The Optimal Amount of Falsified Testimony

Emons, Winand; Fluet, Claude (June 2005). The Optimal Amount of Falsified Testimony (Discussion Papers 05-06). Bern: Department of Economics

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An arbiter can decide a case on the basis of his priors or he can ask for further evidence from the two parties to the conflict. The parties may misrepresent evidence in their favor at a cost. The arbiter is concerned about accuracy and low procedural costs. When both parties testify,
each of them distorts the evidence less than when they testify alone. When the fixed cost of testifying is low, the arbiter hears both, for intermediate values one, and for high values no party at all. The ability to commit to an adjudication scheme makes it more likely that the arbiter requires evidence.

Item Type:

Working Paper

Division/Institute:

03 Faculty of Business, Economics and Social Sciences > Department of Economics

UniBE Contributor:

Emons, Winand and Fluet, Claude

Subjects:

300 Social sciences, sociology & anthropology > 330 Economics

Series:

Discussion Papers

Publisher:

Department of Economics

Language:

English

Submitter:

Lars Tschannen

Date Deposited:

02 Oct 2020 10:59

Last Modified:

02 Oct 2020 10:59

JEL Classification:

D82, K41, K42

BORIS DOI:

10.7892/boris.145660

URI:

https://boris.unibe.ch/id/eprint/145660

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