Werner, Jonas (2020). Contingent Objects, Contingent Propositions, and Essentialism. Mind, 130(520), pp. 1283-1294. Oxford University Press 10.1093/mind/fzaa080
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Trevor Teitel (2017) has recently argued that combining the assumption that modality reduces to essence with the assumption that possibly some objects contingently exist leads to problems if one wishes to uphold that the logic of metaphysical modality is S5. In this paper I will argue that there is a way for the essentialist to evade the problem described by Teitel. The proposed solution crucially involves the assumption that some propositions possibly fail to exist. I will show how this assumption affords a motivated contingentist response to Teitel’s argument.
Item Type: |
Journal Article (Original Article) |
|---|---|
Division/Institute: |
06 Faculty of Humanities > Department of Art and Cultural Studies > Institute of Philosophy 06 Faculty of Humanities > Department of Art and Cultural Studies > Institute of Philosophy > Theoretical Philosophy |
UniBE Contributor: |
Werner, Jonas |
Subjects: |
100 Philosophy 100 Philosophy > 110 Metaphysics |
ISSN: |
0026-4423 |
Publisher: |
Oxford University Press |
Language: |
English |
Submitter: |
Jonas Werner |
Date Deposited: |
08 Mar 2021 09:13 |
Last Modified: |
05 Dec 2022 15:48 |
Publisher DOI: |
10.1093/mind/fzaa080 |
BORIS DOI: |
10.48350/153024 |
URI: |
https://boris.unibe.ch/id/eprint/153024 |
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