Arnold, Markus C.; Grasser, R. (2007). Effects of Competitive Pressure on Principal-Agent Relationships: an Experimental Investigation (In Press). Journal of management accounting research Sarasota, Fla: American Accounting Association
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Effects of Competitive Pressure on Principal-Agent Relationships_Arnold.pdf - Submitted Version Restricted to registered users only Available under License Publisher holds Copyright. Download (205kB) |
This paper analyzes the effects of competitive pressure among agents on principal-agent relationships. We examine both situations where competitive pressure is valuable for the principal from a theoretical perspective and situations where it is not. Our results show that competitive pressure significantly affects both effort levels and surplus sharing in principal-agent relationships. In particular, even if competitive pressure should not have any effect from a theoretical point of view, effort levels significantly increase and surplus sharing is significantly shifted towards the principal. This suggests that the perception of what is a 'fair' contract offer shifts under situations of competitive pressure. However, within a given treatment, agents' effort choices are influenced by reciprocal considerations both in settings with competitive pressure and without.
Item Type: |
Journal Article (Original Article) |
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Division/Institute: |
03 Faculty of Business, Economics and Social Sciences > Department of Business Management > Institute for Accounting and Controlling > Managerial Accounting |
UniBE Contributor: |
Arnold, Markus Christopher |
Subjects: |
300 Social sciences, sociology & anthropology > 330 Economics |
ISSN: |
1558-8033 |
Publisher: |
American Accounting Association |
Language: |
English |
Submitter: |
Lynn Carole Selhofer |
Date Deposited: |
11 Mar 2020 11:54 |
Last Modified: |
05 Dec 2022 15:37 |
BORIS DOI: |
10.7892/boris.141312 |
URI: |
https://boris.unibe.ch/id/eprint/141312 |