Almer, Christian; Winkler, Ralph (November 2010). Strategic behavior in IEAs: When and why countries joined the Kyoto Protocol (Discussion Papers 10-14). Bern: Department of Economics
|
Text
dp1014.pdf - Published Version Available under License Creative Commons: Attribution (CC-BY). Download (250kB) | Preview |
We empirically analyze the formation of international environmental agreements within a political economy framework. We develop a theoretical model of state dependent net benefits of ratification predicting (i) strategic behavior with respect to the timing of ratification and (ii) that ratification per se is not necessarily a stronger signal of support compared to signature. Analyzing the signature and ratification process via generalized binary and ordered response models, we find significant evidence for our theoretical predictions. In addition, we show that a wide selection of determinants including economic and political factors influences the decision whether to sign and when to ratify.
Item Type: |
Working Paper |
|---|---|
Division/Institute: |
03 Faculty of Business, Economics and Social Sciences > Department of Economics |
UniBE Contributor: |
Almer, Christian, Winkler, Ralph |
Subjects: |
300 Social sciences, sociology & anthropology > 330 Economics |
Series: |
Discussion Papers |
Publisher: |
Department of Economics |
Language: |
English |
Submitter: |
Lars Tschannen |
Date Deposited: |
15 Oct 2020 17:18 |
Last Modified: |
05 Dec 2022 15:39 |
JEL Classification: |
Q54, F53, C25 |
BORIS DOI: |
10.7892/boris.145736 |
URI: |
https://boris.unibe.ch/id/eprint/145736 |
Actions (login required)
 |
Edit item |