Central bank digital currency: Stability and information

Keister, Todd; Monnet, Cyril (2022). Central bank digital currency: Stability and information. Journal of economic dynamics & control, 142, p. 104501. Elsevier 10.1016/j.jedc.2022.104501

[img] Text
1-s2.0-S0165188922002056-main.pdf - Published Version
Restricted to registered users only
Available under License Publisher holds Copyright.

Download (1MB)

We study how introducing a central bank digital currency (CBDC) would affect the stability of the banking system. We present a model that captures a concern commonly raised in policy discussions: the option to hold CBDC can increase the incentive for depositors to run on weak banks. Our model highlights two countervailing effects. First, banks do less maturity transformation when depositors have access to CBDC, which leaves them less exposed to runs. Second, monitoring the flow of funds into CBDC allows policymakers to identify and resolve weak banks sooner, which also decreases depositors’ incentive to run. Our results suggest that a well-designed CBDC may decrease rather than increase financial fragility.

Item Type:

Journal Article (Original Article)

Division/Institute:

03 Faculty of Business, Economics and Social Sciences > Department of Economics
03 Faculty of Business, Economics and Social Sciences > Department of Economics > Institute of Economics

UniBE Contributor:

Monnet, Cyril

Subjects:

300 Social sciences, sociology & anthropology > 330 Economics

ISSN:

0165-1889

Publisher:

Elsevier

Language:

English

Submitter:

Julia Alexandra Schlosser

Date Deposited:

19 Dec 2022 13:46

Last Modified:

25 Dec 2022 02:12

Publisher DOI:

10.1016/j.jedc.2022.104501

BORIS DOI:

10.48350/176048

URI:

https://boris.unibe.ch/id/eprint/176048

Actions (login required)

Edit item Edit item
Provide Feedback