Werner, Jonas (2020). A grounding-based measure of relative fundamentality. Synthese, 198(10), pp. 9721-9737. Springer Netherlands 10.1007/s11229-020-02676-2
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Reality is hierarchically structured, or so proponents of the metaphysical posit of grounding argue. The less fundamental facts obtain in virtue of, or are grounded in, the more fundamental facts. But what exactly is it for one fact to be more fundamental than another? The aim of this paper is to provide a measure of relative fundamentality. I develop and defend an account of the metaphysical hierarchy that assigns to each fact a set of ordinals representing the levels on which it occurs. The account allows one to compare any two facts with respect to their fundamentality and it uses immediate grounding as its sole primitive. In the first section, I will set the stage and point to some shortcomings of a rival account proposed by Karen Bennett. The second section will present my own proposal and the third section will discuss how it can be extended to non-foundationalist settings. The fourth section discusses potential objections.
Item Type: |
Journal Article (Original Article) |
|---|---|
Division/Institute: |
06 Faculty of Humanities > Department of Art and Cultural Studies > Institute of Philosophy 06 Faculty of Humanities > Department of Art and Cultural Studies > Institute of Philosophy > Theoretical Philosophy |
UniBE Contributor: |
Werner, Jonas |
Subjects: |
100 Philosophy 100 Philosophy > 110 Metaphysics |
ISSN: |
0039-7857 |
Publisher: |
Springer Netherlands |
Language: |
English |
Submitter: |
Jonas Werner |
Date Deposited: |
08 Mar 2021 09:31 |
Last Modified: |
29 May 2024 00:25 |
Publisher DOI: |
10.1007/s11229-020-02676-2 |
BORIS DOI: |
10.48350/153026 |
URI: |
https://boris.unibe.ch/id/eprint/153026 |
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