Explaining governmental preferences on Economic and Monetary Union Reform

Târlea, Silvana; Bailer, Stefanie; Degner, Hanno; Dellmuth, Lisa M; Leuffen, Dirk; Lundgren, Magnus; Tallberg, Jonas; Wasserfallen, Fabio (2019). Explaining governmental preferences on Economic and Monetary Union Reform. European Union politics, 20(1), pp. 24-44. Sage Publications 10.1177/1465116518814336

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This article examines the extent to which economic or political factors shaped government preferences in the reform of the Economic Monetary Union. A multilevel analysis of European Union member governments’ preferences on 40 EMU reform issues negotiated between 2010 and 2015 suggests that countries’ financial sector exposure has significant explanatory power. Seeking to minimize the risk of costly bailouts, countries with highly exposed financial sectors were more likely to support solutions involving high degrees of European integration. In contrast, political factors had no systematic impact. These findings help to enhance our understanding of preference formation in the European Union and the viability of future EMU reform.

Item Type:

Journal Article (Original Article)

Division/Institute:

03 Faculty of Business, Economics and Social Sciences > Social Sciences > Institute of Political Science

UniBE Contributor:

Wasserfallen, Fabio Adriano

Subjects:

300 Social sciences, sociology & anthropology > 320 Political science

ISSN:

1465-1165

Publisher:

Sage Publications

Language:

English

Submitter:

Mirco Thomas Good

Date Deposited:

24 Apr 2020 16:58

Last Modified:

24 Apr 2020 16:58

Publisher DOI:

10.1177/1465116518814336

Uncontrolled Keywords:

Economic Monetary Union, European integration, financial crisis, preference formation, public opinion

BORIS DOI:

10.7892/boris.141493

URI:

https://boris.unibe.ch/id/eprint/141493

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