Werner, Jonas (13 September 2022). Wrong Good Guesses (Unpublished). In: GAP.11.
The practice of guessing has found some attention in the recent literature and rules that
govern good guesses have been proposed. One of the main ideas is that good guesses strike
the perfect balance between informativeness and accuracy. This leads to the result that
sometimes good guesses can be such that one’s credence in the truth of one’s guess is relatively low. In particular, it is acceptable to guess the most likely of a selection of unlikely
options. In my talk I tease out normative implications of such guesses. I argue that there
can be cases of harmful and morally wrong guesses that meet the non-normative criteria
for goodness. In particular, I argue that in many mundane contexts giving the only answer
that meets the non-normative criteria for a good guess is giving an answer that is harmful
and wrong. I use this result to show that there can be a particular way of harmful speech-
acts that take the form of presupposition- and implicature-free questions.
Item Type: |
Conference or Workshop Item (Speech) |
|---|---|
Division/Institute: |
06 Faculty of Humanities > Department of Art and Cultural Studies > Institute of Philosophy 06 Faculty of Humanities > Department of Art and Cultural Studies > Institute of Philosophy > Theoretical Philosophy |
UniBE Contributor: |
Werner, Jonas |
Subjects: |
100 Philosophy |
Language: |
English |
Submitter: |
Jonas Werner |
Date Deposited: |
02 Nov 2022 09:41 |
Last Modified: |
05 Dec 2022 16:27 |
URI: |
https://boris.unibe.ch/id/eprint/174317 |
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