Werner, Jonas (2022). Extended Dispositionalism and Determinism. Ergo : an open access journal of philosophy, 9(24), pp. 623-644. Univ. of Michigan Library 10.3998/ergo.2280
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Modal dispositionalists hold that dispositions provide the foundation of metaphysical necessity and possibility. According to the kind of modal dispositionalism that can be found in the present literature, a proposition p is possible just in case some things are disposed to be such that p. In the first part of this paper I show that combining this classic form of dispositionalism with the assumptions that the laws of nature are necessary and deterministic and that all dispositions are forward-looking in time leads to the unattractive conclusion that every truth is necessary. I argue that the classic dispositionalist should be troubled by this result and in the second part of the paper I suggest a novel variant of dispositionalism that avoids it. This extended form of dispositionalism allows that some propositions are only indirectly underwritten by dispositions.
Item Type: |
Journal Article (Original Article) |
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Division/Institute: |
06 Faculty of Humanities > Department of Art and Cultural Studies > Institute of Philosophy 06 Faculty of Humanities > Department of Art and Cultural Studies > Institute of Philosophy > Theoretical Philosophy |
UniBE Contributor: |
Werner, Jonas |
Subjects: |
100 Philosophy 100 Philosophy > 110 Metaphysics |
ISSN: |
2330-4014 |
Publisher: |
Univ. of Michigan Library |
Language: |
English |
Submitter: |
Jonas Werner |
Date Deposited: |
03 Apr 2023 13:03 |
Last Modified: |
03 Apr 2023 13:03 |
Publisher DOI: |
10.3998/ergo.2280 |
BORIS DOI: |
10.48350/181355 |
URI: |
https://boris.unibe.ch/id/eprint/181355 |
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