Political influence on non-cooperative international climate policy

Habla, Wolfgang; Winkler, Ralph (August 2011). Political influence on non-cooperative international climate policy (Discussion Papers 11-06). Bern: Department of Economics

[img]
Preview
Text
dp1106.pdf - Published Version
Available under License Creative Commons: Attribution (CC-BY).

Download (249kB) | Preview

We analyze non-cooperative international climate policy in a setting of political competition by national interest groups. In the first stage, countries decide whether to set up an international emission permits market, which only forms if it is supported by all countries. In the second stage, countries non-cooperatively decide on the number of tradable or non-tradable emission allowances, depending on the type of regime. In both stages, special interest groups try to sway the government in their favor. We find that (i) both the choice of regime and the level of aggregate emissions only depend on the aggregate levels of organized stakes in all countries and not on their distribution among individual interest groups, and (ii) an increase in lobbying influence by a particular lobby group may backfire by inducing a change towards the less preferred regime.

Item Type:

Working Paper

Division/Institute:

03 Faculty of Business, Economics and Social Sciences > Department of Economics

UniBE Contributor:

Winkler, Ralph

Subjects:

300 Social sciences, sociology & anthropology > 330 Economics

Series:

Discussion Papers

Publisher:

Department of Economics

Language:

English

Submitter:

Lars Tschannen

Date Deposited:

15 Oct 2020 17:34

Last Modified:

15 Oct 2020 17:34

JEL Classification:

D72, H23, H41, Q58

BORIS DOI:

10.7892/boris.145751

URI:

https://boris.unibe.ch/id/eprint/145751

Actions (login required)

Edit item Edit item
Provide Feedback