Maximal Domains for Strategy-proof or Maskin monotonic Choice Rules

Bochet, Olivier; Storcken, Ton (August 2008). Maximal Domains for Strategy-proof or Maskin monotonic Choice Rules (Discussion Papers 09-01). Bern: Department of Economics

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Domains of individual preferences for which the well-known impossibility Theorems of Gibbard-Satterthwaite and Muller-Satterthwaite do not hold are studied. First, we introduce necessary and sufficient conditions for a domain to admit non-dictatorial, Pareto efficient and either strategy-proof or Maskin monotonic social choice rules. Next, to comprehend the limitations the two Theorems imply for social choice rules, we search for the largest domains that are possible. Put differently, we look for the minimal restrictions that have to be imposed on the unrestricted domain to recover possibility results. It turns out
that, for such domains, the conditions of inseparable pair and of inseparable set yield the only maximal domains on which there exist non-dictatorial, Pareto efficient and strategy-proof social choice rules. Next, we characterize the maximal domains which allow for Maskin
monotonic, non-dictatorial and Pareto-optimal social choice rules.

Item Type:

Working Paper

Division/Institute:

03 Faculty of Business, Economics and Social Sciences > Department of Economics

UniBE Contributor:

Bochet, Olivier

Subjects:

300 Social sciences, sociology & anthropology > 330 Economics

Series:

Discussion Papers

Publisher:

Department of Economics

Language:

English

Submitter:

Lars Tschannen

Date Deposited:

07 Oct 2020 15:21

Last Modified:

07 Oct 2020 15:21

BORIS DOI:

10.7892/boris.145716

URI:

https://boris.unibe.ch/id/eprint/145716

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