Accuracy versus Falsification Costs: The optimal Amount of Evidence under different Procedures

Emons, Winand; Fluet, Claude (January 2007). Accuracy versus Falsification Costs: The optimal Amount of Evidence under different Procedures (Discussion Papers 07-02). Bern: Department of Economics

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An arbiter can decide a case on the basis of his priors or he can ask for further evidence from the two parties to the conflict. The parties may misrepresent evidence in their favor at a cost. The arbiter is concerned about accuracy and low procedural costs. When both parties testify,
each of them distorts the evidence less than when they testify alone. When the fixed cost of testifying is low, the arbiter hears both, for intermediate values one, and for high values no party at all. The arbiter’s ability to remain uninformed as well as sequential testifying
makes it more likely that the arbiter requires evidence.

Item Type:

Working Paper

Division/Institute:

03 Faculty of Business, Economics and Social Sciences > Department of Economics

UniBE Contributor:

Emons, Winand and Fluet, Claude

Subjects:

300 Social sciences, sociology & anthropology > 330 Economics

Series:

Discussion Papers

Publisher:

Department of Economics

Language:

English

Submitter:

Lars Tschannen

Date Deposited:

02 Oct 2020 07:43

Last Modified:

02 Oct 2020 07:43

JEL Classification:

D82, K41, K42

BORIS DOI:

10.7892/boris.145692

URI:

https://boris.unibe.ch/id/eprint/145692

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