introspectively seems to one to be the case. What one can know of the conscious character of the experience one undergoes when one hallucinates is that it introspectively seems to one to have the conscious character of a genuine perceptual awareness of some entity or entities.

The subject’s epistemic position with respect to the conscious character of the experience that he undergoes when he successfully perceives the world is somewhat different. In the case of successful perception the subject has available to him the kind of introspective access to his experience that he seems to have, because he has available to him the kind of perceptual access to objects of experience that he seems to have. The subject is in a position to acquire knowledge of the conscious character that the experience actually has, and not just knowledge of the conscious character that it introspectively seems to have. It is for this reason that the naive realist relationalist should hold that the right account of what one can know of the conscious character of the experience one undergoes when one perceives the world, and one’s account of what puts one in a position to know it, cannot be straightforwardly and symmetrically applied to the case of hallucination. This is why he should resist the conclusion that Robinson wants to draw from his causal argument—that ‘there is a subjective element in all perception, for which a brain state is a sufficient cause, and which contains all those phenomenal features that we are familiar with in perception’ (p. 162).

This is just a brief sketch of a line of response to Robinson’s causal argument; and it should be said that Robinson presents a number of other arguments challenging naive realism and its metaphysical commitments. Whether or not one agrees with the conclusions that Robinson draws from his arguments, his book succeeds in persuading one that it would be a mistake to think that one can now safely dismiss the once popular sense-datum option. To engage with the arguments that Robinson musters in support of a sense-datum theory is to engage with issues that are at the heart of current debates about perception and phenomenal consciousness.

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doi:10.1093/mind/fz063

Advance Access publication 2 December 2011


The title of this collection of essays by the late Timothy Sprigge (1932–2007) is taken from an inaugural lecture he gave upon his appointment to the Regius Chair of Logic and Metaphysics at the University of Edinburgh in 1980, a position he held from 1979 to 1989. In this lecture, Sprigge criticized his fellow British philosophers for their inadequate grasp of the nature of
consciousness. This failure, he argued, led to a number of distortions in all areas of philosophy and—since philosophical ideas have an impact upon the way we conduct our lives—in matters of ordinary concern as well. The notion that consciousness is the key philosophical concept now provides the principle of organization for this book. Two brief introductory pieces (‘Orientations’ (1996) and ‘What I Believe’ (2000)) outline the main stages of Sprigge’s intellectual development and summarize his philosophical credo. The following nineteen essays are grouped into three parts, respectively dealing with the nature of consciousness (‘Consciousness and the Metaphysics of Experience’), its status in the larger scheme of things (‘The Metaphysics of Time and the Absolute’), and the implications of having a full grasp of the nature of consciousness and of its place in the physical world (‘Ethics, Animal Rights, and the Environment’).

What, then, is consciousness according to Sprigge? Consciousness is such a basic reality that it defies definition. Still, one can at least gesture at it, so as to draw attention to the relevant phenomenon. ‘One is wondering about the consciousness which an object possesses’, Sprigge says in ‘Final Causes’ (1971), ‘whenever one wonders what it must be like being that object’ (p. 35). This conception of consciousness might sound familiar today, but it was not when Sprigge first advanced it. Only a few years later, however, this approach was to be made popular by Thomas Nagel in his now classic ‘What Is It Like to Be a Bat?’ (1974). Always an iconoclast, Sprigge charged the philosophical hero of the day, Ludwig Wittgenstein, with having set philosophers on the wrong path by discouraging them from paying attention to the immediate qualities of their own felt life. If one wanted to regain a concrete sense of what consciousness is, he argued, one should turn to relatively neglected thinkers such as William James, Alfred North Whitehead, Josiah Royce, and Francis Herbert Bradley. Sprigge constructed his philosophical synthesis from these thinkers and subsequently drew on Santayana and Spinoza. In a piece written in a very colloquial and entertaining style, ‘The Distinctiveness of American Philosophy’ (1980), he pays an explicit tribute to some of the main sources of his inspiration.

In several of the papers included in this volume, most clearly perhaps in ‘Consciousness’ (1994) and ‘Is Consciousness Mysterious?’ (1999), Sprigge appeals to the qualitative nature of consciousness in order to reject all forms of physicalism, functionalism, and behaviourism—eliminativism is the acme of absurdity in his view. This would seem to leave Cartesian dualism as the sole remaining solution to the mind–body problem, yet Sprigge rejects that too, favouring a version of panpsychism in its stead. Contemporary philosophers of mind such as David Chalmers, William Seager, and Galen Strawson have recently taken seriously the idea that one way to bridge the explanatory gap would be ascribing experiential states to all ultimate constituents of reality. This is a point that Sprigge would have endorsed, but it is not his main argument in these essays. His basic consideration is that in
ordinary sense-perception we are acquainted with the ‘appearances’ of a ‘noumenal’ reality. There is thus a non-spurious question as to the intrinsic nature of those things we encounter in perception and that we refer to collectively as ‘the physical world’. Reasoning by analogy from the human case—what is externally presented as a physical body is here internally experienced as a rich mental life—why not speculate that all physical things have an inward psychical side (p. 209)? In this way, Sprigge achieves a view, closely akin to that of Leibniz, in which the world is constituted by mental atoms or—as Sprigge calls his monads, after the fashion of Bradley—‘centres of experience’.

There are two main difficulties that any panpsychic theory of reality has to face. One is that of accommodating the common-sense intuition that such things as rocks and tables are insentient. How could there be such things in a universe made up of mental atoms? Sprigge cursorily hints at the Leibnizian notion of a ‘dominant monad’ (p. 208): whereas human beings are hierarchically organized complexes of monads, insentient things such as rocks are devoid of any ruling unit. Obviously enough, such a view stands or falls with the analysis one provides of the notion of ‘dominance’, yet Sprigge leaves this concept wholly unexplained. The other main objection is the so-called ‘composition problem’. How could the experiences that constitute the brain coalesce so as to constitute the unified experience of a human being? Unfortunately, one doesn’t find any discussion of this fundamental objection in any of the papers collected in this volume.

The papers in the second part of the book illustrate several aspects of Sprigge’s general metaphysics. Although Sprigge accepted panpsychism as the best solution to the mind–body problem, he rejected a pluralistic universe of monads as the final word in metaphysics (which at least partially explains why he should be so little concerned in working out the precise detail of a Leibnizian view of nature). As he tells us in ‘Absolute Idealism’ (1996) and ‘Pantheism’ (1997), his final position is a form of Absolute Idealism in which the monads are re-conceptualized, somewhat after the fashion of Spinoza, as modes of the one cosmic substance. On this view, each moment of our psychic lives is one of a myriad of focal points through which the larger reality of the Absolute shines. The argument for this view is not directly given in any of these essays—for this, one will have to turn to his ambitious book of 1983, The Vindication of Absolute Idealism—but the main supporting idea emerges clearly in ‘Russell and Bradley on Relations’ (1979). Sprigge argues here that all real relations (that is, other than mere affinities and contrasts in the terms’ characters) are to be conceived holistically as existing within a larger overarching whole. Apart from its intrinsic philosophical value, this important scholarly article is worthy of careful attention as it still provides—more than thirty years after its original date of publication—one of the best discussions available of that crucial episode in the history of analytic philosophy which was the Bradley–Russell debate.
(Readers of Bradley will also find Sprigge’s examination of the inner life of a monad in ‘The Self and its World in Bradley and Husserl’ (1984) very instructive.)

But how is the One to be conceived? Psychic monads need a common dimension to constitute a world, yet they can’t exist in space as this is given in our phenomenology. The only possibility is to postulate a wider consciousness that embraces them all (pp. 210–11). One can follow the logic of this reasoning, yet its conclusion is very counter-intuitive. Is it intelligible to claim that our finite minds stand to the infinite Mind in the same way in which our own perceptions and cogitations stand to our own mind? Sprigge’s view is even more difficult to understand in light of the fact that he condemns time as unreal (cf. his papers ‘The Unreality of Time’ (1992) and ‘Ideal Immortality’ (1972)) and conceives of the Absolute Experience as existing in the guise of an eternally standing ‘now’. This view can not be easily reconciled with the sense of transience that is so essential a feature of our own stream of consciousness. If ‘the general character of reality must lie in our immediate sense of our own being as we live from moment to moment’ (p. 208), as Sprigge repeatedly says, then reality cannot be a static Parmenidean One, but must be in constant flux. Be that as it may, Sprigge thought that this kind of Absolute Idealism would inspire people towards the greatest tolerance, helping them to see that there is a single divine essence in which all things partake — an idea that links him with Hinduism, a religion he thought he could embrace at one point in his life but eventually rejected as superstition (p. 8).

Sprigge did not derive his ethical views from his metaphysics, but instead developed them on independent grounds. The question is the one raised by G. E. Moore (whom Sprigge met while still a student) in his Principia Ethica (1903): What is the right conception of the summum bonum? In an article entitled ‘Is the Esse of Intrinsic Value Percipi?’ (2000), Sprigge answers it in terms of a hedonistic theory that ‘identifies intrinsic value … with pleasurableness as a quality of certain experiences’ (p. 249). Enjoying a walk is an activity that stands in need of no justification, the pleasure it provides is its own reward; moreover, pleasurable and painful mental states do have a kind of ‘magnetic attraction’ and ‘repulsiveness’, since we cannot refrain either from desiring what we envision as pleasurable or avoiding what we imagine to be painful. Against this, it seems possible to object that there is nothing of intrinsic value in the wicked pleasures that torturers are said to derive from their victims. One could also imagine a machine that produces all sorts of pleasurable illusions — would a life spent in pleasurable deception be a life truly worth living? Sprigge recognizes the force of these objections, but fails to show how they could be effectively countered.

Whereas Spinoza is reported by his biographer Colerus to have enjoyed tormenting spiders and flies, Sprigge was much offended by the way we treat our fellow ‘non-human animals’ in laboratory research and factory farming.
In a paper entitled ‘Metaphysics, Ethics, and Animal Rights’ (1979), he first notices that empathy enables us to get a genuine cognitive grasp of animals’ conscious states. Then, he goes on to argue that the stronger one’s grasp of an animal’s suffering is, the stronger is one’s desire to end it. What is notable about this view is that it is not meant to be a mere factual generalization. Rather, the connection between one’s empathic understanding and the incipient desire to action is a strong, necessary one: there is no possible world in which someone could fully grasp what it means for a living creature to be in pain and fail to feel a desire, however weak, to bring it to an end. As Sprigge has it, ‘one cannot really take in certain facts without developing certain wishes, and these wishes include those which find expression in the crucial judgements of an ethics of altruism’ (p 280; cf. also pp. 284–5). It is difficult to see how a view of this kind could ever be conclusively established. A cynic would remark that it has something of the noble but irremediably naive Socratic dream that evil action is really ignorance — but again, is it really so clear that the cynic is right?

These are just some among the many issues discussed by Sprigge in this rich and stimulating volume, nicely edited by one of his former students and literary executor, Leemon McHenry. The collection ends with ‘An Idealist’s Prayer for the World’, Sprigge’s version of the Lord’s Prayer. This previously unpublished piece, found among Sprigge’s papers in his home in Lewes, is a moving yet at the same time amusing statement of the main themes in his metaphysics and ethics. No doubt, Sprigge’s views are bound to remain controversial, but the attentive reader will be forced to admit that there is always some significant drift of reason behind them. All in all, one could not have hoped for a better introduction to the philosophy of one of the greatest idealist thinkers in the second half of the twentieth-century.


At first glance the title of Robert Stern’s book, Hegelian Metaphysics, sounds rather bold. It gives rise to the expectation that what one will find here is an informed and unbiased assessment of what is contained in the ultimate formulation of Hegel’s metaphysics, that is, his Science of Logic. And because this Science of Logic has proved to be one of the most inaccessible works in the