Werner, Jonas (14 September 2022). Qualitativism and Radical Underdetermination (Unpublished). In: GAP.11.
Qualitativism is sometimes be understood as the thesis that qualitative facts ground all
other facts. This understanding of qualitativism leads to a view on which there are non-
qualitative high-level facts. However, qualitative facts seem unable to modally fix all non-
qualitative facts. One way to deal with this is to uphold that non-qualitative facts are met-
aphysically indeterminate in the sense that the world does not settle which non-qualitative
states of affairs obtain. I argue that conventional ways to model this indeterminacy lead to
a problem for proponents of grounding-qualitativism, namely that it requires that the iden-
tities of all objects whose existence is possibly grounded in the qualitative base have to be
fixed. As a way out I consider the view that the world is radically under-determined in the
sense that it is metaphysically underspecified without there being any candidate-specifica-
tions. A way to connect indeterminacy and radical underdetermination is proposed: Certain
cases of radical underdetermination present themselves as cases of indeterminacy when
considered from the perspective of richer worlds in which more identities are fixed. From
its own perspective, however, the world is radically underspecified
Item Type: |
Conference or Workshop Item (Speech) |
|---|---|
Division/Institute: |
06 Faculty of Humanities > Department of Art and Cultural Studies > Institute of Philosophy 06 Faculty of Humanities > Department of Art and Cultural Studies > Institute of Philosophy > Theoretical Philosophy |
UniBE Contributor: |
Werner, Jonas |
Subjects: |
100 Philosophy 100 Philosophy > 110 Metaphysics |
Language: |
English |
Submitter: |
Jonas Werner |
Date Deposited: |
02 Nov 2022 09:24 |
Last Modified: |
05 Dec 2022 16:27 |
URI: |
https://boris.unibe.ch/id/eprint/174318 |
Actions (login required)
 |
Edit item |