The Cooperative Capacity of Swiss Federalism

Wasserfallen, Fabio (2015). The Cooperative Capacity of Swiss Federalism. Swiss political science review / Schweizerische Zeitschrift für Politikwissenschaft, 21(4), pp. 538-555. Wiley 10.1111/spsr.12187

[img] Text
The Cooperative Capacity of Swiss Federalism.pdf - Published Version
Restricted to registered users only
Available under License Publisher holds Copyright.

Download (246kB) | Request a copy

The federal structure is a defining feature of the Swiss polity. According to the disenchanted hypothesis, which argues that the Swiss political culture of accommodating competing interests has come under pressures, we should expect that cooperation among the cantons and between the federal and cantonal governments has deteriorated over the last 25 years. However, inter‐cantonal coordination has increased substantially. In addition, the successful negotiation of the NFA shows that the federal and cantonal governments can reach comprehensive agreements. This study provides empirical analyses of the NFA reform and of inter‐cantonal tax competition. The NFA analysis shows that the cantons successfully coordinated their interests vis‐à‐vis the federal government, and the findings of the spatial econometric tax competition investigation suggest that inter‐cantonal coordination in the NFA had an attenuating effect on tax competition. Overall, the problem‐solving capacity of the Swiss federal system is remarkably high—not disenchanted.

Item Type:

Journal Article (Original Article)

Division/Institute:

03 Faculty of Business, Economics and Social Sciences > Social Sciences > Institute of Political Science

UniBE Contributor:

Wasserfallen, Fabio Adriano

Subjects:

300 Social sciences, sociology & anthropology > 320 Political science

ISSN:

1424-7755

Publisher:

Wiley

Language:

English

Submitter:

Mirco Thomas Good

Date Deposited:

14 May 2020 15:32

Last Modified:

14 May 2020 15:32

Publisher DOI:

10.1111/spsr.12187

Uncontrolled Keywords:

Decentralisation, Federalism, Fiscal Federalism, Cantons

BORIS DOI:

10.7892/boris.141482

URI:

https://boris.unibe.ch/id/eprint/141482

Actions (login required)

Edit item Edit item
Provide Feedback