Strategic behavior in IEAs: When and why countries joined the Kyoto Protocol

Almer, Christian; Winkler, Ralph (November 2010). Strategic behavior in IEAs: When and why countries joined the Kyoto Protocol (Discussion Papers 10-14). Bern: Department of Economics

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We empirically analyze the formation of international environmental agreements within a political economy framework. We develop a theoretical model of state dependent net benefits of ratification predicting (i) strategic behavior with respect to the timing of ratification and (ii) that ratification per se is not necessarily a stronger signal of support compared to signature. Analyzing the signature and ratification process via generalized binary and ordered response models, we find significant evidence for our theoretical predictions. In addition, we show that a wide selection of determinants including economic and political factors influences the decision whether to sign and when to ratify.

Item Type:

Working Paper

Division/Institute:

03 Faculty of Business, Economics and Social Sciences > Department of Economics

UniBE Contributor:

Almer, Christian and Winkler, Ralph

Subjects:

300 Social sciences, sociology & anthropology > 330 Economics

Series:

Discussion Papers

Publisher:

Department of Economics

Language:

English

Submitter:

Lars Tschannen

Date Deposited:

15 Oct 2020 17:18

Last Modified:

10 Mar 2021 13:11

JEL Classification:

Q54, F53, C25

BORIS DOI:

10.7892/boris.145736

URI:

https://boris.unibe.ch/id/eprint/145736

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