The Effect of Target Transparency on Managers’ Target Setting Decisions

Arnold, Markus C.; Artz, M.; Tafkov, I. D. (2 August 2019). The Effect of Target Transparency on Managers’ Target Setting Decisions Elsevier 10.2139/ssrn.3431071

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This study investigates via an experiment the effects of target transparency on managers’ target setting decisions. Specifically, we investigate whether target transparency, which reflects employees’ knowledge about each other’s targets, affects managers’ target setting decisions and whether this effect depends on the need for help and cooperation among employees. Consistent with our predictions, we find that target transparency and need for help and cooperation interact to influence manager’s target setting decisions. Specifically, target transparency reduces target divergence (i.e., the difference between individual employee targets), and this reduction is greater when the need for help and cooperation is high than when it is low. Additional analyses provide support for our underlying theory by revealing that managers strategically set targets in an attempt to motivate both effort at the individual level and help and cooperation among employees when such are needed.

Item Type:

Working Paper

Division/Institute:

03 Faculty of Business, Economics and Social Sciences > Department of Business Management > Institute for Accounting and Controlling > Managerial Accounting

UniBE Contributor:

Arnold, Markus Christopher

Subjects:

300 Social sciences, sociology & anthropology > 330 Economics

Publisher:

Elsevier

Language:

English

Submitter:

Lynn Carole Selhofer

Date Deposited:

12 Mar 2020 09:54

Last Modified:

12 Mar 2020 10:04

Publisher DOI:

10.2139/ssrn.3431071

BORIS DOI:

10.7892/boris.141317

URI:

https://boris.unibe.ch/id/eprint/141317

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