Moral Obligations and Consent

Müller, Andreas (2018). Moral Obligations and Consent. In: Müller, Andreas; Schaber, Peter (eds.) The Routledge Handbook of the Ethics of Consent. Routledge Handbooks in Applied Ethics (pp. 119-130). London: Routledge 10.4324/9781351028264-12

Full text not available from this repository. (Request a copy)

In this chapter, I examine the effects consent has on our moral obligations. In particular, I address three questions: (1) Whose obligations are affected by a person’s consent? It is uncontroversial that consent changes the normative situation of the agent to whom it is given. But can it also create a new obligation for the person giving it? (2) Which obligations are affected by consent? Consent makes a difference to whether or not an action constitutes a breach for some moral obligations but not for others. Here, I survey the moral obligations that are most often thought to be consent-sensitive in this sense. (3) Why does a person’s consent sometimes ensure that an action no longer breaches an obligation? I distinguish three answers to this question and discuss their implications for determining the scope of our ability to consent.

Item Type:

Book Section (Book Chapter)


06 Faculty of Humanities > Department of Art and Cultural Studies > Institute of Philosophy
06 Faculty of Humanities > Department of Art and Cultural Studies > Institute of Philosophy > Practical Philosophy

UniBE Contributor:

Müller, Andreas (A)


100 Philosophy
100 Philosophy > 170 Ethics




Routledge Handbooks in Applied Ethics






Andreas Müller

Date Deposited:

25 Jun 2019 11:00

Last Modified:

29 Mar 2023 23:36

Publisher DOI:



Actions (login required)

Edit item Edit item
Provide Feedback