Emons, Winand (October 2018). The Effectiveness of Leniency Programs when Firms choose the Degree of Collusion (Discussion Papers 18-16). Bern: Department of Economics
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An antitrust authority deters collusion using fines and a leniency program. It chooses the probability of an investigation. Firms pick the degree of collusion: The more they collude, the higher are profits, but so is the probability of detection. Firms thus trade-off higher profits
against higher expected fines. If firms are sufficiently patient, leniency is ineffective; it may even increase collusion. Increasing the probability of an investigation at low levels does not increase deterrence. Increasing the probability of an investigation at high levels reduces collusion, yet never completely.
Item Type: |
Working Paper |
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Division/Institute: |
03 Faculty of Business, Economics and Social Sciences > Department of Economics |
UniBE Contributor: |
Emons, Winand |
Subjects: |
300 Social sciences, sociology & anthropology > 330 Economics |
Series: |
Discussion Papers |
Publisher: |
Department of Economics |
Language: |
English |
Submitter: |
Lars Tschannen |
Date Deposited: |
03 Sep 2020 08:12 |
Last Modified: |
05 Dec 2022 15:40 |
JEL Classification: |
D43, K21, K42, L40 |
BORIS DOI: |
10.7892/boris.145867 |
URI: |
https://boris.unibe.ch/id/eprint/145867 |
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