Unregulated and regulated free banking: Evidence from the case of Switzerland (1826-1907)

Herger, Nils (2022). Unregulated and regulated free banking: Evidence from the case of Switzerland (1826-1907). Explorations in economic history, 83, p. 101423. Elsevier 10.1016/j.eeh.2021.101423

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This paper provides a reassessment of the free-banking history of Switzerland, which included both a period of unfettered competition (1826–1881) and one of strong banknote regulation (1881–1907). Unfettered competition between note-issuing banks gave rise to a fragmented paper-money system, with limited liquidity banknotes. To increase confidence in these notes, the federal government introduced a minimum-reserve requirement and a mutual-conversion rule in 1881. Based on a theoretical model and new empirical evidence, this paper shows that this enhanced regulation came at a cost, as it led to the overissuing of banknotes and an inelastic paper-money supply.

Item Type:

Journal Article (Original Article)

Division/Institute:

03 Faculty of Business, Economics and Social Sciences > Department of Economics

UniBE Contributor:

Herger, Nils

Subjects:

300 Social sciences, sociology & anthropology > 330 Economics

ISSN:

0014-4983

Publisher:

Elsevier

Language:

English

Submitter:

Dino Collalti

Date Deposited:

27 Jan 2022 15:49

Last Modified:

05 Dec 2022 16:00

Publisher DOI:

10.1016/j.eeh.2021.101423

BORIS DOI:

10.48350/163364

URI:

https://boris.unibe.ch/id/eprint/163364

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