Killer Acquisitions and Beyond: Policy Effects on Innovation Strategies

Letina, Igor; Schmutzler, Armin; Seibel, Regina (August 2020). Killer Acquisitions and Beyond: Policy Effects on Innovation Strategies (Working Paper Series 358). University of Zurich, Department of Economics

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This paper provides a theory of strategic innovation project choice by incumbents
and start-ups. We show that prohibiting killer acquisitions strictly reduces the variety
of innovation projects. By contrast, we find that prohibiting other acquisitions only
has a weakly negative innovation effect, and we provide conditions under which the
effect is zero. Furthermore, for both killer and other acquisitions, we identify market
conditions under which the innovation effect is small, so that prohibiting acquisitions
to enhance competition would be justified.

Item Type:

Working Paper

Division/Institute:

03 Faculty of Business, Economics and Social Sciences > Department of Economics

UniBE Contributor:

Letina, Igor

Subjects:

300 Social sciences, sociology & anthropology > 330 Economics

ISSN:

1664-705X

Series:

Working Paper Series

Publisher:

University of Zurich, Department of Economics

Language:

English

Submitter:

Dino Collalti

Date Deposited:

13 Jan 2021 15:49

Last Modified:

13 Jan 2021 15:49

URI:

https://boris.unibe.ch/id/eprint/150267

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