Emons, Winand; Garoupa, Nuno (May 2004). The Economics of US-style Contingent Fees and UK-style Conditional Fees (Discussion Papers 04-07). Bern: Department of Economics
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Under contingent fees the attorney gets a share of the judgement; under conditional fees the lawyer gets an upscale premium if the case is won which is, however, unrelated to the adjudicated amount. We compare conditional and contingent fees in a principal-agent framework where the lawyer chooses unobservable effort after she has observed
the amount at stake. Contingent fees provide better incentives than conditional fees independently of whether upfront payments are restricted to be non-negative or not. Under contingent fees the attorney uses her information about what is at stake more efficiently.
Item Type: |
Working Paper |
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Division/Institute: |
03 Faculty of Business, Economics and Social Sciences > Department of Economics |
UniBE Contributor: |
Emons, Winand |
Subjects: |
300 Social sciences, sociology & anthropology > 330 Economics |
Series: |
Discussion Papers |
Publisher: |
Department of Economics |
Language: |
English |
Submitter: |
Lars Tschannen |
Date Deposited: |
14 Sep 2020 15:34 |
Last Modified: |
05 Dec 2022 15:39 |
JEL Classification: |
D82, K1 |
BORIS DOI: |
10.7892/boris.145639 |
URI: |
https://boris.unibe.ch/id/eprint/145639 |
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