Genetic Tests and Intertemporal Screening in Competitive Insurance Markets

Emons, Winand (December 2006). Genetic Tests and Intertemporal Screening in Competitive Insurance Markets (Discussion Papers 06-05). Bern: Department of Economics

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We consider successive generations of non-altruistic individuals carrying a good or bad gene. Daughters are more likely to carry their mother’s gene than the opposite one. Competitive insurers can perform a genetic test revealing an agent’s gene. They may condition their quotes on the agent’s or on her ancestors’ genetic status. In equilibrium generation one is bribed to take the test with an unconditional quote. The insurer uses this information to profitably screen a finite number of generations of their offspring. The offspring of good gene carriers subsidize the tested generation.

Item Type:

Working Paper

Division/Institute:

03 Faculty of Business, Economics and Social Sciences > Department of Economics

UniBE Contributor:

Emons, Winand

Subjects:

300 Social sciences, sociology & anthropology > 330 Economics

Series:

Discussion Papers

Publisher:

Department of Economics

Language:

English

Submitter:

Lars Tschannen

Date Deposited:

02 Oct 2020 07:48

Last Modified:

02 Oct 2020 07:48

JEL Classification:

D82, G22

BORIS DOI:

10.7892/boris.145688

URI:

https://boris.unibe.ch/id/eprint/145688

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