscript Type:	Original Article
Keywords:	Diversity Management, Morality, Moral Value, Reverse Discrimination, Affirmative Action, Equality

SCHOLARONE™
Manuscripts

An indisputable “holy trinity”? On the moral value of equality, diversity, and inclusion

Introduction

Equality, diversity, and inclusion are three closely related concepts. The concept of *diversity* builds on the fact that there are numerous categories, often referred to as dimensions of diversity, that can be used to describe humans, and that humans can utilize to describe themselves. These dimensions of diversity, such as age, sexual orientation, gender, nationality, etc., can assume different shapes or manifestations; for example, being male, female, or intersex, in terms of the dimension of gender. Every human, at a given time, represents at least one manifestation of every dimension of diversity, within a given context. The vast number of shared similarities, and prevalent differences, between humans, alongside a conceptually infinite number of dimensions, represents the diversity of, for example, a given workforce, a nation, or even of humanity as a whole. Since it is often the case, in given contexts, that certain manifestations of specific dimensions are valued more highly than others, the concept of *equality* is concerned with the way in which an individual (or group) displaying specific manifestations (of any dimension of diversity) is related to that individual's (or group's) (un)equal achievements, status, or access to resources. Figurative terms that are often used in this context, in order to describe the (un)equal positioning or standing of the representatives of differing manifestations of given dimensions of diversity, are ‘hierarchy’/‘hierarchization’ or ‘marginalization’. In this context, the concept of *inclusion* refers to the way that these differing manifestations are organized alongside, for example, societal, national, or organizational hierarchies; *inclusion* can also refer to the process of (de)hierarchizing these manifestations. Most voices in the academic and practical discourse on equality, diversity and inclusion assume that a high level of inclusion is positively related to a high level of equality amongst the representatives of the differing manifestations of the

1
2
3 dimensions of diversity in question. For many, the state of equality seems to be a positive
4 condition *per se*, which is therefore worth striving for. Thus, it seems to have become an
5 imperative that diversity should be handled (or managed) in a way that promotes the highest
6 degree of inclusion and, with it, the highest degree of equality, possible. Average group
7 values over the specific manifestations of each dimension of diversity often serve as an
8 indicator for this degree. However, it would seem that, within the discourse on equality,
9 diversity, and inclusion, it is equality that holds a central position. It seemingly prescribes and
10 legitimates the way in which the inclusion of diversity should happen. The most common
11 term for attempts towards this inclusion is 'diversity management'. Literature on the moral
12 value of EDI is very scarce (Byrd, 2018; Nkomo, 2014; Oswick and Noon, 2014; Sposato *et*
13 *al.*, 2015).

14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26 Organizational or business research on EDI, which stresses its moral value, seldom reflects
27 upon the specific moral perspective taken, its underlying basic assumptions, or potential
28 points of criticism; for the most part, an everyday understanding of what might be morally
29 praise- and blameworthy is applied (e.g. Jones *et al.*, 2013). Questioning the moral value of
30 EDI would seem to be taboo, which supports the view held by Nietzsche; he, through
31 Zarathustra, compares the 'preachers of equality' with secretly vengeful 'tarantulas', hiding
32 behind the word 'justice,' whose goal is to ensure that the "'will to equality' shall henceforth
33 be the name for virtue" (Nietzsche, 1954, p. 100), whilst actually only serving their own "will
34 to power." This leads him to the dictum: "Mistrust all who talk much of their justice. [...]
35 And when they call themselves the good and the just, do not forget that they would be
36 pharisees, if only they had — power" (Nietzsche, 1954, p. 100). Nietzsche exemplifies only
37 one of many critical moral perspectives on EDI, which hitherto have been silent within the
38 academic discourse on EDI. In the same way, the moral legitimacy and value of EDI is rarely
39 expressed explicitly in this discourse, and is rarely embedded in concrete moral philosophies.

1
2
3 Although there seems to be a widespread and unquestioned consent, both in research and
4
5 practice, that there is a moral value inherent in diversity and inclusion initiatives, there is a
6
7 lack of theorizing with regard to this, as well as a lack of critically linking these initiatives and
8
9 their underlying targets with specific moral philosophies. Most research in EDI implicitly
10
11 values *equality* as something morally “good”, but this is mostly borne out of a political
12
13 conviction, and without any ethical grounding. While a considerable amount of research has
14
15 been conducted on different facets of the economic value of equality, diversity, and inclusion,
16
17 very little research has been undertaken on its moral value (e.g. Köllen, 2016; van Dijk, 2017;
18
19 van Dijk *et al.*, 2012). Therefore, this paper aims at structuring the moral perspectives in EDI
20
21 more precisely and more critically.
22
23

24 The remainder of this introductory article for the special issue of EDI on “Moral Perspectives
25
26 of Equality, Diversity, and Inclusion” is structured as follows. Firstly, we discuss the way in
27
28 which initiatives towards diversity and inclusion are justified morally in literature. We point
29
30 out the crucial position of equality, and then, secondly, we outline how the different
31
32 approaches to equality attempt to achieve moral legitimacy. Since it comprises an important
33
34 group of initiatives in this debate, we subsequently reflect upon the moral (il)legitimacy of
35
36 affirmative action. The concluding section of this article provides a brief summary of the
37
38 findings of this paper; it gives an overview of the contribution of the four papers of this
39
40 special issue to the discourse on moral perspectives of equality, diversity, and inclusion, and it
41
42 proposes streams for future research and discussions on this issue.
43
44
45
46
47

48 **Equality and the Moral “Goodness” of Initiatives towards Diversity and Inclusion**

49
50 Diversity management and related initiatives towards the inclusion of a diverse workforce are
51
52 currently a globally widespread practice amongst organizations and territorial authorities, and
53
54 the diffusion of such initiatives is still increasing (Martínez-Ariño *et al.*, 2018; Vasconcelos,
55
56 2017). Besides citing business case arguments for the implementation of these practices
57
58
59
60

1
2
3 (Heres and Benschop, 2010; Kulik, 2014; Soltani *et al.*, 2012), organizations tend to present
4 diversity management as some kind of morally ‘praiseworthy’ or ‘good’ organizational
5 practice in their internal and external communication. They “often try to project the estimated
6 ‘goodness’ of these actions onto the actors themselves, aiming at giving the company [or
7 organization] a general label of ethical ‘goodness’” (Köllen, 2016, p. 216). Often without
8 stating it explicitly, “equality” is assumed to be a crucial indicator for the degree of
9 organizational “goodness” (or even “justice”), which therefore, for many, can be seen as the
10 intended, morally praiseworthy outcome of diversity management initiatives or organizational
11 programs of “inclusion” of a diverse workforce (see e.g. Brewis, 2017).

12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22 Diversity management is, then, assumed to be “socially just and morally desirable” (Lorbiecki
23 and Jack, 2000, p. 21). Within the discourse on EDI, the “proper” management of a diverse
24 workforce has become something of a “moral imperative” (O’Leary and Weathington, 2006;
25 Vertovec, 2013). Romani *et al.* (2017) summarize this imperative as the “principle of
26 representation, social responsibility, anti-discrimination and equal treatment [accomplished
27 by] HRM practices that seek to blur, or somewhat minimise, the differences with which
28 minority groups might contribute in the name of anti-discrimination and equality of treatment
29 (the moral imperative)” (Romani *et al.*, 2017, p. 273).

30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
The assumed moral value that is ascribed to these management practices is predominantly
based on the same considerations that were, in the past, also referred to in order to legitimize
equal opportunity and affirmative action (also referred to as “positive action”, “reservation”,
or “employment equity”) programs, and to load them morally. From the standpoint of this
morality, diversity management should aim at the same goals that equal opportunity or
affirmative action (AA) initiatives did. One of these goals is adjusting the representation of
certain manifestations of certain dimension of diversity (which, in the AA context, are mainly
gender and race) on certain organizational levels, with regard to their representation in
society. With diversity management, an additional business perspective has entered the

1
2
3 discourse; however, its moral value is almost exclusively deduced from its impact (or
4 intention) in achieving some state of group-based equality. “Though arguments based on
5 organizational self-interest might well be the norm amongst advocates of diversity, in
6 principle nothing prevents diversity being argued for as a way of serving the very same moral
7 ends as equal opportunity” (Kaler, 2001, p. 59). Cox (1993) describes this phenomenon in the
8 following way:
9

10
11
12
13
14
15 “In most organizations the representation of culture groups in the overall work population,
16 and especially in the most powerful positions, is highly skewed [...which makes] equal
17 opportunity issues prominent aspects of diversity work in organizations. [...] Thus for nations
18 and organizations that subscribe to a creed of equal opportunity, a major motive for investing
19 in managing-diversity initiatives is that it is morally and ethically the right thing to do” (Cox,
20 1994, p. 10).
21

22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29 Some actors even label their diversity approach, and with it their contribution towards
30 equality and inclusion, as an element of their “responsibility” towards society or humanity,
31 and, in doing so, bestow upon themselves the quality of moral “goodness.” Its “moral grounds
32 seem to touch more directly upon inclusion (of individuals), and then, upon equality, [...] [being related to the] social responsibility of corporations [...] and eventually a more
33 egalitarian society”. (Romani *et al.*, 2017, p. 274). The category of “equality” itself, then, is
34 not called into question, and it effectively turns into a moral value in itself.
35

36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
Equality, therefore, is the (partial) goal of initiatives towards diversity and inclusion, which is
frequently assumed to be morally desirable, and which attaches moral value to the initiatives
themselves. In order to shed more light on the differing ways of attaching moral value to
“equality”, the different notions of equality will be discussed in the next section,

The Moral Legitimization of the Different Approaches towards Equality

1
2
3 Equality is mostly discussed in the form of *equality of opportunity* (Fleurbaey *et al.*, 2017),
4 *equality of outcome*, or, less frequently, *equality of treatment* (Dahlerup, 2007; Klarsfeld *et*
5 *al.*, 2016) for all employees, regardless of their diverse demographics or backgrounds.
6
7 Organizations mostly present their attempts to work towards any of these forms of equality as
8 something that is morally praiseworthy or morally good, although they only rarely accentuate
9 this as being their primary incentive (Barclays, 2002; Demuijnck, 2009; Guarnieri and Kao,
10 2008). In some cases quite explicitly (Fujimoto *et al.*, 2013), but mostly in an implicit way, a
11 state of equality is equated with a state of fairness and (social) justice (Brewis, 2017; Choi
12 and Rainey, 2014). Depending on the form or type of equality in question, this perceived
13 justice can then occur in the form of interactional justice (Bies, 2015), distributive justice
14 (Villanueva-Flores *et al.*, 2017), or procedural justice (Kim and Siddiki, 2018). In this
15 context, the moral value of equality seems to be non-disputable and irrevocable (Frankfurt,
16 1987; Westen, 1982), and the moral goodness of an organization (or at least of its values)
17 seems to be determined by the ways in which it strives for equality, and the intensity with
18 which it strives.

19
20 In terms of the idealization of equality, Kaler (2001) distinguishes between three dominant
21 positions in the discourse on equality and diversity: *weak equal opportunity*, *strong equal*
22 *opportunity*, and *equal group selection*.

23
24 Equal opportunity is about the attempt to provide one's employees with the opportunity to
25 compete "on an equal basis for unequal rewards [..., whereby the] equal basis for competition
26 provided by equal opportunity is selection of merit" (Kaler, 2001, p. 53). The merit in
27 question here is one's contribution to the organization's objectives, although the matter of
28 how these contributions can be valued in concrete terms remains open for discussion (Liff and
29 Wajcman, 1996). However, it is safe to assume that mere demographics, such as race, sexual
30 orientation, or gender *per se*, cannot be considered as being meritorious. In case the unequal
31 distribution of rewards is solely due to unequal merits, the *weak equal opportunity* approach

1
2
3 backs unequal outcomes. This approach legitimizes diversity and inclusion initiatives which
4
5 counteract selections or decisions that are based on social group-memberships, alongside the
6
7 differing dimensions of workforce diversity. However, if certain merits are inherent in certain
8
9 group-memberships or demographics, a group-related, unequal distribution of outcome is
10
11 acceptable (Kaler, 2001). Examples of meritorious characteristics are, amongst others, self-
12
13 confidence, the qualifications of individuals, commitment, aplomb, ambition, and experience.
14
15 Going one step further than the mere possession of such characteristics, the *strong equal*
16
17 *opportunity* approach also takes into account the potential of the individual to acquire them,
18
19 and to develop them further. Equal opportunities for all individuals, from this perspective,
20
21 would demand that every individual had the same full potential for acquiring them.
22
23

24
25 As group-specific barriers might impede the attempts of some individuals to acquire these
26
27 characteristics, the strong equal opportunity approach backs diversity and inclusion initiatives
28
29 which exclusively support specific groups, in order to make the members of these groups
30
31 more competitive in the struggle for unequal rewards. Such group-specific barriers are often
32
33 based on, or related to, group-specific ways of being socialized, general social stereotyping,
34
35 and, especially in the case of the dimension of gender, the way in which domestic
36
37 responsibilities are traditionally distributed (Blaine and McClure Brenchley, 2018; McMillan-
38
39 Capehart, 2005). The strong equal opportunity approach proceeds on the assumption that
40
41 work, and the definition of work-related merits, are not race-, gender-, sexual orientation-,
42
43 etc.-, neutral. Since each dimension of diversity has, from this perspective, privileged
44
45 manifestations in a given context (Acker, 2006; van Dijk *et al.*, 2017), this approach allows
46
47 remedial initiatives of diversity and inclusion. These initiatives, then, can exclusively address
48
49 and support representatives of underprivileged manifestations of the respective dimensions of
50
51 diversity; for example, black, female, foreign, or homosexual employees. The strong equal
52
53 opportunity approach, therefore, legitimizes the unequal treatment of employees, through
54
55 practices that are often rhetorically framed as *affirmative actions* or *positive actions*. This
56
57
58
59
60

1
2
3 reverse discrimination allows the provision of certain groups of employees with resources to
4 which others may not have access (Newton, 1973; Taylor, 1973). On an averaged group-
5 perspective, one result of such an approach might be the equality of outcome, but this is not
6 perform the primary goal of this approach.
7
8

9
10
11 “Equality of outcome”, in the form of achieving representativeness in all working areas and
12 on all hierarchy levels, is rather the explicit ideal/typical goal of a third approach to equality:
13 the *equal group selection* approach. “Its ideal outcome is a situation in which every workforce
14 is more or less representative of all the social groupings available to it” (Kaler, 2001, p. 53).
15 Any measure that is legitimized by the strong equal opportunity approach is also legitimized
16 in this approach, which additionally legitimizes quota systems. Focusing primarily on an
17 individual’s demographics or group membership, instead of his or her merits, (e.g. when
18 making decisions pertaining to recruitment and promotions), makes this approach, strictly
19 speaking, unrelated to “equal opportunities”; it is no longer about an equal competition for
20 scarce resources.
21
22

23
24 Approaches to equality, which emphasize the goal of representativeness, are often labelled as
25 “radical” approaches. Approaches to equality, which put an emphasis on the merits of the
26 individual, are often labelled as “liberal” approaches. This distinction was coined by Jewson
27 and Mason (1986); it is a distinction, that is often referred to as the ‘sameness-difference
28 debate’ (Greene, 2015). Intersectional perspectives utilizing this simplistic distinction
29 between radical and liberal approaches partially integrate other dimensions such as age, class,
30 and race (e.g. Acker, 2006; Berger and Guidroz, 2010), but the academic discourse on this
31 issue revolves predominantly around the dimension of gender. The very influential and oft-
32 cited paper from Liff & Wajcman (1996) exemplifies this issue. This is why, within this
33 discourse, the distribution of caring responsibilities between women and men is a central issue
34 (Leitner, 2003); this is an issue that is non-transferable to other dimensions of workforce
35 diversity.
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

1
2
3 Drawing on Kaler's (2001) classification of approaches to equality, it is the *equal group*
4 *selection* approach and, with certain qualifications, the *strong equal opportunity* approach that
5 provide legitimacy for direct intervention aiming at redistributing power and resources
6 between social groups. The most widely used term for these interventions, representing some
7 kind of positive discrimination, is affirmative actions (AA). These actions can also include
8 quotas for the differing manifestations of certain dimensions of workforce diversity.
9 However, political motivations aside, the topic of how these actions are justifiable morally
10 will now be discussed.
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21

22 **The Moral (II-)Legitimacy of Affirmative Actions**

23
24 One group of arguments in favor of affirmative actions, no matter whether they are labelled as
25 such within organizational diversity management initiatives, is related to the consequences of
26 these actions. Besides potentially positive economic consequences, other alleged positive
27 consequences of these actions are also pointed out in literature.
28
29
30
31
32

33 One line of argument in favor of organizational interventions towards redistributing resources
34 and power from "over"represented groups to "under"represented ones sees the impact of role
35 models for members of hitherto underrepresented groups as positive. Providing these groups
36 with such role models might motivate them to follow in their footsteps, or, at least, it might
37 contribute towards convincing them that their demographic *per se* is not a reason for not
38 working in a given area, or at a given level (Securius-Carr and Rohr, 2018; Singh *et al.*,
39 2006). The basic assumption of this argument is related to a second line of argument.
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47

48 This line of argument states that segregation (or "exclusion") is "bad". Segregation is any
49 state of unrepresentativeness, on whatever hierarchy level or working area, in terms of any
50 dimension of diversity. Overcoming it is seen as "good", since "that integration of racial,
51 ethnic, and other groups that mark significant lines of social inequality is a vital ideal for a
52 democratic society, necessary for its basic institutions to function successfully" (Anderson,
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

1
2
3 2010, p. X). With reference to racial segregation in US society, Anderson (2010) alleges that
4
5 “if segregation is a fundamental cause of social inequality and undemocratic practices, then
6
7 integration promotes greater equality and democracy. Hence, it is an imperative of justice. It
8
9 is also a positive good. It should appeal to us as well as command us to action” (Anderson,
10
11 2010, p. 2). Therefore, for Anderson, any race-based affirmative actions that aim at
12
13 overcoming this segregation are morally legitimate; she very much connects it with her
14
15 conviction that democracy is worth protecting, and segregation might destabilize democracy:
16
17 “Segregation of social groups is a principal cause of group inequality. It isolates
18
19 disadvantaged groups from access to public and private resources, from sources of human and
20
21 cultural capital, and from the social networks that govern access to jobs, business connections,
22
23 and political influence. It depresses their ability to accumulate wealth and gain access to
24
25 credit. It reinforces stigmatizing stereotypes about the disadvantaged and thus causes
26
27 discrimination. Segregation also undermines democracy” (Anderson, 2010, p. 2). These
28
29 arguments are intuitively comprehensible; however, they lack a clear ethical grounding.
30
31 Furthermore, they do not resolve the conflict between the standpoint that every individual
32
33 deserves the same respect, treatment, and opportunities (for whatever reason), and the fact
34
35 that these practices make the individual a prisoner of her or his demographics.
36
37

38
39 Another line of argument is less concerned with the consequences of these initiatives, but
40
41 legitimates AA as rectification for historical injustice. In the context of the US, Jarvis
42
43 Thomson (2013) morally justifies the systematic disadvantaging of white males through AA
44
45 in two ways. Firstly, the potential that they might have benefitted from policies that have
46
47 advantaged them in the past. Secondly, she derives its legitimacy from the competitive
48
49 advantage that, in her opinion, was available to white males through their higher level of
50
51 confidence, which was a product of their higher status (Jarvis Thomson, 2013). Others take
52
53 the same line by arguing that disadvantaging certain individuals because of their
54
55 demographics or group-membership is legitimate when this membership is related to certain
56
57
58
59
60

1
2
3 competitive advantages that non-members do not receive, or have not received in the past.
4
5 From this perspective, reverse discrimination seems to be justified, as being a compensation
6
7 for disadvantaging that has been experienced in the past (Boxill, 1972; Sher, 1975). Since the
8
9 group-memberships in question, (such as being female, white, transgender, and heterosexual),
10
11 have not been chosen by their members, Lippert-Rasmussen (2017) categorizes these
12
13 arguments as “innocent beneficiary argument[s] for affirmative action” (Lippert-Rasmussen,
14
15 2017, p. 74), from which its advocates derive the “putative obligations of the innocent
16
17 beneficiaries of past injustice to benefit the involuntary victims of those past injustices”
18
19 (Lippert-Rasmussen, 2017, p. 73). However, what is designated “justice” from this
20
21 perspective can only count for group-averages, since not every individual is perforce a victim
22
23 or beneficiary of historic “injustice”. Disentangling the underlying beneficiary principle (see
24
25 e.g. Butt, 2014) from the concept of luck egalitarianism, Lippert-Rasmussen (2017) shows
26
27 that “affirmative action is never required by justice because of a duty for the innocent
28
29 beneficiaries of past injustice to compensate their victims” (Lippert-Rasmussen, 2017, p. 77).
30
31
32 However, from the perspective of luck egalitarianism, striving for some kind of distributive
33
34 justice, AA can be justified on the group level, but not as a duty on the individual level
35
36 (Lippert-Rasmussen, 2017).
37
38
39
40
41

42 **Conclusion, this Special Issue, and Future Research**

43 *Conclusion*

44
45
46 Morally evaluating equality, diversity and inclusion remains an under-theorized field. Within
47
48 the discourse on equality, diversity and inclusion, the term ‘justice’ is predominantly used in a
49
50 more intuitive way, and is mostly not rooted in a specific philosophy. Just as “there is no
51
52 sound general answer to the question “is affirmative action just?”” (Lippert-Rasmussen, 2017,
53
54 p. 76), one can also not expect an indisputable answer to the question as to whether any
55
56
57
58
59
60

1
2
3 approach towards equality, diversity and inclusion is morally praiseworthy or just. However,
4
5 much more critical reflection and theorizing of the moral value (i.e., the moral ‘goodness’ or
6
7 ‘evilness’) of the differing approaches is required. Instead of implicitly applying prescriptive
8
9 ethics, which are mostly based on intuitive reasoning, or simple political convictions, future
10
11 research could enrich the discourse on the moral evaluation of diversity management,
12
13 inclusion programs, and organizational equality approaches, with new philosophical facets
14
15 and perspectives; perspectives that might differ from those taken in the predominantly
16
17 American discourse. This special issue hopes to contribute to this endeavor through the four
18
19 contributions included within it.
20

21 22 23 24 *Articles included in this Special Issue*

25
26 The article “Ethics and intercultural communication in diversity management” by Eila
27
28 Isotalus and Marja-Liisa Kakkuri-Knuuttila demonstrates the need for a radically new
29
30 approach to diversity management, which shifts the focus in diversity management on
31
32 meanings and communication. The central role of meanings should be obvious, with the
33
34 perception that all diversity categories (such as sexual orientation, race, gender, etc) are
35
36 loaded with contextually varying cultural meanings. Furthermore, these diversity categories
37
38 are neither ethically nor politically neutral, hence presenting the challenge of deconstructing
39
40 value hierarchies, detrimental both from the ethical and economic perspectives. To improve
41
42 team performance and product quality, team members need to overcome stereotypical
43
44 categorizations, and get to know each other’s methods of thinking and acting. For the
45
46 development of the dialogical skills needed to promote healthy communication practices, the
47
48 paper introduces negotiating reality dialogue developed by Ariane Berthoin Antal and Victor
49
50 Friedman. Because putting such diversity management measures into practice presupposes
51
52 both emotional and cognitive development, its challenges are discussed in terms of
53
54 Aristotelian virtue ethics.
55
56
57
58
59
60

1
2
3 The article "Justice as fairness in the workplace: A trajectory for managing diversity" by
4 Pradeepa Dahanayake, Diana Rajendran, Christopher Selvarajah, and Glenda Ballantyne
5 extends the discourse on the moral evaluation of diversity management, inclusion programs,
6 and organizational equality approaches, by introducing conceptual tools to bridge the gap
7 between literature on organizational justice and diversity management, and by the empirical
8 analysis of two cases highlighting the significance of this approach. The conceptual analysis
9 consists of, firstly, presenting four categories of workplace justice (distributive, procedural,
10 interpersonal, and informational justice) and four theories of justice (equity theory, social
11 exchange theory, and John Rawl's and Amartya Sen's theories of social justice) and,
12 secondly, discussing their relevance to diversity management. Both of the two cases consist of
13 comparing diversity practices and consequences in two organizations in Australia with the
14 help of the conceptualization of justice and fairness as described. Two organizations are
15 compared with respect to their gender pay inequity measures; the other two with respect to
16 their means of coping with cultural diversity. Significant differences between the compared
17 organizations yield a vivid picture of the complexity of issues linking justice and diversity
18 management.

19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37 The article "HPWS and climate for inclusion: A moral legitimacy lens" by Jennifer Harrison,
38 Janet Boekhorst, and Yin Yu offers a conceptual model to expand the notion of climate for
39 inclusion (CFI) to include moral legitimacy assessments of employees on the organization's
40 human relations policies, specified as high-performance work systems (HPWS). The moral
41 legitimacy assessments of inclusion-oriented HPWS are conceptualized through the
42 application of Suchman's (1995) four categories: structural, procedural, consequential, and
43 personal. In the model, the employee's moral identity is offered as a factor influencing the
44 person's assessment of each of the four dimensions. To form a collective evaluation of
45 climate for inclusion, the variability of climate assessments between organizational groups,
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

1
2
3 such as majority and minority groups, is taken into account as a mediating factor between
4
5 individual- and collective-level perceptions.
6

7 Looking at the most significant international documents on disability, the article “Remarks on
8
9 Disability Rights Legislation” by John-Stewart Gordon and Felice Tavera-Salyutov reviews
10
11 the history of disability rights legislation. Drawing on the concept of “human rights”, the
12
13 authors identify patterns that in future could be crucial for the disability movement. They
14
15 describe a fully inclusive and embracing society as a utopian goal that it is worth striving
16
17 for, a goal that only can be reached when people with impairments are fully included.
18
19

20 21 22 *Future research*

23
24 Future research could continue to derive the moral value, or question the value, of different
25
26 approaches to EDI from the perspective of specific moral philosophies. Future research might
27
28 also apply a perspective of deontological (e.g. Hegel, 1821, 1991; Kant, 1785; 2011, or
29
30 others), asking whether organizations and/or individuals within these organizations do indeed
31
32 have an obligation or duty (or even responsibility) towards approaching equality, diversity,
33
34 and inclusion in a certain way. The question might be asked, from the perspective of virtue
35
36 ethics (e.g. Anscombe, 1958; Aquinas, 1570; Aristotle, 2000; Plato, 1907, or others), as to
37
38 whether there is a virtuous way of approaching EDI within organizations, and, if so, what the
39
40 most virtuous way might be. From a utilitarian perspective (e.g. Bentham, 1789; Mill, 1863,
41
42 or others) the question might be asked as to how organizations, or individuals within
43
44 organizations, should approach EDI in order to maximize categories such as welfare,
45
46 happiness, autonomy, etc. From these perspectives, or from the perspective of other moral
47
48 philosophies, research might question how existing organizational or individual approaches to
49
50 EDI can be evaluated morally. Another research stream could focus on the role of the
51
52 incentives of organizations or individuals in their efforts regarding EDI. The question might
53
54 be posed as to how genuine incentives determine the moral praiseworthiness/blameworthiness
55
56
57
58
59
60

of organizational approaches to EDI (e.g. applying ethics from Hume, 1751; Schopenhauer, 1860; 2010, or others). Future research could also examine more closely how the attribution of moral worth to different approaches to EDI might be unmasked and deconstructed as a mere means to other ends. Philosophical perspectives on the notional and moral worth of equality and inequality as such could be developed further. Research could examine whether (certain) organizational inequalities could be “just,” morally acceptable, or even morally praiseworthy, or even whether equality is a moral category at all. Future research could also direct its attention towards moral perspectives of quota systems and affirmative actions, asking what kind of understanding of “equality” these measures express, and how (dis)advantaging of certain groups of employees can be evaluated morally.

References

- Acker J. (2006), "Inequality regimes: Gender, class, and race in organizations", *Gender & Society*, Vol. 20 No. 4, pp. 441-464.
- Anderson E. (2010), *The Imperative of Integration*, Princeton University Press, Princeton.
- Anscombe G.E.M. (1958), "Modern moral philosophy", *Philosophy*, Vol. 33 No. 124, pp. 1-19.
- Aquinas T. (1570), *editio Piana*, Santa Maria sopra Minerva, Rome.
- Aristotle (2000), *Nicomachean Ethics*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
- Barclays (2002), "Success through inclusion: Equality and diversity at Barclays", *Human Resource Management International Digest*, Vol. 10 No. 7, pp. 9-12.
- Bentham J. (1789), *Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation*, Thomas Payne and Son at the Mews Gate, London.
- Berger M.T. and Guidroz, K. (2010), *The intersectional approach: Transforming the academy through race, class, and gender*, University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill.

- 1
2
3 Bies R.J. (2015), "Interactional justice: Looking backward, looking forward". In: Cropanzano,
4 R.S.andAmbrose, M.L. (eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Justice in the Workplace*.
5 Oxford University Press, New York, 89-107.
6
7
8
9 Blaine B.E. and McClure Brenchley, K.J. (2018), *Understanding the Psychology of Diversity*,
10 Sage Publications, London.
11
12
13 Boxill B.R. (1972), "The morality of reparation", *Social Theory and Practice*, Vol. 2 No. 1,
14 pp. 113-123.
15
16
17 Brewis D.N. (2017), "Social justice 'lite'? Using emotion for moral reasoning in diversity
18 practice", *Gender, Work & Organization*, Vol. 24 No. 5, pp. 519-532.
19
20
21
22 Butt D. (2014), "'A doctrine quite new and altogether untenable': Defending the beneficiary
23 pays principle", *Journal of Applied Philosophy*, Vol. 31 No. 4, pp. 336-348.
24
25
26
27 Byrd M.Y. (2018), "Does HRD have a moral duty to respond to matters of social injustice?",
28 *Human Resource Development International*, Vol. 21 No. 1, pp. 3-11.
29
30
31
32 Choi S. and Rainey, H.G. (2014), "Organizational fairness and diversity management in
33 public organizations", *Review of Public Personnel Administration*, Vol. 34 No. 4, pp.
34 307-331.
35
36
37
38 Cox T. (1994), *Cultural diversity in organizations: Theory, research and practice*, Berrett-
39 Koehler Publishers, San Francisco.
40
41
42
43 Dahlerup D. (2007), "Electoral gender quotas: Between equality of opportunity and equality
44 of result", *Representation*, Vol. 43 No. 2, pp. 73-92.
45
46
47
48 Demuijnck G. (2009), "Non-discrimination in human resources management as a moral
49 obligation", *Journal of Business Ethics*, Vol. 88 No. 1, pp. 83-101.
50
51
52
53 Fleurbaey M., Peragine, V. and Ramos, X. (2017), "Ex post inequality of opportunity
54 comparisons", *Social Choice and Welfare*, Vol. 49 No. 3, pp. 577-603.
55
56
57
58
59
60 Frankfurt H. (1987), "Equality as a moral ideal", *Ethics*, Vol. 98 No. 1, pp. 21-43.

- 1
2
3 Fujimoto Y., Härtel, C.E.J. and Azmat, F. (2013), "Towards a diversity justice management
4 model: integrating organizational justice and diversity management", *Social*
5 *Responsibility Journal*, Vol. 9 No. 1, pp. 148-166.
6
7
8
9
10 Greene A.-M. (2015), "Equal opportunities" *Wiley Encyclopedia of Management*. John Wiley
11 & Sons, Ltd, London.
12
13
14 Guarnieri R. and Kao, T. (2008), "Leadership and CSR-a perfect match: How top companies
15 for leaders utilize CSR as a competitive advantage", *People and Strategy*, Vol. 31 No.
16 3, pp. 34-41.
17
18
19
20 Hegel G.W.F. (1821), *Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts. Naturrecht und*
21 *Staatswissenschaft im Grundrisse*, Nicolaische Buchhandlung, Berlin.
22
23
24 Hegel G.W.F. (1991), *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*, Cambridge University Press,
25 Cambridge.
26
27
28
29 Heres L. and Benschop, Y. (2010), "Taming diversity: an exploratory study on the travel of a
30 management fashion", *Equality, diversity and inclusion: an international journal*, Vol.
31 29 No. 5, pp. 436-457.
32
33
34
35 Hume D. (1751), *An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals*, Andrew Millar, London.
36
37
38 Jarvis Thomson J. (2013), "Preferential hiring". In: Cahn, S.M. (ed.), *The Affirmative Action*
39 *Debate*. Routledge, 35-50.
40
41
42
43 Jewson N. and Mason, A. (1986), "The theory and practice of equal opportunities policies:
44 Liberal and radical approaches", *The Sociological Review*, Vol. 34 No. 2, pp. 307-334.
45
46
47 Jones K.P., King, E.B., Nelson, J., Geller, D.S. and Bowes-Sperry, L. (2013), "Beyond the
48 business case: An ethical perspective of diversity training", *Human Resource*
49 *Management*, Vol. 52 No. 1, pp. 55-74.
50
51
52
53 Kaler J. (2001), "Diversity, equality, morality". In: Noon, M. and Ogbonna, E. (eds.), *Equality,*
54 *Diversity and Disadvantage in Employment*. Palgrave Macmillan UK, London, 51-64.
55
56
57
58
59
60

- 1
2
3 Kant I. (2011), *Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals: A German-English Edition*,
4
5 Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
6
7 Kim J. and Siddiki, S. (2018), "Linking diversity of collaborative policymaking venues with
8
9 procedural justice perceptions: A study of U.S. marine aquaculture partnerships", *The*
10
11 *American Review of Public Administration*, Vol. 48 No. 2, pp. 159-174.
12
13 Klarsfeld A., Ng, E., Booyens, L., Castro Christiansen, L. and Kuvaas, B. (2016),
14
15 "Comparative equality and diversity: main findings and research gaps", *Cross*
16
17 *Cultural & Strategic Management*, Vol. 23 No. 3, pp. 394-412.
18
19 Köllen T. (2016), "Acting out of compassion, egoism, and malice: A Schopenhauerian view
20
21 on the moral worth of CSR and diversity management practices", *Journal of Business*
22
23 *Ethics*, Vol. 138 No. 2, pp. 215-229.
24
25 Kulik C.T. (2014), "Working below and above the line: the research–practice gap in diversity
26
27 management", *Human Resource Management Journal*, Vol. 24 No. 2, pp. 129-144.
28
29 Leitner S. (2003), "Varieties of familialism: The caring function of the family in comparative
30
31 perspective", *European Societies*, Vol. 5 No. 4, pp. 353-375.
32
33 Liff S. and Wajcman, J. (1996), "'Sameness' and 'difference' revisited: Which way forward
34
35 for equal opportunity initiatives?", *Journal of Management Studies*, Vol. 33 No. 1, pp.
36
37 79-94.
38
39
40
41 Lippert-Rasmussen K. (2017), "Affirmative Action, historical injustice, and the concept of
42
43 beneficiaries", *Journal of Political Philosophy*, Vol. 25 No. 1, pp. 72-90.
44
45 Lorbiecki A. and Jack, G. (2000), "Critical turns in the evolution of diversity management",
46
47 *British Journal of Management*, Vol. 11 No., pp. S17-S31.
48
49 Martínez-Ariño J., Moutselos, M., Schönwälder, K., Jacobs, C., Schiller, M. and Tandé, A.
50
51 (2018), "Why do some cities adopt more diversity policies than others? A study in
52
53 France and Germany", *Comparative European Politics*, Vol. online first No., pp. 1-22.
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

- 1
2
3 McMillan-Capehart A. (2005), "A configurational framework for diversity: Socialization and
4
5 culture", *Personnel Review*, Vol. 34 No. 4, pp. 488-503.
6
7 Mill J.S. (1863), *Utilitarianism*, Parker, Son & Bourn, London.
8
9 Newton L.H. (1973), "Reverse discrimination as unjustified", *Ethics*, Vol. 83 No. 4, pp. 308-
10
11 312.
12
13 Nietzsche F. (1954), *Thus Spoke Zarathustra - A Book for None and All*, Penguin Books,
14
15 Harmondsworth.
16
17 Nkomo S.M. (2014), "Inclusion: Old wine in new bottles?". In: Ferdman, B.M.andDeane,
18
19 B.R. (eds.), *Diversity at Work: The Practice of Inclusion*. Wiley, New York, 580-592.
20
21 O'Leary B.J. and Weathington, B.L. (2006), "Beyond the business case for diversity in
22
23 organizations", *Employee Responsibilities and Rights Journal*, Vol. 18 No. 4, pp. 283-
24
25 292.
26
27
28
29 Oswick C. and Noon, M. (2014), "Discourses of diversity, equality and inclusion: Trenchant
30
31 formulations or transient fashions?", *British Journal of Management*, Vol. 25 No. 1,
32
33 pp. 23-39.
34
35 Plato (1907), *Platonis opera*, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
36
37 Romani L., Holck, L., Holgersson, C. and Muhr, S.L. (2017), "Diversity management and the
38
39 Scandinavian model: Illustrations from Denmark and Sweden". In: Özbilgin,
40
41 M.andChanlat, J.-F. (eds.), *Management and Diversity*. Emerald Publishing Limited,
42
43 261-280.
44
45
46 Schopenhauer A. (1860), *Die beiden Grundprobleme der Ethik*, F. A. Brockhaus, Leipzig.
47
48 Schopenhauer A. (2010), *The Two Fundamental Problems of Ethics*, Oxford University Press,
49
50 Oxford.
51
52 Securius-Carr C. and Rohr, R. (2018), "Educating for inclusive diversity". In: Gertz, S.K.,
53
54 Huang, B.andCyr, L. (eds.), *Diversity and Inclusion in Higher Education and Societal*
55
56
57
58
59
60

- 1
2
3 *Contexts: International and Interdisciplinary Approaches*. Springer International
4 Publishing, Cham, 97-118.
5
6
7 Sher G. (1975), "Justifying reverse discrimination in employment", *Philosophy & Public*
8 *Affairs*, Vol. No., pp. 159-170.
9
10
11 Singh V., Vinnicombe, S. and James, K. (2006), "Constructing a professional identity: how
12 young female managers use role models", *Women in Management Review*, Vol. 21
13 No. 1, pp. 67-81.
14
15
16 Soltani E., Syed, J., Liao, Y.-Y. and Shahi-Sough, N. (2012), "Tackling one-sidedness in
17 equality and diversity research: Characteristics of the current dominant approach to
18 managing diverse workgroups in Iran", *Asia Pacific Journal of Management*, Vol. 29
19 No. 1, pp. 9-37.
20
21
22 Sposato M., Feeke, S., Anderson-Walsh, P. and Spencer, L. (2015), "Diversity, inclusion and
23 the workplace-equality index: the ingredients for organizational success", *Human*
24 *Resource Management International Digest*, Vol. 23 No. 5, pp. 16-17.
25
26
27 Taylor P.W. (1973), "Reverse discrimination and compensatory justice", *Analysis*, Vol. 33
28 No. 6, pp. 177-182.
29
30
31 van Dijk H. (2017), "(Managing) Diversity". In: Poff, D.C. and Michalos, A.C. (eds.),
32 *Encyclopedia of Business and Professional Ethics*. Springer International Publishing,
33 Cham, 1-4.
34
35
36 van Dijk H., Meyer, B., van Engen, M. and Loyd, D.L. (2017), "Microdynamics in diverse
37 teams: A review and integration of the diversity and stereotyping literatures",
38 *Academy of Management Annals*, Vol. 11 No. 1, pp. 517-557.
39
40
41 van Dijk H., van Engen, M. and Paauwe, J. (2012), "Reframing the business case for
42 diversity: A values and virtues perspective", *Journal of Business Ethics*, Vol. 111 No.
43 1, pp. 73-84.
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

1
2
3 Vasconcelos A.F. (2017), "Organizational diversity commitment: A web-based investigation",
4
5 *Management & Marketing*, Vol. 12 No. 3, pp. 474-499.

6
7 Vertovec S. (2013), "'Diversity' and the social imaginary", *European Journal of Sociology*,
8
9 Vol. 53 No. 3, pp. 287-312.

10
11 Villanueva-Flores M., Valle, R. and Bornay-Barrachina, M. (2017), "Perceptions of
12
13 discrimination and distributive injustice among people with physical disabilities: In
14
15 jobs, compensation and career development", *Personnel Review*, Vol. 46 No. 3, pp.
16
17 680-698.

18
19
20 Westen P. (1982), "The empty idea of equality", *Harvard Law Review*, Vol. 95 No. 3, pp.
21
22 537-596.