# PROJECT MUSE®

Pursuing the Perpetual Conflict: Ethnographic Reflections on the Persistent Role of the "Terrorist Threat" in Contemporary Peru

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Pursuing the Perpetual Conflict

Ethnographic Reflections on the Persistent Role of the "Terrorist Threat" in Contemporary Peru

Martha-Cecilia Dietrich

The question of how to remember twenty years of insurgency and state violence during the internal armed conflict (1980–2000) continues to polarize the social and political landscape of Peru. Dominant narratives of victims and perpetrators effectively silence more ambiguous and complicated memories. In this article I examine memories of the conflict that have been relegated to the margins of public discourse. Memories that tell stories of victims as perpetrators and perpetrators as victims are "placeless" because they upset a post-conflict order that is constituted by a form of civil contract through which mutual opponents coexist with each other without having to confront a conflicted past. I argue that in order to maintain a status quo, polarization is not merely a byproduct but a condition.

Keywords: Social memory; perpetual conflict; anthropology of culpability; post-conflict Peru

> *In [the] future, all violence will reveal what Christ's Passion revealed, the foolish genesis of bloodstained idols and the false gods of religion, politics, and ideologies. The murderers remain convinced of the worthiness of their sacrifices.*
>
> René Girard, *The Scapegoat*, 212

Since the end of the Peruvian internal armed conflict (1980–2000), human rights activists and leftist politicians have sought to distance themselves from acts of politically motivated violence committed in the name of radical left-wing ideologies. In the early 1980s two insurgent groups declared war against the Peruvian state: the Sendero Luminoso, Shining

Path, the Maoist inspired Communist Party of Peru (PCP-SL), and the Soviet-inspired socialist Revolutionary Movement Tupac Amaru (MRTA). What was known as the Peruvian terrorist threat ended with the capture and imprisonment of the insurgents' leaders and an almost complete dismantling of the country's democratic institutions by the government of the then President Alberto Fujimori (1990–2000). However, after almost two decades of transitional justice, memory activism and human rights movements, today's public debates about terrorism still seem more concerned with fabricating images of inherently evil perpetrators rather than trying to understand the roots of politically motivated violence. Superficial discussions in the media on how to understand terrorism tend to favor a view that isolates the culprit or group from a broader social environment and situates the terrorist outside of any social experience that may have contributed to his/her radicalization. This common perspective inevitably absolves the society in which terrorism occurs. In the past two decades prevailing perspectives on terrorism have been critically discussed by a number of scholars of Peru, both inside and outside the country.[1] In times of "fake news" and the development of various radicalisms in Europe and the United States, there is much to learn from Peru and how its society and politics have responded to terrorism and its aftermath.[2] The question I raise in this article is twofold: what are the dominant memory narratives and how do they contribute to establishing a post-conflict order? Drawing on my long-term study of discourses of violence and my work with political prisoners and victims' organizations in Peru, I will discuss the mechanisms by which violent groups or individuals are constructed by public discourse and how they affect former actors of the conflict. First, I introduce my collaborators Ana and Cristina, whose stories have been the basis for my ethnography.[3] Then, I provide a short historical contextualization of the conflict in order to facilitate a subsequent discussion of the contemporary state of memory discourses in Peru. Fundamentally, I am interested in how intended polarizations impact the emotional and experiential worlds of former actors in the conflict and how newly established areas of silence—now more than ever— may impede post-conflict societies from coming to terms with a violent past.

Of what use is our voice if nobody wants to listen?

Since the early 1990s, when both insurgent groups were still active, Peruvian right-wing politicians and media have seized upon people's fear of terrorism, a strategy that until today has helped populist parties to win elections. Even though both insurgent groups have declared the end of their armed struggle, the creation of "the terrorist" as the modern scapegoat has succeeded in Peru and is alive and well today.[4] Some insurgents who have not been killed or imprisoned or have not resigned from their militant organization have chosen a life as drug traffickers in the Amazon rainforest. Occasionally there are reports of military interventions or armed confrontations with Shining Path in central and southern rainforest regions. Even though the name is a reminder of the insurgent group that was active in the 1980s and 1990s, there seems to be little left of any political ambition. History books have declared the terrorist groups as the sole perpetrators of the Peruvian armed conflict. Books, movies and the media portray its members as social outcasts, furious, promiscuous, blood- and revenge-thirsty.[5] Despite the fact that terrorism has ceased to be a priority of state affairs, it continues to haunt contemporary politics, not only during elections but also in debates about national security, citizens' rights and education.

A saying goes that people do not listen with the intention of understanding, but with the intention of replying. Whether the speaking out or speaking up by victims or perpetrators of a conflict is productive depends on a public that all too often expects to hear categorical assumptions and common scripts. The higher the level of polarization in public debate, the simpler the narratives, the binary oppositions and the images that portray people. In a conversation with a former insurgent I was told: "What's the point of ambiguous stories if no one is interested in the truth?"

Activists, scholars and artists working in the aftermath of violent conflicts have often sought to tell the stories of "the unheard," those who are rendered vulnerable. The act of "giving voice" to people without agency seeks to point out and defy unequal relationships of power, but all too often it has the effect of reinforcing them.[6] Nonetheless, the attempt to articulate someone else's experiences reveals a certain politics of telling, listening and being heard.[7] To understand the often-subtle layers of negotiating voice and the practice of voicing in post-conflict settings, the

researcher is presented with the difficult task of reaching beyond polarizations. Social anthropologist Antonius Robben speaks of "ethnographic seduction" when referring to the interviewee's manifold ways of influencing the interviewer's understandings and research results.[8] He argues that narratives, in all cases, are fragments of experience as remembered, which are made to fit certain framings of the past. Ambiguity is more likely to be found in fragments that are cut out from people's narratives precisely because they challenge boundaries that delineate what can be told and what not. Discussing migrant stories as told by asylum seekers and refugees in Ireland, Darcy Alexandra reminds us that stories are not created in or for isolation. Rather, they are the result of the narrator's understanding of her own situation and position in relation to a specific environment.[9] Alexandra argues that storytelling, particularly in contexts of forced or illegal migration, occupies an important social role because it allows an increase in narrative rapport, building understanding, for example, between migrants and the general public.[10] In my project, in which I worked with perpetrators and relatives of victims of the Peruvian armed conflict, the intention was to co-create filmic narratives of the past that would allow for an engaged inquiry into the experience of memory and memory regimes in post-conflict Peru. In this sense, the research aimed to analyze the politics and poetics that shape practices of fragmenting, framing and constructing memory through storytelling.

The stories of Ana and Cristina could not be more different. Narrating memory in both cases presented practical, conceptual and political limitations to telling their stories. Ana is a former guerrilla fighter who was sentenced to twenty-five years of imprisonment. Originally from an urban middle-class background, she studied at a national university, where, in her own words, she "became politicized." Eager to change the future of her country, she decided to become a revolutionary. In the early 1980s, she was on a mission when a squad of special agents arrested her. For about two weeks she disappeared in the dungeons of the anti-terrorist police force (DINOCTE), where she was interrogated and tortured before being transferred to a public prison. She has told her story a thousand times in poems and letters, at court hearings and to journalists, researchers, artists and students of all sides and fields. "I have learned how to tell my story," she told me at the beginning of our collaboration. Cristina is one of the earliest members of ANFASEP, the oldest victims' organization in the

country.[11] She is known for her sacrifice and perseverance in providing support and guidance to relatives of the disappeared. Before the conflict, she lived a humble existence as a farmer in Ayacucho with her husband and eight children. She herself lost a son during the conflict. In 1983 a squad of soldiers took him from their family home in the middle of the night, an act that changed her life forever. Since then, she has not once refused to give an interview, hoping to reach those who have the capacity to help find the dead and bring justice to their cause. Armed with a banner and cross she still walks the streets of Lima and Ayacucho in protest. Her story of courage has been told in films, museums, books and articles. Many elements contributed to how Ana's and Cristina's stories were told in our collaboration, including institutional politics, discrepancies between victims' groups, the context of a maximum-security prison and the degree to which people, places and language were politically charged. Our priority was their safety, which is why we increasingly saw the necessity for research methods that would ensure that their names, identities and personal histories would remain concealed.

At different points in our collaboration, Ana and Cristina shared other sides of their stories with me. As actors in the conflict, they are seen as being opposed to each other—one the terrorist, the other the victim—but they both represent emblematic figures. Ana, the insurgent woman, is painted in popular narratives as a mad, promiscuous and ruthless killer. The figure of the female terrorist is considered to have worse personality traits than her male counterparts, underlining the dimensions in which post-conflict identities are gendered identities that incorporate assumptions about the social role of men and women in a society termed "machista."[12] In an interview I conducted with Peruvian congresswoman Luisa Maria "Lucha" Cuculiza of the Fuerza Popular Party, she described the profile of the insurgent woman as follows:

> She is Machiavellian. She is the one who gives the coup de grâce, who is in charge of persecutions and of conducting attacks. It's incredible, but the female terrorist is beyond what I would call a normal human being. I believe they go through a transformation to become hyenas—this evilness, this insanity.… In the depths of their soul, their being and their consciousness they should know that being a woman means to protect life, to show their children to be

good men. How is it possible that the soul of a woman is a terrorist? It doesn't make any sense to me.[13]

The narrative works through othering, by means of which the terrorist woman becomes "not us" and thus endangers what is ours.[14] The criminalization of the other further elevates the "us." On the other side, there is Cristina and her fellow relatives at ANFASEP, who have been portrayed as the ultimate innocent victims or "victimas puras" (pure victims), as she once stated herself. Affectionately, they are referred to as "mamas," signifying the mother who looks for the human remains of her son, marching the streets peacefully. Her words and images conjure a selfless, persevering, compassionate and determined mother, even though she increasingly feels she has had enough. Comparing Ana's descriptions with Cristina's, it becomes apparent how emotions such as pain, hate, fear, disgust, shame and love, or more importantly, the ability to control emotions, are bound up with securing social hierarchy. In this sense, "emotionality as a claim about a subject or collective is clearly dependent on relations of power, which endows others with meaning and value."[15]

Cristina describes the symbolic meaning of her portrayal as enabling, but also limiting, the sharing, claiming or negotiating of ANFASEP's demands. Many of the depictions of Cristina resemble the image of the Virgin Mary, who confronts injustice with faith. As such, she and her fellow *mamas* have been turned into the symbols of a human rights and victims' movement. "This is how demands for truth, justice and memory can be made in Catholic Peru," she once confided. But Ana and Cristina also have stories they cannot tell, because they have much to lose in a world where polarizing oppositions have become the norm. These are stories of guilt, conscious choices and unwanted outcomes. In my research, I have been most concerned with those memories that cannot always be articulated, making them "placeless" in the space of public discourse. Paying attention to these impossible-to-tell stories may not only enable a broader understanding of the forces operating behind the making of history and memory but may also reveal the existential grounds on which people have built identities in post-conflict Peru. I argue that the placelessness of such memories has furthered violent discourses and politically informed practices of "un-listening," rather than broadened our understanding of violence.

FRAMING A CONFLICT

At the end of the 1970s and in the early 1980s, after twelve years of military rule, Peru experienced a phase of a new "democratic awakening." During the transition period from a military to a civil government, Peru's political landscape was roiled by serious tensions. According to Alberto Gálvez Olaechea, a former member of the MRTA, *la nueva izquierda* (the new left) was convinced that every revolution started with an armed uprising. A revolution is what the country needed in order to break with the "old ways" of Peruvian politics. Olaechea writes, "everything had to be redefined and discussed: new ways of how to actually do politics in a democracy, or defining what a Peruvian left actually meant."[16] The growth of new guerrilla movements on the continent and recognition of Peru's deep-rooted social inequalities inspired the emergence of radical factions of left-wing parties, which later morphed into what we now know as the PCP-SL and the MRTA.

In 1980, the Shining Path declared its so-called people's war against the Peruvian state. Based in Ayacucho and with the initial support of large factions of society, mainly from the Andean highlands, the Shining Path considered the state an enemy of the people which needed to be annihilated in order to free the space for a new order.[17] With the support of provincial teachers' unions, the Shining Path gained access to rural communities, where, in *escuelas populares* (people's schools) they led campaigns to educate peasants. Rural communities were educated in the Shining Path's ideology, which they referred to as "Gonzalo Thought,"[18] harnessing people's sense of dissatisfaction and social injustice in the country's poorest regions, whilst keeping its distance from other left-wing or communist groups.[19]

Four years after the Shining Path's declaration of war in 1984, the MRTA, an urban guerrilla group, also initiated an armed struggle, so that there were now two insurgent groups aiming to overthrow the country's political elite. As opposed to the Shining Path, the MRTA identified with the existing nation-state but saw a need for substantial changes to it. Socialist liberation and national equality were seen as the ideological-political solutions for a democracy permeated by social fragmentation, political repression and persecution.[20] Their symbolic appropriation of the Peruvian flag and adoption of a new national anthem signified this antago-

nistic relationship to the nation-state.[21] Political violence was considered a tool for advancing a global anti-imperialist project, working alongside revolutionary governments like Cuba and other militant movements in the region such as the Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria in Chile and the M-19 movement in Colombia to which they had close ties. Despite fundamental differences between the two insurgent groups—encompassing political vision, military strategy, ideology, etc.—politicians and mainstream media have made no effort to distinguish between them, and today the two organizations are remembered as mere terrorist groups. However, there is a great deal to be learned from the diversity of political organizations of that time and the ways those groups have, in their own manner, shaped today's political landscape.

During the twenty years of the Peruvian internal armed conflict, three different presidents responded to the insurgents by sending the armed forces, the police and clandestine paramilitary units to conduct a brutal counterinsurgency campaign that lasted until 2000, when Alberto Fujimori's increasingly authoritarian government eventually fell.[22] With around 70,000 people killed and almost a half-million people forced to leave their homes, the internationally acclaimed Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) declared this conflict the longest and most costly conflict in terms of human casualties, forced migration and material losses since the foundation of the republic in 1822.[23] The TRC further found that the state forces were responsible for 37 percent of the conflict's fatalities, as well as systematic human rights violations, including torture, forced disappearances, sexual violence, and vandalism. While the MRTA was found responsible for 1.8 percent of inflicted deaths during the conflict, the majority—54 percent—was ascribed to the Shining Path. As investigations have shown, violence was unleashed in unprecedented ways when the Shining Path lost control over its territories.[24] Its repression of and punishments against civilians, public executions of alleged traitors and the systematic destruction of key infrastructure turned the population, mainly peasants who had initially supported Shining Path's call for a revolution, against them. Civilians organized into self-defense committees that collaborated with the Peruvian military and ultimately led to the collapse of the Shining Path.

The unprecedented use of violence by an insurgent group is how the Peruvian conflict differs significantly from other conflicts in the region.

For instance, in Chile and Argentina the military dictatorships of the time were considered the main, if not exclusive, culprits in inflicting violence and death. In the Peruvian case, categories of victims and perpetrators could not clearly and exclusively be allocated to a specific group. In this sense, making and taking sides has been particularly challenging for those concerned with establishing truth and justice in a way that serves what the TRC has called a "national reconciliation."[25] For understanding the Peruvian case it may be useful to abstain from defining categories such as victims and perpetrators. Like in many other contexts of war and conflict, their memories often carry uncomfortable, dangerous and silenced truths. They are memories that are based on lived experiences and therefore not easily brushed away by those who own them. The brutality has been mainly attributed to the Shining Path, and the effect of this on public discourses, particularly in Lima, has been to obscure and even legitimize the violence inflicted by agents of the state. In this context, an analysis of the social production of guilt becomes all the more relevant, not least because legitimacy in Peru is produced over opposing narratives. The tragedy lies in the ways the complexities of the conflict were reduced to simplified and polarized depictions of the past, often favoring the army and governments of the time, while demonizing the insurgents and the people of Ayacucho, who wanted social change.

In March 2018 ANFASEP's Museum of Memory in Ayacucho came under investigation by the prosecutor's office. In early October 2017 Congressman Octavio Salazar, a member of the Fuerza Popular party that was formerly led by incarcerated ex-president Alberto Fujimori, accused the museum of misrepresenting the state forces as perpetrators and thus glorifying terrorism and the atrocities committed by the Shining Path.[26] Indeed, the museum contains a reproduction of a torture cell, commonly installed at police stations or military barracks; according to the women from ANFASEP, however, the point of this display is to show the different kinds of violence inflicted by both the Shining Path and the state forces. Juana Carrion Jaulis, president of ANFASEP and one of my main informants during fieldwork, told me over the phone, "See, once more we have to defend our disappeared relatives, our organization, and our history as we know it."[27]

MEMORIES WITHOUT PLACE

The stories told by former insurgents, which I collected over the past six years, carry a strong sense of injustice about the writing of an official history of the conflict. According to them, publicly sharing their experiences is a way to contest imposed silences that reproduce and secure a hegemonic truth and memory of the conflict. Voices and perspectives of former insurgents are absent from publicly accessible spaces of memory, constituting an exclusion from official histories in-the-making. The most prominent example is the Lugar de la Memoria (Place of Memory), a museum of memory in Lima that opened its doors in early 2015. Its permanent exhibition is based on several months (October 2013–February 2014) of careful research conducted by a team of curators on the kinds of memories to be narrated through text, images and video, and, more importantly, on who should narrate them.[28] Because of ongoing contestations in the news and internal disputes about who should be given what space in this environment, an exhibition script (*guion museográfico*) was elaborated, which was then taken for consultation to different groups of former actors around the country.[29] The groups included "affected civilians," "those affected by the armed forces and police," "journalists," "artists," "human rights activists," "members of the state forces and police" and "authorities." These groups were invited to discuss a set of topics ranging from media coverage; the role of women, the community and perpetrators; and the "memorialization" of experiences. According to the authors, this participatory process was necessary in order to elicit what they refer to as "difficult knowledge" or "uncomfortable memories" that not only facilitate "the knowledge of an official past … but also serve the purpose of education and prevention on a national and international level."[30] At no point were former insurgents involved in the process despite the TRC's finding that the boundary separating victims from perpetrators was, in the Peruvian case, blurred and that responsibilities for inflicting violence on civil society had to be assumed by the insurgent groups as well as by the state and state forces. However, according to one of the curators the inclusion of former insurgents in developing the script would have been categorically rejected by the political authorities. The exhibition includes one testimonial of a former member of the Shining Path, who shows repentance by attributing

her error and confusion to her young age, a lack of perspective in life and the power of Shining Path's leadership to persuade people.

Despite attempts to consolidate a single narrative of the conflict, competing narratives continue to crop up in art, literature, film and (social) media platforms, which suggests the great extent to which memories of the armed conflict are actually part of the country's sociopolitical present. In this context, memory—as the public articulation of collective pasts—has turned into something reserved for certain actors only. And not only insurgents share this opinion. One of my informants, Pepe Garrido, a military general during the conflict, described memory as a right that had been "hijacked" by human rights activists. Indeed, the concept of the "right to remembrance" has been associated with human rights movements at a time when authoritarian discourses that favored oblivion have dominated civil society.[31] With the notion of the "right to remembrance," human rights activists appealed to the constitutional state to reconstruct a past that would bring justice to the victims of the conflict. Memory in this sense serves as a means for justice and for bringing about social healing. But what happens when lived experiences contradict narratives that substantiate legitimate claims and demands for justice? I want to turn to discussing two stories from my collaborators, who have become friends over the years. Their stories are considered "untellable" and yet they occupy their lives. According to Ana and Cristina, the experiences of violence and conflict are full of particular stories, stories of the impossibility of telling them.

Ana

In 2011 I invited activists of the victims' organization ANFASEP, a group of female insurgents currently in prison and former members of the armed forces, to participate in making a documentary film. The purpose of the film was to look closely at their ways of remembering the armed conflict to make tangible their notions of this contested past. The film, *Entre Memorias* (Between Memories), was released in 2015 (see figure 1).[32]

For three months we worked on the four-page-long voice-over in which Ana would narrate her upbringing, her radicalization at university, her life as an insurgent of the Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement, and her capture and imprisonment. After the police arrested her in 1992, she was physically and sexually abused. She suffered several rounds of

Fig. 1. Poster of *Entre Memorias* created by Lisa Ifsits. Photo by Martha-Cecilia Dietrich 2015.

interrogation under torture and was isolated for several months in solitary confinement, and, as it was for many others, this was an experience from which she never fully recovered. To this day, she suffers from migraine headaches, a sleep disorder, panic attacks and other psychiatric problems. National courts have never taken up her demands for justice, even though her case was supported by several human rights organizations in the country.

When we started our film project, she explained that she had nothing to lose and therefore did not shy away from taking responsibility for her actions as an insurgent and sharing her thoughts on the role of memory after the conflict. She participated in insurgent activities in the 1990s and

even though she was not directly involved in any killings, she helped in planning and organizing subversive actions with casualties. She was sentenced to twenty-five years of imprisonment. When we first met in April 2012 she had already spent nineteen years in prison and had no confidence in ever leaving the female maximum-security prison in Chorrillos because, according to her, politicians remain reluctant to release "terrorists" in fear of the possible political backlash. At the time of writing it is October 2018, and she still remains in prison.

A few days before the completion of our first phase of work, in June 2012, Ana received news that the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights had forwarded her case to the court of that same institution. This was wonderful news, as new opportunities for parole could open up, potentially meaning an end to imprisonment and perhaps even reparation payments for the abuse suffered after her capture. After receiving this news, things changed for Ana. With a tone of irony, she said to me that to find real justice she now had to become a victim: "I have to be innocent; I cannot be guilty, not even a bit. People don't want to hear anything else, and I want to get out and stay out of prison for good. I want to start a life." Because she did not want to disappoint me given the work we had done until that point, she proposed to write a new voice-over text, but this time focusing on her experiences of torture and maltreatment in prison. After a meeting with her lawyer to discuss her new text, not much was left of her original story. Her text had been reduced from four to one-and-a-half pages and the content had been partially rewritten to suit the victim narrative (figure 2). We discussed what it would mean to change her story in this way. The story of a confident, righteous, defiant and angry woman who went through a time of critical reflection in prison had turned into the story of an innocent victim: a girl manipulated into following a misguided ideology.

Her original story started with a young woman who, at the age of seventeen, received a scholarship that would allow her to travel to the former Soviet Union and discover what socialism really meant. At the time, she felt she was part of a global revolution. Ana was no exception; she was one among hundreds of Latin American women and men who were drawn to the revolutionary ideas of an internationalist socialism. She was eager to learn how to apply these ideas and systems to her own country, adapting them to Peru's specific realities and needs. The demo-

Fig. 2. Ana's corrected voice-over text. Photograph by Martha-Cecilia Dietrich 2015.

cratic process of the early 1980s became more and more frustrating, and this lack of satisfaction turned many people, particularly those of younger generations, to join struggles that aimed to take power by force. Stories like that of Ana hardly exist in public discourses, not least because they challenge established and protected narratives of the Peruvian "terrorist threat." Her story, like the stories of many others, opposes the depiction of insurgency as the embodiment of violence and instead offers a layered account of what motivated so many young intellectuals to join insurgency, an account that may even inspire understanding.

Ana's choice to change her story led to our mutual decision to end our collaboration, and all I was left with was the story of why her story could not be told.

Cristina

Cristina is the mother of one of the 15,000 people estimated to have been disappeared by the Peruvian armed forces in the early 1980s. As a member of ANFASEP, she regularly participates in demonstrations in Lima and Ayacucho, demanding justice alongside her fellow *mamas*. Thirty years ago, there were hundreds of women protesting on the streets, but every year more and more die of old age and broken hearts, says María Elena Tarqui Palomino, who works in ANFASEP's own Museum of Memory in Ayacucho. María Elena experienced the conflict as a young girl and has a disappeared brother, whom she saw for the last time in the summer of 1983. To members of ANFASEP, justice means the political recognition of the people who were abducted, tortured, (extrajudicially) killed and disappeared during the conflict. The organization demands the acknowledgment that the state was at least in part and knowingly responsible for their suffering. Beyond the symbolic aspect of this recognition, relatives would become entitled to claim collective and individual reparations from the state. After more than three decades of continuous protests ANFASEP is still demanding a more intensive search for the disappeared. According to José Pablo Baraybar, the director of EPAF, Peru's non-governmental organization of forensic anthropologists, there are still 4,600 registered mass graves that are awaiting exhumation. Further, ANFASEP is asking for justice in the writing of history since people from Ayacucho are still stigmatized as *terrucos* (terrorists). In Lima and other places this stereotype has closed doors to the labor market and to higher education.[33]

Mama Cristina does not tire of telling the story of the disappearance of her son, who she claims to be an "innocent victim." One night, army soldiers came to their house to pick him up and she never saw him again. She went to the local military base almost every day, as they had told her this was the place to which all prisoners would be taken. The soldiers at the gate however kept denying that he had ever been there. Cristina's desire, like that of many other relatives, is to find her son and give him a Christian burial. Then, she says, she would like to stay alive a little longer so she

can visit his grave, decorate it with flowers and leave traditional offerings such as coca leaves, cigarettes and *wawas* (sweet bread) on the day of the dead. She has often spoken in the media and has written her personal story, which, along with those of other *mamas*, was later published in a book.[34]

What Cristina does not speak of is the fate of two of her other children: her missing son had a twin brother, and he and her eldest daughter were members of the Shining Path. They were both killed, presumably by members of the armed forces. They were victims too, but not innocent. She lost not one but three of her eight children to the war. Only some neighbors and old friends know about the other two. In her neighborhood, Cristina is not the only one with such a story and sometimes, when there are quarrels in the family or among neighbors, these stories are deployed to blame or offend the other side. Cristina has seen betrayal and people profiting from other people's suffering, which is why she keeps this story to herself. It is private, she says; it has no place at ANFASEP or in any courtroom, museum or school book. She almost seems to agree that she has no right to mourn the death of her other children, at least not publicly. She cannot search for their bodies, because it might keep her from finding her innocent boy, and the last thirty years of her struggle for ANFASEP would have been for nothing. "If there is any justice at all, it is only for innocent victims," she once confided. Nevertheless, every night before she goes to bed, she lights not one but three candles.

Research in the aftermath of war and conflict has been described as contested and emotionally charged.[35] How to respond to the differences and discrepancies between experiences as narrated and experiences as lived? The anthropologist Michael Jackson suggests that the analysis of stories—as they are told—is a way to reach an understanding of what constitutes human experience, because like memory, stories highlight some and cloud other aspects of an experience. He writes: "[stories] reconcile fields of experience that are, on the one hand, felt to belong to us, or our own kind and, on the other, felt to be shared or belong to others. Yet, stories may just as trenchantly exaggerate differences, foment discord, and do violence to lived experience."[36] In this sense, stories are not only for their tellers alone but also for negotiating the space in between expression and perception. The act of storytelling is therefore many things at once: a means of protection and/or a means of living one's own illusions.[37] Through the performative practice of storytelling, one seeks confirmation

for one's own existence, however problematic this existence may be. If we understand storytelling as an existential practice, the stories of Ana and Cristina are an indication of the importance of making sense of one's own being-in-a-world-after-violence. Sense is found in the necessity to come to terms with this past, which enables justice and practices of closure. But the struggle for legitimacy and public acknowledgement is competitive and under continuous contestation in courtrooms, schools, museums, the media and the streets.

The social anthropologist Nandini Sundar suggested that the study of discourses that aim to make sense of violent pasts should consider how culpability is constructed in the aftermath of violent events.[38] With an "anthropology of culpability," she proposes to look at social processes, mechanisms and practices that situate culpability—meaning the definition and allocation of guilt—in a larger moral framework. By doing so, the questions to be asked shift from who is to blame and why to how people become moral culprits for acts of violence that they committed or were committed in their name. At the same time, the aim is to explore the power relationships in the attribution and circulation of culpability that, so she argues, "influence the ways in which hierarchies of guilt and the guilty are established."[39] Based on a variety of examples including the US "War on Terror" and the response of mainstream media, but also numerous truth and reconciliation commissions, war crime tribunals and public statements of perpetrators around the world, Sundar argues that the establishment of an official type of guilt is often used to consolidate new hierarchies and cover up "guilt" in and for the present.[40] The stories of Ana and Cristina make tangible the mechanism through which memories can exist beyond discursive surfaces. However, it is these surfaces, defined by moral norms and social order, that not only create the texture of spaces in which stories can or cannot be shared but also invite inquiry into the impact these moral(izing) memory regimes have on those who live them.

MORAL PASTS

Patterns of social processes in which individuals and groups are ousted have been analyzed by Erving Goffman and René Girard. Goffman discusses the practice of actively exposing what is "unusual and bad about the moral

status of the signifier," which he traces back to the Greeks, who called these signs of disgrace "stigma."[41] Stigmata mark their carriers as blemished or polluted persons who are to be publicly avoided. Girard focuses less on the alienating agent as something that is given or owned, and more on the social mechanisms that shape the process of scapegoating. He argues that the creation of the scapegoat "always relates to collective persecutions that gives birth to religious illusions."[42] What Girard refers to as illusions may be translated into what is meant by the "greater good." It establishes a certain order in which hierarchies and relationships of power can be asserted, but only against a common threat. Examples of scapegoated groups and individuals are manifold, whether religious or political groups, racial or ethnic minorities, class- or gender-related groups, and so forth. A sense of being and/or belonging may be conceived of as a threat, but also the opposite: not wanting to belong to a dominant group may have similar effects. Albert Camus once commented on the hero of his 1942 book *The Stranger,* saying that "those who refuse to play the game, are condemned."[43] Camus underlines the social consequences of resistance to canons that call for the implementation of exclusive moral norms and orders. In this sense, (moral) otherness is created to instill a sense of threat.

According to Didier Fassin there has been a general reluctance within the discipline of social anthropology to investigate moral engagements.[44] The reasons for this deep-rooted discomfort, he argues, are historical as well as epistemological. On the one hand, anthropologists have long struggled to overcome the discipline's colonial legacy and to renounce the practice of providing scientific answers to political problems or agendas. On the other hand, modern anthropology since Franz Boas, is spurred by ideas of cultural relativism where the researcher's job is to offer a sense of a social reality that is legitimated by its situated-ness. However, speaking about people's values and the motivations underlying their moral engagements generates a certain discomfort not only because there is a risk of falling into a somewhat moralist or moralizing rhetoric but also because questions posed to the researched may as easily be turned toward the researcher. Anthropologists who have thought about an analysis of moral engagements seem to plead either for disciplinary objectivity or for a commitment to their ethical responsibilities.[45] Fassin's claim, not for "moral sentiments" but for a "science of morals," maintains that beyond an evaluation of what is considered good and evil, there is a certain obligation to inquire

into "the human belief in the possibility of telling right from wrong and in the necessity of acting in favour of the good and against the evil."[46] Looking at the construction of moral selves and others in the aftermath of war and conflict, we might ask: how do social agents distinguish between manufactured dichotomies, where discrepancies between what is said and what actually is are inevitable.

Seventeen years after the end of the armed conflict, there are still intense debates on what, who and how Peruvians should remember. Rules for evaluating stories, events and people are contested and constantly negotiated. If on one end of the spectrum the moral obligation resides in defending a status quo, on the other end, it lies in challenging and changing what is considered immoral. The moralization of practices and people defines which deaths can be mourned and which cannot. Some deaths are considered national tragedies, while others, like those of terrorists, are comprehended as socially beneficial. This means that mourning over some deaths is more righteous than mourning over others, a sentiment that stems from a shared sense of justice. The main concern however is not whether it is right or wrong to think that some deaths can be mourned and others cannot, but rather what kind of frameworks created the moral legitimacy of mourning. A recent example shows some of the arguments used. During the heated public debate that was fought in the media and in street protests about granting parole to former president Alberto Fujimori, who had been convicted of corruption and crimes against humanity, his supporters claimed that, despite his and his government's unconstitutional actions, he had eradicated terrorism and regained control over the country.[47] This argument—that violence is a legitimate if not necessary means to defend the greater good—justifies civilian casualties, and even more so if their status as innocents is unclear. This is how politicians today explain the massacres of Barrios Altos (November 3, 1991) and La Cantuta (July 18, 1992), where death squads linked directly to Fujimori killed civilians who allegedly were members of the Shining Path, but were later proclaimed innocent. In debates about the rightfulness of having killed suspected insurgents, Fujimori's supporters fire up familiar narratives: of collateral damage (even when innocents are killed, if there is one terrorist it is a success), of the stronger force (Fujimori had to show a stern hand in order to take back control) and of the exclusive binary oppositions (those who are not for us, can only be against us). Those opposing this motion

are deemed terrorists, which is how ANFASEP's Museum of Memory in Ayacucho found itself under attack when Congressman Salazar declared in an open parliamentary session that the museum was apologetic toward terrorism by exposing violence that was inflicted by the state forces.[48]

Current discourses on memory in Peru, and around the globe, force people to adopt radical positions. What is disturbing is not only the current popularity of different kinds of radicalisms, but the ways that common enemies are so easily created and mystified. Radical extremists are painted as seemingly isolated groups situated outside society. However, taking insurgency or terrorism out of their sociopolitical context works to absolve societies, and the people behind these crimes, from their own histories. Being "other-than-us" becomes the main problem. What can be conceived of as a social question is turned into a moral question based on a political reconfiguration of moral sentiments and values. Conversely, stories that humanize perpetrators or even show them as victims carry a specific kind of ambiguity that, to the disquiet of those who promote these separations, embed perpetrators in, rather than isolate them from, society. It comes as no surprise that these stories are unwanted because they demand that not only governments and local authorities take responsibility but also that they come together with civil society to solve the problem. Uncomfortable stories that disrupt the coherence of polarizing narratives are adapted or else relegated to the margins of what is considered a morally acceptable truth.

George Orwell's concept of the perpetual conflict expresses the idea that the continuous reproduction of mutual hatred ties together opposing parties.[49] The creation of fixed identities that exist only in relation to something or someone other not only reproduces a polarized discursive landscape but also limits the expression of diverse memories, experiences and narratives. I have found Orwell's propositions useful to make sense of Peru's current situation and to bring together the historical, social and political construction of the country's most recent armed conflict.

PERPETUAL CONFLICTS: CONCLUDING THOUGHTS

Previous analyses of societies dealing with political, religious or ethnic violence all suggest that social violence has a "before" and an "after," and it continues after the bloodshed ends and peace treaties are signed.[50]

Societies aiming to come to terms with a violent past write official histories that are defined by the politics and poetics of memory. Memory narratives create heroes and villains, victims and perpetrators, good and evil. In Peru these binary divisions are not as clear as they might be in other contexts. Even though official versions of the past such as the final report of the TRC underline the multiplicity of roles in and responsibilities toward the crimes committed, in public discourses insurgents have become the scapegoats of history, the common enemy that enables other narratives to exist without having to confront personal experiences of a contested past. Splinter groups of the Shining Path have withdrawn into the Amazon region, turning to drug trafficking for survival, while the main leaders of both the Shining Path and the MRTA remain imprisoned. But the myth of the common enemy has to be kept alive—to secure an existing civil contract that bonds the many by alienating the few—without compromising the appearance of being a democratic nation. Recommendations discussed in congress and the media over what to do with former terrorists range from lifelong imprisonment and forcing them to undergo public exposure and humiliation to reintroducing the death penalty.[51]

Nonetheless, throughout fieldwork I met people who spoke of complex realities and ambiguous memories, among insurgents, victims' organizations and members of the armed forces. They spoke of institutional hierarchies, battlefield traumas and the tormenting silences after ceasefire. My brief encounters with former soldiers of lower ranks were mainly coincidences—a taxi driver in Lima, a shop assistant in Ayacucho, a hotel manager in the lowlands of Cusco. One did not reveal his name, and the other two made it a condition to not even mention their stories in any text or film I would make, not even to underline the impossibility of telling their unwanted stories. The taxi driver told me: "*Señorita*, it's going to be very difficult—you see, I have a family and I don't want to get in trouble. No one is going to tell you *la verdad verdadera* [the true truth]. No one! Who would benefit from it, apart from you, missus?" Not too dissimilar from the moments in which Ana and Cristina shared their stories, these encounters were accompanied by feelings of discomfort and were permeated by defensive arguments. Even though these men's stories did not necessarily contradict institutional narratives, they had the potential to challenge the seemingly unswerving truth promoted by the army.

My fieldwork has led me to look at the limitations of storytelling, which perhaps say more about the relationships and spaces in which these stories are (not) being told, rather than about the people (not) telling them. In this context, the practice of storytelling, meaning the articulation of personal histories, is a process in which moral values are given narrative form. In her book *The Human Condition*, Hannah Arendt states that people tell stories in order to make what is private, public.[52] The act of storytelling, she argues, cannot be understood in isolation because it is defined by the complexity and relationality of human relationships. Jackson expands on Arendt's arguments saying that what is publicly narrated in turn also shapes the private sphere.[53] In this intersubjective space, where interpersonal dynamics and social interactions occur, private turns public and vice versa. Further, notions of self and other turn into stories with underlying narratives, which are active interventions in the production of agency. Under disempowering circumstances, the act of narrating gains meaning—as does the act of silencing—because telling stories means claiming ownership over one's own history. Through telling (and silencing) one creates a place in the world. So, while storytelling is a social act in itself, it is also the foundation of self. My informants took a certain risk when trusting me with stories that they understand as publicly untellable. Still, there are reasons why they chose to tell them to me, the social anthropologist, who is nothing more than another storyteller. "El silencio nos enferma" (silence sickens us), Cristina once told me. Memory functions as a driving force, but it is also toxic in that it may impact the body and the mind destructively.

Confiding one's burden to someone else produces a sense of closeness and trust, and Ana and Cristina hope their stories—though anonymized and decontextualized—may speak to other people in similar circumstances or at least enable them to discuss the complexity of the conflict. But silencing ambiguous memories has also been regarded as productive. In his ethnography of village communities in the Andean highlands, the historian Ponciano Del Pino describes how victims and perpetrators had to learn how to live next door to each other. In this sense, Del Pino speaks of a "restoring and integrating silence," a kind of communal compromise that allowed for the (re)construction and growth of social structures in an environment where obligations toward the collective are situated above individual needs.[54] However, there is a difference between silence as a

decision—individual or collective—and silence as an imposition, which may have the opposite effect.[55] In politically pluralistic contexts such as Peru, imposed silences invite political elites to use memory as a tool—or as Victor Igreja says, a "weapon"—to influence political disputes.[56] This observation is not dissimilar from what can be currently witnessed in European countries coping with the newly awoken "threat of terrorism" and a political shift to the right.

Ana and Cristina have been at once subjects and agents of discursive appropriations in post-conflict narratives. Ana has changed her claim from that of a revolutionary freedom fighter to a victim hoping for a release from prison. Cristina has silenced the stories of the deaths of two of her children in order to uphold the claim for truth and justice for the death of a third child, her innocent son. Both stories suggest that (experiential) truths and claims for justice can be mutually obstructive and hinder the potential polyphony in understanding the past. Now, we arrive once more at the initial question: what does it mean to cope with memories of a violent past and how can memory contribute to a depolarization of a seemingly perpetual conflict between narratives that are informed by politically motivated agendas? Are possible solutions closer to simplifications or complications of that past?

While I have found that dichotomies such as victim/perpetrator, justice/injustice and guilt/innocence may be analytically misleading, they are still important to those who make use of them in order to exist in a world-after-war. These terms accomplish an important task in that they create a certain order amidst the chaos of disrupted lives. "Life after the war only regains meaning once you return to understand what is good and bad, ugly and beautiful, the reasons for which you live and for which you hate," said Cristina's youngest daughter who has fought alongside her mother as long as she can remember, as she described the importance of these dichotomies. This only affirms that people need to position themselves in relation to "others," but the problem is not the production of opposing perspectives, as Ernst Becker suggests in his book *The Denial of Death*, but to include them in a larger theoretical structure.[57] In this sense, anthropology may help to identify and analyze senses of justice and morality, by complicating supposedly fixed meanings. Closing with Sundar's suggestion that, rather than supporting the "owners of moral norms" who often purport to act in the name of universal values, the aim

should be to analyze how guilt is constructed in everyday life.[58] My own analysis of guilt has led me to the limits of storytelling and the silences that polarized discourses provoke. Creating more nuanced images of actors in former conflicts scrutinizes simplistic dichotomies of good and evil, while—and this is vital—avoiding any relativization or legitimization of the crimes committed. But without identifying the nuances that blur established boundaries, we run the risk of creating new myths.

NOTES

1. Among many others, see, for example, Ponciano Del Pino, "Looking to the Government: Community, Politics and the Production of Memory and Silences in Twentieth-Century Peru, Ayacucho" (PhD diss., University of Wisconsin, 2008); Kimberly Theidon, "Commissioning Truth, Constructing Silences: The Peruvian Truth Commission and the Other Truths of 'Terrorists,'" in Maxine Clarke Kamari and Mark Goodale, eds., *Mirrors of Justice: Law and Power in the Post-Cold War Era* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 291–315; Carlos Ivan Degregori and Elizabeth Jelin, *Jamás tan cerca arremetió lo lejos: Memoria y violencia política en el Perú* (Lima: Instituto de Estudios Peruanos, 2015); José Carlos Agüero, *Los rendidos: Sobre el don de perdonar* (Lima: Instituto de Estudios Peruanos, 2016).

2. Considering a changed global political landscape and the particularities of different kinds of asymmetric warfare, there are overlapping issues and discussion in terms of their instrumentalization in a political arena. See Rod Thornton, *Asymmetric Warfare: Threat and Response in the 21st Century* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2007).

3. Both names and personal details have been changed to protect their identities.

4. See René Girard, *The Scapegoat*, trans. Yvonne Freccero (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986).

5. See, for example, Ricardo Caro Cárdenas "Ser mujer, joven y senderista: Género y pánico moral en las percepciones del senderismo," *Allpanchis* 67 (2006): 125–52; Rocio Silva Santisteban, *El factor asco: Basurización simbólica y discursos autoritarios en el Perú contemporáneo* (Lima: Editorial Universidad del Pacífico, 2008); Martha-Cecilia Dietrich, "Dehumanizando: Über die Konstruktion von Gerechtigkeit(en) fünfzehn Jahre nach Ende des bewaffneten Konflikts in Peru," in Jonas Bens and Olaf Zenker, eds., *Gerechtigkeitsgefühle: Zur affektiven und emotionalen Legitimität von Normen* (Berlin: Transcript, 2016).

6. The notion of "giving voice" was initially inspired by ethical principles in social sciences research in the 1980s and '90s and has since been frequently used in participatory or action research. See Douglas Holmes and George E. Marcus, "Collaborative Imperatives: A Manifesto, of Sorts, for the Reimagination of the Classic Scene of Fieldwork Encounter," in Monica Konrad ed., *Collaborators Collaborating: Counterparts in Anthropological Knowledge and International Research Relations* (New York: Berghahn Books, 2012), 129. See also John W. Bennett, "Applied and Action Anthropology: Ideological and Conceptual Aspects," *Current Anthropology* 37, no. 1 (1996): S23–S53; Martin Bauer and George Gaskell, *Qualitative Researching with Text, Image and Sound: A Practical Handbook* (London: SAGE, 2000), 1; Frances Mascia-Lees, Patricia Sharpe, and Colleen Ballerino Cohen, "The Postmodernist Turn in Anthropology: Cautions from a Feminist Perspective," *Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society* 15, no.1 (1989): 7–33.

7. Aline Gubrium and Krista Harper, *Participatory Visual and Digital Methods* (California: Left Coast Press, 2015), 22.

8. Antonius Robben, "Ethnographic Seduction, Transference, and Resistance in Dialogues about Terror and Violence in Argentina," *Ethos* 24, no. 1 (1996): 72.

9. Darcy Alexandra, "Are We Listening Yet? Participatory Knowledge Production through Media Practice: Encounters of Political Listening," in Gubrium and Harper, eds., *Participatory Visual and Digital Methods*, 48–49.

10. See, for example, Darcy Alexandra, "Digital Storytelling as Transformative Practice: Critical Analysis and Creative Expression in the Representation of Migration in Ireland," *Journal of Media Practice* 9, no. 2 (2008): 101–12.

11. Asociación Nacional de Familiares de Secuestrados, Detenidos y Desaparecidos del Perú, http://anfasep.org.pe/ (accessed August 25, 2018).

12. Ricardo Caro Cárdenas, "Ser mujer, joven y senderista: Género y pánico moral en las percepciones del senderismo," *Allpanchis* 67 (2006): 125–52; Jelke Boesten, *Sexual Violence during War and Peace: Gender, Power, and Post-Conflict Justice in Peru* (Berlin: Springer, 2014).

13. Interview with Luisa Maria "Lucha" Cuculiza, March 5, 2012; translated from Spanish by the author.

14. Sara Ahmed, *The Cultural Politics of Emotion* (New York: Routledge, 2004).

15. Ibid., 4.

16. Alberto Gálvez Olaechea, *Aún suenan tambores* (Lima: edited and published by the author, 2012): 11–12

17. Orin Starn, Carlos Ivan Degregori and Robin Kirk, *The Peru Reader: History, Culture, Politics* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1995); Steven J. Stern, ed., *Los senderos insólitos del Perú: Guerra y sociedad, 1980–1995* (Lima: IEP, 1999); Carlos Ivan Degregori, *La década de la anti política: Auge y huida de*

Alberto Fujimori y Vladimiro Montesinos (Lima: Instituto de Estudios Peruanos, 2000); Carlos Ivan Degregori, *Qué difícil es ser Dios: El Partido Comunista del Perú: Sendero Luminoso y el conflicto armado interno en el Perú, 1980-1999,* (Lima: Instituto de Estudios Peruanos, 2010).

18. The writings of the leader of Shining Path, Abimael Guzmán, who adopted the nom de guerre *camarada* Gonzalo, were promoted by the group as a new theoretical understanding of the world, which they called *Pensamiento Gonzalo* (Gonzalo Thought), that built on the three thinkers Karl Marx, Vladimir Lenin and Mao Zedong, with Guzmán being the fourth thinker.

19. Gonzalo Portocarrero, *Profetas del odio: Raices culturales y lideres de Sendero Luminoso* (Lima: Fondo Editorial de la PUCP, 2012); Stern, *Los senderos insólitos*.

20. PSR-ML-MIR-EM statute, in *Nuestra Posición* (July 1981). This document emanated from a conference of the radical organizations (before the consolidation of the MRTA), united as PSR-ML/MIR-EM (Partido Socialista Revolucionario [Marxista-Leninista], Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria–El Militante), held in June 1980. This document would be the basis for the MRTA's self-definition and plan of action.

21. Marie J. Manrique, "Generando la inocencia: Creación, uso e implicaciones de la identidad de 'inocente' en los periodos de conflicto y posconflicto en el Perú," *Bulletin de l'Institut Français d'Études Andines* 43, no.1 (2014): 64.

22. Jo-Marie Burt, *Political Violence and the Authoritarian State in Peru: Silencing Civil Society* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007); Degregori, *La década de la anti política*.

23. CVR (Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación), *Informe Final de la Comision de la Verdad y Reconciliacion* (Lima: Defensoría del Pueblo, 2003); CVR, *Hatun Willakuy: Versión abreviada del Informe Final de la Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación* (Lima: Instituto de Estudios Peruanos, 2004).

24. See, for example, Carlos Ivan Degregori, "Fatal Attraction: Peru's Shining Path, NACLA Report on the Americas," *Boletin Informativo* 30 (Dec./Jan. 1990–1991): 1–31; Gustavo Gorriti, *Sendero: Historia de la guerra milenaria en el Perú* (Lima: Editorial Apoyo, 1990); Nelson Manrique, *El tiempo del miedo: La violencia política en el Perú, 1980–1996* (Lima: Fondo Editorial del Congreso del Perú, 2002); CVR, *Informe Final de la Comision de la Verdad y Reconciliacion*; Andrea Portugal, "Voices from the War: Exploring the Motivation of Sendero Luminoso Militants," *CRISE Working Paper*, no. 57 (Oxford Department of International Development, October 2008), among others.

25. CVR, *Informe Final de la Comision de la Verdad y Reconciliacion*.

26. http://larepublica.pe/politica/1109912-octavio-salazar-acusa-al-museo-de-la-memoria-de-ayacucho-de-hacer-loas-al-senderismo-video (accessed August 25, 2018).

27. Personal communication, October 2017.

28. José Carlos Agüero and Ponciano Del Pino, *Cada Uno, Un Lugar de Memoria* (Lima: Lugar de la Memoria, la Tolerancia y la Inclusion Social, 2014).

29. Authors of the original script were the social anthropologist Karen Bernedo and the writer and theater director Miguel Rubio. Ibid., 27.

30. Ibid., 31, 42, 25, 26.

31. Rocio Silva Santisteban, *El factor asco* (Lima: Editorial Universidad del Pacífico, 2008).

32. Martha-Cecilia Dietrich, *Entre Memorias* (UK: The Royal Anthropological Institute, 2015), https://raifilm.org.uk/films/between-memories/.

33. Carlos Aguirre, "Terruco de m… Insulto y estigma en la guerra sucia peruana," *Histórica* 35, no. 1 (2011): 103–39.

34. ANFASEP, *Hasta cuando tu silencio*? (Ayacucho: ANFASEP, 2007).

35. Robben, "Ethnographic Seduction," 72.

36. Michael Jackson, *The Politics of Storytelling: Violence, Transgression, and Intersubjectivity* (Copenhagen: Museum Tusculanum Press, 2006), 2.

37. Ibid., 15.

38. Nandini Sundar, "Toward an Anthropology of Culpability," *American Ethnologist* 31 no. 2 (2004): 145–63.

39. Ibid., 147.

40. Ibid., 146.

41. Erving Goffman, *Stigma: Notes on the Management of Spoiled Identity* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1963), 11.

42. Girard, *The Scapegoat*, 212.

43. Quoted in David Carroll, *Albert Camus the Algerian: Colonialism, Terrorism, Justice* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), 27.

44. Didier Fassin, "Beyond Good and Evil? Questioning the Anthropological Discomfort with Morals," *Anthropological Theory* 8, no. 4 (2008): 333–44.

45. According to the anthropologist Roy D'Andrade, what is "moral" has to be seen in association with cognitive relativism and value judgment and therefore demands an emotional distancing or objectivity. "Moral Models in Anthropology," *Current Anthropology* 36, no. 3 (1995): 309–408, cited in Fassin, "Beyond Good and Evil?," 334. The idea of anthropology as an ethically committed discipline is based on an understanding of the anthropologist as an involved actor in the field who therefore rejects cultural relativism and advocates political commitment. Nancy Scheper-Hughes, "The Primacy of the Ethical: Propositions for a Militant Anthropology," *Current Anthropology* 36, no. 3 (1995): 409–40, cited in ibid.

46. Fassin, "Beyond Good and Evil," 334.

47. In 2007 former President Alberto Fujimori was convicted by a national court for corruption and later, in 2009 for crimes against humanity, and sentenced to 27

years in prison. http://www.americatv.com.pe/noticias/actualidad/javier-villa-stein-legal-darle-indulto-alberto-fujimori-n294070 (accessed August 25, 2018).

48. http://rpp.pe/peru/ayacucho/Anfasep-ayacucho-rechaza-cuestionamiento-al-museo-de-la-memoria-noticia-1082408 (accessed August 25, 2018).

49. George Orwell, *1984: A Novel* (USA: Signet Classics, 1977).

50. See, for example, Allen Feldman *Formations of Violence: The Narrative of the Body and Political Terror in Northern Ireland* (London: University of Chicago Press, 1991); Michael Taussig, *The Nervous System* (London: Routledge, 1992); Antonius Robben and Marcelo Suárez-Orozco, *Cultures under Siege: Collective Violence and Trauma* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000); Veena Das, *Remaking a World: Violence, Social Suffering, and Recovery* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001); Heonik Kwon, *After the Massacre: Commemoration and Consolation in Ha My and My Lai* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2006).

51. Camille Boutron, "'Genre et conflit armé: La trajectoire des femmes combattantes du conflit armé interne péruvien (1980–2000) et leur réintégration à la société civile comme éléments d'interprétation de la réconciliation nationale" (PhD diss., Université de la Sorbonne Nouvelle–Paris III, 2009).

52. Hannah Arendt, *The Human Condition*, trans. Margaret Canovan (1958; London: University of Chicago Press, 1998).

53. Jackson, *The Politics of Storytelling*, 15.

54. Del Pino, *Looking to the Goverment*, 153. See also Theidon, *Commissioning Truth*.

55. Victor Igreja, "Memories as Weapons: The Politics of Peace and Silence in Post-Civil War Mozambique," *Journal of Southern African Studies* 34, no. 3 (2008): 539.

56. Ibid., 540.

57. Ernest Becker, *The Denial of Death* (New York: Free Press, 1973), xi.

58. Sundar, "Toward an Anthropology of Culpability," 157.

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