Optimal Selling Mechanisms under Imperfect Commitment

Beccuti, Juan I. (April 2014). Optimal Selling Mechanisms under Imperfect Commitment (Discussion Papers 14-01). Bern: Department of Economics

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This paper studies the optimal mechanisms for a seller with imperfect commitment who puts up for sale one individual unit per period to a single buyer in a dynamic game. The buyerís willingness to pay remains constant over time and is his private information. In this setting, the seller cannot achieve greater payo§s than those obtained by posting a price in each period. However, price posting is not optimal if the buyer is su¢ ciently impatient relative to the seller. It is also proved that a mechanism ‡ la Goethe (see Moldovanu and Tieztel 1998) is almost optimal. Keywords: asymmetric information, imperfect commitment, dynamics, mechanism design, non-optimality of posting prices.

Item Type:

Working Paper

Division/Institute:

03 Faculty of Business, Economics and Social Sciences > Department of Economics

UniBE Contributor:

Beccuti Vazquez, Juan Ignacio

Subjects:

300 Social sciences, sociology & anthropology > 330 Economics

Series:

Discussion Papers

Publisher:

Department of Economics

Language:

English

Submitter:

Lars Tschannen

Date Deposited:

18 Dec 2020 15:00

Last Modified:

18 Dec 2020 15:00

JEL Classification:

D82

BORIS DOI:

10.7892/boris.145800

URI:

https://boris.unibe.ch/id/eprint/145800

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