Optimal Leniency Programs When Firms Have Cumulative and Asymmetric Evidence

Blatter, Marc; Emons, Winand; Sticher, Silvio (2018). Optimal Leniency Programs When Firms Have Cumulative and Asymmetric Evidence. Review of industrial organization, 52(3), pp. 403-427. Springer 10.1007/s11151-017-9586-8

[img] Text
Blatter2018_Article_OptimalLeniencyProgramsWhenFir.pdf - Published Version
Restricted to registered users only
Available under License Publisher holds Copyright.

Download (670kB) | Request a copy

An antitrust authority deters collusion with the use of fines and a leniency program. Firms have imperfect cumulative evidence of the collusion. That is, cartel conviction is not automatic if one firm reports. Reporting makes conviction only more likely: the more that firms report, the more likely is conviction. Furthermore, the evidence is distributed asymmetrically among firms. This set-up allows us meaningfully to analyze three typical features of leniency programs: minimum-evidence standards; ringleader discrimination; and marker systems. Minimum-evidence standards provide high-evidence firms with proper incentives to report. They are better at deterring than is ringleader discrimination. Under a marker system only one firm reports so that the antitrust authority never gets the entire available evidence. Appropriate minimum-evidence standards make a marker system redundant.

Item Type:

Journal Article (Original Article)

Division/Institute:

03 Faculty of Business, Economics and Social Sciences > Department of Economics

UniBE Contributor:

Blatter, Marc and Emons, Winand

Subjects:

300 Social sciences, sociology & anthropology > 330 Economics

ISSN:

0889-938X

Publisher:

Springer

Language:

English

Submitter:

Dino Collalti

Date Deposited:

01 May 2019 07:57

Last Modified:

12 Nov 2019 15:48

Publisher DOI:

10.1007/s11151-017-9586-8

BORIS DOI:

10.7892/boris.127494

URI:

https://boris.unibe.ch/id/eprint/127494

Actions (login required)

Edit item Edit item
Provide Feedback