Azouvi, Sarah; Cachin, Christian; Le, Duc V.; Vukolić, Marko; Zanolini, Luca (2023). Modeling Resources in Permissionless Longest-Chain Total-Order Broadcast. Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics, 253(19) Schloss Dagstuhl - Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik
Full text not available from this repository.Blockchain protocols implement total-order broadcast in a permissionless setting, where processes can freely join and leave. In such a setting, to safeguard against Sybil attacks, correct processes rely on cryptographic proofs tied to a particular type of resource to make them eligible to order transactions. For example, in the case of Proof-of-Work (PoW), this resource is computation, and the proof is a solution to a computationally hard puzzle. Conversely, in Proof-of-Stake (PoS), the resource corresponds to the number of coins that every process in the system owns, and a secure lottery selects a process for participation proportionally to its coin holdings.
Although many resource-based blockchain protocols are formally proven secure in the literature, the existing security proofs fail to demonstrate why particular types of resources cause the blockchain protocols to be vulnerable to distinct classes of attacks. For instance, PoS systems are more vulnerable to long-range attacks, where an adversary corrupts past processes to re-write the history, than PoW and Proof-of-Storage systems. Proof-of-Storage-based and PoS-based protocols are both more susceptible to private double-spending attacks than PoW-based protocols; in this case, an adversary mines its chain in secret without sharing its blocks with the rest of the processes until the end of the attack.
In this paper, we formally characterize the properties of resources through an abstraction called resource allocator and give a framework for understanding longest-chain consensus protocols based on different underlying resources. In addition, we use this resource allocator to demonstrate security trade-offs between various resources focusing on well-known attacks (e.g., the long-range attack and nothing-at-stake attacks).
Item Type: |
Journal Article (Original Article) |
|---|---|
Division/Institute: |
08 Faculty of Science > Institute of Computer Science (INF) > Cryptology and Data Security Group 08 Faculty of Science > Institute of Computer Science (INF) |
UniBE Contributor: |
Cachin, Christian, Lê, Viet Duc, Zanolini, Luca |
Subjects: |
000 Computer science, knowledge & systems 500 Science > 510 Mathematics |
ISSN: |
1868-8969 |
Publisher: |
Schloss Dagstuhl - Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik |
Language: |
English |
Submitter: |
Christian Cachin |
Date Deposited: |
30 Mar 2023 11:13 |
Last Modified: |
31 Jul 2024 15:07 |
Additional Information: |
26th International Conference on Principles of Distributed Systems (OPODIS) |
URI: |
https://boris.unibe.ch/id/eprint/181057 |
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