Optimal Leniency Programs when Firms Have Cumulative and Asymmetric Evidence

Blatter, Marc; Emons, Winand; Sticher, Silvio (July 2014). Optimal Leniency Programs when Firms Have Cumulative and Asymmetric Evidence (Discussion Papers 14-05). Bern: Department of Economics

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An antitrust authority deters collusion using fines and a leniency program. Unlike in most of the earlier literature, our firms have imperfect cumulative evidence of the collusion. That is, cartel conviction is not automatic if one firm reports: reporting makes conviction only more
likely, the more so, the more firms report. Furthermore, the evidence is distributed asymmetrically among firms. Asymmetry of the evidence can increase the cost of deterrence if the high-evidence firm chooses to remain silent. Minimum-evidence standards may counteract this effect. Under a marker system only one firm reports; this may increase the cost of deterrence.

Item Type:

Working Paper

Division/Institute:

03 Faculty of Business, Economics and Social Sciences > Department of Economics

UniBE Contributor:

Blatter, Marc; Emons, Winand and Sticher, Silvio

Subjects:

300 Social sciences, sociology & anthropology > 330 Economics

Series:

Discussion Papers

Publisher:

Department of Economics

Language:

English

Submitter:

Lars Tschannen

Date Deposited:

18 Dec 2020 14:54

Last Modified:

18 Dec 2020 14:54

JEL Classification:

D43, K21, K42, L40

BORIS DOI:

10.7892/boris.145806

URI:

https://boris.unibe.ch/id/eprint/145806

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