Emons, Winand; Lenhard, Severin (2023). Rebating Antitrust Fines to Encourage Private Damages Negotiations. American law and economic review, 24(2), pp. 589-613. Oxford University Press 10.1093/aler/ahac008
Full text not available from this repository. (Request a copy)To encourage private negotiations for damages in antitrust cases some jurisdictions subtract a fraction of the redress from the fine. We analyze the effectiveness of this policy. Such a rebate does not encourage settlement negotiations that would otherwise not occur. If, however,
the parties settle without the rebate, the introduction of the reduction may increase the settlement amount. Yet deterrence for those wrongdoers who are actually fined always goes down. Under a leniency program the rebate does not affect the leniency applicant: she doesn’t
pay a fine that can be reduced. The overall effect of a fine reduction on deterrence is, therefore, negative.
Item Type: |
Journal Article (Original Article) |
|---|---|
Division/Institute: |
03 Faculty of Business, Economics and Social Sciences > Department of Economics |
UniBE Contributor: |
Emons, Winand, Lenhard, Severin Jean-Jacques |
Subjects: |
300 Social sciences, sociology & anthropology > 330 Economics |
ISSN: |
1465-7260 |
Publisher: |
Oxford University Press |
Language: |
English |
Submitter: |
Julia Alexandra Schlosser |
Date Deposited: |
10 Nov 2022 15:17 |
Last Modified: |
20 Oct 2023 15:32 |
Publisher DOI: |
10.1093/aler/ahac008 |
URI: |
https://boris.unibe.ch/id/eprint/174656 |
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