A Note on the Optimal Punishment for Repeat Offenders

Emons, Winand (December 2001). A Note on the Optimal Punishment for Repeat Offenders (Diskussionsschriften 01-04). Bern: Universität Bern Volkswirtschaftliches Institut

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Agents may commit a crime twice. The act is inefficient so that the agents are to be deterred. The agents are wealth constrained so that increasing the fine for the first offense means a reduction in the sanction for the second offense and vice versa. The agents may follow history dependent strategies. The government seeks to minimize the probability of apprehension. The optimal sanction scheme is decreasing rather than increasing in the number of offenses. Indeed, the sanction for the first offense equals the entire wealth while the sanction for the second offense is zero.

Item Type:

Working Paper

Division/Institute:

03 Faculty of Business, Economics and Social Sciences > Department of Economics
03 Faculty of Business, Economics and Social Sciences > Department of Economics > Institute of Economics > Economic Theory

UniBE Contributor:

Emons, Winand

Subjects:

300 Social sciences, sociology & anthropology > 330 Economics

Series:

Diskussionsschriften

Publisher:

Universität Bern Volkswirtschaftliches Institut

Language:

English

Submitter:

Aline Lehnherr

Date Deposited:

15 Apr 2020 11:53

Last Modified:

06 Aug 2020 14:18

JEL Classification:

D82, K41, K42

BORIS DOI:

10.7892/boris.142429

URI:

https://boris.unibe.ch/id/eprint/142429

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