Contingent Objects, Contingent Propositions, and Essentialism

Werner, Jonas (2020). Contingent Objects, Contingent Propositions, and Essentialism. Mind, pp. 1-12. Oxford University Press 10.1093/mind/fzaa080

[img] Text
Contingent_Objects__Contingent_Propositions__and_Essentialism.pdf - Published Version
Restricted to registered users only
Available under License Publisher holds Copyright.

Download (188kB) | Request a copy

Trevor Teitel (2017) has recently argued that combining the assumption that modality reduces to essence with the assumption that possibly some objects contingently exist leads to problems if one wishes to uphold that the logic of metaphysical modality is S5. In this paper I will argue that there is a way for the essentialist to evade the problem described by Teitel. The proposed solution crucially involves the assumption that some propositions possibly fail to exist. I will show how this assumption affords a motivated contingentist response to Teitel’s argument.

Item Type:

Journal Article (Original Article)

Division/Institute:

06 Faculty of Humanities > Department of Art and Cultural Studies > Institute of Philosophy
06 Faculty of Humanities > Department of Art and Cultural Studies > Institute of Philosophy > Theoretical Philosophy

UniBE Contributor:

Werner, Jonas

Subjects:

100 Philosophy
100 Philosophy > 110 Metaphysics

ISSN:

0026-4423

Publisher:

Oxford University Press

Language:

English

Submitter:

Jonas Werner

Date Deposited:

08 Mar 2021 09:13

Last Modified:

08 Mar 2021 09:20

Publisher DOI:

10.1093/mind/fzaa080

BORIS DOI:

10.48350/153024

URI:

https://boris.unibe.ch/id/eprint/153024

Actions (login required)

Edit item Edit item
Provide Feedback