On the methodological arguments for wave-function realism

Matarese, Vera (2021). On the methodological arguments for wave-function realism. International studies in the philosophy of science, 34(2), pp. 63-80. Taylor & Francis 10.1080/02698595.2021.2024786

Text On_The_Methodological_Arguments_for_Wave_Function_Realism.pdf - Published Version Restricted to registered users only Available under License Publisher holds Copyright. Download (1MB) | Request a copy

The paper explores a particular line of objection against wave-function realism. This view, advocated by Bell (1987) and presently defended by Albert (1996), North (2013) and Ney (2016), claims that the quantum wave function is a high-dimensional physical field. Normally, wave-function realism has been criticized for its ontological commitments, which are regarded as empirically unsupportable in principle and as violating empirical coherence. In this paper, I investigate whether there are any methodological arguments for endorsing such an ontology and whether they are sound. In particular, I home in on and discuss three arguments that may be used to support wave-function realism: (i) the argument from laws; (ii) the argument from the complete information of the system; (iii) the argument from explanation. My conclusion is that these arguments do not provide any good methodological grounds for inferring the existence of a high-dimensional physical field from quantum theory.

Interest & Impact

Downloads

1 since deposited on 03 Nov 2022
1 in the past 12 months

Citations

5 Citations in Web of Science ®
6 Citations in Scopus

Search

in Google Scholar™

Services

Actions (login required)

Edit item

Actions (login required)

Edit item