Wage Rigidity and Monetary Union

Dellas, Harris; Tavlas, George (December 2002). Wage Rigidity and Monetary Union (Diskussionsschriften 02-19). Bern: Universität Bern Volkswirtschaftliches Institut

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We compare monetary union to flexible exchange rates in an asymmetric, three-country model with active monetary policy. Unlike the traditional OCA literature, we find that countries with high nominal wage rigidities benefit from monetary union, specially when they join other, similarly rigid countries. Countries with relatively more flexible wages lose when they form a union with more rigid wage countries. We study the France, Germany and the UK and find that wage asymmetries across these three countries dominate other types of asymmetries (in shocks, monetary policy etc.) in welfare comparisons. And that, if the UK had a substantially higher degree of wage flexibility than France and Germany, then her participation in EMU would be costly.

Item Type:

Working Paper

Division/Institute:

03 Faculty of Business, Economics and Social Sciences > Department of Economics

UniBE Contributor:

Dellas, Harris

Subjects:

300 Social sciences, sociology & anthropology > 330 Economics

Series:

Diskussionsschriften

Publisher:

Universität Bern Volkswirtschaftliches Institut

Language:

English

Submitter:

Aline Lehnherr

Date Deposited:

11 Jun 2020 16:57

Last Modified:

06 Aug 2020 14:18

JEL Classification:

E4, E5, F4

BORIS DOI:

10.7892/boris.144017

URI:

https://boris.unibe.ch/id/eprint/144017

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