Exclusivity Clauses: Enhancing Competition, Raising Prices

Blatter, Marc; Sticher, Silvio (November 2013). Exclusivity Clauses: Enhancing Competition, Raising Prices (Discussion Papers 13-12). Bern: Department of Economics

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In a setting where retailers and suppliers compete for each other by offering binding contracts, exclusivity clauses serve as a competitive device. As a result of these clauses, firms addressed by contracts only accept the most favorable deal. Thus the contract-issuing parties have
to squeeze their final customers and transfer the surplus within the vertical supply chain. We elaborate to what extent the resulting allocation depends on the sequence of play and discuss the implications of a ban on exclusivity clauses

Item Type:

Working Paper

Division/Institute:

03 Faculty of Business, Economics and Social Sciences > Department of Economics

UniBE Contributor:

Blatter, Marc and Sticher, Silvio

Subjects:

300 Social sciences, sociology & anthropology > 330 Economics

Series:

Discussion Papers

Publisher:

Department of Economics

Language:

English

Submitter:

Lars Tschannen

Date Deposited:

18 Dec 2020 15:03

Last Modified:

18 Dec 2020 15:03

JEL Classification:

D86, L13, L42

BORIS DOI:

10.7892/boris.145777

URI:

https://boris.unibe.ch/id/eprint/145777

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