On Holders, Blades and Other Tie-In Sales

Egli, Alain (July 2004). On Holders, Blades and Other Tie-In Sales (Discussion Papers 04-17). Bern: Department of Economics

[img]
Preview
Text
dp0417.pdf - Published Version
Available under License Creative Commons: Attribution (CC-BY).

Download (175kB) | Preview

Tie-in sales have a bad image because of anti-competitive effects. Notably, tying contracts allow monopolists to carry over monopoly power into markets where they meet competition. Most of the literature assumes a firm being monopolist in one market and facing competition in another. In contrast, we analyze two firms which both are monopolists in one market and competitors in the other. Under such a symmetric structure tying has competitive effects. Tie-in sales may increase the consumers’ expected utility. By tying their products, the firms insure consumers against uncertain future demand.

Item Type:

Working Paper

Division/Institute:

03 Faculty of Business, Economics and Social Sciences > Department of Economics

UniBE Contributor:

Egli, Alain

Subjects:

300 Social sciences, sociology & anthropology > 330 Economics

Series:

Discussion Papers

Publisher:

Department of Economics

Language:

English

Submitter:

Lars Tschannen

Date Deposited:

16 Sep 2020 17:22

Last Modified:

16 Sep 2020 17:22

JEL Classification:

D21, D31, D43, L11

BORIS DOI:

10.7892/boris.145650

URI:

https://boris.unibe.ch/id/eprint/145650

Actions (login required)

Edit item Edit item
Provide Feedback