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# Corporate gift or political sacrifice? State-sponsored CSR and electricity provision in Guinean extractive enclaves

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ABSTRACT

Going beyond a static conceptualization of the mining enclave, recent research increasingly scrutinizes the role of corporate social responsibility (CSR) schemes as a means of territorial entanglement. Several authors refer to the notion of the "corporate gift" to describe these control and coping strategies as well as the resulting power relations between companies and the population around the production facilities. In this article, we focus on electricity provision as an example for such a "gift". Extensive field research in the Guinean mining areas of Siguiri, Kamsar, and Mambia showed that in all of these areas, the mining companies not only acted as "givers" of electricity, but also handed over the bill for this electricity provision to the state. Confronted with this curious fact of state-sponsored CSR, this article questions the foundations of the arguments around the notion of the corporate gift and comes to the conclusion that these three electrification projects were, at the same time, acts of "political sacrifice". This concept points beyond the obvious conclusion that mining companies try to maximize their legitimization efforts in an increasingly competitive environment and underlines the role of the state in "company-community" relations and the maintenance of extractive enclaves.

## 1. Introduction

The rising importance of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) as an operational field of governance in the mining sector came along with a renewal of the gift rhetoric to mediate relations between companies and local populations (Cross, 2011; Gardner, 2015; Rajak, 2011). Attention paid to forms of corporate giving has contributed to nuance Ferguson's thesis on enclave economies (2005), by showing that extractive enclaves were not merely disconnected territories, but that they strongly relied on local entanglements to justify their relative immunity from the law (Le Meur, 2017; cf.; Barkan, 2013, p. 4) or to securitize their borders (Welker, 2009). Rather than "thinning social relations", as Ferguson's thesis suggests, mining enclaves "thicken politics" (Côte & Korf, 2018) through various mechanisms and channels of governance, of which corporate giving has become one of the most dominant.

In this article, we contribute to this endeavour by analysing the CSR-mediated politics of electricity provision in three Guinean mining towns and settlements, namely Siguiri, Kamsar and Mambia, where major extractive corporations for gold (Siguiri) and bauxite (Kamsar and Mambia) are located. Building on the concept of the corporate gift, our analysis paradoxically points to the crucial role of the Guinean state as a sponsor of these schemes through debt and reallocation of royalties. In order to do justice to the under-scrutinized role of the state in CSR, or what we coin "state-sponsored CSR", we critically reinterpret the bipartite concept of corporate gift and offer instead to analyse such tripartite exchanges as a form of political sacrifice. Heuristically drawing on Maussian notions of gift exchange and sacrifice (Mauss, 1925 [2007]; Huber and Mauss, 1899 [2010]), we thus contend that the cases of state-sponsored CSR we present come close to the concept of political sacrifice, which differentiates on the giving side between a sacrifier (the "sponsor") and a sacrificer (the "performer"). In our case studies, the state is the sacrifier and endures the costs of electricity provision, the company as the sacrificer performs the gift, and the population (or at least part of it) is the receiver - of its own gift one could say. The Maussian lens of gift exchanges helps us to shed a new light on debates about sovereignty in mining contexts by paying attention to the role of the state in the financial underpinnings of certain CSR schemes, and thereby in the maintenance and perpetuation of extractive enclaves.

In Guinea, since the construction of the first industrial mines in the years 1960, electricity in mining towns has almost fully been provided

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by mining corporations. This sector has grown continuously since then, and extractive industries now contribute to nearly 90 per cent of Guinean exports (OEC 2018). Due to the weak public infrastructure provision in the country this means that, until today, at least half of Guinean electricity is produced, or – as we will see – at least controlled by private companies (cf. Samb, 2006). Mining towns like Fria, Kamsar, Sangaredi and Siguiri were among the first Guinean cities to receive electricity and until now, this provision came fully (Sangaredi and Siguiri) or partly (Kamsar) from generators in the mines. Together with a wide range of other services, electricity provision formed part of a paternalist model of company towns for a while (cf. Pauthier, 2002, p. 16), but in the 1990s, mostly as a consequence of the hegemonic triumph of economic liberalism, this model, which was comparatively generous in *material* terms (in contrast to local self-determination), was gradually replaced by the concept of corporate social responsibility (CSR). From then on, electricity increasingly became part of the CSR apparatus of mining companies, which, as a whole, works as a standardized set of legitimation and security strategies (for the latter, see Zalik, 2004, p. 419; Welker, 2014).

Based on the case studies of three of the major extractive corporations of gold and bauxite (and de facto energy providers) in Guinea, we build upon the corporate gift of electricity provision to compare local practices of infrastructural power, and look transversally at the evolution of these practices in time. In doing so, the article questions the assumption that the state and mining companies compete for territorial sovereignty (cf. Emel & al., 2011) and rather calls for an integrated view based on a two-step approach. First, by embedding electrification projects in the socio-historical context of Guinea, we point to changing relational configurations between the state and mining companies in making and maintaining extractive enclaves. Second, by critically drawing on the notion of the corporate gift (Cross, 2011; Rajak, 2011), on which mining companies mostly base their "social license to operate", we destabilize the predominant narrative of a bipartite exchange between the company and the local community that tends to ignore the involvement of the state. In our case studies, this private-public entanglement not only becomes apparent in state participation, the power of private wealth, and the consolidation of the economic and political elite, but also in the curious fact that companies perform as "givers" of electricity, while, in fact, the state pays for the gift.

This peculiar mise-en-scène partly results from the fact that companies are (or feel) increasingly forced to portray themselves as benefactors (Hilson, 2012, p. 132) while competition for ore deposits becomes increasingly fierce (see e.g. Southall & Melber, 2009). By analysing the resulting practices of state-sponsored CSR as forms of "political sacrifice", this article not only challenges the bipartite notion of the corporate gift that tends to ignore the state, but it also discusses the possible reasons of its relative success by connecting it to Guinean (and West African) ideas and conceptions of the state. This leads us to reconsider the relations between the state and mining corporations, often viewed in terms of competition, and to propose a more integrated view where both play a complementary role in performing the enclave dimension of extractive spaces. Such argument comes in line with recent scholarship on the local diversity of social, political and territorial entanglements of mining companies (e.g. Côte & Korf, 2018; Le Meur, 2017; Rubbers, 2019; Welker, 2014), including their role in electricity provision (Bolay, 2014; Kesselring, 2017; cf. Jaglin & Dubresson, 2016). Following many of these recent publications, we provide another case for reformulating Ferguson's conception of extractive enclaves as primarily bounded spaces disconnected from the local environment (2005) and call, in particular, for more attention to be paid to the financial agreements underlying the instrumental use of CSR in the governance of mining enclaves. Methodologically speaking, we take companies' discourses of corporate giving as an invitation to empirically look at the actors involved, their respective roles, and the terms and content of the exchanges that underpin electricity provision. Our findings are based on ethnographic observations and interviews in the mining areas of Siguiri, Kamsar and Mambia, notably with city dwellers, farmers, artisanal miners, mine employees, corporate staff, civil society representatives, public servants and other local authorities. Both authors have visited these places several times between 2009 and 2019 and have spent several months there. We were introduced to the field both by company employees and local dwellers with whom we sometimes resided, which made us aware of the very different perceptions and assessments of electrification projects, depending on the position of the observer.

## 2. Mining enclaves and the corporate gift

With increasing expectations towards multinational corporations to become agents of development at the local level (Banks et al., 2016), mining companies have gained greater legitimacy in exercising infrastructural power. Guinea can be considered a typical case of "hybrid governance" (Geenen, 2016; Hönke, 2013) where the state operates alongside 'informal' and other 'non-state' organizations, including corporations, in the exercise of public authority and service provision. The government mostly bases its control over the population on despotic power (in the sense of Mann, 1984, p. 55), while much of its infrastructure is in fact controlled by corporate headquarters outside the country. Besides international development agencies, mining companies play a central role in providing this infrastructure. This leads to a considerable number of political and economic enclaves whose fate depends at least as much on decisions of transnational mining companies in Moscow, Johannesburg or Pittsburgh, as on decisions of the government in Conakry. The difference between private and public actors and interests is hard to uphold within such a constellation. In Guinea, this is further complicated by the fact that the state holds significant stakes in several mines and the boundaries between CSR and legal obligations are particularly fuzzy (see case studies). This leads the local population in Guinean mining areas to increasingly address private companies as primary political decision makers, while local politicians are increasingly seen as powerless, because they seem to oversee little investments compared to corporate actors.

Since the 2000s, these changes have increasingly been framed by corporations in terms of obtaining a "social license to operate" and ensuring their "corporate social responsibility". Among other things, these concepts have emerged against the background of structural adjustment, going along with a decreasing demand for local labor, mainly due to ongoing mechanization and new spatial arrangements like fly-in-fly-out schemes (cf. Li, 2010). The surrounding population is less and less addressed as a (potential) workforce and increasingly conceived as an imagined "local community". As a consequence, the complexity of local constellations in terms of values, aspirations and interests is continuously simplified through managerial categories as just an additional "risk" to deal with. Concepts like "corporate responsibility", "communities", and the "social licence to operate" have thus become central elements of standardized sets of discourses and practices meant to regulate the relations between mining corporations and the population directly affected by their operations (Kirsch, 2014).

Given that mining operations depend on the territorial appropriation and even enclosure of land that is granted on lease by national governments for periods of at least 20 years, the CSR departments of mining companies are inevitably involved in issues of governance, securitization and sovereignty. Though the notion of "enclave" may suggest rigid boundaries and disconnection (e.g. Ferguson, 2005), Le Meur (2017, p. 160) makes the point that enclavement also requires a certain degree of entanglement and is the outcome of *institutional, material* and *ideological* endeavors. CSR programmes have become very efficient tools for building and maintaining the *ideological* boundaries of extractive enclaves in ways that aim to reduce frictions with the local environment, especially by resorting to the gift rhetoric. For instance, in a study of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative on Guinea (EITI, 2015), so-called "voluntary payments" by mining companies entailed the construction of educational and health infrastructure, well drillings, different sorts of workshops, as well as the maintenance of roads, bridges and dams that are in fact of direct use to the companies. Companies' reports systematically refer to such "voluntary payments" to highlight the concrete realizations of their CSR like the construction of a health center, the equipment of a school with computers (e.g. AGA, 2018) or, as is of interest here, an electrification project (AGA, 2012).

Corporate gifts nurture the perception of enclosure, and thereby of enclaves, by perpetuating a paternalist mode of operation. Companies tend to incorporate locals – or rather a limited number of local elites – into their CSR schemes to increase the legitimacy and security of their operations (see e.g. Rajak, 2011; Welker, 2009) ) by seemingly compensating for the negative impact of the industry (i.e. loss of land, pollution, etc.). This underlying logic of CSR follows longstanding postcolonial practices of compensation that avoid positioning locals as right holders (Campbell, 2012). Compensations can take a great variety of forms, ranging from direct payments to job provision, but in the context of Guinea and other low-income countries where extraction is highly profitable, CSR programs nearly always focus on a large set of social services and infrastructure, which states do not, or scarcely, provide. This includes health programs, education, access to water, or electricity. As Rajak (2011, p. 14) notes – and this also seems to be the case for electricity in Guinea – these services are indeed quite often more effectively executed by the company than by the state. This inevitably leads to profound political ambiguities that question assumptions about state sovereignty imagined as circumscribed to a well-defined territory managed by a state "with the autonomous capacity of controlling" (Emel et al., 2011, p. 72): Who is then "responsible" for providing water, education, electricity, health care, etc.?

Mining companies have tended to resolve this ambiguity and avoid the responsibilities associated with their sovereign power (Barkan, 2013, chap. V) by referring to the notion of the "corporate gift", and thereby discursively insulating CSR practices from the political implications of extractive projects (Cross, 2014; Gardner, 2012; Rajak, 2011). Gardner, for instance, has shown how Chevron's funding of micro-credit programs in communities surrounding its Bibiyanna plant in Banglasdesh ultimately aimed to remain disconnected from communities' claims and complaints (2012); the CSR argument was that the "gift" (here, access to micro-credit), would allow communities to "help themselves" (2012, p. 165), thereby delegitimizing compensation demands made to Chevron. Particularly in constellations of mining conflicts, gifts serve as means of "appeasement" (Gardner, 2015, p. 496) that sustain long-established paternalistic (between donors and receivers) and clientelistic (between patrons and clients) power relations. Focusing on material needs, these practises dismiss, circumvent and undermine other claims of ownership, accessibility and transparency, which would allow for a greater redistribution of mineral wealth.

By examining the discursive framing of the binding relations and obligations involved in the morality of gift exchange, many scholars were able to substantiate their critical analytical stance towards CSR (cf. Cross, 2014, p. 124). Yet, one of the less explicit underlying premises of these approaches is that the Maussian notion of the gift is binary in nature, thus implying two parties in an exchange. Moreover, this dichotomy is in fact partly created and maintained by the act of giving. Drawing on Strathern's (1999) notions of personhood and detachment, Cross (2014, p. 124) argues for instance that beyond its social power in terms of establishing hierarchies, the corporate gift is itself an effective tool to create social persons or parties, and therefore establish power relations. Indeed, much of the anthropological literature on mining demonstrates that so-called corporate gifts lead to separations and reifications of groups and persons; for example the "local community" (Welker, 2014), the "local leaders" (Gardner, 2012), the "autochthons" (Bolay, 2014), the "indigenous" (Golub, 2014), or the "landowners" (Jorgensen, 2007) on the receiving end, and "the corporation" on the giving end. However fruitful, the final image which the gift framework tends to provide when applied to CSR, is one made of two – albeit constructed – opposite parts: the locals and the corporation, thus leaving the state out of the picture. This "omission" can be partly explained by what was coined as the relative absence of the state in large portions of African national territories, and subsequently by the conceptions of extractive enclaves as a typical feature of "weak states" (Ferguson, 2005). However, the cases we analyse tell a different story that challenges narratives on corporate giving and calls to carefully take into consideration the local political histories of company-community relations (c.f. Gardner, 2012). Despite being described and promoted in such terms as well, we contend that the electrification of mining areas in Guinea was in fact the outcome of a tripartite exchange in which corporations only "performed" as givers, while the costs were borne by the state. In Maussian terms, such state-sponsored corporate responsibility follows the scheme of the sacrifice rather than the gift: the giving end entails two entities, one which performs (*the sacrificer* or the company) and one which endures the costs (*the sacrifier* or the state; Hubert and Mauss, 1898; Ch. II).[1] Together, they benefit from what Graeber would call the political dimension of sacrifice (2001, p.113) – in this case, reduced risks for capitalist resource extraction due to more robust ideological boundaries of the mining enclave.[2]

In the following sections of this paper, we will explore these questions first by situating the electrification of company towns in the Guinean socio-historical context and by pointing to the relational configurations between the state and mining companies. Then, we will compare the three case studies from the viewpoint of corporate giving. In a last step, we will link our findings with McGovern's (2013) understanding of the relation between *hosts* (expected to act as sacrifier) and *guests* (expected to act as sacrificer) which shapes much of the political life in Guinea.

## 3. Mining companies and the fragmented electrification of Guinea

In 1958, on the eve of independence, Guinea was about to receive a power plant comparable to the Akosombo dam in Ghana, which has remained until today the largest artificial lake in the world (measured in terms of surface). The motivation for this late colonial project was the same as in Ghana: power generation for the transformation of bauxite into aluminium. To the leaders of independence, these projects were perceived as the first light switches of a modernization process that was going to illuminate whole countries within a few years, along with industrial fishing, irrigation schemes, consumer goods industries and so on (see e.g. , Condé, 1972; Wiederstein, 1994, pp. 35–38). While most of these hopes have proven untenable, it is understandable that they were triggered by plans for constructing aluminum smelters.[3]

In Guinea, detailed plans of the colonial administration for the integrated production of aluminum out of bauxite have not been implemented because of Guinea's unilateral declaration of independence in 1958 and the following deterioration of relations between the French and Guinean governments. The plans nonetheless resulted in the first

[1] Caillé (2007, p. 149) rightly argues that, although the thesis on sacrifice initially addressed the field or religion, it is also applicable to other supra-entities such as the nation or the society. Its destination to a "superior entity" (Huber and Mauss, 1899[2010], p.16–17) is precisely what distinguishes the sacrifice from the gift. According to Caillé (2007, p. 145), besides its tripartite structure, the main distinction of the sacrifice from common gifts - including the obligation to accept and reciprocate - is thus its explicit *utilitarian* dimension for religious and/or political aim.

[2] In the existing literature, the logic of a political sacrifice can mainly be understood in the relations between companies and their countries of origin, such as the practice of tied aid (Nuscheler, 2012, pp. 314-7). However, under the title of "political discharge" (Hibou, 1999; Mbembe, 2000), more and more studies are emphasising the deterritorialization of these private-public entanglements. Our findings fit quite neatly into this evolving literature.

[3] Today, the about 200 worldwide existing aluminum smelters consume as much energy as all the inhabitants of Sub-Saharan Africa (authors).

(and until now the only) alumina refinery on the African continent. Bauxite has to be transformed into alumina ($Al^2O^3$) before aluminum can be produced by separating oxygen from aluminum through the energy-intensive Hall–Héroult process. In the 1950s, the colonial government started to construct an entire city called Fria, which included roads, story buildings for the workers, villas for the managers, the best hospital of the country, water treatment, recreation centers, hotels etc., and, last but not least, a power plant in the mine both for the production process and the local population. Fria thereby became the so-called "Petit Paris" of Guinea, attracting the elite from all over the country for work, education, shopping, recreation and medical treatment. This process was repeated in a quite similar manner for the bauxite towns of Sangaredi and Kamsar in the late 1960s, which were built under the joint venture "Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinée - CBG", led by the American aluminum major Alcoa. In the 1970s, a third production network, the "Office des Bauxites de Kindia - OBK" (today "Compagnie des Bauxites de Kindia - CBK) was established (Knierzinger, 2018, p. 132). This bauxite mine was connected to the Soviet Union and was taken over by the private company Rusal in 2001.[4]

Since the 1960s, aluminium ore had been the dominating export commodity of Guinea, accounting for over two thirds of exports until 2013 (OEC, 2018). In the 2010s, gold became a second pillar of Guinean exports, mainly due to the strong rise of gold prices since then. Currently, gold accounts for around 37 percent of exports and bauxite for 49 (calculations of the authors based on USGS, 2018 and SMB, 2018). Gold is sourced mainly from two large-scale mines,[5] of which Kintinian (in the Siguiri prefecture) is the largest and oldest one. Gold regions were less prone to the kind of company-led urbanization that occurred in bauxite towns because of gold's materiality and extraction process – necessitating either labor-intensive artisanal extraction in informal settings or formal, capital intensive extraction by mining companies with comparatively little labor requirements. Though they had been artisanally exploited for centuries, Guinean gold deposits did not lead to a model of industrial capital-intensive exploitation during the colonial period, as in other famous gold-rich regions of Africa. Given the access constraints from the coastal cities, colonizers continued to rely on a system of indirect labor control based on complex lineage-based systems of clan affiliation that structured artisanal production, rather than to invest in mechanized infrastructure (Luning et al., 2014). Only in 1996, the Société Aurifère de Guinée (SAG), today to 85% owned by Anglogold Ashanti, started its first operations in Bouré (around Kintinian, Siguiri).

Up to now, most mining fields are occupied by informal artisanal miners (*orpailleurs*) who work on their own and sell their products almost on a daily basis through informal channels, altogether producing at least 20% of Guinean gold and employing around 300,000 people, according to recent estimations (Seccatore & al., 2014). The rest is produced by large companies like SAG which deploy lots of effort to remain politically disconnected from the artisanal sector with which they are in competition for land and gold resources. SAG employs very little local labor, but due to its proximity to the city of Siguiri and because of the strong sense of ownership of Bouré dwellers concerning gold resources, the company had few other choices than to link up with the local population in order to avoid the so-called "costs of conflicts". In Siguiri, the initial 8890 $km^2$ exploration lease, which was granted by the government of Lansana Conté in 1988 was described as absurdly huge even by officials of the Ministry of Mines at this time (Soumah, 2010). This resulted in an almost continuous expansion of the mines over the Bouré area, coupled with the displacement of entire villages and the closure of artisanal mining fields to make room for new pits and processing plants, which led to increasing tensions. From the start, the provision of electricity by SAG to the city of Siguiri, and later to the villages of Bouré, epitomized the efforts of the company to appease these tensions by bringing "development" to the community.

From the 1990s onwards, the mining companies were increasingly determined to reduce their non-core business that still remained from the paternalistic approach of colonial and early post-colonial mining, while at the same time increasingly using CSR as a tool to appease the population. As the three Guinean bauxite mines dated from the 1960s and 1970s, so did their industrial relations. This led to the situation that mining companies invested less and less into social welfare while at the same time increasingly advertising the programmes and investments that were left. In view of this contradiction, electricity provision remained one of the most tangible positive side effects of mining for the local population. Apart from the administrative core of the capital Conakry, the few mining areas continued to be the only areas of the Guinean territory to have a relatively stable access to power. However, as we will show in the next section, contrary to the corporate framing of these projects as gifts, all of them went along with public debt. This concerns debts of Guinea versus the French government and Pechiney in the case of Fria; Guinean debt versus the Soviet Union, whose claims have been taken over by Rusal; debts of the state versus CBG; and debts of the state towards Anglogold Ashanti. In what follows, we take a closer look at the contexts of these various electrification deals and insist on the role of public debt, which points to the state as being the actual sponsor of CSR, the *sacrifier*, while mining companies only perform the gift of electrification, thereby acting as *sacrificers*.

## 4. Three cases of state-sponsored corporate social responsibility

Apart from land issues, demonstrations in Guinean mining towns mainly occur because of water and power shortages, as well as imbalances in the local distribution of these goods. In the last five years, such demonstrations happened in Mambia (near Kindia), Siguiri, Kamsar, Sangaredi, Fria, and recently also in Boké, which hosts a Chinese-controlled mine that has started to export bauxite in 2016. In September 2017, demonstrations for a return of electricity and water in Boké led to clashes with security forces, resulting in several deaths and dozens of injuries. The inhabitants of Boké demonstrated for more than 10 days, setting on fire almost all public buildings, including the town hall, the sub-prefectural headquarters, the residence of the sub-prefect and the gendarmerie post. Government officials talked about a rarely seen aggression against "public symbols and representatives". Young men armed with clubs, sticks and gas cans also attacked private persons and hospital staff, tried to remove the rails of the bauxite trains tracks, and blocked the routes of mining trucks and petrol trucks alimenting the thermal plants of the mines. In Siguiri, in 2015, several persons were injured when the military opened fire on residents during the forced relocation of parts of the village of Kintinian which was to be exploited by the SAG thereafter. Three years later, during a protest to increase electricity provision in the whole area, 43 people were injured again by military forces, 10 of which by gunshots.

While public institutions are usually among the first ones to be attacked, mining companies sometimes manage to side with the population during such uprisings. As will be exemplified in the following section, the difference between public and private is not always easy to make. This provides considerable scope of action and room for discursive reframing for both private and public actors. In Kamsar, Siguiri and Débélé/Mambia, which will be analysed in detail below, companies reacted inter alia by reframing state-sponsored electricity provision as corporate social responsibility.

### 4.1. The compagnie des bauxites de guinée (CBG) in kamsar

According to the Agence Nationale d'Aménagement des Infrastructures Minières, about 80% of the population of Kamsar is "deprived of an acceptable level of basic public services", mainly due to a lack of sufficient drinking water and electricity (Diawara, 2014, p. 62).

4 https://rusal.ru/en/about/34/.

5 There is also an important artisanal activity which is held mostly informally and therefore is not accounted in official export numbers.

The respondents spoke of a "total separation" (ibid.) in the city: only the approximately 50,000 inhabitants of the inner city ("Kamsar cité") have always been connected to the grid. In 2010, as a reaction to the recurrent demonstrations, the government signed a contract with the private Guinean company SMS Kakandé to provide electricity to Kamsar village, where another 50,000–100,000 people live (the figures vary considerably depending on the source). With financial support from the World Bank, CBG, which is 49% state-owned, installed a 4 MW generator that requires 150 L of fuel per day. As in many other cases, this fuel was provided by the mining company and should have been paid for by the consumers themselves. However, as this did not work, the operator SMS Kakandé increasingly took on debts with CBG. After two years the contract was not renewed and the government started to guarantee the debt and asked CBG to continue its fuel supply. This worked for several months, but soon the company stopped supplying fuel again, as neither the company nor the government paid for it. In February 2016, the CEO of CBG stated in a public interview that CBG was still producing electricity for the village of Kamsar. At that time, the public debt to CBG amounted to 5 billion GNF or about 500,000 USD.[6] According to Bah (2015, pp. 61–62), these 500,000 USD amounted to 18 percent of the total CSR budget for the rural communities ("communes rurales riveraines").[7] If these figures are correct, this means that a substantial part of the CBG's CSR budget is actually cross-financed by the state.

Our own research in the years 2014 and 2017 showed a considerable lack of transparency with regard to these figures. Despite several attempts and even a contract with the CBG regarding our research in Kamsar, we have not been able to obtain comprehensive data nor a clear distinction between voluntary CSR and commitments (Knierzinger, 2018, pp. 169-173). Considering the lack of transparency regarding tax payments in Guinea in general (see below), this is not surprising. This opacity results, among other things, from contradictory regulations (cf. with the term "institutional addition" by Bierschenk & Olivier de Sardan, 1999, p. 52) and the highly controversial applicability of the new mining law of 2013 to old mining contracts (see Knierzinger, 2016, pp.1-2). In the case of CBG, this situation is further complicated by its private-publiccharacter combined with its high contribution to the Guinean budget.

On the 16th of January 2012, people took to the streets because SMS Kakandé had announced that it would raise prices while at the same time failing to provide electricity as scheduled. When protesters looted the police headquarters and the buildings of the sub-prefecture, one of them was shot dead (Knierzinger, 2018, p. 165). According to the police commissioner, these buildings were the usual targets of the recurrent demonstrations, as they are located at the entrance of the city centre and the headquarters. He went on to say that CBG's infrastructure had never been damaged during the demonstrations until then. When asked how this was possible, he replied:

> "In such a case, we are ready to sacrifice the life of someone who attacks CBG! Our mission here is CBG. We have to do everything to protect the property of CBG. It's CBG which pays more than how many million [sic] Guinean civil servants"

At the time of the interview, the Commissioner was accommodated by CBG, received 40 L of fuel per month and had access to cheaper foodstuffs of CBG. Most police, navy, customs and military officers in Guinean mining towns enjoy similar privileges. In Kamsar, all police officers receive subsidized food from the state, and about half of them also receive similar benefits from CBG. Several of them are accommodated by the company. In Sangaredi, a second CBG mining town, the company accommodated the police commissioner and a considerable number of police officers, the gendarmerie commander, his deputy and four other subordinates, as well as the sub-prefect and his deputy, the secretary general of CU Sangaredi and many teachers.

The fact that CBG buildings have never been attacked certainly has to do with this clientelism comprising of almost all formal employment and thus a large part of the population. In particular petrol, for electricity generation and mobility, plays a key role for the maintenance of Guinean power relations. Several interview partners stated that a huge part of the petrol that is meant for electricity generation is sold on the black market. In addition, CBG also gives out petrol when police patrols pass by. The last CEO of CBG, Kémoko Touré, had tried to rule out these practices along with subsidized food-provisions for non-workers. Since he left, relations between the police and the company have improved. The police commissioner of Kamsar also commented on this issue in a relatively straightforward manner:

> "You see, when you work for the factories, the expectations are even higher. Sometimes when we want to patrol, for example, we ask for fuel. There is none. That's why I said that there have not been healthy relations"

The astonishing fact that the CBG buildings have never been touched by recurrent violent demonstrations certainly has to do with co-optation of parts of the population (of the workers, the civil servants and especially the security forces). This is not to say that the company is necessarily pursuing a deliberate strategy to divide the population (cf. Luning, 2012a, p. 26), but it is certainly trying to maintain control by providing services to parts of the population and thus to present at least parts of its profit-oriented operations as benefactions. This has been the case in Guinea since colonial times and perhaps even earlier, but the role of formal political actors has never been less visible than today. Our focus on the publicly-financed electricity supply in the village of Kamsar is an extreme case of such a reinterpretation of social exchange relations: Although the company still insists that the state repay its expenses, it has included the same amount in its CSR budget. The company thus not only presents itself as a benefactor, but also reinterprets actual government services as private aid. In the following section, we present two other cases in Guinea, which indicate that the state often plays a much more important role in the effective provision of corporate gifts than the existing literature suggests.

### 4.2. Anglogold Ashanti In Siguiri

When SAG was founded in 1996, the company had nearly no contact with the surrounding populations and applied a "fortress" approach (Hönke, 2013) as its main enclavement strategy, with military protection within its lease limits (Soumah, 2010). However, this approach changed since the merger of Anglogold with Ashanti Goldfields Corporation in 2004, which resulted in a strong increase of mining operations and the construction of a new processing plant. The increase of SAG operations led to greater concerns and voice in the neighbouring villages – some of which had been displaced to dig new mineshafts. In addition, by becoming even larger, the exploited part of the lease was also becoming more difficult to control by simple fencing, private protection and military forces. From then on, the company followed the motto that "governance is cheaper than defense", as promoted by the International Council on Mining and Metals (ICMM, 2006), and started to systematically integrate CSR along with its operations. Since then, SAG's extractive enclave has built upon a mix of territorial governance through the company's CSR apparatus and the continual upgrading of transport infrastructure to operate as offshore-like as possible. In Kintinian, the company built roads between the pits and the plant, and between the plant and Siguiri airport, which is a state-owned infrastructure that only

[6] https://guinee7.com/namory-conde-dg-de-la-cbg-letat-nous-doit-5-milliards-de-francs-guineens/.

[7] Of the total 2.75 million USD in CSR payments to rural communities, CBG paid 1.5 million USD for water and electricity in Kamsar, Boké and Sangaredi, of which 500,000 USD went to Kamsar village. Only the remaining 750,000 USD went to other sectors such as community infrastructure construction, small local business creation, cheap food and disaster relief (Bah 2016, pp. 61–62).

operates flights on behalf of the gold mining company. Far from the shining image of "Petit Paris" in Fria, the rest of the city which counts nearly 200,000 inhabitants, has no paved roads except for its principal axis. Expatriate employees working for the mining company live in gated barracks on site, and local employees arrive every day in company buses from Siguiri.

Electrification has been at the core of the company's CSR strategy and has proven to work efficiently in creating a positive image of the company in the rest of the country where dwellers of Siguiri – "where there is light continuously" – are seen as being the lucky beneficiaries of mineral extraction and private foreign investment. When, in 2004, the company was about to displace the entire village of Kofilani to build a second processing plant, contestation was so high that Anglogold Ashanti agreed to provide electricity in Siguiri through its own power plant. This first "electrification project" durably transformed the relation of the SAG with the heterogeneous population who, from then on, was dependent on the company for electricity provision, although to different degrees. Daily power cuts largely contributed to a reorganization of the temporal order and periodically triggered diatribes that were also connected to other (unfulfilled) promises of SAG, such as the provision of jobs for locals and the maintenance of the road to villages in the Kintinian sub-prefecture. In spite of these reoccurring demonstrations the topos of the corporate gift already seemed to strongly influence public opinion. Participant observation and interviews conducted between 2009 and 2015 showed that the discourse was strongly polarized with one part of the population taking up the rhetoric of the company and welcoming the fact that it "offered" electricity to the population, and others continuing to insist that the company was extracting "their gold" and that electricity provision was hence the least that the company could do to compensate for this pillage; that is to reciprocate with an obligatory counter-gift in the form of electricity.

While the initial corporate gift of electricity only covered the centre of the prefecture where political power was concentrated, the villagers in the Bouré area, altogether more than 100,000 inhabitants, which were directly affected by the operations (displacement, land seizure, dust, etc.), felt that not only were they negatively impacted by the mining company, but they were also deprived of compensation. Numerous discontent groups (urban youths demanding work, local resident demanding compensations and access to electricity like in Siguiri, artisanal miners demanding access to land) regularly allied and thereby increased the frequency of blockades against the company. SAG reacted again by deploying a new "plan d'action stratégique" which contained the extension of power supply to adjacent villages. In 2010, SAG announced that its CSR engagement would extend its first electrification project and acquire a new generator to provide electricity to nine villages close to the mine.

By then, the company also followed dominant trends in the sector by merging its CSR branch with its security branch (AGA, 2011, p. 37). This strategical shift led to a growing number of CSR projects, many of which were repeatedly said to favour local elites, in particular by favouring local "clans" (Arnaldi di Balme, 2013). Without delving into all the details of this process (for more see Bolay, 2014, 2016), this second phase of electrification is worth being briefly analysed through the lens of exchange and its impact on infrastructural power and company-state relations. First, whereas the new mining code of 2013 stipulated the creation of a Local Development Fund ("Fonds de Développement Local", art. 130), the electrification project displayed all the attributes of a gift – especially in view of the infrastructural power it created and the allegiance it demanded from the receiver. SAG indeed admitted later (see VCC, 2013) that its community relations agents ignored local decision-making procedures as stipulated in the new mining code (which should result in local development plans) and thereby privileged pre-existing (clientelist) relations that better suited the interests of the company. Insisting on efficiency, SAG bypassed local institutions and arbitrarily allocated electricity as a gift.

Second, through the lens of the corporate gift, the actual position of "the giver" performed by SAG towards its audience framed as the "local community" is fuzzier than it appears since the company did not assume the costs that amounted to 5 million USD (République de Guinée, 2015) for the extension of the project. Indeed, the second round of electrification was part of a deal with the Guinean government to whom SAG invoiced all the costs and installed "a schedule of payment in order to ensure that the *debt* accrued within the context of the project is re-absorbed progressively" (AGA, 2013, p. 105). The accounts of the company count zero-sum investment under the label of electricity (EITI, 2015), thereby confirming that the costs were fully attributed to the state through the agreed loan. Following dominant trends in the CSR arena (Dolan & Rajak, 2016, pp. 11–16), SAG had moved to a more contractual relation with the Guinean government in which service provision – rather than paternalistic gift – would supposedly favour autonomy and responsibility, or what has elsewhere been called a "corporate ethic of detachment" (Cross, 2011; Gardner, 2012). In the eyes of the population, however, the company was still the "giver". Although SAG was considered obliged to reciprocate among critical voices that claimed for due compensation, everyone would agree that its role included providing services that the state was incapable of furnishing. Since SAG was laying the lines and since the power plant was located within its compound, the extension of power supply was explicitly framed by the company's CSR branch (AGA, 2013) and perceived by the population as a "gift". It also left unchanged the relations of dependency towards SAG which, in practice, can switch the power on or off across all the connected villages.

### 4.3. Rusal in Débélé/Mambia

The bauxite mine of Débélé in the sub-prefecture of Mambia remained under the control of the Guinean government until the 1990s, when the Soviet Union was dissolved and Russian aluminum facilities were gradually taken over by the oligarch Oleg Deripaska during the so-called aluminum wars in post-soviet Russia (Peck, 2011). This disarray in Russia directly affected bauxite mining in Débélé, whose management searched for new investors until 2001, when Deripaska and his company Rusal emerged as winners in the post-soviet struggle for control over the Russian aluminum industry. In the same year, Rusal started to rent the facilities,[8] now renamed "Compagnie des bauxites de Kindia – CBK". The company obtained a comprehensive tax exemption until 2003 and presented its plans to further reduce salaries, which were already the lowest of the sector, and to replace retiring Guineans by Russian workers. This led to strikes and demonstrations, which were amplified due to the increasingly tense political situation in Guinea in the mid-2000s, when the global mining boom led to the end of a long social and economic downturn.

Among other things, these global developments coincided with the death of Guinea's second long-term president, Lansana Conté (in power from 1984 to 2008), which further contributed to social movements all over the country. Conté was replaced by the self-proclaimed revolutionary Moussa Dadis Camara, who imposed a military rule and was initially quite popular due to his aggressive campaigns against drug trafficking, corruption, and the pillaging of Guinea by "international crooks" (Knierzinger 2018, p. 100)(authors). Camara took on fights with virtually every major mining company on Guinean soil, mainly by questioning the legality of existing mining conventions. This included a particularly fierce confrontation with Rusal. Camara considered Rusal's take-over of Fria in 2006 as fraudulent and repeatedly announced a renationalization of its assets. This popular facet of the new regime was soon overshadowed by its oppressive character. On the 28th of

[8] According to the former Prime Minister Lansana Kouyaté, Rusal's rent payments for the facilities in Débélé, the whole railway to Conakry, the port and the offices, workers' homes, and other infrastructure in Débélé and Conakry are comparable to the rent for a "simple villa" (Knierzinger 2018, p. 134).

September 2009, 157 people were killed and 1200 injured during an opposition rally in the national stadium that was raided by the army (Arieff & Cook, 2009). A few months later, in December 2009, Camara was wounded during an assassination attempt by his own aide-de-camp and went into exile.

This nationwide political struggle was also fought out in Mambia, a sub-prefecture of about 30,000 inhabitants, where Rusal stopped paying local taxes from 2007 to 2010.[9] The explications and the exact timeline for this refusal differ considerably depending on the sources. The *directeur adjoint* of the mine explained that Rusal had paid 200,000 USD in local taxes in 2005/2006, which were meant for the construction of a secondary school and a health centre, but were embezzled by the governor and prefect of Kindia. Another source mentioned an electrification project of the Guinean government in 2003 in Mambia that did not work out. Either way, all interviewees agreed on the fact that Rusal stopped paying local taxes from 2007 to 2010 and explained this stop of payments by pointing to the misappropriation of former payments. It seems likely that Guinea's tense political situation which began in 2007 led to a democratic mass movement, and culminated in the death of President Lansana Conté and the political coup of Moussa Dadis Camara in December 2008, added to Rusal's unwillingness to pay taxes.

During this period, demonstrations for electrification and other critical infrastructure such as schools, hospitals and access to drinking water occurred repeatedly in Mambia. Similar to the situation in the early 2000s, when Rusal had taken over, these demonstrations led to several deaths and severe injuries (caused by the military) as well as detentions, for instance of the later mayor of Mambia, who was held in jail for 3 weeks. In 2008, Rusal decided to side with the mayor and transferred its local taxes directly to operators who had been chosen by the local authorities. Mambia thereby became the first bauxite settlement that was connected to the national grid instead of a power supply from the mining facilities. In 2009, the Mambian sub-prefecture accounted this investment as "mining royalties" in the local budget. Notwithstanding its acclamation as a result of a popular movement, the electrification project thereby violated Guinean law in several instances: Companies are not supposed to dispose over their own tax payments and electrification projects cannot be undertaken on the sub-prefectural level. In addition, the relation between withheld taxes and investments in electrification could not be verified because of missing local budgets and a lack of transparency concerning the calculation of taxes.

In 2017, inquiries in Mambia showed that both tax payments and their use remained unclear. In addition, the "Conseil Préfectoral de Développement – CPD" (a body that decides upon the distribution of mining receipts in the prefecture of Kindia), as it works in Kindia, has no legal basis. The new mining code of 2013 would provide for a local development fund controlled by local communities, but not by the region or the prefecture. However, as the application texts for this development fund are still missing, the actors in Kindia resorted to this adhoc solution, which distributes mining taxes to all sub-prefectures of Kindia, many of which are not affected by mining. This has also been approved by the sub-prefect of Mambia arguing that mining will soon stop in Mambia, but continue in neighbouring communities.

All in all, these arrangements considerably reduce the accountability of the actors involved and blur boundaries, on the one hand, between the state, the civil society and private companies, and, on the other hand, between tax payments and philanthropy. For instance, on the personal website of Oleg Deripaska, which provides ample information on Deripaska's life, his businesses (stating that he employs over 200,000 people), his world view ("100 people are enough to change a country") and, last but not least, his philanthropic activities, amongst which Guinea figures more prominently than any other country apart from Russia. There we also learn that: "In 2008, Rusal helped to support sustainable development in Guinea by building drinking water wells in Simbaya village and spearheading a power supply project in Mambia".[10] In fact, the electrification had been paid for with local tax money, which in turn means that the local government was the actual sponsor of what the company frames as CSR.

The case of electricity provision in Mambia is atypical for Rusal's way of doing business. CSR is not only an instrument used by Western companies to secure their "social license to operate", but also arises to a large extent from Western lending standards. Western companies face pressure from international investors and civil society in the US and Europe to comply with certain social and environmental standards. Among other things, this pressure causes them to try to bypass the local political sphere as far as possible, arguing that competencies are too low and corruption too high at the local level. For example, provisions of the recent mining law that would lead to a contribution to local development amounting to 0.5% of turnover (République de Guinée, 2013; §130) are not interpreted by CBG as local taxes but as an obligation to invest directly in local development - which means that local politicians are not involved in financial matters. Rusal, like most other non-Western investors, has a much less conditionalist approach. The company pays local taxes and does not feel concerned if its tax payments were misappropriated.

In 2008 and 2009, the company was under pressure because its longtime ally, the late President Lansana Conté, had been replaced by an enemy military junta, initially supported by a mass movement calling for the nationalization of one of the company's mines, Fria. Withholding taxes could have been a way of defending itself by depriving the government of one of its scarce sources of income. And at the end of the day, the company gained at least part of the population of Mambia as an addiditonal ally. In this context, the political sacrifice was made by the local authorities - against the prefecture and national government. The local authorities were the sacrifiers (the "sponsors") who accorded Rusal the role of the sacrificer (the "performer"). Here, the role of the "state" is thus even more opaque than in the previous case studies. However, the sacrifice had a similar outcome: the company succeeded in reframing a publicly financed project as an act of entrepreneurial integrity and generosity.

## 5. Conclusions: logics and configurations of the political sacrifice

Notwithstanding the highly diverse entanglements of states, mining companies and the local population, state-sponsored CSR seems to be a quite common feature in extractive enclaves. In all three case studies, the provision of electricity by mining companies was ultimately financed by the Guinean government either in the form of debt (in Kamsar and Siguri) or in the form of a reallocation of royalties (in Mambia). Despite the considerable variation of the instrumental use of the gift rhetoric – from a reallocation of costs into government debt, to the provision of concessional loans, or the conditional payment of royalties – electrification systematically went along with a quite particular "division of work" between the state and the companies: The former as a sacrifier that "sponsors" the "performance" of the corporate sacrificer.

In Kamsar, the dominant mining company, CBG, can look back to a long paternalistic history of infrastructure provision, which has always

[9] The payment of local taxes by the CBK is most likely based on its mining contract of 2000 and 2008 (République de Guinée, 2019). The new nationwide mining code of 2013 stipulates a "contribution to local development" of 0.5 percent of the turnover (République de Guinée, 2013; §130). At the time of writing, CBK has not yet adapted its contract to fulfill these requirements and it seemed improbable that it will do so. Other companies like CBG have done that, but they do not interpret this "contribution" as tax payments, because they do not want to financially involve the local administration (Knierzinger 2016, p. 6).

[10] http://www.deripaska.com/initiative/guinea-s-sustainable-development/.

tended to blur the distinction between public and private actors, mainly because the state has had a 49% share in the company since its inception in the early 1970s. The recent history of electricity provision, as recounted in this article, shows how the directorate of CBG kept on relying on a gift rhetoric while at the same trying to reduce spending. The result is the paradox of giving presents to people that have been purchased with their own tax contributions. This paradox has existed since Guinea's independence, but the financialization of the mining industry since the 1980s (cf. Larrue, 1997, p. 272) and the subsequent rise of CSR seem to provide a particularly fertile ground for it.

Siguiri illustrates the mainstream trends of mining governance in more conflictual constellations, where security issues are increasingly addressed by "appeasement" strategies and the establishment of selected links with the population, for instance by integrating local elites into CSR programmes. As the facility was created in the 1990s, the workers and the adjacent population never had to accommodate to (and to resist) profoundly new forms of governance. Nonetheless, a change of ownership in 2004 also led to a change of the company's policies of securitization, from a "fortress approach", to a more hegemonic strategy of a selected inclusion that was carried out mostly through CSR measures.

The bauxite mine of Mambia, finally, was strongly affected by the downfall of the Soviet Empire. Because the social investments of the Soviet Union never came close to those of the Western-controlled bauxite towns (Fria, Kamsar and Sangaredi), the local population could have perceived the last three decades as a period of social decline. However, the end of the Soviet Empire transformed Mambia from a formally state-owned (but Russian controlled) mine to a fully private mine. The workers and the local population did not suffer from the austerity measures, but rather from the scramble over the mine itself, which led to an open conflict with the Guinean government from 2007 to 2015. Rusal's majority owner Oleg Deripaska was initially less keen to buy into CSR than Western investors, but finally used electricity provision as a tool in the fight over legitimacy with the Guinean government.

All three cases point to the paramount role of power provision – in a country deprived of electricity – and exemplify the tendency of using the rhetoric of corporate giving as a means of legitimizing control over this power supply. However, what is striking and ultimately challenges much of the narrative of the corporate gift is precisely that in all these cases, the projects' costs were borne by the government – either in the form of credits and debts or in the reallocation of royalties. We thus argue that, from the perspective of the political sacrifice, the corporate gift of electricity can be analysed from three instead of two angles: The company as the performer, the local population as the receiver, and state as the sacrifier.

The notion of sacrifice is not a new descriptor in mining politics. It has often been used in reference to land in so-called "sacrifice zones" (e.g. Lindsay and Shade, 2015; Reinert, 2018) whose destruction is accepted, and to a certain degree planned, by the state with the expectation of obtaining valuable, though uncertain, financial returns from extraction. Following Graeber (2001, p. 113), it is precisely the idea of ceding something - land certainly, but also sovereignty and taxes due as we have shown - as a means to generate greater, yet uncertain, benefits that makes the political sacrifice an instructive lens to analyse practices of state-sponsored CSR. Each of the cases we presented drew upon specific logics and histories of the corporate sector (paternalism, securitization, philanthropy). However, they all share a similar pattern in the way their tripartite configurations underpin electrification projects, pointing to the active role of the state in fabricating enclaves.

From a realist corporate point of view, the political sacrifice strategically serves the purpose of maintaining the appearance of mining companies as local agents of development in times of increased competition for African resources — which also impacts CSR budgets and legitimation strategies as a whole. This does not mean that mining companies deliberately and systematically try to adorn themselves with borrowed plumes. However, a tripartite view, as suggested by the concept of the political sacrifice, forces the observer to look at where the money comes from.

In a second step, one could reflect on the reasons why state officials would sponsor CSR measures. From a rational choice point of view, it could be argued that the government acts irrationally: it finances companies for doing tasks that it should do itself and thereby undermines its own legitimacy. This certainly means that there are other "rationalities" at stake. From the point of view of the political sacrifice, we can identify at least two such rationalities. First, assuming that the political sacrifice entails the idea of assuming a *loss* for a greater (yet *uncertain*) benefit, one could argue that state officials deliberately support state-sponsored CSR to promote the image of mining companies, because the latter are the main generators of export revenues and therefore foreign currency. As Emel et al. (2011) argue, this view entails a selective renouncement of parts of its territorial sovereignty to regain overall sovereignty through connections to global flows of capital, which goes far beyond the simple assumption that the political elite is corrupt and colludes with mining companies for private gains.

Indeed, the high risk associated with mining at both the corporate and national level (see e.g. Ferguson, 1999) suggests that the Guinean state is quite deliberately foregoing part of its revenues and relying on mechanisms of "discharge" (Hibou, 1999, pp. 6–15; Mbembe, 2000, p. 80; Hönke, 2010; Williams, 2010, p. 131) to "outsource" responsibility and reduce (political) uncertainty. Building on the two quite undeveloped notions of lease ("Verpachtung") and transfer ("Überweisung") of Max Weber (1922, pp. 580–623; 1923, pp. 86–108), these authors show how the state seeks to increase its room for manoeuvre, while at the same time minimizing risk by "outsourcing" more and more tasks to non-governmental actors. Destabilizing the idea of an ongoing retreat of the state in Africa, we showed that state power can actually increase with privatization and outsourcing. In other words, one could argue that, in recent decades, many African states managed to expand their sphere of influence by sacrificing parts of their local and national decision-making structures, among other things, by "hitchhiking" on the infrastructural power of private companies. Our case studies of state-sponsored CSR add another element to these peculiar private-public entanglements.

Finally, another logic to take into consideration is in relation to the third actor of this tripartite relation, the local population. We argue that the origin of these practices not only has to do with current norms and conventions of capitalist resource extraction in a globalized and financialized economy, but it also has to do with the expected political roles of hosts and guests that shape Guinean conceptions of sovereignty. This means, rationalities and power relations as they tend to be construed in Guinea – and not in transnational governance circles. Relations between so-called first and late comers (Kopytoff, 1987) have regularly been described as particularly salient in extractive contexts (e.g. Bolay, 2014; Luning, 2012). In Guinea – and in the Mandé world in general – political relations are often built upon a hierarchy between hosts and guests. In this context, sacrifices are expected to reflect a hierarchical complementarity: hosts are patrons and typically occupy the sacrifier position by paying for the sacrifice, while guests are political clients who borrow the land and become sacrificers by performing the sacrifice on behalf of their host (McGovern, 2012: Chap. 3). This thesis of a transfer of local and regional practises to the national - and even the global - sphere may appear as a constructed and deliberate attempt to show that globalization is more than a top-down process, and that South-North-transfers of norms and practices do actually happen, in particular in the economic sphere. However, CSR branches of mining companies are in fact relatively familiar with sacrifice rituals, which they perform on behalf of local authorities every time a new project starts or a new parcel opens. From this stance, the sacrifice analogy offers possible alternative pathways to look at how CSR establishes relations across different scales: relations with the "communities" at the local level by performing gifts and thus establishing power relations and dependence, but also relations at the national level by endorseing the rile of "guests" of the "host" government. At the national level, extractive relations are based upon contracts between the “host” government, which owns the land, and the “guest” mining company, which is granted a lease for mining. Thus, the transfer of the costs of corporate gifts to the government meets the ideal representation of what political sovereignty entails in the Guinean context, where the landowner secures his position by making the guest perform expenses on his behalf.

Thus, as paradoxical as it may seem that companies distribute gifts paid for by the state, the political sacrifice of state-sponsored CSR not only has a long history, for instance in development aid, but also corresponds to regional ideas about how to deal with foreigners (or latecomers), fits into current strategies of political discharge, and appears to be an increasingly important instrument in the scramble for African resources.

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