An Impossibility Theorem on Truthful Reporting in Fully Decentralized Systems

Garratt, Rodney; Monnet, Cyril (2022). An Impossibility Theorem on Truthful Reporting in Fully Decentralized Systems

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We show that truthful reporting about the realization of a publicly observed event cannot be implemented as a unique equilibrium in a completely decentralized environment.

Item Type:

Working Paper

Division/Institute:

03 Faculty of Business, Economics and Social Sciences > Department of Economics

UniBE Contributor:

Monnet, Cyril

Subjects:

300 Social sciences, sociology & anthropology > 330 Economics

Language:

English

Submitter:

Julia Alexandra Schlosser

Date Deposited:

19 Dec 2022 14:04

Last Modified:

19 Dec 2022 18:39

BORIS DOI:

10.48350/176053

URI:

https://boris.unibe.ch/id/eprint/176053

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