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Populism as a Problem of Social Disintegration?

A Comparative Analysis of the Socio-Integrational Underpinnings of Populism in Europe

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"*Mein Hirn überrascht mich gelegentlich*"

– *Albus Dumbledore*

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Content

Acknowledgements v

Figures xii

Tables xiv

1 Introduction 1

2 Conceptualising Populism 10

2.1 The Ideational Approach to Populism 10

2.2 Varieties of Populism 22

2.2.1 Radical Right-Wing Populism 23

2.2.2 Radical Left-Wing Populism 28

2.3 Populist Attitudes 32

2.4 Populism in the Countries under Study 36

3 Previous Research on the Explanation of Populism 51

3.1 Explaining Radical Right-Wing Populism 52

3.2 Explaining Radical Left-Wing Populism 72

3.3 Explaining Populist Attitudes 79

3.4 Research Gap 84

4 Conceptualising Social Integration 89

4.1 Social Integration 89

4.2 Manifestations of Social Integration 96

4.2.1 Subjective Social Status 99

4.2.2 Social Trust 108

4.2.3 Subjective Group Relative Deprivation 121

5 Populism as a Problem of Social Disintegration? 132

5.1 Subjective Social Status and Populism 139

5.2 Social Trust and Populism 143

5.3 Subjective Relative Deprivation and Populism 152

6 Research Design 157

6.1 Original Survey Data 157

6.2 Case Selection 160

6.3 Variables 162

6.3.1 Populism 162

6.3.2 Social Integration 173

6.3.3 Control Variables 181

6.4 Methodological Approach 185

7 Empirical Analysis Part 1: The Role of Subjective Social Status 189

7.1 Subjective Social Status and Populist Attitudes 189

7.2 Subjective Social Status and Radical Left- and Right-Wing Populism 194

7.3 Chapter Discussion 200

8 Empirical Analysis Part 2: The Role of Social Trust 206

8.1 Social Trust and Populist Attitudes 206

8.2 Social Trust and Left- and Right-Wing Populism 213

8.3 Chapter Discussion 218

9 Empirical Analysis Part 3: The Role of Subjective Group Relative Deprivation........... 223

9.1 Subjective Group Relative Deprivation and Populist Attitudes 223

9.2 Subjective Group Relative Deprivation and Left- and Right-Wing Populism........ 226

9.3 Chapter Discussion 233

10 General Discussion 237

10.1 Is Populism a Problem of Social Disintegration? 237

10.2 Limitations 250

10.3 Avenues for Future Research 255

10.4 Implications 261

11 Conclusion 263

Appendix A 267

Appendix B 273

Appendix C 283

Appendix D 295

References 308

Declaration of Authorship 360

Figures

Figure 1 Conceptualisation of populism as combination of people centrism, anti-elitism, and Manichean outlook 15

Figure 2 Radical right-wing populism and its sub-dimensions 25

Figure 3 Radical left-wing populism and its sub-dimensions 30

Figure 4 Election results of populist parties in the six countries under study from 1990-2021 38

Figure 5 Boxplot of populist attitudes in the countries under study 169

Figure 6 Histogram showing the distribution of subjective social status in the six countries 174

Figure 7 Histogram showing the distribution of particularised trust in the six countries 175

Figure 8 Histogram showing the distribution of generalised trust in the six countries 176

Figure 9 Histogram showing the distribution of identity-based trust in the six countries 177

Figure 10 Boxplots of different forms of subjective group relative deprivation (SGRD) in the six countries 180

Figure 11 Coefficient plot for the country-wise relationship between subjective social status and populist attitudes 190

Figure 12 Average marginal effects of subjective social status on populist attitudes 192

Figure 13 Coefficient plot for the relationship between subjective social status and support for a radical right-wing populist party (Panel A) and support for a radical left-wing populist party (Panel B) 195

Figure 14 Average marginal effects of subjective social status on right-wing populist party support 197

Figure 15 Average marginal effects of subjective social status on left-wing populist party support ... 198

Figure 16 Coefficient plot for the country-wise relationship between different forms of social trust and populist attitudes ... 207

Figure 17 Average marginal effects of particularised trust on populist attitudes ... 208

Figure 18 Average marginal effects of identity-based trust on populist attitudes ... 210

Figure 19 Average marginal effects of generalised trust on populist attitudes ... 211

Figure 20 Coefficient plot for the country-wise relationship between different forms of social trust and right-wing populist party support ... 214

Figure 21 Coefficient plot for the country-wise relationship between different forms of social trust and left-wing populist party support ... 216

Figure 22 Coefficient plot for the country-wise relationship between subjective group relative deprivation and populist attitudes ... 224

Figure 23 Average marginal effects of subjective group relative deprivation on populist attitudes ... 225

Figure 24 Coefficient plot for the country-wise relationship between subjective group relative deprivation (immigrants) and right-wing populist party support ... 228

Figure 25 Average marginal effects of subjective group relative deprivation (immigrants) on right-wing populist party support ... 230

Figure 26 Coefficient plot for the country-wise relationship between subjective group relative deprivation (rich people) and left-wing populist party support ... 231

Tables

Table 1 Items for populist attitudes and their respective sub-dimensions 168

Table 2 Overview of the populist parties, their election results, and vote share in the survey data from the six countries 171

Table 3 Factor loadings of social trust based on confirmatory factor analysis 178

Table 4 Principal component analysis for ideological positions 184

Table 5 Summary of model specifications 186

1 Introduction

Undisputedly, populism has become omnipresent in scientific and public discussions. In particular, events such as the election of Donald Trump or the vote to leave the European Union in the United Kingdom (Brexit) have sparked considerable interest in the topic. Besides these prominent events, populist parties have mobilised increasing shares of the voting population in many different and diverse countries including France, Spain, Germany, Hungary, or Sweden. Looking at the political landscape, populism seems to be on the rise as the average vote share of populist parties is increasing in Western countries in recent years (Norris & Inglehart, 2019). The recent success of populist parties seems to have disrupted the relative stability of European party systems, yet populism is far from being exclusively a phenomenon of the 21st century (Mudde, 2017; Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2015). Nevertheless, what renders it so relevant today is that the success of populist parties and movements is unprecedented in both magnitude and consistency.

Against this background, scholarly research on populism has grown considerably (Rovira Kaltwasser et al., 2017). More importantly, after long debates, scholars increasingly agree on a common understanding of what populism is (see chapter 2). Most prominently, the ideational approach regards populism “as a unique set of ideas, one that understands politics as a Manichean struggle between a reified will of the people and a conspiring elite” (Hawkins & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2018, p. 3). Such ideas can be expressed in the form of populist attitudes which are understood as a “set of evaluative reactions” to populism (van Hauwaert et al., 2020, p. 5). Furthermore, a populist ideology can be fruitfully combined with other ideologies that form the different varieties of populism.

Two forms of populism are particularly important in the European context. First, the most dominant form, radical right-wing populism, combines a populist ideology with nativism and authoritarianism to form an exclusionary ideological package (Mudde, 2007). Second,

radical left-wing populism, which combines populism with a certain form of socialism. Albeit less successful than its right-wing counterpart, radical left-wing populism has recently gained more traction in the aftermath of the financial crisis, in particular in Southern Europe (Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2013). These three forms of populism – populist attitudes and support for radical left- and right-wing populism – take centre stage in this investigation.

While there are many interesting research avenues regarding populism, a particularly prominent avenue is the explanation of individual-level support for different forms of populism. Given the rise of populism and its position outside of the political mainstream, scholars have long aimed to understand why people vote for populist parties or support populist ideologies. In particular, as populism challenges democracy in its current form, understanding who supports populism and why is crucial. Not only does this advance our understanding of people's vote choice and the underlying attitudes, but it also allows us to understand the challenges to democratic societies that are presented by populist parties and movements. In this vein, this dissertation aims to contribute to the explanation of populist attitudes and support for radical left- and right-wing populism, thereby advancing our understanding of why people support these different forms of populism.

With regard to the explanation of populism, scholarly literature often juxtaposes two different explanatory arguments (see chapter 3). On the one hand, advocates of the losers of modernisation and globalisation thesis focus on the consequences of economic globalisation for broad segments of the workforce (Betz, 1994; Kriesi et al., 2006). Increasing competition and innovation, so the argument goes, pose a threat to those parts of the workforce that are less well equipped to adapt to these changes: people who are less educated, older, or work in manual or routine jobs. These dynamics result in deteriorating labour market opportunities and decreasing material security (Betz, 1993, 1994). Consequently, these individuals become increasingly dissatisfied with the political system and especially with the mainstream political parties,

thereby forming electoral *potentials* that are mobilised by populist parties (Kriesi et al., 2006). Populist parties are a particularly attractive option for the losers of globalisation as these parties present themselves as challengers to the political mainstream and offer a way to punish governing parties for the economic vulnerabilities (Betz, 1993, 1994; Kriesi et al., 2006).

On the other hand, proponents of a cultural explanation explain the rise of populism with a shift in values. They argue that cultural changes such as increasing diversity or gender equality have affected whether people see their values represented in society. For certain groups, these changes have produced a feeling that their way of life and values are not reflected by the public and elite discourse. More importantly, they feel that their values are no longer fully accepted in society (Ignazi, 1992; Norris & Inglehart, 2019). This results in a backlash against the new values and the mainstream parties that promote them (Norris & Inglehart, 2019). Thus, people who perceive such a shift away from their values become susceptible to the messages of populism, which aims to restore the society as it once was (Norris & Inglehart, 2019).

Recently, however, scholars have argued that a too rigid conceptualisation of economic and cultural explanations is not useful (Carreras et al., 2019; Gest et al., 2018; Gidron & Hall, 2017, 2020). Rather, both cultural and economic transformations have affected individuals' personal situations, perceptions, and attitudes. In particular, ethnographic studies provided a more in-depth understanding of the subjective impressions of populist supporters (Cramer, 2016; Gest, 2016; Hochschild, 2016). With their focus on the subjective reality of populist supporters, these studies point to specific feelings of neglect, disadvantage, and deprivation as driving factors for populist support. Conversely, quantitative studies so far "do not directly touch-upon the resentments that qualitative reporting has found to prevail among political supporters of radical parties: a feeling of 'losingout' compared with one's own past and compared with other groups in society" (Burgoon et al., 2019, p. 52). In this vein, to better

capture the reported grievances and the resentment of populist supporters, Gidron and Hall (2020) argue that populism can be understood as a problem of social integration implying that supporters of populism are characterised by a feeling of social marginalisation that is caused by long-term economic and cultural transformations of society.

It is here that this investigation finds its starting point. In this study, I follow and extend the approach taken by Gidron and Hall (2020) by focussing on the socio-integrational underpinnings of populism. In particular, I aim to uncover whether populism is a problem of social *disintegration.* Based on previous research and the assumption that globalisation and societal modernisation have brought about cultural and economic changes that affect individuals' perceptions and attitudes, I argue that these developments have created a feeling of social *disintegration* for certain people in society (Gidron & Hall, 2017, 2020). Going beyond previous research, I argue that social integration as a multidimensional phenomenon requires a multifaceted approach to investigate the question whether social *disintegration* fosters support for populism. Furthermore, explaining three different forms of populism requires nuanced theoretical arguments that are thus far underdeveloped in the socio-integrational approach.

Overall, I follow Gidron and Hall (2020, p. 1031) and define social integration as a multidimensional phenomenon

"based on (a) the degree to which individuals see themselves as part of a shared normative order, (b) their levels of social interaction with others, and (c) the extent to which they feel recognised or respected by others in society".

This multidimensionality of social integration requires a multifaceted approach and thus the inclusion of different manifestations of social integration. I propose subjective social status[1], social trust, and subjective group relative deprivation as manifestations of social integration (chapter 4). While all three are adequate manifestations of social integration, their simultaneous

[1] Here, I follow Gidron and Hall (2020).

investigation offers a more encompassing picture and allows accounting for three crucial aspects of social integration that are thus far neglected in previous research: a) the relational nature of social integration, b) the importance of groups, and c) the subjective impression of social *disintegration*. Taken together, I offer a) a more detailed and comprehensive conceptualisation of social integration and thus b) a more encompassing theoretical framework that is put to c) a rigorous empirical test.

In overall terms, I argue that social *disintegration* is positively related to the different forms of populism. Nevertheless, I offer detailed arguments for the respective manifestations of social integration, which allows explaining the different forms of populism more adequately (chapter 5). For subjective social status, I argue that it is positively related to populist attitudes. I follow Gidron and Hall (2020) by arguing that subjective social status also positively relates to the probability of supporting radical left- and right-wing populist parties.

Social trust as multidimensional construct allows more differentiated arguments. Particularised trust (trust in close people) is expected to be negatively related to all forms of populism. Similarly, generalised trust with its integrative vision of society is thought to be a barrier against populist attitudes and parties. Conversely, identity-based trust as group-based thinking that "excludes persons with specific characteristics" (Torpe & Lolle, 2011, p. 489) is considered as partial social *disintegration* and thus conducive to populist attitudes. However, I argue that the specific in-group is crucial in determining which form of populism is supported. While identity-based trust based on nationality and language (ethnic-based trust) is conducive to radical right-wing populism, identity-based trust based on class and occupation (class-based trust) is argued to foster radical left-wing populism.

Finally, subjective group relative deprivation as clear manifestation of social *disintegration* is expected to be positively related to populist attitudes. Yet, I argue that the out-group compared to which respondents' feel disadvantaged matters decisively for which form

of populism is supported. I claim that subjective group relative deprivation compared to immigrants is crucial for radical right-wing populism while subjective group relative deprivation compared to rich people should have the highest importance for radical left-wing populism.

To test these arguments empirically, I rely on original survey data from France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom collected in April and May 2020 (Freitag et al., 2020, see chapter 6). Using regression analyses yields mixed findings (see chapters 7 to 9). While the analyses overall indicate that social *disintegration* and populism are positively related, this relationship varies a) across countries and b) for the different forms of populism as well as the different manifestations of social integration. While subjective social status is negatively related to all three forms of populism, this negative relationship does not manifest itself in all six countries.

For particularised trust, I find the expected negative relationship with populist attitudes. However, this finding does not translate to radical left- or right-wing populist party support. Although generalised trust is negatively related to populist attitudes and radical right-wing populist party support, this form of social integration is not related to radical left-wing populism. For identity-based trust, the analyses reveal the expected positive relationship of group-based thinking with populist attitudes. The expected influence of different in-groups for radical left- and right-wing populist party support, however, is not fully reflected in the data.

Subjective group relative deprivation is the indicator that offers the strongest evidence as it is positively related to populist attitudes in all countries. Furthermore, feeling disadvantaged compared to immigrants significantly predicts support for a right-wing populist party. Interestingly, feeling disadvantaged compared to rich people is not related to support for a left-wing populist party.

With this dissertation, I offer six different theoretical and empirical contributions to the literature. First, I refine the socio-integrational approach to populism by using three different manifestations of social integration. Thereby, I am able to offer a more comprehensive test of the question whether populism is a consequence of social *disintegration.* Even more so, my approach allows accounting for three important aspects of social integration. First, I am able to grasp the relational element of social integration. I measure not only an individual's degree of social integration but also her relative position compared to other members and groups in society more explicitly. Second, (the quality of) inter-group relationships and in-group identification are more explicitly included in my theoretical and empirical contribution. Third, opposed to previous research, I am able to uncover subjective impressions of *disintegration* and disadvantage more explicitly. In sum, the first contribution lies in the encompassing conceptual and theoretical approach to social integration.

Second, I advance previous research by presenting a more accurate quantitative application of recent ethnographic studies. By offering three distinct manifestations of social integration, I capture different perceived grievances and resentment in more detail. At the same time, my approach allows a quantitative assessment of the relationship between these perceptions and populism. To that end, I am able to show how deeply such subjective perceptions are rooted in society and whether they translate into support for different forms of populism. Third, by explicating a more detailed theory of social integration, I offer an explanatory framework for populist attitudes as well as radical left- and right-wing populism. To that end, I contribute to the explanation of populism in general, and to the explanation of populist attitudes in particular, which has so far received less attention in the literature.

Fourth, by investigating populist attitudes in combination with the two dominant forms of populism in Europe, radical left- and right-wing populism, I provide an exhaustive empirical test of the socio-integrational underpinnings of populism. Investigating populist attitudes

reveals whether the explanatory power of social integration holds for the attitudes underlying populism itself. The crucial advantage of an attitudinal approach is that “voters are always recruited on the basis of several issues and concerns”, which makes it difficult to extract support for populism from vote choice or party support (Spruyt et al., 2016, p. 336). Complementing these analyses by investigating radical left- and right-wing populist party support additionally allows to assess the explanatory power of the socio-integrational approach for two very different forms of populism. More importantly, I show that different inter-group dynamics, inter-group comparisons, and in-group identifications are crucial aspects of social integration that can help to explain different forms of populism.

Fifth, the original survey data used in this study offers the unique possibility to combine different informative measures of social integration with measures of populism. To that end, my study covers this relationship in conceptual depth while at the same time applying a comparative perspective across six different countries. Sixth, in using such a comparative approach, I consider country differences and thus show that the relationship between social integration and populism might also be context-dependent.

This book is structured as follows. First, I focus on the explanandum of this study, populism. Within chapter 2, I pay particular attention to the definition and conceptualisation of populism as thin ideology (chapter 2.1) before focussing on radical left- and radical right-wing populism (chapter 2.2) and populist attitudes (chapter 2.3). Subsequently, the aim of chapter 3 is to summarise and discuss previous research on the explanation of radical left- and right-wing populism as well as populist attitudes. Chapter 3.4 concludes with a synthesis that identifies the research gap that my study addresses. Successively, chapter 4 is dedicated to the explanans of this study, social integration. Starting from classical literature in sociology, I define and conceptualise social integration (chapter 4.1) before introducing the three different manifestations of social integration central to this thesis (chapter 4.2). Chapter 5 explicates the

theoretical framework and the theoretical arguments regarding the relationships between the different manifestations of social integration and the respective forms of populism.

Starting the empirical part of this book, chapter 6 describes the research design, which is used to test the theoretical propositions of this dissertation. Chapters 7, 8, and 9 present the empirical results. Chapter 7 focuses on the relationship between subjective social status and the different forms of populism. Chapter 8 presents the relationship between social trust and the different forms of populism and chapter 9 presents the relationship between subjective group relative deprivation and the different forms of populism. Subsequently, chapter 10 provides an overarching discussion whether populism is a problem of social *disintegration* and thereby situates the findings and propositions of this dissertation in a broader context (chapter 10.1). Within this chapter, I also discuss limitations of my study (chapter 10.2) as well as avenues for future research and potential implications (chapters 10.3 and 10.4). Lastly, chapter 11 concludes this dissertation with a short summary of the arguments, findings, and contributions.

2 Conceptualising Populism

The aim of this chapter is to present the central concept and explanandum of this study, populism. In the first subchapter, I present the ideational approach to populism and conceptualise populism as a thin ideology with its relevant sub-dimensions. In subchapter 2.2, I focus on the conceptualisation of radical right- (2.2.1) and left-wing populism (2.2.2). In subchapter 2.3, I focus on populist attitudes understood as the manifestation of populism at the individual level. Lastly, subchapter 2.4 presents the development of populism in the countries under study.

2.1 The Ideational Approach to Populism

It is common wisdom that populism is a contested concept (Hawkins & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2017a, 2017b, 2018; Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2018; J.-W. Müller, 2016). Despite a vast amount of literature, journalists, politicians, and academics still do not fully agree what populism exactly is (Brubaker, 2017; Freeden, 2017; Gidron & Bonikowski, 2013; Hawkins & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2017a; J.-W. Müller, 2016). In a review, Gidron and Bonikowski (2013) identify three different theoretical accounts of populism.

First, the political-strategic approach regards populism "as a political strategy through which a personalistic leader seeks or exercises government power based on direct, unmediated, uninstitutionalized support from large numbers of mostly unorganized followers" (Weyland, 2001, p. 14). Therefore, scholars using this approach focus rather on the actions of populists than on what they say (Weyland, 2017). The ultimate goal of populism is to achieve the power of government in order to implement the will of the people. To articulate this will, populist movements trust in a charismatic leader who is said to unify the masses (Weyland, 2001). While this tradition is popular in the study of populism in Latin America, it has been criticised for a

lack of distinguishability (Mudde, 2017). Moreover, although many scholars agree that populism has an affinity with charismatic leadership, it appears not to be the common denominator of populist movements around the world (Mudde, 2017).

The second stance regards populism as a discursive style (Gidron & Bonikowski, 2013).[2] Despite identifying the antagonistic relationship between the people and the elite, this approach shifts the analytic focus towards political discourse and sees populism as "a mode of political expression that is employed selectively and strategically by both right and left, liberals and conservatives" (Gidron & Bonikowski, 2013, p. 8). Thus, proponents of this approach study the affinity for and the use of a discourse that pits the people against the elite in an ultimate struggle for political power (Aslanidis, 2016; Bonikowski & Gidron, 2016; Hawkins, 2009; Jagers & Walgrave, 2007; Moffitt & Tormey, 2014).

Despite ongoing conceptual debates, the third approach to populism can be regarded as the most prominent and widely used definition (Hawkins & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2018; Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2017). The ideational approach situates the phenomenon of populism within the realm of ideas. Populism is best understood "as a unique set of ideas, one that understands politics as a Manichean struggle between a reified will of the people and a conspiring elite" (Hawkins & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2018, p. 3). Based on this definition, three constitutional parts of populism can be distinguished: "a) a Manichean and moral cosmology; b) the proclamation of 'the people' as a homogeneous and virtuous community; and c) the depiction of 'the elite' as a corrupt and self-serving entity" (Hawkins & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2018, p. 3). A discourse or ideology is populist if all three elements are present (Brubaker, 2017; Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2013).

[2] It has to be noted that some scholars see this discursive approach as a part of the ideational approach, such as Hawkins and Rovira Kaltwasser (2018) and Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser (2017).

From a conceptual standpoint is it often useful to analyse the opposites of a concept to better delineate its boundaries (Goertz, 2006). In the literature, two opposites of populism are distinguished: elitism and pluralism (Hawkins et al., 2012). Elitism reverses the discourse and categorises the elite as good, rationally thinking group while the people are seen as dangerous and incapable of making any good decisions. Consequently, the elite rather than the people should possess the ultimate decision-making power and should be in charge of the government (Caramani, 2017; Hawkins et al., 2012). Despite these differences, populism and elitism share the affinity for a Manichean outlook on society, i.e., the idea that political conflict has a moral quality (Hawkins & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2018). The people and the elite represent the good and the evil side of a moral conflict. Who is good and who is evil depends on whether the conflict is seen through a populist or through an elitist lens.

The second opposite of populism is pluralism. In contrast to elitism and populism, pluralism is sceptical of both an unmediated general will of the people and the superiority of elitist decision-making. Rather, pluralism regards society as a complex building of different groups and opinions that are engaged in an open-ended process of decision-making (Hawkins & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2018). This contradicts the superiority of elitist decisions inherent to elitism, as well as the absolute realisation of an unmediated general will of the people inherent to populism. Moreover, rather than seeing political conflict as moral, pluralism values differences in opinion and sees them as inherent part of the political system, thereby regarding the diversity of political opinions as unproblematic or even desirable (Hawkins & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2018).

When following the ideational approach to populism one can distinguish between two different perspectives. The first option is based on Ernesto Laclau and conceives of populism as a discourse "to generate a new hegemonic order that pits 'the people' against 'the elite'" (Hawkins & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2018, p. 4; Laclau, 2005). This strand of research has focussed

on investigating whether populist elements are used in political discourses around the world (Gidron & Bonikowski, 2013). The ultimate struggle between the people and the elite remains at the centre of such a discourse used by different actors over time (Aslanidis, 2016; Bonikowski & Gidron, 2016; Jagers & Walgrave, 2007; Moffitt & Tormey, 2014). Therefore, this approach allows investigating the affinity for and the use of a discourse that pits the people against the elite. The objects under study may range from political parties, manifestos, to speeches but also individuals and their affinity for such a discourse (Hawkins & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2017b, 2018).

The second perspective is to define populism as thin-centred ideology. This approach "highlight[s] the central place of a so-called popular identity as well as its antagonistic relationship with a putative, vilified elite that stands as the anti-people" (Hawkins & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2017a, p. 516). One of the most prominent and widely used definitions is the one by Mudde (2007, p. 23) who defines populism as a

"thin-centered ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, 'the pure people' versus 'the corrupt elite', and which argues that politics should be an expression of the volontée générale (general will) of the people".[3]

As opposed to full ideologies, thin ideologies have "a restricted core attached to a narrower range of political concepts" (Freeden, 1998, p. 750). Consequently, these thin ideologies do not offer answers to all social, political, or economic questions but rather focus on a smaller set of questions. In so far, populism itself "can offer neither complex nor comprehensive answers to the political questions that modern societies generate" (Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2017, p. 6). As thin ideologies do not offer such answers they instead aim to prioritise certain aspects such as the focus on the antagonistic relationship between the people and the elite (Freeden, 1998).

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[3] Despite the prominence and usage of this definition, there is still ample debate about whether or not populism is in fact an ideology; see for example Aslanidis (2016); Freeden (2017); Moffitt and Tormey (2014); J.-W. Müller (2016). Yet, solving this debate is beyond the scope of this dissertation.

From the definition above, three distinct sub-dimensions of populism can be distinguished: a moral struggle between good and bad (Manichean outlook), anti-elitism, and people centrism (see Figure 1).[4] It is important to note, however, that these constructs are not uniquely populist and can exist independently or as part of other concepts. Elitist discourses, for example, also employ a Manichean outlook on society with the rational thinking elite on the good and the impulsively acting masses on the bad side (Caramani, 2017; Castanho Silva et al., 2018).

Brubaker (2017, p. 361), however, reminds us that even though certain elements "are not uniquely populist, but may belong to other political repertoires as well, […] that it is the combination of elements – rather than the use of individual elements from the repertoire – that is characteristic of populism". Consequently, populism is not just "old wine in new bottles" (cf. Geurkink et al., 2020) but a concept with theoretical and empirical value (Wuttke et al., 2020). As the peculiarity of the populist set of ideas is the combination of people centrism, anti-elitism, and a Manichean vision, populism is more than just the sum of already established constructs (Wuttke et al., 2020). Figure 1 visualises this concept structure. In the following, I elaborate on the respective sub-dimensions of populism.

Starting with the focal point and main concept of populism, the people. As evidenced by the definitions of Mudde and others, the people are at the centre of populism. Yet, who or what the people are, remains unclear and vague (Mudde, 2017). Some scholars proposed different terms to clarify what is meant with the people. Taggart (2000), for example, used the term "heartland" to refer to a nostalgic and idealised past. This conception of the people refers

[4] Some studies separate people centrism in two categories: "homogeneity of the people" and a "call for popular sovereignty" (Schulz et al., 2018). Yet, people centrism as a combined dimension accounts for the fact that "homogeneity of the people" and a "call for popular sovereignty" are hard to distinguish as both have the people as focal point (Castanho Silva et al., 2018). Therefore, I follow Castanho Silva et al. (2018) and use people centrism as it captures a romanticised view of the people and its general will.

to “an idealized conception of the community” (Taggart, 2004, p. 274). In this vein, populism might need to fill this definition with life and provide aspects to offer identification.

However, Laclau (1977, 2005) argued that the strength of populism lies precisely in the fact that the people is an “empty signifier”. The people are a socially constructed entity that is often filled with life through the ideological features that are attached to the populist core (Mudde, 2017; Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2013, 2017). Irrespective of its vagueness, certain aspects of the people are found in populist ideologies and discourses irrespective of the ideological package that accompanies them.

Figure 1 Conceptualisation of populism as combination of people centrism, anti-elitism, and Manichean outlook



Notes: Similar illustrations shown by Castanho Silva et al. (2018) and Wuttke et al. (2020).

Based on the moral distinction between the good people and the evil elite, it becomes evident that the people possess a moral quality in terms of their virtuousness (Mudde, 2017). Irrespective of their exact composition, the people are of a good and honest nature distinguishing them from their main adversary, the elite (Mudde, 2017; Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2013, 2017). Furthermore, the people are often described to be a homogeneous entity in terms of their character, interests, and actions (Mudde, 2007, 2017). In combination,

their homogeneity and virtuousness implies that the people are able to formulate a common general will. Thus, the concept of the general will draws its meaning directly from the definition of the people (Mudde, 2017). To that end, the ultimate sovereign is not the parliament or the government but the people.

With their expression of the general will, the people should ultimately guide all political decisions. This general will is superior to other elements and thus has to be unmediated by intermediary institutions or (constitutional) laws (Mudde, 2007). For example, if populist parties enter government they regard mutual constraints or checks and balances as less necessary, given that they represent the *volontée générale* (Huber & Schimpf, 2017; Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2013). Thus, the will of the people should guide political decision-making as it draws its legitimacy from the purity, virtuousness, and homogeneity of the people.

Opposed to the people and classified as the most important antagonist is the elite (Mudde, 2004, 2007; Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2017). The distinction between the people and the elite is based on morality. While the people are pure, the elite is corrupt. Put differently, the struggle can be seen as "the good people vs. the evil elite" (Hawkins, 2009; Mudde, 2017). Although different populists construct the elite in different shades, the distinction between the people and the elite remains moral rather than ethnic or economic (Mudde, 2017).

Importantly, the elite are the ones who hold the power. This does not solely apply to politicians but also to economic or cultural elites who hold the power in their respective domains. The elite uses the (political) system for their own benefit and by doing so betrays the people of their rights. The elite always pursues more power and profit to stabilise the current situation as it is beneficial to them albeit harmful to the people (Hawkins, 2009). Interestingly, even if populists are in political power, for example by being democratically elected into government, the elite still plays an important role. Although being in power, the populists claim not to possess the real power. Instead "some shadowy forces […] continue to hold on to

illegitimate powers to undermine the voice of the people, that is, the populists" (Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2015, p. 503). In sum, populism stipulates that the elites have found a way to obscure the functioning of the political system so that it benefits the elite at the cost of the people. Yet, who is categorised as elite varies over time and context but often involves governmental officials, politicians in general, the media, economic elites, supranational organizations, or the judiciary (Hawkins, 2009; Jagers & Walgrave, 2007; Rooduijn & Akkerman, 2017).

The last sub-dimension of populism is the Manichean outlook on society. This term is used to describe that populism regards society and politics as divided in good and bad (Castanho Silva et al., 2018). In a populist conception of the world, the good is symbolised by the people and the bad by the elite (Mudde, 2007). More importantly, this implies that the conflict between the people and the elite is moral rather than programmatic in nature (Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2013). The Manichean vision, however, goes beyond the struggle of the people and the elite but rather extends to politics as such. Politics is not about discussion and compromise but about right and wrong (Castanho Silva et al., 2020).

This worldview regards the antagonistic struggle as an essential characteristic of politics in general rather than it being just a state of the current system (Castanho Silva et al., 2018). This implies that differences in political opinions are not seen as essential part of the political process. Instead, they are understood as manifestations of a problematic situation. People with a different opinion have a wrong opinion (Castanho Silva et al., 2018). As opposed to pluralism, the diversity of political opinions is regarded as undesirable. To that end, populism colours (political) conflict in a moral division between good and bad.

In this study, I follow the ideational approach and understand populism as a thin-centred ideology with three necessary sub-dimensions: people centrism, anti-elitism, and a Manichean outlook on society. From a concept formation perspective, this approach has several

advantages. In the following, I judge the concept of populism based on the eight criteria of conceptual goodness put forth by Gerring (1999).[5]

Starting with familiarity – how familiar the concept is to academic and non-academic audiences – one has to acknowledge that populism itself is a prominent concept that is familiar to researchers, pundits, and citizens alike. In particular, in scientific discussions, the ideational approach has gained high levels of prominence (Rovira Kaltwasser et al., 2017). Second and connected to familiarity is the resonance of the term. The long history of populism and the particular prominence of the ideational definition shows that the concept itself seems to resonate well with scholarly and public audiences (Rovira Kaltwasser et al., 2017).

The third aspect is concerned with the parsimony of the concept, i.e., whether the definition of the concept lists an endless number of attributes. Looking at the ideational approach, it becomes evident that its definition is rather parsimonious with only three distinguishable attributes: anti-elitism, a people centric vision, and a Manichean outlook on society. In addition, the term populism itself is rather parsimonious.

Fourth, one of the most important aspects of conceptual goodness is the internal coherence of a concept. For Gerring (1999), coherence concerns how logically related the attributes of the concept are. Put differently, there "must be some sense of *coherence* to the grouping, rather than simply a coincidence in time and physical space" (Gerring, 1999, 373f emphasis in original). A lack of coherence implies that the concept attributes do not have any obvious relationship (Gerring, 1999, p. 374). As evident from the discussion above, people centrism, anti-elitism, and a Manichean outlook on society complement each other nicely thereby forming a coherent view on society and politics. The functional relationship is clearly stated in the definition of the ideational approach.

[5] Importantly, Gerring (1999) notes that there are trade-offs between the respective criteria and that ideal-types do not exist. Thus, the researcher has to balance the trade-offs in order to offer a good concept.

Fifth, the opposite of internal coherence is the external differentiation of the concept, i.e., the ability to distinguish it from similar concepts and to state clearly, what it is not. As established above, populism has two relevant opposite concepts – elitism and pluralism – that clearly denote the boundaries of populism and as such make it distinguishable from these concepts (see above and subchapter 2.3).

Furthermore, external differentiation of the ideational approach is given by its distinguishability, i.e., the ability to clearly distinguish between populists and non-populists (Mudde, 2007, 2017). While attributes of populism such as anti-elitism "are not uniquely populist, but may belong to other political repertoires as well" (Brubaker, 2017, p. 361), populism is the combination of anti-elitism, people centrism, and a Manichean outlook. A party with only an anti-elitist discourse that does not refer to the people is thus not populist. Empirically, this distinction between populism and non-populism has been supported for different cases and with different methods (Hawkins, 2009; Mudde, 2007; Rooduijn & Pauwels, 2011; van Hauwaert & van Kessel, 2018).[6]

Sixth, with regard to the depth of the concept (Gerring, 1999), one has to note that it is able to capture different instances with a rather limited number of attributes. Populism can be used to identify different political movements of different ideological shades and across different contexts through their shared core of a populist ideology (Hawkins et al., 2018; Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2013; Rooduijn, 2018; Rooduijn & Akkerman, 2017; Rooduijn & Pauwels, 2011; van Hauwaert & van Kessel, 2018). Mudde (2017) points out that the ideational approach is particularly well-suited to construct typologies that are mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive (see Sartori, 1970). To that end, scholars using the ideational approach

[6] Besides, the ideational approach also allows distinctions in a "more-or-less" nature. For an excellent discussion of "degreeism" concerning populism, see van Kessel (2015).

have brought forward conceptual distinctions such as left-wing vs. right-wing populism or inclusionary vs. exclusionary populism (Mudde, 2017; Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2013).

Seventh, as concepts are often used to advance theory development and formulation, theoretical utility is another important criterion of conceptual goodness. Good concepts offer a view on causal connections between different aspects of reality. Concepts derive their utility from their position within their universe of terms (Gerring, 1999). If "ideas are the core of populism, it follows that they have some independent causal power with measurable effects" (Hawkins & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2018, p. 6). To that end, the ideational approach shows that these populist ideas have effects at different levels of analysis as well as across different contexts thereby offering theoretical utility.

For example, populism is shown to affect different phenomena, ranging from democratic functioning, political attitudes to economic outcomes on different levels of analysis and across different contexts (Geurkink et al., 2020; Houle & Kenny, 2018; Huber & Ruth, 2017; Huber & Schimpf, 2017; Mohrenberg et al., 2021; Rooduijn et al., 2014; Rooduijn et al., 2016; van Hauwaert et al., 2019). The ideational approach has been fruitfully applied across the globe showing that it has extant capability to "travel" (Sartori, 1970). Examples range from Latin America (Hawkins, 2009; Houle & Kenny, 2018), Eastern Europe (Santana et al., 2020; Stanley, 2011), Asia (Hieda et al., 2021) to Western (Rico & Anduiza, 2019; van Hauwaert & van Kessel, 2018) and Southern Europe (Marcos-Marne, 2021; Rico et al., 2017).

The final criterion according to Gerring (1999) is field utility, that is, how useful the concept is with regard to related concepts in the field of study. Given that populism's concept dimensions can exist independently from populism, scholars have warned about a lack of field utility. Such a conceptual overlap to other concepts in the field would leave these other concepts "empty" (Gerring, 1999, p. 376). As the ideational approach regards populism as the combination of the three necessary dimensions – people centrism, anti-elitism, and Manichean

outlook – populism is more than the sum of these established constructs. Rather it lies at the intersection of the three concepts thereby offering a new concept that provides analytical value (Wuttke et al., 2020). Subchapter 2.3 deals with this discussion in relation to populist attitudes.

Lastly, one advantage of the ideational approach aside from conceptual goodness is that it "invites us to study both the supply side and the demand side of populism" (Hawkins & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2017b, p. 529). The ideational approach allows scholars to apply it to a variety of different political actors as well as to the individual voter. Put differently, it allows to "analyse whether these ideas are widespread across certain segments of the electorate, irrespective of the presence of populist actors, and under which conditions they tend to get activated" (Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2018, p. 1671).

Populism in this sense is a moralistic rather than programmatic ideology with the concept of the people being of central importance (Mudde, 2004). The normative distinction is between the people and the elite and symbolises the Manichean outlook on society: the struggle between good and bad. Empirically, scholars often observe that populism is attached to other worldviews, thereby forming certain subtypes of populism. For instance, inclusionary populism usually combines populist conceptions of society with some forms of socialism (Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2013). Alternatively, when populism is combined with nativism, scholars speak of exclusionary populism or radical right-wing populism (Mudde, 2007; Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2013). To that end, the thin ideology of populism latches itself onto a host ideology such as nativism or socialism. In the following chapter, I conceptualise the two versions of populism that are the focus of investigation in this study, i.e., radical left- and right-wing populism.

2.2 Varieties of Populism

In the following, I outline the distinctive nature of radical right- and left-wing populism. Both versions of populism share a populist conception of politics and society but differ with regard to the respective host ideology that is attached to populism. While radical right-wing populism is usually associated with authoritarianism and nativism, radical left-wing populism is often associated with some form of socialism and a focus on economic issues, such as income inequality or redistribution.

I refer to both forms of populism as "radical". There has been ample debate in the literature on whether certain parties are radical or extreme (Rydgren, 2007). Within this study, I focus on radical right- and left-wing populism for two important reasons. First, this study focuses on individual voters rather than parties which allows to neglect certain subversive strategies of extreme parties that run counter to democratic norms (Rydgren, 2007). The ideational approach taken here allows focusing on the ideological content rather than the strategies and goals of the respective parties. Second, the ideologies under study here are not necessarily anti-democratic. While the expressed positions are certainly critical towards the current functioning of the democratic system and towards liberal democracy as such, populism is regarded as inherently democratic making the varieties of populism under study radical rather than extreme (Mudde, 2010). This is not to say that some of the parties studied here do not tend towards an extremist stance and might be evaluated differently in the future.

In the following two subchapters, I present the core concepts and respective sub-dimensions that form radical right- and left-wing populism. I start with radical right-wing populism as the more dominant and more extensively researched form of populism in (Western) Europe which is usually associated with a combination of populism, nativism, and authoritarianism (Betz, 2017; Mudde, 2007, 2010). Subsequently, I present the much less

researched radical left-wing populism which usually consists of populism and anti-capitalism (Fagerholm, 2018a, 2018b).

2.2.1 Radical Right-Wing Populism

When discussing populism in Europe, parties such as the *Alternative für Deutschland* (AfD) in Germany, the *Rassemblement National* (RN) in France, or the *Schweizerische Volkspartei* (SVP) in Switzerland usually come to mind. With regard to their ideological orientation, these parties are often associated with a radical right-wing populist ideology, also seen as the most dominant form of populism in Europe (Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2013). The election results of these parties further suggest that there is sufficient support among the population for such an ideology (Rooduijn, 2014).

To analyse the ideology, one needs to separate the different components. First, on a more general level, a radical right-wing populist ideology consists of two dimensions: populism and a radical right ideology. To that end, radical right-wing populism combines a populist ideology (people centrism, anti-elitism, and a Manichean outlook) with the substantive positions of a radical right ideology that is based on nativism and authoritarianism (Rooduijn, 2014). As populism with its three sub-dimensions is conceptualised in the previous chapter, I now focus on the core concepts that have been identified to form the crucial components of the radical right-wing ideology: nativism and authoritarianism (Betz, 2017; Mudde, 2007, 2010). Figure 2 graphically illustrates radical right-wing populism and its sub-dimensions.

Following Mudde (2007, 2010), nativism constitutes the key feature of the radical right ideology. Nativism is in itself a contested concept (Betz, 2017; Zhao, 2019). It can be understood as hostility towards anything that is foreign and poses a threat to national cohesion or identity (Betz, 2017). According to Betz (2017), there are two important aspects of nativism.

First, it has an affinity to a nostalgic vision that promises to restore traditional elements of the native culture (Betz, 2017, p. 337). Second, nativism has a preference for the native-born “exclusively on the grounds of ‘being native’” (De Genova, 2016, p. 233). Put differently, nativism is an ideology “which holds that states should be inhabited exclusively by members of the native group (‘the nation’) and that non-native elements (persons and ideas) are fundamentally threatening to the homogeneous nation-state” (Mudde, 2007, p. 19).

In this sense, nativism is inherently connected to nationalism. However, nationalism in itself is too broad of a concept to capture the ideological orientation of radical right-wing populism. National identity in general and nationalism in particular are not necessary illiberal by definition (Blank & Schmidt, 2003; Simonsen & Bonikowski, 2020). Radical right-wing populism, however, is characterised by an exclusive nationalism based on ethnic or cultural exclusion (Dunn, 2015; Hobsbawm, 1992). Put differently, radical right-wing populism is connected to an aggressive and antagonistic nationalism that distinguishes “the Good nation and Evil outsiders” (Rooduijn, 2014, p. 82).

One important manifestation of nativism is the focus on questions of immigration (Betz, 2017; Ivarsflaten, 2008; Oesch, 2008; Rooduijn, 2014; van der Brug & Fennema, 2007). Ideologically this focus on immigration dovetails with two different versions of nativism, one that focuses on ethno-cultural aspects (symbolic nativism) and one that focuses on economic factors such as labour market competition (economic nativism; Betz, 2017). To that end, immigration is regarded as a threat to the nation in economic and cultural terms, i.e., by threatening the cultural and economic foundations of the natives (Betz, 2017). Thus, restrictive policy positions on immigration and asylum are at the core of this ideology and regarded as a mobilising issue (Rydgren, 2007). In electoral terms, nativism seems to be the connecting element and winning formula of the populist radical right (Ivarsflaten, 2008).

Figure 2 Radical right-wing populism and its sub-dimensions



Notes: Own illustration. All sub-dimensions are necessary dimensions.

Populism and nativism seem to have an inherent affinity making it a fruitful ideological combination (Betz, 2017). This becomes particularly evident as both concepts have clear in-group-out-group distinctions with a positively viewed in-group and a negatively connoted out-group. In this regard, the Manichean struggle of populism can easily be interpreted as a struggle between the good native people and the evil elite that betrays the people by favouring non-natives over natives (Mudde, 2007, 2010).

Similarly, nativism allows a detailed definition of the people based on characteristics such as ethnicity, nationality, and potentially religion (Betz, 2017; Mudde, 2007). Consequently, right-wing populism constructs the people on ethnic or national categories. The people are an ethnically homogeneous and virtuous group that is the ultimate sovereign and thus should have the final say on policy decisions (Mudde, 2007). Immigrants or other non-natives do not belong to the people and are thus excluded. In a similar vein, the main antagonist of the people, the elite, is corrupt as they help non-native people (and themselves) to gain an advantage over the true native people (Mudde, 2007).

The second important ideological component of radical right-wing populism is authoritarianism. Authoritarianism has long been a prominent concept in the social sciences (Adorno et al., 1950; Altemeyer, 1981). While early research regarded it as a stable trait, in recent years, scholars have swayed from this view and now regard authoritarian attitudes as an expression that is "exclusively attitudinal or ideological in content" (Duckitt, 2013, p. 1). Authoritarian attitudes are defined as "social attitudinal or ideological expressions of basic social values or motivational goals that represent different, though related, strategies for attaining collective security at the expense of individual autonomy" (Duckitt & Bizumic, 2013, p. 842). This implies support for traditional moral and ethical claims, and the "need for order, quick responses to threats to order, and support for authorities who can maintain order" (Aguilar & Carlin, 2018, p. 398).

Authoritarian attitudes consist of three sub-dimensions (Adorno et al., 1950; Altemeyer, 1981; Duckitt & Bizumic, 2013): authoritarian submission (preference for obedience to authorities and institutions), authoritarian aggression (preference for harsh, coercive social control against the violation of rules and laws), and conventionalism (cultural conformity to established rules, norms, and values). Generally speaking authoritarians are sceptical of diversity and "[a]s a result of this aversion, authoritarians are predisposed to express intolerant and punitive attitudes when threatened with the fragmentation of society" (Dunn, 2015, p. 368). Social changes such as globalisation and modernisation are threatening the coherent and stable institutions of the nation and its traditions. Thus, vulnerable individuals are trying to cope with such threatening situations by striving for traditions and old rules that were guiding a predictable society (Dunn, 2015).

Moreover, authoritarian attitudes are often associated with a preference for law-and-order politics as such measures imply predictable results for deviant behaviour and a harsh response to violations of long-standing societal rules and traditions (Akkerman et al., 2017).

Authoritarians combine such preferences with a punitive understanding of traditional morals (Mudde, 2007).

Altogether, authoritarian attitudes express a desire for collective security at the expense of individual liberty. These attitudes offer specific strategies to regain security in times of social change and (perceived) threats. This is often combined with a preference for strong leadership that is designed to counter (perceived) threats (Donovan, 2021). Authoritarianism matches with the nativist sentiment by favouring a rule- and tradition-based society that is sceptical of diversity. Moreover, nativism and authoritarianism both share a positive relationship with the nation-state.

Authoritarianism, like nativism, resonates well with populism. The desire for a rule and tradition based society that is working for those that are following society's rules is in line with populism's fight for the virtuous people. Conversely, the elites have neglected and forgotten these traditions and rules subverting the authority of (state) institutions controlled by them. They have corrupted the rule-based system to their advantage and at the expense of the people. A return to a society with a strong focus on law-and-order and traditions could mitigate the crisis (Mudde, 2007). Even though authoritarians are in favour of submission to authority, they are sceptical of the current elite. This makes submission to authority only an option when the populists are in power (Donovan, 2019, 2021).

Authoritarianism and populism also share a certain nostalgia for that what was before and thus a desire for a return to the traditions and roots of society (Elchardus & Spruyt, 2016; Gest et al., 2018; Steenvoorden & Harteveld, 2018). Populism promises such a return to a rule-based society in combination with an aggressive rhetoric to remove the corrupt elite from power, which resembles the ideas of authoritarian aggression that favours harsh punishment of disobedience.

To sum up, radical right-wing populism is a combination of a populist (people centrism, anti-elitism, and a Manichean outlook) and a radical right-wing ideology (nativism and authoritarianism). In combination, they form a coherent set of attitudes that can be articulated by political parties, politicians, or citizens.

2.2.2 Radical Left-Wing Populism

Compared to radical right-wing populism, radical left-wing populism has been less researched. One particular reason is the decreasing relevance of radical left parties after 1989 and the dominance of radical right-wing parties in the decades since (Fagerholm, 2017). Yet, in recent years, parties such as *SYRIZA* in Greece or *Podemos* in Spain have sparked considerable interest in radical left-wing populism. Both parties might serve as prototypical cases for radical left-wing populism in Europe (Sanders et al., 2017; Stavrakakis & Katsambekis, 2014). Other examples for such parties include *La France Insoumise* in France, *Die Linke* in Germany, or *Socialistische Partij* in the Netherlands. While less successful in some elections than their right-wing counterparts, these parties also attract support from a significant portion of the population with some even entering governmental power. This shows that there is also considerable support for such a radical left-wing populist ideology.

With regard to the ideological orientation, there is no overall agreement on the core dimensions of radical left-wing populism (March & Mudde, 2005). On the one hand, some authors would argue that radical left-wing populists are socialists as socialism itself is populist (March, 2007). On the other hand, research found that left-wing populists seem to be less concerned "with doctrinal purity and class-consciousness than the traditional left" (March, 2007, p. 66). These parties are populist in their emphasis on the struggle between the good people and the evil elite but they adopt less clear policy positions than traditional communist or socialist parties (March, 2007; March & Mudde, 2005). Consequently, it seems too far-

fetched to argue that socialism constitutes a main part of radical left-wing populist parties' ideological core. Rather, radical left-wing populism attaches certain aspects of socialism to its populist core (March, 2007).

A common theme in the literature is that left-wing populism seems to be mainly concerned with economic questions such as income inequality, redistribution, or public ownership (Akkerman et al., 2017; Bowyer & Vail, 2011; March, 2007, 2017; March & Mudde, 2005; March & Rommerskirchen, 2015). Thus, as opposed to radial right-wing populism, immigration does not play a major role (Akkerman et al., 2017). To that end, some scholars have categorised left-wing populism as inclusionary populism as it aims to include larger segments of (poorer) people while at the same time not excluding horizontal out-groups (Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2013). Yet, this inclusion comes at the expense of the exclusion of cultural, economic, or political elites. Even more so, Sanders et al. (2017) have argued that populism per se is exclusionary and only the excluded group varies with ideology.

Despite the ample debate about the exact nature of the ideological orientation of radical left-wing populism, one important ideological factor can be identified from the literature: anti-capitalism (Fagerholm, 2018a, 2018b). Figure 3 graphically illustrates the dimensionality of radical left-wing populism.

According to Fagerholm (2018a, 2018b), anti-capitalism constitutes the single most common feature of radical left-wing parties. It can be defined as "rejection of capitalist economic inequity and a support for collective ownership of the means of production" (Fagerholm, 2018a, p. 542). Left-wing populism identifies economic inequity as a fundamental characteristic of the current political and economic system. In this vein, capitalism is responsible for the economic exclusion of certain social strata. In combination with globalisation, this increased economic competition threatens the social community that is central to socialist ideas (March, 2007; March & Mudde, 2005). Consequently, "[t]he left-

populists present an idealized version of a social democratic society before it began to 'rot' under the influence of 20 years of neo-liberalism and betrayal by 'mainstream' social-democratic parties" (March, 2007, p. 67). In this vein, radical left-wing populism presents a socialist critique of capitalism. Yet, contrary to classical socialist parties, radical left-wing populists "present themselves as the vox populi, not just the vanguard of the proletariat" (March, 2007, p. 67).

Figure 3 Radical left-wing populism and its sub-dimensions



Notes: Own illustration. All sub-dimensions are necessary dimensions

As an alternative to the capitalist and neo-liberal mainstream, radical left-wing populism champions increased social welfare and public ownership. Public ownership is related to the anti-capitalist stance as it limits accumulation of private wealth through public ownership of the means of production. Thus, it is not about abolishing private property but rather about the nationalisation of key industries. Public ownership could compensate for the competition and liberalisation pressures of globalisation thereby limiting the negative consequences of a globalised capitalist economy (Fagerholm, 2017, 2018b). Such a stronger state intervention is seen as necessary to counter the inequities of global capitalism (March, 2007; March & Mudde, 2005; March & Rommerskirchen, 2015). Regulation of capital and large businesses as well as

their political influence is therefore a central component of a radical left-wing ideology (Akkerman et al., 2017).

Another important aspect of anti-capitalism is economic equality or the combat of economic inequality (Ramiro, 2016; Ramiro & Gomez, 2017; Visser et al., 2014). Here, the focus is on income redistribution to mitigate the consequences of capitalist competition. The desire for economic equality directly relates to mitigating the consequences of the capitalist system. Akkerman et al. (2017) show that voters of left-wing populist parties support income equality. Similarly, Visser et al. (2014) show that people with a radical left ideology clearly favour income redistribution from higher to lower incomes. One particularly important concern for left-wing populists is unequal income growth or income growth that is limited to the upper spheres of the income ladder (Burgoon et al., 2019). To that end, redistribution form the upper to the lower spheres is an important aspect of the anti-capitalist ideology (Ramiro, 2016; Ramiro & Gomez, 2017; Visser et al., 2014). Lastly, the expansion of the welfare state and more generous social benefits essentially aim at the economic and social inclusion of poorer segments of the population, i.e., the true hard-working people (Kioupkiolis, 2016; Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2013).

In a nutshell, radical left-wing populism combines populism with an anti-capitalist ideology that focuses on limiting the influence of the rich and big businesses while strengthening the economic and social position of the “common people”. Thus, the combination of a socialist critique of capitalism and anti-establishment rhetoric is evident. While the economic and political elites profit from the capitalist system, the people are exploited and sidelined. Thus, the Manichean struggle is interpreted as a struggle between the good hard-working people and the evil (economic and political) elite that betrays the people by fostering capitalist competition and increasing wealth for the few (March, 2007; March & Mudde, 2005).

Radical left-wing populism defines the out-group on economic rather than ethnic criteria (Ivaldi et al., 2017). As opposed to its right-wing counterpart, the exclusion criterion here is social position (Akkerman et al., 2017). Consequently, the people as defined by social class are at the forefront. They are a homogeneous and virtuous group that is the ultimate sovereign and should thus have the final say on policy decisions. To that end, the call for popular sovereignty is an empowering element for those betrayed by the capitalist elite.

Conversely, the elite is responsible for the economic inequalities and thus the people (and the populists who give them a voice) should take back political control to limit capitalist exploitation (Akkerman et al., 2017). Economic redistribution functions as a similar vessel to increase the political and social position of the exploited (March, 2007; March & Mudde, 2005). Yet, radical left-wing populism does not solely focus on the traditional working-class but on those that are neglected by the capitalist economy more generally (March, 2007). Thus, radical left-wing populism has a more encompassing understanding of the hard-working people (Stavrakakis & Katsambekis, 2014).

Overall, radical left-wing populism is a combination of a populist (people centrism, anti-elitism, and a Manichean outlook) and a radical left-wing ideology (anti-capitalism) (Fagerholm, 2018a, 2018b; March, 2007). Together, they form a coherent set of attitudes that can be articulated by political parties, politicians, or citizens.

2.3 Populist Attitudes

After establishing populism as a concept, this chapter focuses on a particular manifestation of populism. Populist attitudes are regarded as an individual-level manifestation of populism that influences certain tendencies and proclivities such as voting for populist parties (Castanho Silva et al., 2018; Castanho Silva et al., 2020; van Hauwaert et al., 2020). The ideational approach to

populism conceptualised above is particularly well-suited to investigate populist attitudes as it does not focus on one particular level of analysis but rather on ideas that can be articulated by different actors at different levels (Hawkins & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2017b; Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2018).

As populism is understood as a unique understanding of how democracy should function, populist attitudes are essentially the expression of these ideas usually obtained through self-reported survey questions (van Hauwaert et al., 2020). In the following, I define attitudes before applying the definition to populist attitudes. Subsequently, I pay particular attention to the sub-dimensions of populist attitudes as well as the relationship of populist attitudes with other established concepts.

Generally speaking attitudes are constructs that can only be observed indirectly and mainly through the evaluation of the construct or object (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993, 2007). Eagly and Chaiken (1993, p. 1) define an attitude as a “psychological tendency, expressed by evaluating a particular entity with some degree of favor or disfavor”. An attitude is comprised of three different features: tendency, attitude object, and evaluation (Eagly & Chaiken, 2007). The entity that is evaluated ranges from persons to ideologies and is considered as the attitude object. In that regard, attitude objects can be concrete or abstract as long as they are “discriminable or held in mind” (Eagly & Chaiken, 2007, p. 583).

The evaluation of this attitude object is based on stimuli elicited by the attitude object and can include cognitive, affective, or behavioural evaluations that can be overt or covert (Eagly & Chaiken, 2007). According to this approach, for an attitude to exist, an individual once must have been exposed to the attitude object to elicit an evaluative response. This exposure leaves – what Eagly and Chaiken call – a mental residue. This residue forms the third component of an attitude: the tendency (Eagly & Chaiken, 2007).

Experiences with the attitude object incline individuals to respond with a certain degree of favour or disfavour. However, opposed to dispositions, this tendency does not imply permanence. Thus, attitudes occupy a middle ground between traits that are stable or permanent over time and moods that change rather quickly. Attitudes are changeable over time but they do not change permanently. In sum, the attitude itself is not observable, only the evaluations of the attitude object can be made observable (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993, 2007).

Transferring this approach to the current study, populism qualifies as the attitude object. In this regard, individuals evaluate this object either more positively or negatively. As populism is a combination of anti-elitism, people centrism, and a Manichean view of society, populist attitudes are generally defined as “the set of evaluative reactions” to the combination of anti-elitism, people centrism, and a Manichean view of society (van Hauwaert et al., 2020, p. 5). Put differently, an individual is qualified as having populist attitudes if she evaluates anti-elitism *and* people centrism *and* a Manichean view of society *positively* (see Wuttke et al., 2020).

It is important to note that anti-elitist, people centrist, and Manichean attitudes can exist independently from each other. As a consequence, scholars have asked whether populist attitudes contribute to the scholarly literature and offer conceptual, theoretical, and empirical value (Geurkink et al., 2020; Wuttke et al., 2020). Wuttke et al. (2020) point out that the study of populist attitudes is particularly vulnerable to this criticism, as it is situated on a level of analysis where other concepts have been used to study similar phenomena.

For example, political trust (A. H. Miller, 1974) and (external) political efficacy (Niemi et al., 1991) have been used for a long time in the context of anti-establishment sentiments (Wuttke et al., 2020). To that end, empirical research has often used such concepts to approximate populist views, for example, in the investigation of populist vote choice (Rooduijn, 2018). Relating back to Gerring (1999), this questions the concept differentiation and field

utility of populist attitudes. To put it bluntly, this raises the question whether populist attitudes can really contribute to our understanding of politics and society (cf. Wuttke et al., 2020).

From a conceptual standpoint, populism lies at the intersection of the aforementioned sub-dimensions. More importantly, anti-elitism, people centrism, and a Manichean outlook are jointly necessary conditions for populist attitudes. All three have to be present, which means that an individual cannot be populist if she has high levels of anti-elitism but low levels of people centrism (see chapter 2.1). Put differently, “understanding populist attitudes as an attitudinal syndrome suggests considering citizens as populists only if they exhibit anti-elitist orientations *and* a Manichean outlook *and* support popular sovereignty” (Wuttke et al., 2020, p. 358; italics in original). This results in a non-compensatory concept structure, meaning that – conceptually speaking – populism is more than just the sum of already established constructs (Wuttke et al., 2020).

From an empirical standpoint, Geurkink et al. (2020) show that populist attitudes are different from other established concepts. Political efficacy and political trust are conceptually and empirically distinct from populist attitudes. While external political efficacy relates to the responsiveness of the political system (i.e., whether an individual perceives to have influence on the decision-making process), political trust relates to the extent to which political actors fulfil the (policy) expectations of the individual (Geurkink et al., 2020). More importantly, both concepts relate differently to the different sub-dimensions of populism. A lack of political trust or a lack of political efficacy can relate positively to the anti-elitism of populism but they are agnostic about the homogeneity of the populace or the structure and properties of political conflict (Geurkink et al., 2020).

Empirically, factor analyses show that populist attitudes, external political efficacy and political trust are distinct concepts with little cross loadings (Geurkink et al., 2020). More importantly, the concepts’ ability to explain populist party support – an important correlate of

populism – varies significantly. Populist attitudes allow explaining support for populist parties of different ideological shades and across different contexts (Geurkink et al., 2020; Hawkins et al., 2018; Loew & Faas, 2019; van Hauwaert & van Kessel, 2018) while political trust and (external) political efficacy are not able to (consistently) explain populist vote intentions (Geurkink et al., 2020; Rooduijn, 2018; van Hauwaert & van Kessel, 2018). To that end, populist attitudes provide additional empirical value to the scholarly literature and are not just “old wine in new bottles” (cf. Geurkink et al., 2020).

Overall, populism is a combination of anti-elitism, people centrism, and a Manichean outlook on society and populist attitudes are thus a set of evaluative reaction to the combination of these three elements. Consequently, populist attitudes are an original concept that promises theoretical and empirical value to the study of political attitudes and democracy. In particular, populist attitudes offer a fruitful concept especially when compared to vote choice. One advantage of such an attitudinal approach over vote choice is that “voters are always recruited on the basis of several issues and concerns”, which makes it difficult to extract support for populism from vote choice (Spruyt et al., 2016, p. 336). The study of populist attitudes has grown considerably in recent years. By now, a well-established set of items is used to measure populist attitudes on the individual-level. In chapter 6.3.1, I elaborate on the respective approaches and present the measurement of populist attitudes in this study in more detail.

2.4 Populism in the Countries under Study

This subchapter briefly presents the history of populism in the countries under study. I present the dominant populist parties, their electoral trajectories, and their ideological orientation. This dissertation investigates populism in six European countries: France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. While I outline the reasoning behind the country

selection in chapter 6.2, this subchapter is solely dedicated to the history of populism in the six countries. I focus on the countries in an alphabetical order.

I start with populism in *France*. It is important to acknowledge that France has a relatively long history of populism, in particular radical right-wing populism. The French *Rassemblement Nationa*l (RN, previously *Front National*, FN), established in 1972, is often considered as a prime example of a European radical right-wing populist party (Ivarsflaten, 2005; Mudde, 2007). The party made a name for itself by gaining seats in the European Parliament in the 1980s (Surel, 2019). The first major success was that Jean-Marie LePen – one of the founders and the Chairman – made it into the second round of the French presidential election in 2002 (Perrineau, 2003). Although LePen lost to Jacques Chirac in the second round, this was a major success for the party as it showed that the *Front National* was capable of winning a large share of voters. Thus, the party established itself as challenger party that threatens the electoral success of its mainstream competitors (Perrineau, 2003).

A sign of the continued relevance of the party is that in 2017, Marine LePen – the successor of Jean-Marie LePen as chairman of the party – also made it to the second round of the presidential election where she lost to Emmanuel Macron (Surel, 2019). Next to these successes in the presidential elections and European parliament elections, the *Front National* also won considerable shares in national parliamentary elections amounting to 15 percent in the first round of the last parliamentary election in 2017 (see Figure 4). For the presidential elections in 2022, the *Rassemblement National* is regarded as one of the main parties to challenge President Emmanuel Macron.

Ideologically, the *Rassemblement National* is a classical radical right-wing populist party. The party places a particular emphasis on issues such as immigration and national identity (Ivaldi & Dutozia, 2018; Mudde, 2007). In particular, the party favours strict policies against immigration and uses xenophobic rhetoric to mobilise its supporters (Surel, 2019). Immigration

is regarded as a threat to national identity and French culture. Thus, the party advocates a stop of immigration. A particular focus of the RN are Muslim immigrants whose attitudes and lifestyles are said to be incompatible with French society (Ivaldi et al., 2017). Under the new leadership of Marine LePen, the party tried to change its bad image and reputation. While Marine LePen made the party's discourse more populist the party retained a strong anti-immigration platform (Stockemer & Barisione, 2017).

Figure 4 Election results of populist parties in the six countries under study from 1990-2021



Notes: France (Faucher & Garcia, 2017; Ministère de l'intérieur, 2017); Germany (Der Bundeswahlleiter, 2021); Italy (Ignazi, 2013; Statista, 2018) Spain (Álvarez-Rivera, 2019); Switzerland (Bundesamt für Statistik, 2019); United Kingdom (Dommett, 2017; Uberoi et al., 2020).

These nativist positions are fruitfully combined with fierce critique towards the political establishment. Politicians from other parties are regarded as corrupt and favouring immigrants over the true French citizens. This form of anti-elitism aligns nicely with the anti-immigrant positioning of the party and the ethnic construction of the true people (Ivaldi et al., 2017). Moreover, the RN criticises national and European elites for their political decisions that are

said to hurt the true French people (Ivaldi et al., 2017; Ivaldi, 2018). To that end, the RN champions the native people and pits them against a conspiring and corrupt elite (Ivaldi et al., 2017; Stockemer & Barisione, 2017). Under Marine LePen's leadership, the party makes much more references to the French people as well as to the (mainstream) elite (Stockemer & Barisione, 2017). Overall, there is scholarly agreement that the RN is a radical right-wing populist party and given its election results a rather successful one (Rooduijn et al., 2019; Zulianello, 2020)

While having a long-standing and strong history of radical right-wing populism, radical left-wing populism is not represented by a comparably established party in France. While there are instances of communist parties, these are not necessarily populist (Sperber, 2010). Yet, in 2016, French left-wing politician Jean-Luc Mélenchon founded *La France Insoumise* ("Unbowed France"). In its first election in 2017, the party obtained over 10 percent of the votes. The party overshadowed the mainstream socialist party and thus is regarded a serious political competitor. For the elections in 2022, Jean-Luc Mélenchon will run again as presidential candidate for his party.

Ideologically, the party champions the hard-working people against the capitalist and political elite. To that end, the party favours less capitalist competition, more redistribution, and more direct democracy. One particular focus of the critique is the political elite in France and Europe who have turned their back on the hard-working people (Ivaldi, 2018). Globalisation and increasing trade are often used as prime examples of how French and European politicians have neglected those that are working hard. Although there is little research on this party, scholars classify it as a radical left-wing populist party (Rooduijn et al., 2019; Zulianello, 2020).

In contrast to France, *Germany* has a rather short history of populism. For radical right-wing populism this is often explained with the particularly violent history of the Nazi-Regime and its historical legacy (Arzheimer, 2019; Goerres et al., 2018). Nevertheless, in 2013, the first

radical right-wing populist party, the *Alternative für Deutschland* (AfD), was founded.[7] Originally, the party was directed against the common currency in Europe and in particular against support for the Southern members of the Eurozone such as Greece and Spain during the financial and sovereign debt crisis (Goerres et al., 2018). Thus, during its early years the AfD was considered a Eurosceptic rather than a populist party (Arzheimer, 2015; Goerres et al., 2018). Although the party performed strongly in its first general election in 2013, the party failed to obtain seats in the parliament. Subsequently, the party changed its image, leadership, and ideology developing into a true radical right-wing populist party (Arzheimer & Berning, 2019; Lewandowsky et al., 2016).[8]

Ideologically, the party changed from Euroscepticism combined with economic liberalism to a radical right-wing ideology with particular emphasis on anti-immigrant positions and anti-establishment rhetoric (Arzheimer, 2015; Arzheimer & Berning, 2019; Lewandowsky et al., 2016). While remaining opposed to the European Union, the party focusses increasingly on the issue of immigration that became particularly prominent during the so-called "refugee crisis" in 2015. The party is strictly in favour of restrictive immigration policies and uses anti-immigrant and xenophobic rhetoric to mobilise supporters or gain attention. To summarise, with regard to its host ideology, the AfD is situated furthest to the right when looking at parties that have a realistic chance of entering the Bundestag (Lewandowsky et al., 2016). Furthermore, Lewandowsky et al. (2016) show that the AfD is the party with the highest level of anti-establishment and people centric ideology in the German party system. Thus, the party combines populism and nativism fruitfully, making it a case of a radical right-wing populist

[7] In Germany, parties such as the National Democratic Party and the Republikaner were not considered as populist parties but as extreme right-wing parties.
[8] Parts of the party are currently under surveillance by the German intelligence services as they are suspected to undermine the democratic order of Germany. Thus, some might argue that the AfD represents an extreme right-wing party.

party comparable to the French *Rassemblement National* (Rooduijn et al., 2019; Zulianello, 2020).

Electorally, the AfD has performed increasingly well since moving towards a right-wing populist ideology (Arzheimer, 2015). After gaining 4.7 percent in the 2013 federal election, the AfD achieved 12.7 percent in 2017 making it the strongest opposition party in the Bundestag (see Figure 4). Furthermore, the AfD has also been shown to be successful in several elections on the regional (Bundesländer) level with particularly strong results in East Germany (Weisskircher, 2020). With the AfD, Germany now has a radical right-wing populist party that has established itself in national and regional parliaments (Lewandowsky et al., 2016).

On the other side of the political spectrum, Germany also has a radical left-wing populist party, *Die Linke* (Olsen, 2018). The origins of the party lie in the German Democratic Republic (GDR) and its main party, the *Socialist Unity Party* (SED). After the reunification, the PDS (*Party of Democratic Socialism*) was designed as the successor of the SED. In 2007, the PDS merged with a faction (WASG) of the German Social Democratic Party (SPD) to form *Die Linke* (Olsen, 2018). *Die Linke* is particularly strong in East Germany. For example, Thuringia was the first German Bundesland to elect a Prime Minster from *Die Linke* in 2014.

Yet, the party has also gained prominence in West Germany making it an all-German party (Olsen, 2018). On the national level, *Die Linke* has been a part of the German Bundestag since 2005 with results of around 10 percent. Recently, the party has struggled to retain its vote share, partly due to competition from the AfD but in particular from mainstream left parties (Olsen, 2018). In the 2021 federal election, the party failed the 5 percent threshold but remains in parliament due to three directly won mandates.

Ideologically, *Die Linke* has transformed from a former socialist party towards a more or less radical left-wing populist party. While the party does not reject democracy, it is highly critical of the current political elite and the functioning of the current democratic system. To

that end, the party has been able to mobilise dissatisfied voters in particular from Eastern Germany (Doerschler & Banaszak, 2007; Olsen, 2018).

With regard to the host ideology, *Die Linke* clearly follows a radical left-wing programme with a focus on redistribution and anti-capitalist rhetoric. Moreover, the party is critical of globalisation and free trade "because [such] agreements purportedly only benefit big business" (Olsen, 2018, p. 76). Furthermore, in terms of social policy, the party is highly critical towards the social reforms implemented by the Schröder government and draws a significant part of her identity from this rejection (Bowyer & Vail, 2011). The party favours a redistribution of income and wealth, for example through a wealth tax. Based on the combination of radical left-wing ideology and populist anti-establishment positioning, scholars have categorised the party as a radical left-wing populist party (Rooduijn et al., 2019; Zulianello, 2020).

For *Italy*, two parties are worth mentioning, the *Lega Nord* and the *Moviemento Cinque Stelle* (M5S, Five Star Movement; Pirro & van Kessel, 2018).[9] The *Lega Nord* originated from several regionalist movements in Northern Italy and made centre stage in Italian politics in 1992 when it reached 8.7 percent in the national elections (Ignazi, 2005). Traditionally, the *Lega* appealed to Northern Italians and contesting in national elections did neither change the party's regionalist appeal nor its radicalism (Ignazi, 2005). The *Lega* provided a discourse that pitted hard-working Northern Italians against a bureaucratic, corrupt, and lazy political establishment that has been co-opted by Southerners (Ignazi, 2005). As a consequence of rather poor electoral performances, the *Lega* shifted towards a more radical position demanding the independence for the Northern states of Italy, thereby shifting "from a community of economic interests to a community of people belonging to a motherland" (Ignazi, 2005, p. 346). This shift provided the

[9] Fratelli d'Italia is sometimes regarded as radical right-wing populist party. Yet, it is less established in the political system. Thus, I focus here mainly on the Lega Nord and M5S but include Fratelli d'Italia in the analyses.

foundation for the nativism and anti-immigrant positioning that is characteristic of the *Lega* today (Pirro & van Kessel, 2018).

Particularly under the rule of Matteo Salvini, the *Lega* increasingly focussed on Italians as the true people thereby overcoming the North vs. South divide of earlier years (Ivaldi et al., 2017). The new focus of the party is to stop immigration in order to protect the Italian culture and Italians form dangerous, illegal immigrants (Ivaldi et al., 2017). To that end, the party's position on immigration resembles the ones of the *Rassemblement National* in France.

In terms of anti-elitism, the *Lega* has not swayed away from the early route but retains a strong anti-elitism that characterises politicians as corrupt thieves that form a caste that betrays the people (Ivaldi et al., 2017). This strategy has been electorally successful in recent years, with a particularly strong performance in 2018 with around 17 percent of the votes in the national election (see Figure 4). As a result, the *Lega* was part of the governmental coalition with the M5S until 2019. Overall, the *Lega* has been characterised as a radical right-wing populist party (Rooduijn et al., 2019; Zulianello, 2020).

The *Moviemento Cinque Stelle* is the second major populist party in Italy. Founded in 2009, the Five Start Movement gained increasing recognition with its major breakthrough in Italian politics when it reached almost 26% in the national election in 2013 (Mosca & Tronconi, 2019). In the beginning, the party of comedian Beppe Grillo was particularly concerned with an anti-neoliberal ideology combined with fierce anti-establishment rhetoric (Passarelli & Tuorto, 2018). Politicians are considered as "a CASTE of corrupt, high-ranking faceless state bureaucrats, and unions that have turned into parasites, no longer protecting workers' interests" (Di Maggio & Perrone, 2019, p. 471). In the aftermath of the financial crisis, M5S recruited higher educated and younger Italians through its easy way of contributing to the party via online platforms. Accordingly, the strong electoral result in 2013 was mainly due to left-wing voters (Di Maggio & Perrone, 2019).

While this ideological combination resembles radical left-wing populist parties, the Five Star Movement transformed in the following years. The party increasingly included Eurosceptic and anti-taxation propositions into its programme (Mosca & Tronconi, 2019). The latter is incompatible with a left-wing agenda. Furthermore, the party avoided taking a clear position when it comes to immigration. Although Ivaldi et al. (2017) point out that some prominent figures in M5S have used anti-immigrant rhetoric, they argue that this is more a strategic decision that does not reach to the core of the party's ideology (Ivaldi et al., 2017).[10] To that end, Mosca and Tronconi (2019, p. 1259) conclude that the M5S is one "of the main examples of non-radical populist parties, which do not display the typical ideological profile of radical left or radical right thus resembling 'centrist populism', a phenomenon that is known and often described in Central Eastern Europe (CEE)".

What also remains ambiguous is the conception of the people as it is neither based on ethnicity or nationality, nor on social class (Ivaldi et al., 2017; Mosca & Tronconi, 2019). Irrespective of such ambiguities, the ideological package of the M5S seems to be attractive for the Italian voters. The party became the strongest party in 2018 with 32 percent of the votes (see Figure 4). Moreover, the party is part of the governing coalition (Paparo, 2018).

Spain was long regarded as an exception to the populist wave, in particular to the emergence of a radical right-wing populist party (Mendes & Dennison, 2021; Turnbull-Dugarte, 2019). While being characterised mostly as a stable two-party system with a centre-right and a centre-left party, the financial crisis and its aftermath altered Spanish party competition (Marcos-Marne, 2021; Orriols & Cordero, 2016).

One of the important contenders that emerged in this context is the radical left-wing populist party *Podemos* (Marcos-Marne, 2021; Orriols & Cordero, 2016; Rodríguez-Teruel et

[10] This is not to say that the party may not develop in such a direction but currently it is not regarded as a party with an anti-immigrant positioning.

al., 2016). As a response to the long-lasting economic crisis and the implementation of harsh austerity policies, *Podemos* ("We can") was founded with a particular focus on economic redistribution embedded in an anti-austerity platform (Ramiro & Gomez, 2017). Yet, the party did not solely focus on economic issues. Rather, Podemos particularly concentrated on the political elite (left and right) or "casta" as responsible actors for the dire situation in Spain (Ivaldi et al., 2017).

The first notable result was the European Parliament election in 2014 where *Podemos* claimed one million votes (Marcos-Marne, 2021). More importantly, *Podemos* went on to receive more than 20 percent of the votes in the national elections in 2015 and 2016 establishing the party in the national political arena (see Figure 4) (Orriols & Cordero, 2016; Rodríguez-Teruel et al., 2016). In 2018, *Podemos* helped Pedro Sanchez from the social democratic party (PSOE) to defeat Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy in a vote of no confidence. Subsequently, the party supported Sanchez' minority government. Since the second 2019 election, *Podemos* is part of the left-wing governmental coalition under Pedro Sanchez. Yet, compared to 2016, *Podemos* lost a considerable amount of votes and is now only the fourth largest party with less than 15 percent of the votes.

Ideologically, *Podemos* is clearly a radical left-wing populist party. From the start *Podemos* aimed to create a new political divide following an "us vs. them" logic that pits the people against the elite (Marcos-Marne, 2021). The elite or "la casta" is identified as the political enemy that conspires against the people (Marcos-Marne, 2021). Yet, this anti-elitism transcends the political sphere and includes economic and financial elites that are claimed to be responsible for the financial crisis and the ensuing austerity politics (Ivaldi et al., 2017). According to Ivaldi et al. (2017, p. 360) these notions were complemented "by a new concept of 'plot' (la trama) referring to a broad network of corruption and collusion among politicians,

economic elites and judges, stigmatized also as the ‘couch mafia’ (mafia del canapé) that would be running Spain”.

Matching its anti-elitist stances, *Podemos* constructs its notion of the people not in ethnic terms but rather in terms of social and economic position. *Podemos* represents the common people that are underprivileged and need to be mobilised against a privileged minority (Ivaldi et al., 2017). Thus, *Podemos* fruitfully combines populism with some form of socialism. By “opposing austerity measures and advocating redistributive social policies, public spending and state intervention in the economy, including for instance a state-led banking sector, introducing a universal basic income for those under the poverty line, as well as energy price caps for low-income households” *Podemos* follows a radical left-wing policy agenda (Ivaldi et al., 2017, p. 364). In combination with its anti-elitist and people centric vision, *Podemos* is regarded as a radical left-wing populist party (Rooduijn et al., 2019; Zulianello, 2020).

While Spain was considered as an exception in Europe due to the absence of a radical right-wing populist party, this exceptionalism came to an end with the electoral success of *Vox* in 2018 (Turnbull-Dugarte, 2019; Turnbull-Dugarte et al., 2020). Already founded in 2013 by former members of the conservative party, *Vox* remained electorally marginal until 2018 (Marcos-Marne, Plaza-Colodro, & O’Flynn, 2021). After impressive performances in local elections, *Vox* gained national relevance by obtaining 10 percent of the votes in April 2019 and even 15 percent in November 2019, making it the third largest party in Spain (Turnbull-Dugarte et al., 2020).

Ideologically, *Vox* combines a hard anti-immigration position with authoritarian and nationalist policy positions (Turnbull-Dugarte, 2019). For example, with regard to immigration, *Vox* resembles other radical right-wing populist parties in Europe such as the RN or the AfD, by demanding the deportation of undocumented and criminal immigrants (Turnbull-Dugarte, 2019). Moreover, in terms of regional independence – an important question in Spain – *Vox*

follows a nationalist agenda by proposing centralisation and advocating bans of political parties that support regional independence (Turnbull-Dugarte, 2019; Vampa, 2020). Lastly, *Vox* also advocates traditionally conservative policies directed against gender quotas, same-sex marriage, and abortion (Turnbull-Dugarte, 2019). All three aspects are clear indicators of a radical right-wing ideology.

With regard to the populism of the party, scholars do not always agree whether it is populist or not (Marcos-Marne, Plaza-Colodro, & O'Flynn, 2021; Turnbull-Dugarte, 2019). While Marcos-Marne, Plaza-Colodro, and O'Flynn (2021) argue that nationalism and authoritarianism take precedence over populist positions, others argue that *Vox* uses populist appeals that pit the elite against the common Spanish people (Turnbull-Dugarte, 2019). Turnbull-Dugarte et al. (2020, p. 5) argue that "its populist rhetoric and the saliency of the same is equitable to that of its populist radical right-wing peers" in other European countries. Put differently, "it's [sic] populist approach of promising to 'make Spain great again' alongside its nativist authoritarianism signal its fulfilment of Mudde's (2004) classification as a populist radical right party" (Turnbull-Dugarte, 2019, p. 2). Thus, recent studies classify *Vox* as a radical right-wing populist party (Rooduijn et al., 2019; Zulianello, 2020).

Switzerland can be regarded as special case not only because of its direct democratic institutions and its consensual government but also because of the role of the major radical right-wing populist party, the *Schweizerische Volkspartei* (SVP; Kriesi et al., 2005; McGann & Kitschelt, 2005).[11] The SVP has been a dominant political actor in Switzerland for almost three decades (Albertazzi, 2008; Bernhard, 2017). Established in 1971, the SVP has had profound impact on Swiss politics but fully entered centre stage in the 1990s when it turned towards a radical right-wing populist party (Bernhard, 2017). In 1999, the SVP became the strongest party

[11] There are two additional radical right-wing populist parties in Switzerland, the Lega dei Ticinesi (LdT) and the Mouvement Citoyens Genevoise (MCR). Yet, both are only marginally or regionally important, especially given the dominance of the SVP in Swiss politics.

(based on votes) and in 2003 demanded a second seat in the consensual Swiss government (Kriesi et al., 2005). Thus, the SVP is a long-term governmental party and has two seats in the federal government since 2016. Compared to other countries, the SVP is one of the strongest radical right-wing populist parties in Europe and given the particularities of the Swiss political system one of the few (long-term) governing populist parties (Albertazzi, 2008; Bernhard, 2017).

Despite this long-term government participation, the SVP did not moderate its ideological position. The combination of anti-establishment politics and a hard stance on immigration (and European integration) was considered as paradigmatic of the European populist radical right (Kitschelt & McGann, 1995). Ideologically, the SVP resembles other radical right-wing populist parties with its hard stance on immigration. Limiting immigration and free movement from the European Union (EU) has been one of the most important goals of the SVP (Kitschelt & McGann, 1995). Rhetorically and substantially, these policy position go beyond that of its mainstream conservative competitors (Kriesi et al., 2005; Kurella & Rosset, 2018; Stockemer, 2018). Yet, due to its strong performance and the special institutional set-up, the SVP was also always regarded as a special case (McGann & Kitschelt, 2005).

On economic issues the party has traditionally favoured market liberal policies and less state intervention compared to similar parties in other countries (Ackermann et al., 2018; Kurella & Rosset, 2018). Kurella and Rosset (2018) show that the SVP is able to mobilise voters with left-wing economic and right-wing cultural attitudes, due to its ownership of cultural issues such as immigration. Furthermore, Bernhard (2017) shows that in the SVP's manifesto, populism plays a considerably larger role than in the manifestos of the mainstream competitors. This is particularly the case for cultural issues where the party combines nativist with populist positions (Bernhard, 2017). Overall, the SVP is considered as radical right-wing populist party (Rooduijn et al., 2019; Zulianello, 2020).

Lastly, in the *United Kingdom* (UK) the *United Kingdom Independence Party* (UKIP) has been the main populist party for a long time. Traditionally, UKIP was considered a Eurosceptic party that demanded the exit of the UK from the EU, thereby capitalising on traditionally strong Eurosceptic sentiments in the country (Ford et al., 2012). Founded in 1993 in opposition to the Maastricht Treaty, UKIP obtained strong electoral results in second order elections, in particular elections to the European parliament (Ford et al., 2012). Starting with a meagre 1 percent of the votes in 1994, UKIP won first place in the European parliament election in 2014 with over 26 percent of the votes (Ford et al., 2012; Ford & Goodwin, 2014). Similarly, UKIP's vote share also rose in national elections to its peak of around 13 percent in 2015 (see Figure 4). In the context of the British majoritarian electoral system with its two-party system, this is a remarkable result for a third party.

After the Brexit referendum in 2016, however, UKIP's vote share declined, potentially because the main objective – the exit of the UK from the EU – has been fulfilled (Goodwin & Heath, 2016; Usherwood, 2019). In 2019, leading figures from UKIP founded a new party, the Brexit Party, whose aim it was to fulfil the Brexit. After the official separation of the UK from the EU, the party changed the name to Reform UK.

Next to Euroscepticism, Ford et al. (2012) point out that anti-establishment rhetoric and anti-immigrant positions are crucial for UKIP's success. UKIP presented itself as true advocate of the British people and thus as an alternative to the corrupt mainstream politicians (Ford et al., 2012). Furthermore, UKIP emphasised the need for stricter immigration policies such as an immigration ban or opposition towards multiculturalism (Ford et al., 2012). This is combined with a focus on conservative policies regarding crime (Ford et al., 2012). Thus, populism and a nativist policy agenda are an integral part of the party's ideology. The novelty of Reform UK makes it difficult to assess its concrete ideology but a recent study by Zulianello (2020) regards

it similar to UKIP and both as radical right-wing populist parties (see also Rooduijn et al., 2019).

3 Previous Research on the Explanation of Populism

Populism has received a large amount of scholarly attention. Besides questions of definition and conceptualisation, scholars have advanced explanations for the success of populism. The explanation of support for populist parties and populist positions is of particular importance for this study. Usually, approaches can be divided in demand- and supply-side explanations (Golder, 2016). The latter focuses on strategic choices of actors and institutional factors while the former focuses on political grievances among the voters that create demand for populist parties (Golder, 2016). For this dissertation, demand-side explanations are the important strand of research.[12]

To that end, this chapter aims to provide an extensive overview of theoretical arguments and empirical results with regard to the explanation of populism. The chapters are organised along the respective forms of populism to account for the different approaches that explain the respective forms of populism. Chapter 3.1 focuses on explanations of radical right-wing populism with three main strands of literature: political discontent, the losers of modernisation thesis, and cultural explanations. Chapter 3.2 focuses on radical left-wing populism, which has been far less researched. Explanations often recur to political discontent, economic hardship, and ideological explanations.

Both radical left- and right-wing populism are discussed using the literature that explains support for radical left- and right-wing populist parties. Support includes voting for these parties or preferring the party to other parties. It is important to note that these chapters draw heavily on arguments that explain radical voting in general. Early research mainly focused on radical voting and only later turned its attention to voting for populist parties. Naturally, support for populism, populist attitudes, voting for radical left- and right-wing populist parties

[12] I acknowledge the fact that demand- and supply-side explanations are complementary rather than competing. Nevertheless, incorporating and reviewing both explanatory strands is beyond the scope of this study.

are different concepts. Nevertheless, one can draw theoretical and empirical value from these studies.

Subsequently, chapter 3.3 presents the growing research on the explanation of populist attitudes. Lastly, Chapter 3.4 synthesises the previous research and shows how my study contributes to the scholarly literature by combining cultural and economic explanations. In doing so, I elaborate on the research gap this study aims to fill.

3.1 Explaining Radical Right-Wing Populism

As conceptualised in chapter 2.2.1, radical right-wing populism is a combination of a populist (people centrism, anti-elitism, and a Manichean outlook) and a radical right-wing ideology (nativism and authoritarianism). Given the dominance of radical right-wing over other forms of populism in Europe, a plethora of studies aim to investigate what makes people support this form of populism and parties that express it. Within this chapter, I focus on three important strands: political discontent as well as economic and cultural grievances.[13]

I start with political discontent as explanatory factor for right-wing populism. As populism has a confrontational relationship with the political elite and liberal democracy as a whole, one of the first arguments that comes to mind when explaining (right-wing) populism is discontent with politics. As populism and political discontent seem to be inherently related (Betz, 1994; Norris, 2005; Rooduijn et al., 2016), many studies have investigated whether different forms of political discontent predict support for (radical right-wing) populism.

[13] Increasingly, research focuses on the psychological underpinnings of populism, e.g., personality traits. Examples include Ackermann et al. (2018), Bakker et al. (2016), Bakker et al. (2021), Erisen et al. (2021), Fatke (2019), and Vasilopoulos and Jost (2020). While these are informative and advance our understanding of populism, they do fully fit in with the other theoretical strands. Future studies should certainly aim to include these factors into theory development but this is beyond the scope of this study.

Theoretically, populism is often seen as a remedy or valve for those that are discontent with the current political system (Rooduijn et al., 2016). Populism is not politics as usual and often characterised by its position outside of the mainstream and against the political establishment. This makes populism a fitting option for those that are fed up with the current functioning of the democratic process or its main actors (Rooduijn et al., 2016; Schumacher & Rooduijn, 2013). Populist parties are often challenger parties that question the legitimacy of mainstream parties and mobilise political dissatisfaction and discontent (Rooduijn et al., 2016). Furthermore, populism contends that politics should be a direct and unmediated expression of the general will (Canovan, 1981, 1999). As the current version of liberal democracy is structured through representation rather than a direct implementation of the general will, populists are likely to be dissatisfied with the current working of the political system (Rooduijn et al., 2016).

Additionally, recent transformations of the political order through globalisation, Europeanisation, and transnationalisation have created increasing tensions between responsibility and responsiveness (Kriesi, 2014; Mair, 2009). While governments and politicians might act responsible by enacting certain policies to accommodate economic transformations, they may move away from the policy positions of their constituents (Hawkins & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2018; Mair, 2009; Verzichelli, 2020). Consequently, such failures of representation might increase suspicion towards the political elite and decrease trust in political actors and institutions. Similarly, a lack of responsiveness might result in the experience of low quality government services thereby decreasing trust in the capability of governments to produce adequate policy outcomes (Agerberg, 2017; Hooghe & Dassonneville, 2018). This increases support for challenger parties in the form of (radical right-wing) populist parties.

Lastly, populism has a critical relationship with liberal democracy. Thus, dissatisfied citizens are more likely to support such critical ideas than citizens who are satisfied with liberal

democracy or trust its processes (Rooduijn et al., 2016; Rovira Kaltwasser & van Hauwaert, 2020). Even more so, some scholars argue that populism can be regarded as hostile towards liberal democracy because it attributes more importance to the general will of the people than to checks and balances or minority rights (Huber & Schimpf, 2017; Taggart, 2000). Thus, people who are discontent with politics and/or the current functioning and structure of democracy regard radical right-wing populist parties as an attractive political option because they express the voter's discontent and promise change.[14]

Empirically studies on the relationship between political discontent and support for populism use different operationalisations of discontent including political trust (Hooghe et al., 2011; Hooghe & Dassonneville, 2018; Lubbers & Coenders, 2017; van der Waal & Koster, 2018), dissatisfaction with democracy (Lubbers et al., 2002), political efficacy (Rooduijn et al., 2016), political cynicism (Bélanger & Aarts, 2006), or a combination thereof (Schumacher & Rooduijn, 2013).

Political trust is more concerned with actors and institutions such as political parties, the parliament, the government, or politicians and the extent to which these fulfil the expectations of the individual voter (Geurkink et al., 2020; Newton et al., 2018). Dissatisfaction with democracy relates more explicitly to the functioning of the current democratic system and examines whether people perceive the democratic regime to work in practice (e.g. Linde & Ekman, 2003). Political efficacy taps into citizens' feelings of how much they can influence political decisions, thus relating to the (policy) responsiveness of the political system (Niemi et al., 1991). Lastly, political cynicism is often associated with an alienation from politics due to

[14] One factor that relates to political discontent is Euroscepticism. In particular, European integration has often been associated with an increasing tension between responsiveness and responsibility of national governments (Kriesi (2014). Radical right-wing populists criticise the superiority of international over national politics as well as the free movement across borders resulting in increasing numbers of immigrants (van Elsas and van der Brug (2015). Halikiopoulou et al. (2012) argue that Euroscepticism of right-wing populism underlies an exclusive nationalism based on ethno-nationalist exclusion. Several studies find that Euroscepticism increases the likelihood of voting for populist radical right parties such as Ivarsflaten (2005), Lubbers and Scheepers (2007), Rooduijn et al. (2017), van der Brug et al. (2005) and Werts et al. (2013).

the normlessness of politics and its actors (Dekker & Meijerink, 2012). Despite being distinct political science concepts, all have in common that they symbolise an underlying discontent with the current functioning of the political system. In the eyes of the discontent citizens, actors and institutions are not functioning as originally intended resulting in unresponsive outcomes. That being said, these attitudes are not anti-democratic but rather imply a critical assessment of the current performance of the system.

Several studies investigate whether different forms of political discontent are related to support for radical right-wing populism, measured as vote choice or party preference. In their study, Lubbers et al. (2002) show that people who are dissatisfied with the way democracy works are significantly more likely to vote for radical right-wing parties such as the *Front National* in France or the Freedom Party (FPÖ) in Austria.

Investigating political distrust, several studies reach similar conclusions. Lubbers and Coenders (2017), for example, show that distrust is significantly related to support for radical right-wing (populist) parties in European countries. Similar findings are reported by Lubbers and Scheepers (2007), van der Waal and Koster (2018), and Zhirkov (2014) who all find that political distrust significantly predicts voting for radical right-wing (populist) parties.

Also investigating the role of political trust, Hooghe and Dassonneville (2018) find that political distrust significantly increases the likelihood of voting for a right-wing populist party in Belgium. Not only are citizens with lower levels of trust more likely to vote for populist parties. Even more so, a decrease in trust is associated with an increase in the likelihood of voting for populist parties. The use of panel data allows the authors to find out that political distrust and voting for populist parties are mutually reinforcing (Hooghe & Dassonneville, 2018). Similarly, Hooghe et al. (2011) can show that politically distrusting citizens turn to populist parties. As the authors use data from Wallonia, which has a system of compulsory

voting, they conclude that distrust increases the likelihood of voting for a right-wing populist party in the absence of a political exit option.

Bélanger and Aarts (2006) use a composite measure of political discontent that combines measures of political efficacy and political cynicism. Leveraging panel data, the authors show that political discontent in 1998 predicted support for the Dutch right-wing populist party *List Pim Fortuyn* in 2002. Also studying the Netherlands, Rooduijn et al. (2016) employ a composite measure of external political efficacy to investigate the relationship between political discontent and populist support. Using a six-wave panel study, the authors find that discontent voters are more likely to vote for populist parties. Additionally, their data allows them to show that voting for populist parties also fuels political discontent making political discontent both a cause and a consequence of populism.

Relatedly, Schumacher and Rooduijn (2013) show that voters of (right-wing) populist parties clearly distinguish themselves from those of mainstream parties. While for both groups of voters, policy positions and leader evaluations are important determinants of vote choice, only supporters of populist parties are characterised by their low levels of trust and high levels of political discontent. The authors conclude that the higher the level of a voter's protest attitude, the larger the chance that she casts a vote for a (right-wing) populist party (Schumacher & Rooduijn, 2013).

Overall, studies show a rather consistent picture pointing towards the influence of different forms of discontent on support for radical right-wing populist parties. In this regard, supporters of these parties seem to be discontent with the current functioning of the democratic system and in particular its actors. However, Rooduijn et al. (2016) already point out that the relationship between political discontent and populism is not as straightforward as usually assumed. While, on the one hand, discontent seems to increase people's intention of voting for radical right-wing populist parties, these parties, on the other hand, also seem to influence

people's level of political discontent. Thus, it remains somewhat unclear what the main driver of the relationship is. More importantly, it seems that the influence of discontent on populist support is empirically often overestimated (cf. Rooduijn et al., 2016).

Furthermore, scholars have suggested that substantive (policy) positions and grievances often overshadow the influence of political discontent. To that end, support for radical right-wing populism seems to be more than just a mere expression of protest and discontent (van der Brug et al., 2000). Consequently, the question what makes people support this form of populism – net of the influence of political discontent – arises. It seems likely that support for radical right-wing populism is based on grievances that are accompanied by certain policy preferences.

One of the most prominent approaches that uses such grievances to explain radical right-wing populist support is the losers of modernisation and globalisation thesis (Betz, 1994; Kriesi et al., 2006; Kriesi et al., 2012). The argument focuses on the consequences of economic globalisation for broad segments of the workforce (Betz, 1994). Increasing competition and innovation pose a threat to the part of the workforce that is less qualified, older, or employed in routine jobs (Betz, 1993, 1994). As they are less well equipped to adapt to the new requirements of a globalised and integrated (knowledge) economy, their labour market opportunities deteriorate. Thus, they are confronted with increasing material insecurity (Betz, 1994; Kriesi et al., 2006; Kriesi et al., 2012).

Opposed to the losers, the winners of globalisation are characterised by higher levels of education, economic security, and human capital making them more adaptable to the changes. Thus, they profit from open borders and global competition, while the losers with their lower socio-economic status feel threatened by economic and cultural competition (Kriesi et al., 2012). Given the inability to provide a good living standard, the losers of globalisation become increasingly dissatisfied with the political system and its actors (Betz, 1994). In their study, Kriesi et al. (2006) argue that the political conflict (in Europe) is increasingly structured along

the conflict line that puts winners and losers of globalisation against each other. In the words of Kriesi and colleagues, the winners and losers form *electoral potentials* that can be mobilised by political actors (Kriesi et al., 2006).

Radical right-wing populist parties such as the *Rassemblement National* in France are considered as such actors (Golder, 2016; Rydgren, 2007; Stockemer et al., 2018; van der Brug & Fennema, 2007).[15] These parties present themselves as challengers and outsiders to the political mainstream. Thus, they offer a way to punish governing parties for the economic vulnerabilities that the losers of globalisation experience (Betz, 1994; Hartmann et al., 2021; Kriesi et al., 2006). The populist anti-establishment positioning of these parties allows them to present themselves as an alternative to the mainstream parties. Consequently, these parties present a viable electoral option for the losers of globalisation.

Furthermore, the combination of anti-establishment positioning and radical right-wing ideology is attractive for low status individuals because this combination offers a scapegoat for the negative economic circumstances (Ivarsflaten, 2005, 2008; Oesch, 2008). Following arguments from the literature on group threats, one can argue that a scarcity of goods that are desired by social groups with conflicting interests produces threat perceptions (Ivarsflaten, 2005; Lucassen & Lubbers, 2012; Sniderman et al., 2004). Thus, low status individuals often perceive a threat based on the competition from immigrants and imports from other countries (Dehdari, 2021; Hainmueller & Hiscox, 2010). These threats are identified as the main source of their economic decline making radical right-wing populist parties an attractive electoral choice as their cultural and economic protectionism seems to address these concerns (Oesch & Rennwald, 2010, 2018; Spies, 2013; van der Waal & Koster, 2018).

[15] It has to be noted that most of the early studies label the parties as radical right or extreme right without focusing on populism. Nevertheless, the same parties are classified as radical right-wing populist today.

In this tradition, several studies have investigated whether the arguments of the losers of globalisation thesis manifest themselves empirically. Most studies utilise lower levels of income, education, or social and occupational class as indicators for the losers of globalisation. While there are several studies that investigate the influence of globalisation or other macro-economic factors (Arzheimer, 2009; Barone & Kreuter, 2021; Bolet, 2020; Hays et al., 2019), the main tenet of the losers of globalisation argument is situated on the individual level.

Overall, the results are rather mixed. While some studies find a significant relationship, others do not. Lubbers et al. (2002) find that manual workers, the self-employed, routine non-manual workers, and the unemployed are more likely to vote for radical right-wing parties such as the *Front National*. Yet, the authors remark that these characteristics hardly explain differences in vote shares between countries and that the influence seems to be mediated by political attitudes such as anti-immigrant attitudes and political dissatisfaction (Lubbers et al., 2002). Bornschier and Kriesi (2013) show that the working class is consistently rooted in the electorate of radical right-wing parties, albeit it is important to note that in the absence of such a party working-class members that oppose recent economic cultural transformations rather abstain. In his study of 14 European countries, Arzheimer (2009) supports the argument that lower social and occupational classes have a higher probability of voting for populist radical right parties but that the influence of political dissatisfaction and ideology (i.e., anti-immigrant sentiment) is even stronger (see also Lubbers & Coenders, 2017; Lubbers & Scheepers, 2007; Lucassen & Lubbers, 2012; Oesch, 2008).

Dehdari (2021) finds that layoff notices increase support for the *Sweden Democrats*. However, this effect only manifests itself in areas with a high share of low-skilled immigrants and in areas with a low share of high-skilled immigrants. This supports the argument that labour market competition and increased economic distress foster anti-immigrant attitudes, which increase support for radical right-wing populist parties. Moreover, self-reported unemployment

risk is positively associated with voting for the *Sweden Democrats* among low-skilled respondents while the opposite is true for high-skilled respondents (Dehdari, 2021). Rooduijn and Burgoon (2018) show that individual hardship leads to right-wing populist voting only when the aggregate conditions are favourable. Economic hardship affects radical right-wing voting under low levels of inequality and unemployment, high social welfare expenditure and GDP (Rooduijn & Burgoon, 2018).

Gidron and Mijs (2019) focus more explicitly on changes in material circumstances and investigate whether income changes affect populist vote choice in the Netherlands. Using fixed-effects regression models, the authors find no evidence that income deterioration increases the probability of voting for a radical right-wing populist party (Gidron & Mijs, 2019). Moreover, the authors also find no evidence that income losses increase nativist or nationalist attitudes, lending no support to the argument that economic factors influence anti-immigrant sentiments (Gidron & Mijs, 2019). In a similar study for Germany, Hartmann et al. (2021) do not find any indications that a lower income is associated with voting for the *Alternative für Deutschland* (AfD) in Germany. Additionally, falling behind in income compared to the average does also not affect voting for the AfD.

These inconclusive results can be exemplified by additional debates about the voters of the AfD (Lengfeld, 2017; Lux, 2018; Rippl & Seipel, 2018; Tutić & Hermanni, 2018). Using survey data from 2016, Lengfeld (2017) also finds no evidence that respondents with less education, lower income, or routine workers are more likely to support the AfD. He concludes that there is no evidence for the losers of modernisation thesis, at least for this particular party. This finding sparked vital interest in replicating these results (Lux, 2018; Rippl & Seipel, 2018; Tutić & Hermanni, 2018).

Rippl and Seipel (2018) qualify the claim by showing that economic factors are not the strongest predictor of AfD voting but play an important role next to cultural and democratic

concerns. Using different survey data, Lux (2018) finds that a significant portion of the voters of the AfD can be regarded as losers of modernisation, especially in comparison to the electorate of other parties in Germany. Tutić and Hermanni (2018) come to a similar conclusion and find that voters with minimal education, low income, the unemployed, workers, and individuals who feel deprived in socioeconomic terms are more likely to support the AfD. This results in an overall mixed picture with regard to the explanatory power of the losers of globalisation thesis.

These overall mixed findings with regard to the explanatory power of classical indicators of economic hardship and low socio-economic status for radical right-wing populist support has led scholars to provide more nuanced arguments and indicators (Abou-Chadi & Kurer, 2021; Burgoon et al., 2019; Kurer, 2020). Burgoon et al. (2019) aim to analyse the influence of economic misfortune on support for radical populism. They argue that research needs to account for dynamic, positional, and relational aspects of economic misfortune. While the former concerns changes over time, the latter concern inter-group or inter-individual comparisons. The authors propose positional deprivation that captures these elements by measuring average income growth across deciles of a country's income distribution minus the growth of a respondent's own decile. They argue that positional deprivation fosters feelings of disadvantage and resentment that are channelled towards the political establishment, resulting in radical right-wing populist party support.

Their analysis reveals that positional deprivation is positively related to the support of radical right-wing (and left-wing) populist parties in 20 European countries. Moreover, the authors distinguish positional deprivation compared to the tenth decile (richest individuals) and compared to the first decile (poorest individuals). As radical right-wing parties have a focus on outsiders (such as immigrants), lazy and poor people, the authors show that positional deprivation compared to the first decile (poorest individuals) predicts support for radical right-wing populist parties (Burgoon et al., 2019).

Abou-Chadi and Kurer (2021) provide a compelling argument by going beyond immediate economic hardship. Instead, they investigate latent forms of economic threat. Thus, they focus on uncertainty with regard to the employment situation and argue that an individual's political preferences are not only affected by their own risk function but also by the risk function of their partner. As households pool their resources, the risk function of the partner automatically affects the well-being of both partners. Their analysis supports this contention. Occupational unemployment risk, not unemployment status is important for vote choice. More importantly, occupational unemployment risk of the household rather than of the individual is decisive in predicting support for the radical right. To that end, subjective or latent economic threats seem to be an important predictor of political preferences and vote choice.

Taking a different angle, Engler and Weisstanner (2021) investigate the influence of income inequality on support for the radical right and find that rising income inequality increases the likelihood of voting for such parties. Yet, accounting for the fact that inequality affects groups in society differently and that subjective perceptions matter, they show that the effect of income inequality is most pronounced for individuals with higher subjective social status and lower-middle incomes (Engler & Weisstanner, 2021). By doing so, the authors show that a potential threat of decline that is caused by the widened social hierarchy resulting from income inequality makes people more likely to support the radical right. Again, latent perceptions of decline rather than actual hardship seem to matter significantly for radical right-wing populist party support.

Investigating the electoral consequences of different employment trajectories, Kurer (2020) comes to similar conclusions. Kurer (2020) argues that with increasing digitalisation certain occupations are at risk of automation (see also Im et al., 2019; Kurer & Gallego, 2019). This susceptibility to automation gives rise to two notions of losing out. First, automation might foster economic disadvantage because of job loss. Second, automation leads to changes in the

social hierarchy. As jobs have a meaning and are often a source of recognition and status, jobs that are threatened by a risk of automation decrease in recognition and status (Im et al., 2019; Kurer, 2020). Both notions, however, imply different political preferences. While the former most likely sparks support for social welfare policies, the latter aims at policies that maintain or restore social status (Im et al., 2019; Kurer, 2020). To that end, employment trajectories are important to understand which preferences are prioritised and articulated.

In his analysis, Kurer (2020) shows that survivors (those that retain their occupational position) are more likely to favour conservative parties – among them radical right-wing populist parties. As survivors are only threatened but not hit by the transformation, they are confronted with a latent perception of decline and thus their focus lies on policies that restore or maintain status, i.e., culturally conservative policies (Kurer, 2020). Conversely, those that lose their job are more in favour of redistributive policies and turn away from (radical) right-wing (populist) parties.

Overall, the evidence for economic explanations is mixed. Traditional measures such as income, education, or occupational status do not provide consistent support for the idea that those less well-off are more likely to support radical right-wing populist parties. Studies using more nuanced arguments and measures for economic risk seem to find more consistent support for the argument that those who are worse-off, perceive themselves to be worse-off, or have a latent perception of decline are more likely to support radical right-wing populist parties.

Nevertheless, several authors have argued that value-based explanations offer more explanatory value than economic approaches at least concerning the proximate cause of populism (Norris & Inglehart, 2019). In particular, scholars have argued that anti-immigrant attitudes and other culturally conservative issue positions are more important than economic factors in explaining support for radical right-wing populist parties (Ivarsflaten, 2008; Oesch,

2008). One prominent theoretical argument in this tradition is the cultural backlash thesis (Norris & Inglehart, 2019).

In their recent book, Norris and Inglehart (2019) aim to provide an explanation for the success of populist parties. The authors start with the seminal work of Inglehart (1977) who observed a shift from materialistic to post-materialistic values in modern societies. He argued that due to increasing economic security, the values in society change, as people are less worried about material security. Following this reasoning, Norris and Inglehart (2019) provide an explanation on how this shift toward post-materialism has caused a backlash that underlies the success of populist parties today (Norris & Inglehart, 2019).

In more detail, Norris and Inglehart (2019) argue that Western societies have experienced large scale transformations in recent decades. Increasing levels of higher education, gender equality, and a diversification of lifestyles are only some of the examples. These developments are based on profound changes in societal values that de-emphasise conformity and traditionalism and emphasise individual liberty and libertarianism (Norris & Inglehart, 2019). Three processes are driving this change in values: expansion of higher education, urbanisation, and increasing (ethnic) diversity (Norris & Inglehart, 2019). These processes not only drive value change but according to Norris and Inglehart (2019, p. 45) also shifted the “relative balance between liberalism and conservatism”.

As younger generations are socialised in relative economic security, they display higher levels of post-material values. Conversely, older generations hold more conservative values as they were socialised in a time with less material security (Norris & Inglehart, 2019). Based on this generational value polarisation, Norris and Inglehart (2019) argue that population replacement – older generations die and younger cohorts take their place – leads to a shift of the overall balance of conservative *vis-à-vis* liberal values. Thus, over time, societies become

more culturally progressive (Norris & Inglehart, 2019). This shift, however, provokes a reaction from those that support conservative values. Or as Norris and Inglehart put it:

"Changes in the relative size of majority and minority groups can spark a decisive shift in collective attitudes and behaviors, catalyzing a reaction when a previously dominant group perceives that their core norms and beliefs are being overwhelmed by social tides and they are losing their hegemonic status." (Norris & Inglehart, 2019, p. 44).

Consequently, this shift in values results in a counter-revolution by people with conservative values who feel threatened and have the impression that their values and opinions are not respected in society (Ignazi, 1992; Norris & Inglehart, 2019). In sum, the cultural backlash theory posits that older cohorts who hold values that are more conservative are more likely to vote for populist parties that claim to protect the old way of life. On the contrary, younger cohorts with their more liberal values vote differently. Given the particularities of the electoral process and the composition of the electorate (older cohorts turn out more often than younger cohorts), electoral results favour conservative over liberal values, although the latter are the majority (Norris & Inglehart, 2019).

Using a plethora of different surveys, Norris and Inglehart (2019) aim to substantiate their claims. First, their analyses seem to imply that there is indeed polarisation between birth cohorts when it comes to post-material values (Norris & Inglehart, 2019, pp. 87–125). Second, in their analysis of voting behaviour the authors find that older generations (particularly the interwar generation) are more likely to vote for authoritarian parties than younger generations. "In short, voting for authoritarian parties is strongest among the older generation, men, the less educated, white European populations, in semi-rural areas, and among the most religious" (Norris & Inglehart, 2019, p. 280).

Moreover, they find that authoritarian values, right-wing ideological orientations, and political mistrust predict the vote for authoritarian parties. Interestingly and contrary to their

expectations, the authors find that younger cohorts are also drawn towards populist parties. They attribute this contradictory finding to the chameleonic nature of populism, making it attractive for challenger parties along the full political spectrum.

While Norris and Inglehart (2019) advance an important argument to explain the support for populism, their study sparked vital criticism with regard to its theoretical, conceptual, and empirical foundations (Schäfer, 2021). In particular, several aspects limit the suitability of the theory and its empirical results.[16] For example, Schäfer (2021) points out that the value polarisation between generations that Norris and Inglehart (2019) claim to find seems to be a matter of degree rather than of principle. For example, all generations seem to generally agree with the statement “Gay men and lesbians should be free to live their own life as they wish” although younger generations have a higher agreement rate than older generations (Schäfer, 2021).

More importantly, the findings for populist parties that Norris and Inglehart (2019) present do not fully track with their hypothesis as younger generations are not less likely to vote for populist parties. In this vein, their causal argument that older generations vote for populist parties because they feel threatened in their way of life does not hold. One particular reason seems to be the way they measure populist (authoritarian) parties. Using a more concise way to measure parties, Schäfer (2021) even shows that younger citizens are more likely to vote for authoritarian-populist parties and that the interwar generation seems to be the cohort least likely to vote for authoritarian-populist parties.[17]

While these problems certainly limit the extent to which the cultural backlash theory can explain populist support, this does not invalidate cultural (or value-based) explanations as such (Schäfer, 2021). The fact that different birth-cohorts do not explain populist support does

[16] For an excellent review see Schäfer (2021).
[17] One major factor explaining this contradiction is that the conceptualisation by Norris and Inglehart (2019) is problematic in that it ignores important aspects in terms of concept formation, in particular with regard to their main concept under study: support for (authoritarian) populism.

not imply that cultural factors such as positions on immigration have no impact on right-wing populist party support. On the contrary, positions on immigration are often found to significantly predict voting for radical right-wing populist parties (Golder, 2016; Schäfer, 2021; Stockemer et al., 2018).

To that end, some scholars have argued that the inconsistency in the results for economic grievances potentially lies in the importance of cultural factors that overshadow or interact with economic explanations. In this vein, it could be argued that opposition to immigration is interpreted in cultural rather than economic terms, thereby giving rise to a cultural explanation for populist support.

For example, in her study, Ivarsflaten (2008) shows that successful populist right-wing parties mobilise on the issue of immigration rather than on economic or elitist grievances (see also Ivarsflaten, 2005). While she finds that some parties are also successful when mobilising other grievances, the most consistent support is found for concerns over immigration. Put differently: the nativist element in the populist radical right seems to be the winning formula for radical right-wing populist parties (Ivarsflaten, 2008). In a similar vein, Oesch (2008), finds that workers are more likely to support right-wing populist parties. Yet, their decision to vote for these parties is not based on precarious economic circumstances but on cultural issues, such as immigration and national identity (Oesch, 2008).

In an early study, van der Brug et al. (2000) show that voting for radical right-wing parties is largely motivated by ideological preferences, i.e., anti-immigrant attitudes. In their study, Lubbers et al. (2002) also find that people who think that too many immigrants are in their country are more likely to vote for radical right-wing (populist) parties. Zhirkov (2014) supports these conclusions by showing that negative perceptions of immigration significantly predict voting for radical right-wing (populist) parties. Moreover, several other studies conclude that anti-immigrant attitudes are more relevant than economic grievances when it comes to

predicting radical right-wing voting (Arzheimer, 2009; Cutts et al., 2011; Lubbers et al., 2002; Lubbers & Coenders, 2017; Werts et al., 2013).

Lucassen and Lubbers (2012) find that perceived cultural ethnic threats are a stronger predictor of radical right-wing voting than perceived economic ethnic threats. This supports the idea of a cultural rather than an economic explanation of right-wing populism. Rydgren (2008) shows that positions that connect immigration to criminality and social unrest are particularly strong in predicting voting for the radical right. Donovan and Redlawsk (2018) show that the appeal of Donald Trump consists in his racial resentment and anti-immigration sentiments while sympathy for centre-right parties in Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the UK is not based on these factors. van der Waal and Koster (2018) show that next to protectionism and political distrust, nativism significantly increases the likelihood of voting for radical right-wing populist parties. A similar finding is reported by Hays et al. (2019) who show that trade shocks increase anti-immigrant sentiments and by doing so increase the likelihood of individuals to vote for a radical right-wing party. As trade shocks worsen economic conditions, they evoke (ethnic) threat perceptions which are mobilised by radical right-wing populists (Hays et al., 2019). These concerns are cultural rather than economic in nature.

Lastly, Akkerman et al. (2017) show that supporters of the Dutch PVV – a prototypical radical right-wing populist party – display low levels of immigrant tolerance, while Rooduijn (2018) shows that the voters of right-wing populist parties in nine European countries share anti-immigrant attitudes. Dunn (2015) finds that exclusive nationalism consistently predicts voting for the (populist) radical right in Austria, Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands, and Switzerland. Overall, there seems to be convincing evidence that anti-immigrant attitudes significantly influence individuals' likelihood of supporting radical right-wing populism.

Yet, recent research has argued that the relationship between economic and cultural factors in explaining radical right-wing populist support is complementary rather than

contradicting (Carreras et al., 2019). In this vein, several studies aim to overcome the dichotomy between culture and economy and combine both approaches. For example, investigating the Brexit vote in the United Kingdom, Carreras et al. (2019) argue that economic decline shapes cultural attitudes, i.e., people living in areas that have experienced economic decline in terms of disposable income are more likely to develop anti-immigrant and Eurosceptic attitudes. These attitudes, in turn, made people more likely to vote leave in the Brexit referendum. Thus, cultural grievances mediate the effect of economic decline on support for Brexit as a manifestation of a populist decision (Carreras et al., 2019).

In a recent contribution, Gidron and Hall (2020) argue that focusing on either economic or cultural explanations constitutes a conceptualisation that is too rigid to meet reality. People might not necessarily be able to distinguish between economic and cultural threats and transformations. Gidron and Hall (2020) argue that recent ethnographic studies paint a more complex picture of the influence of economic and cultural vulnerability (Cramer, 2016; Gest, 2016; Hochschild, 2016; Koppetsch, 2017). To that end, supporters of (right-wing) populism do not solely feel economically or culturally vulnerable, but rather socially marginalised and disrespected by and in society. Thus, support for (right-wing) populism is explained neither solely on economic nor solely on cultural grounds but rather by the subjective assessment of socio-integrational consequences of the economic and cultural developments associated with globalisation and modernisation (Gidron & Hall, 2020).

Several studies aim to provide such nuanced explanations although some do so more explicitly than others. Furthermore, there are significant differences in how they approach this explanation.[18] In their study, Gidron and Hall (2017) aim to understand how cultural and economic developments have interacted in fuelling support for right-wing populism. Their main

[18] It is important to note that some of the studies presented above also try to combine different approaches, e.g., Burgoon et al. (2019), Engler and Weisstanner (2021), and Kurer (2020).

argument is that status anxiety is a useful concept to understand the consequences of these developments and subsequently the support for right-wing populism.

Using survey data from 20 countries included in the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP), the authors show that lower levels of subjective social status are associated with voting for right-wing populist parties. Moreover, the authors aim to show that certain cultural and economic developments such as the decline in jobs for low-skilled workers, urbanisation, and multiculturalism have affected the subjective social status of working class men in a particularly negative way (but see Oesch & Vigna, 2021). To that end, the decline in subjective social status in the last 30 years is proposed as an explanation for the higher likelihood of working class men to vote for radical right-wing populist parties. Similar findings are reported by Carella and Ford (2020) who show that status as a function of the social distance between occupational groups positively predicts voting for UKIP as well as other right-wing populist parties in Europe.

In a different paper, Gidron and Hall (2020) extend their previous arguments and argue that populism is a problem of social integration.[19] They refer to subjective social status "defined as [people's] beliefs about where they stand relative to others in society" and as a measure of "how well people are integrated into society" (Gidron & Hall, 2020, p. 1031). Their analysis reveals that people who feel more socially marginal – i.e., with low levels of subjective social status – are more likely to support right-wing (and left-wing) populist parties. Put differently, feeling socially marginalised compared to others in society makes people more likely to vote for populist parties (see also Burgoon et al., 2019).

[19] There are earlier approaches that aim to explain right-wing populist vote choice with measures of social integration. Rydgren (2009, 2011) argued that growing atomisation and the loss of togetherness and community spur a longing for new identities, which are provided by charismatic (populist) leaders. In his analyses, he does not find any convincing support. Conversely, Berning and Ziller (2017) show that a lack of generalised trust increases anti-immigrant sentiments, which increase the likelihood of voting for radical right-wing parties.

Taking a different angle by focusing on the influence of nostalgia and deprivation, Gest et al. (2018) aim to explain the success of right-wing populism in the UK and the US. They present the concept of nostalgic deprivation as latent psychological phenomenon that describes the discrepancy between individuals' understandings of their current status and their perceptions about their past (Gest et al., 2018, p. 1695). They argue that supporters of radical right-wing parties are driven by their perceived loss of status over time. Such status concerns transcend the economic sphere and also relate to social and political aspects. Using a novel measure for their concept, the authors find that nostalgic deprivation significantly predicts support for radical right parties or movements in the UK and the US (Gest et al., 2018).

Several other studies investigate such latent perceptions of disadvantage or decline. Marchlewska et al. (2018), for example, show that subjective relative disadvantage predicted support for Donald Trump in the US. Urbanska and Guimond (2018) find that people who feel disadvantaged compared to immigrants living in France are more likely to vote for the populist radical right *Front National*. In general, the recent approaches that go beyond the dichotomy of economic and cultural explanation have found support for their hypotheses indicating that both economic and cultural transformations work in conjunction with each other resulting in perceptions of social marginalisation and disadvantage that fuel support for radical right-wing populism.

Overall, this chapter has given a brief overview on the most important explanations for support of radical right-wing populism on the individual level. To that end, this overview has shown that political discontent as well as economic and cultural grievances are important factors. All three are shown to affect individuals' decisions to support radical right-wing populism, albeit to different degrees. More importantly, however, I discussed recent advances in the literature that go beyond the distinction between cultural and economic approaches by taking into account that qualitative research has found that the grievances of populist supporters

are more complex. These approaches form the starting point for the theoretical and empirical contribution of this study, which I elaborate on in chapters 3.4 and 5.

3.2 Explaining Radical Left-Wing Populism

As conceptualised in chapter 2.2.2, radical left-wing populism is a combination of a populist (people centrism, anti-elitism, and a Manichean outlook) and a radical left-wing ideology (anti-capitalism). There is less research on left-wing populism and in particular on the determinants of people's support for this form of populism. Within this chapter, I focus on the three most important strands: political discontent, economic, and value-based explanations. The first strand focuses on the relationship between different form of political discontent and left-wing populism. The second approach focuses on the losers of modernisation thesis and the third on value-based explanations that use political attitudes and values to explain support for radical left-wing populism.

Starting with political discontent, the arguments outlined in chapter 3.1 in parts also apply for radical left-wing populism. As populism is a set of ideas that sees politics as a struggle between the people and the elite, it has a critical relationship with the political establishment questioning the legitimacy of mainstream parties and institutions (Rooduijn et al., 2016). Moreover, the call for popular sovereignty makes these parties sceptical of the current system as liberal democracy is structured through representation rather than a direct implementation of the general will (Canovan, 1981, 1999).

As opposed to right-wing populism, left-wing populism is sometimes regarded as less critical towards liberal democracy, especially when it comes to upholding minority rights (Huber & Schimpf, 2017). Nevertheless, the tensions between responsibility and responsiveness created by increasing globalisation increase suspicion towards the political elite

and decrease trust in political actors and institutions (Hawkins & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2018; Mair, 2009).

To investigate the relationship between political discontent and support for left-wing populism empirically, most studies rely on political trust, dissatisfaction with democracy, political efficacy, political cynicism, or a combination thereof.[20] Lubbers and Scheepers (2007) find that distrust in the European parliament strongly influences radical left-wing vote choice in 21 European countries. Replicating this finding for the Netherlands, van der Waal and Koster (2018) find that political distrust is one of the main drivers of voting for the left-wing populist Socialist party (SP) in the Netherlands. Similarly, Akkerman et al. (2017) show that voters of the SP display lower levels of political trust than voters of mainstream parties. Sperber (2010) investigates radical left-wing voting in France and shows that voters of radical left-wing parties are significantly driven by political distrust.

Relatedly, Schumacher and Rooduijn (2013) show that voters of (left-wing) populist parties distinguish themselves clearly form those of mainstream parties. Although the authors show that policy positions such as a preference for economic redistribution are important, supporters of (left-wing) populist parties display low levels of trust and high levels of political discontent. Based on their analyses, the authors maintain that lower levels of trust significantly increase the likelihood of voting for a (left-wing) populist party (Schumacher & Rooduijn, 2013). Similarly, Rooduijn et al. (2016) show that political discontent increases the likelihood of supporting a radical left-wing populist party. The authors argue that discontent voters are more likely to vote for populist parties as this allows them to express their discontent.

Investigating the role of dissatisfaction with democracy rather than political trust yields similar results. Ramiro (2016) shows that dissatisfaction with democracy increases the likelihood of voting for radical left-wing populist parties even when ideological positions are

[20] For a definition of these concepts see chapter 3.1.

controlled for. In a similar vein, Hansen and Olsen (2021) show that dissatisfaction with democracy makes voters choose a radical left-wing party as opposed to traditional social democratic parties in Germany, the Netherlands, and Sweden (Hansen & Olsen, 2021). A similar finding is reported for Spain where democratic dissatisfaction plays a particularly important role in distinguishing voters of *Podemos* from their mainstream (left) counterparts (Ramiro & Gomez, 2017).

Overall, studies paint a rather consistent picture pointing towards the influence of different forms of discontent on support for radical left-wing populist parties. This is not surprising as the anti-establishment nature of populism is successfully mobilising those that are discontent with the current functioning of the democratic system and in particular its actors. In this regard, political discontent seems to be the common denominator of populist parties on the left and the right (but see Rooduijn, 2018). Yet, studies also show that voting for the populist left is more than just a protest vote and that political discontent does not help distinguishing voters from the right and the left (Rooduijn, 2018; Visser et al., 2014). As with right-wing populism, it seems likely that support for left-wing populism is also based on grievances that are accompanied by certain policy preferences (Visser et al., 2014).

In this vein, radical left-wing populist parties have also proven successful in mobilising the losers of globalisation. Evidently, left-wing populists are equally capable of mobilising the politically disenchanted. Actors from the radical left are not less populist than their right-wing counterparts (Bernhard & Kriesi, 2019; Rooduijn & Akkerman, 2017). In fact, Rooduijn and Akkerman (2017) show that left-right radicalism predicts the use of populism. Thus, losers of globalisation that are disenchanted from the current functioning of the political system are potentially drawn to radical left-wing populism as it offers an alternative to mainstream parties.

More importantly, globalisation has significant implications for broad segments of the workforce, especially those who are less qualified, older, or employed in routine work jobs

(Betz, 1994; Kurer, 2020; Kurer & Palier, 2019). Thus, these people are less likely to adapt to the changing circumstances of a globalised economy successfully. To that end, left-wing populism offers not only a way to express political discontent but also offers policies that specifically target the losers of economic transformations. In contrast to radical right-wing populism, radical left-wing populism does not focus on immigration or cultural issues but mainly on issues such as redistribution of income and policies that compensate the risks of a globalised economy, i.e., welfare state policies (Akkerman et al., 2017; Gomez et al., 2016; Ramiro, 2016; Rooduijn et al., 2017; Visser et al., 2014). Thus, instead of status enhancing policies, left-wing populism provides direct economic relief in the form of redistributive and welfare policies with a particular focus on the economically disadvantaged. In this regard, radical left-wing populism is a logical political choice for those that face dire labour market opportunities (Akkerman et al., 2017).

In this tradition, several studies have investigated whether the argument of the losers of globalisation empirically holds for radical left-wing populism. Again, most studies rely on measures such as lower levels of income, education, or social and occupational class. The results provide an overall mixed picture when it comes to the hypothesised relationship (Ramiro, 2016; Visser et al., 2014).

Visser et al. (2014) show that unemployed people and those with lower incomes are more likely to support radical left-wing parties in 32 European countries. The authors attribute this relationship to the importance that these people put on economic redistribution. A similar finding is reported by Guth and Nelsen (2021) who show that supporters of left-wing populism are characterised by low education and income as well as a pessimistic view of economic developments. To that end, radical left-wing populist parties offer policies that provide relief to economic hardship, in combination with anti-establishment blame assignment.

Gidron and Mijs (2019) are able to detect an income effect on voting for radical left-wing populist parties in the Netherlands. Their findings indicate that income losses are significantly related to an increase in the likelihood of voting for a left-wing populist party while the opposite is true for income gains. For Germany, Hartmann et al. (2021) come to similar conclusions. Respondents who are less well off with regard to their income are more likely to support *Die Linke* in Germany.

In his study of different employment trajectories, Kurer (2020) focuses on new threats for the working class such as increasing digitalisation that puts certain occupations at risk of automation. Susceptibility to automation increases the likelihood of economic disadvantage as automation allows replacing a worker. Such a (potential) job loss most likely sparks support for social welfare policies. In his analysis, Kurer (2020) shows that respondents who dropout (unemployment) or downgrade from their former occupation are more likely to support left-wing parties. Although they experience a certain decline in status, the drop in material resources is the crucial factor directing their focus away from status enhancing policies and towards social welfare (Kurer, 2020).

While research seems to show that those in lower social and economic strata are more likely to vote for left-wing populist parties, scholars have argued that this relationship is not always consistent (Hansen & Olsen, 2021). For example, Ramiro (2016) shows that radical left-wing parties seem to be able to combine low- and high-skilled voters in their constituencies. While some of their voters seem to be losers of globalisation, others are highly educated and thus very well equipped to handle economic transformations (see Rooduijn et al., 2017). Bowyer and Vail (2011) provide similar findings for Germany and show that highly educated voters are more likely to vote for the radical left. This casts doubt on the idea that radical left-wing populist parties draw their voters (exclusively) from the losers of globalisation. To that end, the common denominator of supporters of radical left-wing populist parties might be a

shared set of ideological positions rather than shared levels of income or education (Rooduijn et al., 2017).

Bowyer and Vail (2011) find that voters of *Die Linke* in Germany are more likely to regard economic inequalities as concerning and are also more likely to favour government redistribution. van der Waal and Koster (2018) find that economic egalitarianism drives voting for the populist left stronger than factors such as political distrust. Moreover, they show that a preference for protectionism is also important for left-wing populist party support. Hansen and Olsen (2021) show that people are more likely to vote for the populist left if they think that income disparities should be reduced by more government intervention.

Akkerman et al. (2017) also report that a preference for redistribution significantly predicts support for the SP in the Netherlands. For Spain, Marcos-Marne (2021) shows that voting for left-wing populist parties is strongly influenced by preferences on redistribution which is echoed by Ramiro and Gomez (2017) who also show the importance of these ideological factors. In France, Sperber (2010) finds that supporters of radical left-wing parties are driven by their opposition towards economic liberalism, while Rooduijn et al. (2017) report that voters of the radical left are much more likely to support governmental redistribution compared to mainstream party voters and voters of the radical right. Moreover, they find that voters of the radical left are less sceptical towards immigrants, explaining why the education profile of these parties includes more highly educated voters (Rooduijn et al., 2017).

Additionally, Gidron and Mijs (2019) report that the effects of income losses on voting for the populist left seem to be most prevalent among middle-class respondents that favour a redistributive policy program. Indeed, the authors find that income losses significantly increase the support for redistribution. These findings point to a mediating relationship between economic hardship, redistributive policy preferences, and support for radical left-wing populism. Put differently, economic hardship increases a preference for redistribution, which

increases the likelihood of voting for a left-wing populist party. Overall, these ideological factors might explain why these parties are able to mobilise both low- and high-skilled voters.

In a recent contribution, Gidron and Hall (2020) point out that focusing too strongly on economic or cultural explanations might not be useful to investigate the support for populist parties in general. The authors point out that economic and cultural developments have resulted in a feeling of social marginalisation. To that end, they argue that people who are not socially integrated are more likely to support radical populist parties (Gidron & Hall, 2020). They argue that people who feel marginalised following the economic transformations of globalisation are less likely to feel socially integrated and respected in society. Even more so, lower levels of subjective social status also might lead to a preference for economic redistribution, which predicts voting for radical left-wing populist parties

Indeed, their analyses show that subjective social status has a substantive and negative influence on voting for radical left-wing populist parties (Gidron & Hall, 2020). Put differently, people who lack a strong attachment to the normative order – i.e., who are social disintegrated – are more likely to support parties of the populist radical left (Gidron & Hall, 2020). They also show that a preference for economic redistribution is positively related to voting for radical left-wing populist parties.

Burgoon et al. (2019) offer a similar conclusion that is, however, more focused on income. They argue that dynamic and relational aspects of economic misfortune matter decisively, for which form of populism is supported (Burgoon et al., 2019). The authors propose positional deprivation, which measures average income growth across deciles of a country's income distribution minus the growth within a respondent's decile. Generally, the authors predict that positional deprivation fosters feelings of disadvantage and resentment, which are channelled towards the political establishment and thus result in populist party support. More

importantly, for radical left-wing populism, positional deprivation compared to the tenth decile (i.e., the richest individuals in society) is the driving form of deprivation.

Their analysis reveals that positional deprivation is positively related to the support of radical left-wing (and right-wing) populist parties in 20 European countries. Supporting their argument about different comparison groups, their analyses shows that positional deprivation compared to the tenth decile (richest individuals) is the most important predictor for left-wing populist party support (Burgoon et al., 2019). The authors explain this finding with the focus of left-wing populism on income inequality and the criticism towards the super-rich (Burgoon et al., 2019).

Overall, this chapter has given a brief overview over the most important explanations for support of radical left-wing populism on the individual level. To that end, this overview has shown that political discontent, economic grievances, and political ideology are important predictors of radical left-wing populist support, albeit to different degrees. More importantly, however, I discussed that some of the recent advances in the literature tried to incorporate cultural and economic approaches jointly. As opposed to the research on radical right-wing populism, these approaches are less elaborate for left-wing populism. However, taking into account that qualitative research has found that the grievances of supporters of populism are more complex, these recent advances offer valuable insights for the study of left-wing populism and form the starting point for the theoretical and empirical contribution of this study (see chapters 3.4 and 5.).

3.3 Explaining Populist Attitudes

The scholarly research on the explanation of support for populism has long been dominated by the literature on voting for populist parties. Recent advances in the literature have proposed

populist attitudes as individual-level manifestation of populism. Although populist attitudes and voting for populist parties seem to be related, they are conceptually and empirically different. Thus, recent research has aimed to explain the adoption of populist attitudes individually. Yet, given that work on populist attitudes has only recently gained traction in the field, there are considerably fewer studies on the explanation of populist attitudes. Moreover, as opposed to voting behaviour this research agenda has been less systematic.

One of the most straightforward arguments on populist attitudes could be that political discontent or dissatisfaction with democracy cause individuals to adopt such populist attitudes (see chapters 3.1 and 3.2 for why discontent and populism should be related). Rovira Kaltwasser and van Hauwaert (2020) investigate the populist citizen across different countries and world regions. Their analysis shows that democratic satisfaction is systematically negatively related to populist attitudes, implying that citizens with lower levels of satisfaction with democracy are more likely to hold populist attitudes. Yet, contrary to widely held beliefs, populist citizens do not prefer authoritarian forms of government to democracy. Populist citizens are more likely to prefer democracy but seem to be dissatisfied with the way it currently works (Rovira Kaltwasser & van Hauwaert, 2020). Interestingly, these relationships hold across the political and social contexts of Latin America and Europe. A similar finding is provided by Vehrkamp and Wratil (2017) for German citizens.

Other studies take a slightly different angle by investigating the role of ideological positions. Of particular interest is whether respondents from the left or the right are more prone to express populist attitudes or whether this is a question of radicalism rather than position. Marcos-Marne, Llamazares, and Shikano (2021) argue that populist and radical attitudes resonate well with each other as both share a propensity to reject ideological ambivalence as well as articulate the preference for a radical transformation of the current society.

Their analyses reveal that people at the far left and the far right are more likely to hold populist attitudes (Marcos-Marne, Llamazares, & Shikano, 2021). Yet, this relationship is also context-dependent: in France, with its dominant radical right-wing populist party, populist attitudes are more prevalent on the far right than the far left while in Spain the pattern is the opposite (Marcos-Marne, Llamazares, & Shikano, 2021). Bernhard and Hänggli (2018) report similar findings for Switzerland where populist attitudes are concentrated at the right-end of the political spectrum. Overall, these findings track with party-level investigations that show that left-right radicalism predicts the adoption and use of populism (Rooduijn & Akkerman, 2017).

As for populist voting, scholars advanced economic explanations for the adoption of populist attitudes. In this regard, Rico and Anduiza (2019) aim to investigate whether the financial crisis affected the adoption of populist attitudes in nine European countries. In particular, they investigate three different forms of economic hardship. They use economic vulnerability (low education, income, occupation, and employment status), economic grievances (reduced consumption and worsening of job condition), and negative perceptions of the national economic situation. Their analyses yield that while economic vulnerability, grievances, and negative perceptions of the national economy all are significantly related to populist attitudes, negative perceptions of the national economy are the strongest predictor. Using Spain as a case study, the authors use panel data to show that the relationship flows from perceptions of the economy to populist attitudes rather than in the other direction. In a similar vein, Rico et al. (2017) show that anger about the financial crisis is positively related to populist attitudes.

Filsinger, Wamsler, et al. (2021) show that lower levels of education and negative economic expectations relate positively to populist attitudes in Germany. Moreover, education and economic expectations moderate the relationship between national identity and populist attitudes, i.e., economic hardship makes people with a civic conception of nationhood more

likely to hold populist attitudes. Tsatsanis et al. (2018) show that in Greece low income and lower levels of education predict whether people adopt populist attitudes. In their study on the populist citizen, however, Rovira Kaltwasser and van Hauwaert (2020) do not find any evidence that populists share certain economic characteristics across contexts.

Next to these objective measures of economic hardship, several studies aim to investigate whether subjective vulnerabilities are related to populist attitudes. Spruyt et al. (2016) use data from Flanders (the Dutch-speaking part of Belgium) to explain who supports populism and why. Following the argument of the losers of globalisation thesis, the authors argue that economic and cultural vulnerabilities predict higher levels of populist attitudes. More importantly, they argue that stigmatised groups who face difficulties in finding a positive social identity are those that are the most likely to support populism. In this sense, populism and in particular the empty signifier of the people offer vulnerable individuals a coping mechanism to form a positive social identity. The analyses show that populist attitudes are most strongly predicted by different feelings of discontent (social, economic, and political). These findings are echoed by Elchardus and Spruyt (2016) who also find that subjective vulnerabilities are important in predicting populist attitudes. Hameleers and de Vreese (2020) report similar results by showing that people who feel disadvantaged are more likely to hold higher levels of exclusionary populist attitudes.

One of the most recent contributions on the explanation of populist attitudes aims to combine economic and cultural explanations of populism within an overarching theoretical framework (Rhodes-Purdy et al., 2021). This study is similar to the approaches by Burgoon et al. (2019), Carreras et al. (2019), and Gidron and Hall (2020) as the authors combine rather than juxtapose cultural and economic explanations of populism. Yet, the study of Rhodes-Purdy et al. (2021) differs in two important aspects. First, they look at populist attitudes and not vote

choice as the dependent variable. Second, they link cultural discontent and economic stress through emotional responses of individuals (Rhodes-Purdy et al., 2021).

The authors propose affective political economy as a theoretical framework to understand the emergence of populist attitudes. They argue that economic threats trigger cultural discontent via emotional responses, in particular anger (Rhodes-Purdy et al., 2021). Cultural discontent, in turn, significantly predicts support for populist attitudes. Using original survey experiments and data from the United States and Spain, the authors find support for their causal chain, namely that economic threats evoke anger which increases cultural discontent that activates populist attitudes (Rhodes-Purdy et al., 2021). To that end, the authors clearly show that cultural and economic factors work in conjunction with each other, making future research on this question much needed.

Overall, the chapter has provided an overview of the literature on the explanation of populist attitudes. While a considerably smaller body of literature than the research on radical left- and right-wing populism, the explanation of populist attitudes often nicely aligns with previous research on populism. Political discontent, economic hardship, and value-based explanations also seem to matter for the adoption of populist attitudes, albeit to different degrees. More importantly, so far only one study combined different explanatory strands – i.e., culture and economy – to offer a more nuanced picture. Yet, these approaches are still in their infancy making further contributions in this area much needed. In chapters 3.4 and 5, I elaborate on how I complement these recent advances and thereby contribute to the literature in a theoretical and empirical manner.

3.4 Research Gap

The aim of the three pervious subchapters was to offer an overview of the literature on the explanation of left- and right-wing populism as well as populist attitudes. As is evident, there is an amplitude of research on how to explain support for these different manifestations of populism. Despite the wealth of studies, several aspects remain understudied or under-scrutinised in the current literature.

One particular aspect that has been pointed out is that the artificial distinction between cultural and economic explanations of populism has hampered rather than facilitated theoretical and empirical progress regarding the explanation of different manifestations of populism (Carreras et al., 2019; Gest et al., 2018; Gidron & Hall, 2017, 2020; Rhodes-Purdy et al., 2021). This claim rests to a considerable amount on ethnographic and qualitative studies that take a closer look at supporters of different forms of populism (Cramer, 2016; Gest, 2016; Hochschild, 2016; Koppetsch, 2017). In particular, these studies suggest that subjective impressions of reality are important to explain people's support for radical politics. Even more so, these studies have pointed out that understanding and capturing the subjective impressions of being left behind or disadvantaged is crucial (Cramer, 2016; Gest, 2016; Hochschild, 2016). Thus, these accounts focus on the subjective reality of populist supporters and point to specific feelings of neglect and disadvantage that these individuals experience which in turn make them susceptible to different forms of populism.

What arises from these qualitative contributions is that many of the previous quantitative analyses fell short in identifying the underlying cause for people's support for populist politics. Put differently, previous accounts often "do not directly touch-upon the resentments that qualitative reporting has found to prevail among political supporters of radical parties: a feeling of 'losingout' compared with one's own past and compared with other groups in society" (Burgoon et al., 2019, p. 52). Two aspects demand further attention.

First, studies have pointed out that studying individuals' emotional reactions to cultural and economic developments is a promising way to expand on these ethnographic findings. In this tradition, Rhodes-Purdy et al. (2021) argue that cultural and economic threats elicit anger, which translates these threats into a populist response.

Second and more importantly, scholars proposed a more sound theoretical foundation for these particular feelings of 'losingout' (Gidron & Hall, 2020). Gidron and Hall (2020) advance the idea that globalisation and the associated changes in economy and society have produced social *disintegration* that fuels populist support. Thus, populism is labelled as a problem of social integration. To that end, the authors combine economic and cultural explanations by putting forward a new theoretical argument that accounts for the importance of both factors.

This approach seems to be particularly important and promising as it might lay the cornerstone for the first aspect, i.e., by theorising the feelings of 'losingout', scholars might uncover the cause for the fierce emotional reactions usually associated with populist politics. In this regard, the present study aims to contribute to the second aspect. Rather than contradicting earlier work, I set out to expand the understanding of populism as a problem of social integration by refining the theoretical and conceptual foundations of social integration as put forward by previous scholarly work (Gidron & Hall, 2020). In particular, my theoretical contribution to the literature is threefold.

First, I refine the socio-integrational approach to populism by taking the multidimensionality and complexity of social integration into account. I offer a more encompassing approach to social integration. Based on classical work in sociology and the work by Gidron and Hall (2020), I follow the same definition that understands social integration as a multidimensional phenomenon

“based on (a) the degree to which individuals see themselves as part of a shared normative order, (b) their levels of social interaction with others, and (c) the extent to which they feel recognised or respected by others in society” (Gidron & Hall, 2020, p. 1031).

Yet, going beyond their study, I rely on three different manifestations of social integration that capture the multidimensionality of social integration more adequately. I use subjective social status, social trust, and subjective group relative deprivation to capture different aspects of social integration in more detail.

With this refined approach, I am able to the measure the relational element of social integration more accurately. In particular, by using subjective group relative deprivation and social trust, I am able to grasp not only an individual’s degree of social integration but also her relative position compared to other members and groups in society. In this regard, a direct reference to and comparison between different members and groups in society is crucial to understand individuals’ perceptions of social integration.

Related to this aspect is the focus on inter-group relationships and group identification. Classical studies in sociology already pointed out that group relationships are an important aspect of social integration (Durkheim, [1893] 1964; Münch, 2015). Recent ethnographic studies underscore this importance of group identities and relationships between in- and out-groups in society (Gest, 2016; Hochschild, 2016). To that end, subjective group relative deprivation and (identity-based) trust allow measuring (the quality of) inter-group relationships as well as in-group identification explicitly. As these are essential characteristics of social integration including different manifestations of social integration promises increasing analytical and theoretical value.

Furthermore, this refined approach allows tapping into subjective impressions of *disintegration* and disadvantage more explicitly. As social *disintegration* implies a violation to social norms and values, measures of social integration need to account for such violations and

perceived disadvantages explicitly. By using subjective group relative deprivation, I am able to capture such subjective impressions of norm violations more explicitly compared to previous studies.

In sum, the first contribution lies in the more encompassing approach to social integration, which allows more nuanced theoretical arguments with regard to the relationship between social integration and populism. In combination with more detailed empirical analyses, the objective is to allow for a better understanding of this relationship.

Second, by refining the socio-integrational approach, I offer a theoretical framework that explains populist support by capturing the subjective feelings of 'losingout' quantitatively. One crucial contribution of this study is that I offer a broad and detailed conceptualisation of social integration, which then allows capturing the findings of ethnographic research more systematically. One drawback of previous studies is that they are often not fully able to measure the resentment and the feelings of disadvantage uncovered by ethnographic research (cf. Burgoon et al., 2019). In this regard, I provide a more accurate quantitative approach integrating insights of recent ethnographic studies by offering three different manifestations of social integration that capture the different subjective impressions of populist supporters.

Third, I propose theoretical arguments that account for different forms of populism. I start by outlining the relationship between social integration and populist attitudes, which has not been done in previous research. I argue that social *disintegration* is likely to fuel populist attitudes as they offer a valve to express the discontent arising from social marginalisation. By doing so, my study is able to uncover whether processes of social *disintegration* relate to populism itself or whether the relationships are driven by the host ideologies of the respective populist parties. Put differently, investigating populist attitudes reveals whether the explanatory power of social integration also holds for the attitudes underlying populism rather than the ideological package of different parties. In this vein, by investigating populist attitudes, I take

a step back and investigate the relationship between social integration and populism as a thin ideology.

I further complement these analyses by investigating radical left- and right-wing populist party support, which allows assessing the explanatory power of the social integrational approach for different forms of populism. More importantly, I formulate distinct theoretical arguments for how different aspects of social integration might foster support for different populist parties. Given their different ideological orientation, I argue that different inter-group dynamics, inter-group comparisons, and in-group identifications are crucial aspects of social integration that matter decisively for which form of populism is supported. This advances the theoretical utility of the socio-integrational approach as it allows distinguishing between supporters of radical left- and right-wing populist parties.

To summarise, my dissertation contributes to the literature by combining arguments from political psychology, political science, and sociology to investigate the relationship between three different manifestations of social *disintegration* and three different forms of populism. In this vein, I offer distinct theoretical arguments and testable predictions that help explain populist attitudes as well as support for the two most dominant forms of populism in Europe. Consequently, my theoretical and empirical contribution might function as a stepping-stone for future research to produce a full explanatory model of populism.

4 Conceptualising Social Integration

This chapter is dedicated to the conceptualisation of social integration, the main explanans and foundation of the theoretical framework of this book. Conceptualising social integration is particularly important, as it has been used in a variety of contexts with different meanings. These range from the traditional sociological accounts of Durkheim to the literature on immigrant integration as well as the broad literature on social capital.

The chapter is structured as follows. First, in chapter 4.1, I discuss the theoretical foundations of social integration dating back to Emile Durkheim. I conclude the chapter with the definition of social integration used in this book which is based on recent work by Gidron and Hall (2020). Chapter 4.2 expands on this definition and in particular on the different manifestations that reflect social integration. While Gidron and Hall (2020) propose subjective social status, I go beyond their study by proposing two additional manifestations of social integration: social trust and subjective group relative deprivation. With this threefold approach to social integration, I am able to scrutinise several elements of social integration in more detail: the relational nature, the group-based structure, and the subjective impression of social *disintegration*. To that end, I offer a more encompassing conceptualisation of social integration. Chapters 4.2.1 to 4.2.3 are dedicated to the precise conceptualisation of subjective social status, social trust, and subjective group relative deprivation as manifestations of social integration.

4.1 Social Integration

Questions of social integration have concerned social science research for a long time. In particular, research has aimed to investigate the consequences of social integration for a plethora of different phenomena (Appau et al., 2019; Berkman et al., 2000; Franklin et al., 2008; Graeff & Mehlkop, 2007; Helliwell et al., 2014; Su et al., 2019; Thorlindsson & Bernburg,

2004). Most of these works relate back to classical work in sociology and in particular to the work of Emile Durkheim.

"*De la division du travail social"* (*Division of Labour in Society)* by Emile Durkheim (Durkheim, [1893] 1964) is usually considered as the "*locus classicus"* for research on social integration (Gidron & Hall, 2020, p. 1030, italics in original). In sociology's first classic (Tiryakian, 1994), Durkheim was concerned with societal organisation in the time of the industrial revolution. Nevertheless, his study still carries a lot of relevance for today as such classics can be used heuristically even if empirical data and conditions applied in the original work do not hold in modern times (Tiryakian, 1994).

Tiryakian (1994) identifies two important aspects where Durkheim's work is particularly relevant. First, Tiryakian (1994) acknowledges the similarities in the contextual conditions. During the writing of Division of Labour, France's advanced industrialisation was characterised by few restraints for economic actors and the society was shaken by scandals and economic crises. In this regard, Tiryakian (1994) draws similarities to the 1980s in France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the US that were all characterised by large deregulation programmes as well as economic downturns. This makes the questions of solidarity and anomie similarly relevant today as they were during the time of Durkheim (Fuchs, 2000; H.-P. Müller, 1994; Tiryakian, 1994).[21]

Second, Tiryakian (1994) argues that the interest of Durkheim in structural means of redressing the pathologies of the division of labour is still relevant today. In particular, this holds for political structures that integrate producers and workers in a system of representation and cooperative mutual interaction, i.e., corporatism (Tiryakian, 1994). Yet, even beyond corporatism, the question of how social structures and institutions can support successful social

[21] Admittedly, there are important differences between the 1980s and today but globalisation, economic transformations, and crises make for similarly challenging economic circumstances.

integration in times of globalisation and economic transformation remains relevant (Fuchs, 2000; H.-P. Müller, 1994). To that end, the reasoning of classics such as "*De la division du travail social"* can provide a stepping stone for theoretical and empirical contributions today (Durkheim, [1893] 1964).

Durkheim ([1893] 1964) started out from the paradox that individuals seem to become more autonomous but at the same time more dependent on society as a whole (Büttner, 2017; Tiryakian, 1994). He argues that the increase in population size and density changes societies as the population growth makes questions of survival more prominent (Barnes, 1966). Thus, the division of labour is a consequence of population growth as differentiation and individualisation allow survival (Durkheim, [1893] 1964). Yet, the division of labour also implies a change in solidarity understood as "a form of sociability that designates the relationship of the structure and functioning of society: its social organization on the one hand and its system of values its morality on the other" (H.-P. Müller, 1994, p. 79).

Durkheim argues that archaic or traditional societies are defined by small units that are not characterised by a division of labour (Durkheim, [1893] 1964). These societies "consist of small, segmentally differentiated units, in which a strong collective conscience creates solidarity out of similarities between members" (H.-P. Müller, 1994, p. 79). Thus, these societies are characterised by little individualism but by solidarity that maintains a collective conscience (Merton, 1994b). This solidarity based on similarity is labelled mechanical solidarity which is signified by laws that favour uniform beliefs and practices and are repressive in nature (Durkheim, [1893] 1964).

Conversely, modern societies are different from traditional societies in that they are based on a division of labour that compartmentalises society into different spheres. According to Durkheim, the reason for this division of labour is the growth in population size and density, which has made it inevitable for individuals to specialise in certain occupations. The

differentiation of occupations fosters the development of individuals' abilities, as the different tasks require different skills.

Moreover, differentiation and individualisation allow individuals to follow and develop their personal preferences (H.-P. Müller, 1994). Importantly, however, this individualisation also leads to a change in solidarity (Durkheim, [1893] 1964). While fostering individualisation, the division of labour also advances the interdependence of individuals and groups at the same time. This interdependence produces a different form of solidarity, i.e., organic solidarity (Merton, 1994b; H.-P. Müller, 1994). To that end, the division of labour is the social thread that links individuals together. Put differently, the interdependence of individuals and groups results in organic solidarity which "consists of differences, and binds the individual indirectly to society by integrating him into whatever fields of activity he is involved in" (H.-P. Müller, 1994, p. 79).

This means that individuals are not integrated within one overarching societal conscience but rather society itself consists of "a plenitude of function-specific codes of norms, which nevertheless retain their moral character" (H.-P. Müller, 1994, p. 79). For Durkheim, organic solidarity is signified by restitutive laws rather than punishment or a focus on uniform beliefs (Durkheim, [1893] 1964).

In his study, Durkheim focuses on the development of solidarity in society and follows a uni-linear argumentation (Merton, 1994b). He proposes that societies always develop from mechanical to organic solidarity as population growth inevitably leads to an increase in interactions resulting in a division of labour (Durkheim, [1893] 1964) or as Merton (1994b, p. 19) puts it "[t]his continuous trend occurs mechanically through a series of disturbed and re-established social dynamic equilibria". Thus, with increasing division of labour, i.e., increasing societal differentiation, mechanical solidarity is replaced by organic solidarity and the dominance of restrictive laws and rules decreases (Merton, 1994b).

What is important to note, however, is that even in highly individualised societies, self-interest is not the only guiding principle (Merton, 1994b). An example are laws that are voluntary at the start but subsequently guide individual interaction (as opposed to self-interest). To that end, society as a whole plays an active part in determining which actions are in line with the dominant values (Merton, 1994b). Put differently, it is the "consensus of parts" that makes social integration (Durkheim, [1893] 1964, p. 360). Thus, it is the non-contractual elements of the "contract where one can find true organic solidarity" (Barnes, 1966, p. 164; cf. Parsons, 1937, p. 319).

While Durkheim expects a transition from mechanical to organic solidarity in modern societies, Merton (1994b) points out that organic solidarity never fully replaces mechanical solidarity. Even more so, Durkheim's idea of a linear and unidirectional development from mechanical to organic society is flawed. On the one hand, "primitive" societies are not solely characterised by punitive law. On the other hand, modern societies are not only characterised by restitutive laws but use punitive laws as well (Merton, 1994b). Durkheim's approach would not allow to uncover such instances of mechanical solidarity in modern societies.

Furthermore, such a unidirectional development can be questioned by the existence of anomic circumstances under the division of labour (Barnes, 1966) as well as by the fact that certain forms of mechanical solidarity are not expressed by repressive laws (Merton, 1994b). Thus, Durkheim's indicators do not represent all different forms of solidarity in an adequate fashion. Even more so, they fail to capture all occurrences of different forms of solidarity. For example, even in modern societies, mechanical solidarity can be expressed by the concept of honour, although it does not find its way into repressive laws and thus would remain undetected by Durkheim's approach (Merton, 1994b).

Similarly, Tiryakian (1994) observes a return of mechanical solidarity in terms of ethnic, religious, or gender solidarity, i.e., a return to solidarity based on similarity. Given that both

organic and mechanical solidarity are forms of positive solidarity that protect the society from anomie (Barnes, 1966), the “return” of mechanical solidarity has positive and negative aspects. Tiryakian (1994, p. 13) points out that for marginalised groups, mechanical solidarity might offer a way to redefine the previous social identity and thus a “return to mechanical solidarity may mean giving dignity and enhancement to what was perceived as inferior”. On the contrary, mechanical solidarity may go hand-in-hand with a demarcation towards the general society, limiting interactions and organic solidarity as a whole (Tiryakian, 1994).

While the theoretical and empirical flaws of Durkheim’s work make modern day application difficult, the value of his work stems from the fact that it is particularly useful as heuristic given that the questions under study remain relevant (Merton, 1994b, 1994a; H.-P. Müller, 1994; Tiryakian, 1994). The theoretical foundations of Durkheim’s ideas can function as a stepping stone for modern day empirical and theoretical contributions as others have successfully shown (Gidron & Hall, 2020; Graeff & Mehlkop, 2007; Su et al., 2019; Thorlindsson & Bernburg, 2004). Yet, to make use of these ideas it is necessary to distil the important ideas and reformulate them into a definition of social integration that is concise and measurable.

From the discussion above, several important aspects are crucial for a definition of social integration. First, social integration refers to the interlinkages between the members of societies (Münch, 2015). This includes not only the extent of interlinkages – i.e., the number of actors involved – but also the intensity of these interactions – i.e., the frequency of these interactions – (Münch, 2015). High social integration occurs when relationships are characterised by interactions that are both intensive and extensive (Münch, 2015). Modern societies are usually not characterised by one integrated group that forms society. Instead, they consist of different groups that are integrated in society through their interdependence (Durkheim, [1893] 1964).

Second, while formal rules and (political and social) institutions partly structure these interdependencies and thereby social integration, non-contractual elements are just as important (Merton, 1994b; Parsons, 1937). Individuals and groups are integrated in society through a high degree of attachment to commonly held values and norms (Thorlindsson & Bernburg, 2004). That is, for social integration to occur, actions of individuals and groups have to be based on normative rules and regulations that all actors can rely on (Münch, 2015). Conversely, if such shared normative rules are not existent, society is characterised by anomie rather than social integration. Or as Münch (2015, p. 244) puts it: "anomie means that individual actors cannot count on such regulation when they encounter other actors and thus have to rely on the power available to them in order to defend their claims for space for action". To that end, a shared normative order that ensures cooperative rather than competitive social interactions is crucial.

Third, as pointed out by Blau (1960), individuals do not only want to be part of groups but more importantly strive for acceptance from other group members. Only if people are recognised as group members, they are able to participate in the shared normative order and also have the impression that this order extends to them (Blau, 1960; Gidron & Hall, 2020). Thus, for social integration to be successful, recognition and respect as members of the group is crucial. Put differently, social acceptance in the group is granted "in exchange for ceasing to compete for superior standing in the group and for the contribution to social integration he [the actor] thereby makes" (Blau, 1960, p. 556).

Based on this discussion, I follow Gidron and Hall (2020, p. 1031) who define social integration as a multidimensional phenomenon

"based on (a) the degree to which individuals see themselves as part of a shared normative order, (b) their levels of social interaction with others, and (c) the extent to which they feel recognised or respected by others in society".

This definition has several advantages. First, the definition captures the three crucial elements of social integration discussed above: a) participation in a normative order that structures behaviour in society, b) interlinkages and interactions between members of society, and c) recognition as members of the group (Durkheim, [1893] 1964; Merton, 1994b; Münch, 2015).

Second, the definition includes both structural and cultural aspects of social integration (Barstad, 2008). The former is about interactions and interlinkages between members of society, while the latter refers to the belonging to the normative order and the recognition as member of society. Third, the definition by Gidron and Hall (2020) is measurable with different indicators that tap into the different dimensions of the concept. More importantly, this allows accounting for the complexities of social integration. Fourth, this definition has already been successfully applied in the study of comparative politics in general and the study of populism in particular (Gidron & Hall, 2020).

4.2 Manifestations of Social Integration

After defining social integration, I introduce the three concepts that I regard as manifestations of social integration. While Gidron and Hall (2020) propose subjective social status as a way to assess how integrated an individual is in society, I argue that in order to capture the phenomenon of social integration adequately, two additional concepts are necessary. In particular, I argue that social trust and subjective group relative deprivation can add to our understanding of social integration. Even more so, they help investigating the relationship between social integration and populism. With this threefold approach to social integration, I am able to scrutinise several elements of social integration in more detail: the relational nature, the group-based structure, and the subjective impression of social *disintegration*. To that end, I offer a more encompassing conceptualisation of social integration that allows for a comprehensive test of the socio-integrational underpinnings of populism.

Following Gidron and Hall (2020), I use subjective social status as a first indicator for an individual's level of social integration. Subjective social status of an individual is "defined as their beliefs about where they stand relative to others in society" (Gidron & Hall, 2020, p. 1031). While subjective social status is influenced by education, income, and occupation, it is theoretically and empirically distinct from these parameters. More importantly, in modern societies, people care extensively about subjective social status, almost as much as about money (Ridgeway, 2014).

Subjective social status refers to the subjective impression of where people stand in society compared to others (Evans & Kelley, 2004; Gidron & Hall, 2020; Lindemann & Saar, 2014). Thus, Gidron and Hall (2020) argue that it captures all three dimensions of social integration as introduced above. First, subjective social status meaningfully captures whether people see themselves as part of a shared order or more precisely, where they see themselves in that order. Second, Gidron and Hall (2020) show that subjective social status also relates significantly to the extent of interactions with other members in society. Third, subjective social status indicates whether people perceive themselves as respected by society and its members, with higher status signifying a more prominent and respected position.

Although subjective social status taps into all three dimensions of social integration, the analysis of social integration could be strengthened by including additional concepts that capture certain aspects of social integration more explicitly. In particular, three aspects come to mind, i.e., the relational nature of social integration, the importance of groups, and the subjective impression of social *disintegration*.

First, while subjective social status relates to where people see themselves within society, it does not fully capture the relational element that is important for social integration. Social status places an individual within the ladder of society without relating this position explicitly to the position of other members of society. In this regard, a direct reference to other

members of society is lacking when solely relying on subjective social status on an abstract unidimensional ladder (L. S. Wolff et al., 2010). In particular, ethnographic research shows that comparisons between different members in society are crucial in understanding the societal grievances that give rise to populist politics (Hochschild, 2016). To that end, it is also important where people see themselves compared to a relevant referent.

Second, subjective social status is focused on the individual and her position within society rather than on individuals within certain groups and their position in society. Both aspects are of crucial importance for social integration as both individuals and groups in society can feel (dis)integrated. In this vein, research on social integration has put emphasis on the role of groups and their integration in the whole society (Durkheim, [1893] 1964). Thus, impressions of social integration are not confined to the individual but instead extend to groups within society that individuals are a part of (Ridgeway, 2014). Subjective social status does not fully capture this group element of social integration as it neglects the idea that an individual as member of a group in society can feel integrated or not.

Third, subjective social status captures social *disintegration* in the sense of a violation of social norms and processes rather indirectly. While people might care about status as strongly as they care about money (Ridgeway, 2014) and lower levels of subjective social status might imply that people feel that the norms of society are violated or do not extend to them, individuals' subjective impressions of *disintegration* are not captured directly. Thus, to understand subjective impressions of norm violation and lack of respect better, additional indicators are needed.

In complementing subjective social status with two additional indicators, this study offers a more encompassing conceptualisation of social integration and a more comprehensive test of the socio-integrational underpinnings of populism. I suggest social trust and subjective group relative deprivation as additional concepts that can complement subjective social status

as manifestations of social integration. All three indicators adequately capture social integration but also complement each other nicely as they tap into different dimensions.

Social trust is defined "as expectation that others will contribute to the well-being of a person or a group, or at least will refrain from harmful actions" (Freitag & Traunmüller, 2009, p. 782). As such, social trust is able to tease out group identifications and their relationship with the society as a whole. Moreover, with generalised trust and its integrative vision of society, social trust might be the indicator that can capture positive social integration best (see chapter 4.2.2).

Subjective group relative deprivation is defined "as a judgment that one or one's in-group is disadvantaged compared to a relevant referent and that this judgment invokes feelings of anger, resentment, and entitlement" (Pettigrew, 2015, p. 12). With its focus on disadvantages of groups compared to others in society, subjective group relative deprivation is able to capture the subjective impression of *disintegration* as well as the relational and the group-based element of social integration more explicitly (see chapter 4.2.3).

In sum, by using subjective social status, social trust, and subjective group relative deprivation to capture social integration, I am confident to offer a comprehensive theoretical and empirical investigation of the relationship between social integration and the support for populism that takes the crucial aspects of social integration into account. In the following subchapters, I present and conceptualise the three concepts of social status, social trust, and subjective group relative deprivation in detail.

4.2.1 Subjective Social Status

Questions of social stratification are at the forefront of sociological research. With rising inequality, questions on how society is structured and what determines this structure are very

relevant. In this regard, the classical work of Max Weber ([1918] 1968) is particularly important for contemporary social science research. One important distinction is made between class and status (Weber, [1918] 1968, [1922] 1972). In a Weberian perspective social class arises from relations on the labour market and is rooted in objective economic conditions (Weber, [1918] 1968). Weber speaks of social class when

"(1) a number of people have in common a specific component of their life chances, in so far as (2) this component is represented exclusively by economic interests in the possession of goods and opportunities for income, and (3) is represented under the conditions of the commodity or labour markets" (Carella & Ford, 2020, p. 3; Weber, [1918] 1968, p. 927).

Put differently, the class structure of a country is grounded in quite objective social relations in economic life, i.e., social relations between production units (Chan & Goldthorpe, 2004). Class refers to the differences between self-employed, employees, and employers (Chan & Goldthorpe, 2004). Yet, with increasing differentiation of the economy, class structure today also includes aspects such as type of employment contract or task autonomy (Carella & Ford, 2020; Chan & Goldthorpe, 2007). Thus, class refers to objective inequalities, particularly with regard to (material) resources and power (Carella & Ford, 2020; Ridgeway, 2014).

While class structures inequality, it is not always as hierarchical as assumed (Carella & Ford, 2020; Chan & Goldthorpe, 2007). This is particularly true for intermediate classes where a true hierarchical ranking is difficult as certain characteristics such employment stability, earnings, or promotion opportunity vary not as much (Chan & Goldthorpe, 2007). More importantly, the concept of class does not capture real-world groups or collectives but rather "a number of people [that] have in common a specific component of their life-chances" (cf. Chan & Goldthorpe, 2007, p. 514; Weber, [1918] 1968, p. 930). Evoking Tönnies ([1887] 1957) famous distinction between *Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft*, Weber [1918] 1968) argues that

classes are not *Gemeinschaften*, i.e., they are not structured through social bonds but only through certain structural components.

Instead, class in modern societies is based on *Gesellschaft* (Tönnies, [1887] 1957) "where relationships are structured through contracts, with clearly defined rewards and rights acquired in exchange for clearly defined duties performed" (Carella & Ford, 2020, p. 3). Nevertheless, class has important implications irrespective of whether people see themselves as members of different classes or not. For example, working class people have a higher likelihood of being unemployed than managerial professionals, irrespective of whether they see themselves as part of different classes (Chan et al., 2011).

Crucially, however, inequality is not just structured by power and resources, i.e., class differences (Ridgeway, 2014). Instead, even structural components such as occupations can be ranked by social prestige thereby reflecting "the distribution of social honor" (Carella & Ford, 2020, p. 1). This distribution is reflected in the concept of (social) status. While some research has conflated status and class both conceptually and empirically, the distinction is important. Over a century ago, Weber argued that next to class, status structures inequality (H.-P. Müller, 2017; Weber, [1918] 1968, [1922] 1972). As opposed to class, social status is rooted in a symbolic hierarchy that is based on subjective perceptions of value and esteem (Chan & Goldthorpe, 2004; H.-P. Müller, 2017). Thus, status refers to inequalities with regard to social honour rather than resources and is

"a typically effective claim to positive or negative privilege with respect to social prestige so far as it rests on one or more of the following bases: (a) mode of living, (b) a formal process of education which may consist in empirical or rational training and the acquisition of the corresponding modes of life, or (c) on the prestige of birth, or an occupation" (Carella & Ford, 2020, p. 3; Weber, 1975, p. 424).

Put differently, status can be thought of in terms of relations of social honour attached to a certain position or ascribed attributes that imply either superiority, inferiority, or equality depending on the social value (Chan & Goldthorpe, 2004, 2007). In this vein, social status "is inequality based on honor, esteem, and respect" (Ridgeway, 2014, p. 2). Rather than material circumstances, status rests on cultural beliefs about social categories and their rank (Ridgeway, 2014). These cultural beliefs are influenced by widely held status beliefs, i.e., beliefs in society about who or what is honourable and respectable (Ridgeway, 2014). Such status beliefs at the societal level shape social interactions on the individual level and structure how other groups in society are perceived with regard to their competence and value.

Interestingly, these status beliefs and the resulting stereotypes are consensual within society (Ridgeway, 2014). Differently put, in addition to a class order based on material resources, modern societies are characterised by a status order (Chan & Goldthorpe, 2004). This status order hierarchically structures relations between groups in society by expressing superiority for certain groups or individuals in society based on "social positions that they hold or […] certain of their ascribed attributes" (Chan & Goldthorpe, 2004, p. 383).

This social hierarchy is expressed through differential association: "Weber speaks of 'commensality' and 'connubium': who eats with whom and who sleeps with whom" (Chan et al., 2011, p. 451; see also H.-P. Müller, 2017). People associate with those that are similar to them in status as they are regarded as equal rather than inferior. When confronted with group differences (such as ethnicity, income, or education) people usually prefer to associate with those that are similar to them (Ridgeway, 2014).

Yet, recently, Ridgeway (2014) points out that when it comes to status differences, both low and high status individuals acknowledge the higher social esteem of high status groups incentivising an association with higher status groups. This might result in an intensified in-group bias for high status groups and an undermined group solidarity for lower status groups

(Ridgeway, 2014). Furthermore, such status beliefs can foster material inequalities by providing legitimacy for power and resource inequalities. Even more so, status can substantiate structural inequalities when material differences develop into status differences and thus become a distinct form of inequality that may generate further material inequality (Ridgeway, 2014).

The particular focus of status on ascribed criteria gave rise to the notion that status relates to more basic forms of social organisation (*Gemeinschaft*) where value is attached through aspects, such as kinship or ethnicity (Tönnies, [1887] 1957). Put differently, status was categorised as being predominant in traditional rather than modern societies (Weber, [1918] 1968, [1922] 1972). While status differences can be based on such ascribed characteristics or on existing differences, such as gender or ethnicity, Ridgeway (2014, p. 4) points out that "they can also be differences constructed entirely for the purpose of asserting the status superiority of the richer and more powerful, as in the case of class-based manners and life-styles" (see also Bourdieu, 1984).

In this regard, social status is also expressed by certain lifestyle choices. Thus, status is based on the "construction of culturally defined social differences" such as sophisticated speech, clothing, or cultural consumption, such as arts or music (Ridgeway, 2014, p. 4). Indeed, social status has been associated with a more distinct use of certain forms of cultural activities, such as theatre or museum visits (Chan, 2010; Chan & Goldthorpe, 2006). Furthermore, these distinctive characteristics are used to maintain structural inequalities by perpetuating these social differences between different status groups (Ridgeway, 2014).

Consequently, analyses of social stratification that solely focus on the struggle for resources and power neglect "how much people care about their sense of being *valued* by others and the society to which they belong – how much they care about public acknowledgement of their worth" (Ridgeway, 2014, p. 2, italics in original). To that end, contemporary research has shown the continuous importance of status in modern societies (Carella & Ford, 2020; Chan et

al., 2011; Chan & Goldthorpe, 2004, 2006, 2007; Demakakos et al., 2008; Richards et al., 2021; Ridgeway, 2014).

While status and class are to some extent interlinked, they are not always congruent (Carella & Ford, 2020; Evans & Kelley, 2004). Interestingly, there is considerable variation of status within classes as well as considerable overlap in status between classes (Chan & Goldthorpe, 2004). Many of the aforementioned studies use occupation as source of status and develop their arguments from there on (Chan et al., 2011; Chan & Goldthorpe, 2004, 2007). This view has sparked criticism from conceptual and empirical standpoints (Bihagen & Lambert, 2018; Flemmen et al., 2019; Fujihara, 2020). The criticism does not necessarily question the usefulness of distinguishing between status and class but point towards the weakness of using occupation as the source of status.

Bihagen and Lambert (2018) argue that, empirically, status and class measures of occupation are too closely related to offer a reliable approach of investigating different consequences. More importantly, they point out that occupation is not necessarily the only source of (status) esteem (Bihagen & Lambert, 2018). Other potential sources include characteristics such as gender, ethnicity, or constructed social hierarchies (Ridgeway, 2014).

In a more general perspective, status beliefs are particularly important because they concern where people locate themselves within the social hierarchy of society, i.e., where they see themselves in society compared to others (Evans & Kelley, 2004; Lindemann & Saar, 2014). As status relates to questions of respect and esteem rather than money and power, status beliefs can emerge from different sources that do not necessarily include occupation, gender, ethnicity, or political values but rather focus on different social identities. Yet, these concerns might very well relate to the struggle for acknowledgement and respect that social status essentially is (Ridgeway, 2014). The result is an overall belief "about where [people] stand relative to others in society" (Gidron & Hall, 2020, p. 1031).

Research has shown that people are inclined to see themselves in the middle of society. As people tend to associate with those that are similar to them, this results in homogeneous reference groups (Evans & Kelley, 2004; Lindemann & Saar, 2014). Furthermore, the homogeneity of the reference group leads people to situate themselves in the middle of their group which results in a tendency towards centrality within the broader society (Evans & Kelley, 2004). The "result combines the reality shared by everyone in objectively similar circumstances with images of the particular, specific milieu of family, friends, and co-workers" (Evans & Kelley, 2004, p. 7).

Overall, social status is understood as a belief where people stand in society relative to others that is based on respect and value (Gidron & Hall, 2020; Ridgeway, 2014). While subjective social status is influenced by objective markers of socio-economic position such as education, income, and occupation, it is theoretically and empirically distinct from class (Chan & Goldthorpe, 2004; Ridgeway, 2014; Weber, [1918] 1968). More importantly, as people care almost as extensively about their subjective social status as about their income, solely focusing on inequalities in resources neglects the importance people attribute to acknowledgment and respect (Ridgeway, 2014). Thus, understood as inequality based on respect and value, social status offers a valuable concept not only to investigate inequalities in modern societies but also to understand political preference formation (Brown-Iannuzzi et al., 2015; Carella & Ford, 2020; Richards et al., 2021).

How does social status function as a manifestation of social integration? Understood as individuals' "beliefs about where they stand relative to others in society", social status meaningfully captures all three dimensions of social integration (Gidron & Hall, 2020, p. 1031). First, subjective social status signifies whether people see themselves as part of a shared normative order (Gidron & Hall, 2020). Social status refers to the esteem and respect a person is awarded in society. Thus, high social status corresponds to high levels of esteem and respect

(Ridgeway, 2014). Conversely, lower levels of status imply that people have the impression that they are not respected or valued in society (Gidron & Hall, 2020). Thus, individuals have the impression that they are not part of a shared normative order that acknowledges their rights and preferences (Gidron & Hall, 2020). Instead, they are sidelined to the fringes of society. This seems to be particularly true for declining levels of status. A decline in status indicates that people have the impression that they lose respect and esteem over time (Gidron & Hall, 2017). More importantly, people have the impression that they are no longer awarded the respect and value they deserve and that was once accorded to them (Gidron & Hall, 2017, 2020).

Second, social status and status differences are an adequate indicator for individuals' levels of interaction with others. Individuals with a higher social status usually have higher levels of social interaction. For example, Gidron and Hall (2020) show empirically that people with higher social status are significantly more likely to interact with others on a regular basis. Furthermore, social status has been associated with a distinct use of certain forms of cultural activities, such as theatre or museum visits, that also entail interaction with others in society (Chan, 2010; Chan & Goldthorpe, 2006).

An additional aspect of the relationship between social status and the interaction with others are the distinct processes associated with status differences. Status hierarchies make people more likely to associate with those that are similar in status (Chan & Goldthorpe, 2007; Evans & Kelley, 2004; Ridgeway, 2014). Thus, high status individuals associate and interact with other high status individuals, reinforcing in-group favouritism and social bonds to those that are similar (Ridgeway, 2014).

Low status individuals are confronted with a dilemma, however. On the one hand, they are inclined to associate with those that are similarly low in status. On the other hand, they acknowledge the superiority and attractiveness of high status individuals which incentivises them to associate with those higher up on the social ladder as way to obtain higher status

themselves (Ridgeway, 2014). This bias of low status individuals towards higher status individuals "undermine[s] associational solidarity among lower status groups" (Ridgeway, 2014, p. 7).

In addition, people who aim to or are perceived to challenge status orders are confronted with backlash reactions (Ridgeway et al., 1994; Rudman et al., 2012). To that end, low status individuals are more likely to have lower levels of social interaction than high status individuals. The trade-off between association with similar (low status) individuals and the aim to associate with high status individuals results in less in-group solidarity and thus less interaction. Even more so, an interaction with high status groups does not necessarily imply an increase in status. Such interactions often reproduce status beliefs and hierarchies rather than transforming them (Ridgeway & Erickson, 2000). Thus, interaction with other members of society is strongly constrained and structured by status and status perceptions, indicating that lower social status is associated with lower levels and lower quality of social interaction and thus lower levels of social integration (Gidron & Hall, 2020).

Third, subjective social status indicates whether people feel respected by society and its members. Status structures society along the lines of respect and (social) esteem (Ridgeway, 2014). Over a century ago, Weber noted that status is a form social privilege that is not accorded to material resources but based on social value and respect (Weber, [1918] 1968). Thus, higher social status is associated with the impression that an individual is valued and respected in society. On the contrary, low social status implies that people are less valued and respected in society.

More importantly, such status orders structure society and the beliefs associated with certain levels of status. Those at the top deserve the high level of respect and esteem they are awarded while those at the lower end are not respected and valued in society (Ridgeway, 2014).

Put differently, social status structures society along the dimension of social respect and esteem, thereby capturing an important aspect of social integration.

Overall, subjective social status defined as the belief about where people stand relative to others in society can be regarded as a manifestation of social integration because it captures the three elements of social integration put forward above (Gidron & Hall, 2020).

4.2.2 Social Trust

Trust is a feature of our daily lives and frequently used in non-scientific contexts. Trusting a friend to keep a secret or trusting an electrician to fix the wires are everyday examples of the importance of trust. Next to this real-world applicability, trust has been a concept studied in the social sciences for a long time, for example dating back to the work of Georg Simmel (Simmel, 1900, 1908). The concept gained full traction in the social sciences with its inclusion in the concept of social capital (Putnam, 1993). Here, the positive effects of trust on cooperation are centre stage and trust is often considered as a catalyst for cooperation and reciprocal relationships (Coleman, 1988, 1990; Putnam, 1993, 2000).

Despite the prominence of trust in public and scientific discourses, there is no common definition that is unequivocally used (Bauer, 2015b). With reference to Offe (1999), Freitag and Traunmüller (2009, p. 782) define trust "as expectation that others will contribute to the well-being of a person or a group, or at least will refrain from harmful actions". Trust is considered as a subjective expectation that others will benefit the well-being of an individual.

Formally speaking, in its simplest form, trust consists of persons A (trustor) and B (trustee). In this regard, trust implies that A trusts B when she expects that B will contribute to A's well-being or at least not harm her (Offe, 1999). In this example, B can be a family member, a friend, a group of colleagues, or a stranger (Hardin, 2002; Offe, 1999; Stolle, 2002). While it

is possible to just state that "Anna trusts" which "describes the idea that individuals possess some generalized situation-independent expectation" that is independent of any other actor, action, or time span, Bauer and Freitag (2018) point out that trust is situation-specific, i.e., it is often necessary to specify certain parameters such as the behaviour (X) (Bauer & Freitag, 2018, p. 16).

Formulated in more concrete terms, Anna (A) trusts that Urs (B) repays borrowed money (X) (Bauer & Freitag, 2018). In this understanding, trust describes a subjectively assessed probability (Gambetta, 1988; Offe, 1999). Put differently, trust "refers to probabilities that [...] others will do certain things or refrain from doing certain things" (Offe, 1999, p. 47).

Following from this understanding, one can distinguish different forms of trust with regard to the radius of trust and the level of information that is available about the trustee. Some scholars have argued that social trust is a one-dimensional concept where individuals display the same level of trust irrespective of the trustee, i.e., people would trust their family members, their friends, and neighbours as much as they trust strangers or people they meet the first time (Whiteley, 2000). Yet, this conceptualisation has been refuted by different studies, both theoretically and empirically (Delhey et al., 2011; Freitag & Bauer, 2013; Newton & Zmerli, 2011).

Conventional wisdom argued for a two-dimensional structure of social trust which distinguishes between particularised and generalised trust (Freitag & Traunmüller, 2009; Newton, 2009; Newton et al., 2018; Newton & Zmerli, 2011). The former refers to people that are known personally – that is with whom one has an existing relationship with – e.g., family, friends, or co-workers (Bauer & Freitag, 2018; Uslaner, 2002). The latter refers to people with whom one has had no prior interaction or information about, i.e., trust in strangers. Often, this

form of trust is associated with trust in a generalised other (Delhey et al., 2011; Freitag & Traunmüller, 2009).[22]

This two-dimensional structure has been the most widely used approach. Yet, recently, scholars have argued that an additional dimension of social trust that is situated between particularised and generalised trust exists. This form of trust is referenced as identity-based trust (Freitag & Bauer, 2013) or as depersonalised in-group trust (Kenworthy & Jones, 2009). This form of trust applies to people who are not known personally but who share certain characteristics with the trustor, such as nationality, religion, language, or social class (Freitag & Bauer, 2013). All three forms of trust differ with regard to the information that is available about the trustee and the radius of trust (Freitag, 2016; Freitag & Bauer, 2016b).

Particularised trust – 'thick trust' (Putnam, 2000) – extends only to a narrow set of people which usually comprises family members, friends, neighbours, and colleagues (Freitag & Bauer, 2016b). Consequently, this form of trust is usually associated with (groups of) people with whom the trustor shares personal experiences. These personal experiences are crucial in trust decisions as they offer information about the trustworthiness of the trustee based on previous interactions. The trust decision is then based on inferences from these past interactions. Particularised trust decisions are based on rather high levels of information that are collected through repeated interactions with people in the own social network. Put differently, the assessment of the subjective probability of the trustee's behaviour is based on ample information decreasing the uncertainty in the decision.

Yet, this high level of information comes at the cost that shared experiences usually only relate to a narrow set of people (Freitag & Bauer, 2016b). Thus, particularised trust is characterised by a small radius as it is only extended to those close to the trustor (Putnam, 2000). Given the high information on the trustee, Uslaner (1999) argued that everyone has to

[22] I will use generalised trust and trust in strangers interchangeably.

trust somebody, leading to the hypothesis that particularised trust is rather widespread (Newton & Zmerli, 2011). Nevertheless, people can also have low levels of particularised trust depending on whether their personal environment proves trustworthy.

Some scholars have argued that strong particularised trust might preclude other forms of trust as a focus on the immediate environment is accompanied by strong external boundaries (Banfield, 1958). However, others have argued that particularised trust does not necessarily preclude other forms of trust (Glanville & Paxton, 2007). Empirically, particularised trust is a conceptually distinct form of trust that seems to be positively correlated with other forms of trust (Freitag & Traunmüller, 2009; Newton & Zmerli, 2011).

The second form of social trust can be labelled generalised trust or trust in strangers – also "thin trust" – (Putnam, 2000). Generalised trust has been widely investigated in the social sciences and also connected to many different positive outcomes such as economic development, health, or democracy (Helliwell & Putnam, 2004; Paxton, 2002; Putnam, 1993; Whiteley, 2000). Uslaner (2018) regards this form of trust as more important because opposed to particularised trust, generalised trust helps solve collective problems or connect people with those who are different.

With regard to this form of trust, it is important to note that both generalised trust and trust in strangers refer to people with whom one has had no prior interaction and no information about, making them conceptually very similar. Yet, generalised trust implies trust in a "generalised other" which is often measured with the generalised trust question in surveys: "Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted, or that you can't be too careful in dealing with people?" Here people are asked whether they trust most people, without any clear indication who is included in this group (Delhey et al., 2011).

This has sparked questions about the so-called radius of trust which has received significant attention in the literature (Delhey et al., 2011, 2014; van Hoorn, 2014). While

Delhey et al. (2011) argue that individuals have people in mind when they answer trust questions (different radii), van Hoorn (2014) argues that the trust radius encompasses different trustees with different levels of trust.

Indeed, Delhey et al. (2011) show that the radius of trust – width of the circle of others who are seen as “most people” – varies considerably between countries. People do not unequivocally think about people they do not know when they are asked the standard measure of generalised trust (Delhey et al., 2011). Conversely, the term trust in strangers more clearly states who is considered as the trustee. Strangers clearly implies that the trustor has never met the trustee before. This avoids confusion about a rather abstract concept of others or people in general.

Empirically, however, both items are highly correlated and when investigated in factor analyses usually load on the same dimension. Conceptually, both are part of thin trust and have a large radius that extends to people who are socially distant from the trustor (Putnam, 2000). Furthermore, both have in common that they relate to (groups of) people that the trustee has no or limited information about, i.e., strangers or people in general. Information about the trustworthiness of strangers is scarce because no prior interaction exists, distinguishing this form of trust from particularised trust. Thus, the decision to place trust in strangers cannot be based on previous interactions.

Nevertheless, it is likely that individuals use prior first- or second-hand experiences with other people to base their trust decisions on. These experiences may be informative in some cases but do not necessarily have to be accurate, making the decision to place one’s trust in strangers a low-information situation (Carlin & Love, 2013). This low-information nature makes such trust decisions much more risky compared to particularised trust decisions as the likelihood of betrayal is higher given the uncertainty about the trustworthiness of the trustee (Sturgis & Smith, 2010).

In recent years, scholars have suggested that there is an additional dimension that captures a form of trust that is situated between particularised trust and trust in strangers. This form of trust differs with regard to the degree of information available to the trustor and is referenced as identity-based trust (Freitag & Bauer, 2013) or as depersonalized in-group trust (Kenworthy & Jones, 2009).

Identity-based trust concerns people who are not known personally but who share certain characteristics with the trustor such as nationality, religion, language, or social class. This form of trust offers the trustor informational cues about the trustworthiness of the trustee based on objective criteria (Freitag & Bauer, 2013). Although no specific interaction with the trustee has taken place, the trustor can base her trust decision on the criterion of group membership (Freitag & Bauer, 2013).

Theoretically, this form of trust draws heavily on social identity theory developed by Tajfel (1974) and Tajfel and Turner (1979). Thus, trust decisions here are based on identification and categorisation. People identify common identities or characteristics and, based on similarities (and differences), categorise other people or groups as trustworthy. The underlying rationale of identity-based trust is that people who share a common identity are more likely to trust each other, although they do not know each other personally (Freitag & Bauer, 2013). As people base their trust decisions on heuristics, such as (perceptions of) resemblance or similarity, a shared identity offers cues about the trustworthiness of the other (Hooghe, 2007). It is likely that such decisions are influenced by personal experiences with other people belonging to same category which allows the trustor to use prior first- and second-hand information about previous interactions with other group members (Freitag & Bauer, 2013).

Shared identity can be understood rather broadly including behavioural similarities, geographical proximities, the notion of a common fate, mores, ethnicity, or traditions (Stolle, 2002, p. 401). For example, Anna regards Urs as trustworthy not because they know each other

or because they have interacted with each other. Rather, Anna trusts Urs because Anna and Urs are both Swiss implying common group membership. As Anna has information about other Swiss people and is Swiss herself, she infers that Urs is trustworthy.

In this understanding, identity-based trust is a form of trust that is distinct from particularised and generalised trust (Bauer & Freitag, 2018). Particularised trust is based on information or previous experiences between the trustor and the trustee indicating a narrow radius of people. Identity-based trust, however, rests on categorisation of certain shared characteristics rather than personal knowledge or previous interactions. Put differently, identity-based trust is based on information acquired by common (group) membership while particularised trust is based on personal knowledge of the trustee. Moreover, identity-based trust also differs from trust in strangers in one crucial aspect. Trust in strangers is based on no information or previous interaction, while identity-based trust is based on information about shared group membership and previous experiences with other members of this group. Thus, it rests on informational cues from this common group membership.

Regarding the foundation of social trust, two competing arguments have been advanced (Freitag & Traunmüller, 2009; Glanville & Paxton, 2007; Torpe & Lolle, 2011). On the one hand, scholars argue that trust is dependent on personal predispositions (Uslaner, 2002). On the other hand, scholars that follow a rational choice perspective argue that trust is based on information used to assess the trustworthiness of another person (Coleman, 1988, 1990; Hardin, 2002, 2006).

The first perspective holds that trust decisions are based on the trustfulness of the trustor rather than the trustworthiness of the trustee (Sztompka, 1998; Yamagishi & Yamagishi, 1994). In particular, generalised trust should rest on predisposition, as there is no real first-hand information on strangers. Uslaner (2002, p. 18) labels this as “moralistic trust” which is understood as “a moral commandment to treat people as if they were trustworthy”. The sources

of trust are traced back to early life experiences (Uslaner, 2002). To that end, trust is understood as a personality trait that is stable over time and not affected by experiences.

In this perspective, trust is closely aligned with other personality traits such as optimism or openness, e.g., people who are more open are more inclined to trust others (Freitag & Bauer, 2016a). Such predispositional features are unlikely to be affected by experiences. Even a breach of trust does not fundamentally alter a trusting individual's trustfulness nor do positive experiences where trust was rewarded (Bauer, 2015a; Freitag & Traunmüller, 2009; van Ingen & Bekkers, 2015). It is important to note that this perspective mainly refers to generalised trust. As no information or prior interaction with strangers exist, this form of trust "is not experience-based trust" (Uslaner, 2008, p. 291). Contrary, even in this perspective, particularised trust may very well be affected by experiences with friends, family, or co-workers.

In the second perspective, scholars argue that trust is based on information that is used to assess the trustworthiness of another person (Coleman, 1988, 1990; Hardin, 2002, 2006). Information most often relates to the reputation of the person and her previous behaviour. To that end, this perspective holds that trust is based on previous experiences. Taking the example of Anna and Urs: before Anna lends Urs money, she evaluates her experiences with Urs to decide whether she trusts him to repay the money in the future. Only if Urs has proven to be trustworthy in the past, Anna will lend the money.

It is important to note that this perspective is mainly concerned with trust in people that are personally known or that belong to the extended social network. This implies that information or previous experiences can be accessed to inform the trust decision. Often, two actors are part of a wider social network making it likely that reputational information can be accessed even in the absence of previous interaction (Coleman, 1990). In this perspective, trust in strangers is irrational and thus – similar to the predispositional perspective – is likely based on predispositions such as optimism (Hardin, 2006).

Besides these two positions, some scholars have pointed out that a too rigid conceptualisation might not be useful (Freitag & Traunmüller, 2009). For example, Putnam (2000) follows a rational choice approach but contrary to the early advocates, he argues that generalised trust also rests on experiences. In particular, he argues that positive experiences in one domain spill over to other domains (Putnam, 2000).

While this perspective is far from being undisputed, Freitag and Traunmüller (2009, p. 789) argue that an “overly rigid and impermeable conception of the general foundation for an individual form of trust (i.e., experiences for particularised trust and predispositions for generalised trust) is clearly too narrow”. Rather, experiences and personal predispositions are both central for the formation of different forms of social trust. For trust in strangers, “there is no doubt that prior first- or second-hand experiences with strangers will influence one’s current expectations of them” (Freitag & Traunmüller, 2009, p. 789). Furthermore, particularised trust is not only influenced by rational calculations on reciprocal relations but it also rests on emotional factors or personal predispositions.

Thus, such a perspective regards trust as a combination of psychological dispositions as well as experiences and information about the behaviour of the trustee(s) (Freitag & Traunmüller, 2009; Torpe & Lolle, 2011). Empirically, studies seem to support this view as both predispositional factors as well as concrete information and experiences matter for different trust decisions. For example, while Freitag and Bauer (2016a) show the importance of personality traits for trust, Filsinger, Freitag, et al. (2021) show that information about trustworthiness of others increases identity-based trust and trust in strangers.

Overall, social trust includes three conceptually distinct forms of trust: particularised trust, identity-based trust, and trust in strangers. These forms differ with regard to the radius of trust and the level of information about the trustee. Furthermore, all three forms of trust are not only shaped by personal predispositions but to a significant amount by personal experiences as

well as first- and second-hand information that is based on experiences, heuristics, or (external) cues.

How does social trust function as a manifestation of social integration? Moreover, are all forms of trust equally representative of social integration? Starting with the first question, Georg Simmel acknowledged the importance of trust for the functioning of modern societies a long time ago: "Without the general trust that people have in each other, society itself would disintegrate" (Simmel, 1900, p. 149). To that end, I argue that social trust can be regarded as a manifestation of social integration, which is understood as a multidimensional phenomenon

"based on (a) the degree to which individuals see themselves as part of a shared normative order, (b) their levels of social interaction with others, and (c) the extent to which they feel recognised or respected by others in society (Gidron & Hall, 2020, p. 1031).

Social trust mirrors the three components of social integration in a meaningful way. Furthermore, the dimensionality of social trust allows differentiating between different levels of social integration.

First, as trust is the expectation that others will contribute to the well-being of a person or a group or refrain from harmful actions, trusting others implies that individuals see themselves as part of a shared normative order that values actions that benefit others rather than self-maximisation. High levels of trust mean that individuals within a society (subjectively) assess that others within this society contribute to their well-being. In this regard, members of this society share the same idea of how society is organised and how interaction should take place. Actions that negatively affect other members are not desirable.

Conversely, people with low levels of trust have the impression that others do not share the same understanding of society making harmful actions more likely. More importantly, not trusting other members implies that an individual expects that others do not contribute to her

well-being or even harm her. Thus, trusting other people reflects the idea that individuals see themselves as a part of a shared normative order.

Second, trust is an important indicator for individuals' levels of interaction with others because it is an important prerequisite for fruitful cooperation and interaction (Paxton & Ressler, 2018; Warren, 2018). Trust in others reduces transaction costs and makes cooperative behaviour more likely and less costly (Coleman, 1988). Following this understanding, trust functions as the basis for a cooperative society in which people interact and cooperate in economic, political, or social relationships. Productive and cooperative interactions with others not only benefit the participants but they may spill over to society as a whole (Putnam, 1993, 2000). In this vein, interactions based on trust can lead to solidarity and reciprocity that provide support and hold society together (Durkheim, [1893] 1964).

On the contrary, people who are unsure whom to trust have the impression that society lacks the foundations of cooperation resulting in less cooperative behaviour and an increase in transaction costs. Such a lack of embeddedness in social relations can lead to social marginalisation (Putnam, 2000). While trust in others is often seen as a key resource for the development of inclusive and cooperative societies, a lack thereof can be regarded as a sign of social *disintegration*.

Third, social trust captures recognition and respect from others (and vice versa) as vital aspects of social integration (Jung & Kwon, 2011). Trusting other members of society implies that the trustor assesses that the trustee will respect the trustor's well-being. To that end, reciprocal trust – i.e., A trusts B and B trusts A – implies that the rights and preferences of A and B are (at least expected to be) recognised and respected by the other. Thus, higher levels of trust imply that actors recognise and respect each other. More importantly, expressing trust means that the trustor feels that others in society respect them and their preferences because they subjectively assess that others will contribute to their well-being. From an institutional

standpoint, people trust when their rights are recognised, or the obligations of others toward them are respected (Sztompka, 1998).

In contrast, a lack of social trust implies that people expect that others will neither recognise their preferences nor act accordingly. Rather, a lack of trust means that people feel not respected and are always wary when it comes to the actions of others. Consequently, high levels of distrust imply that individuals expect that others will not behave respectfully. Based on the discussion, it becomes evident that social trust functions as a manifestation of social integration. Furthermore, the dimensionality of social trust allows formulating nuanced arguments with regard to the different levels of social integration.

Regarding generalised trust, people who place their trust in strangers are socially integrated and societies with high levels of trust in strangers seem to be well integrated. People who place their trust in strangers view themselves and others as part of a shared normative order that allows for cooperation and interaction in a meaningful way. Moreover, trust in strangers implies that respect and recognition of the rights and preferences of others are likely guaranteed. This shared order transcends the immediate personal environment of the trustor and extends to society as a whole and its members.

For particularised trust, one could argue that people who trust their close social environment can rely on a group of people that share their values and recognise as well as respect each other. In this regard, a lack of trust in people of the immediate environment is a sign of severe social *disintegration* and marginalisation (Arendt, 1973; Rydgren, 2009). Moreover, Newton and Zmerli (2011) report that particularised trust and trust in strangers are positively correlated indicating that – on average – people who trust people they are close to

also trust strangers (and vice versa). This implies that particularised trust can be regarded as an indicator of social integration.[23]

For identity-based trust, the argument seems to be more complex and one could argue that identity-based trust challenges the societally shared normative order and provokes at least partial social *disintegration*. Given the focus on one particular, narrowly definable part of society, identity-based trust limits the possibility of an overall integrated society (Kenworthy & Jones, 2009). Given the complexities of modern societies, group-based trust inevitably leads to the idea that some members of society are not trustworthy. This perspective challenges the shared normative order, the interaction between different groups, and the respect and recognition that different groups in society deserve.

Furthermore, following the insights of social identity theory, individuals who share similar cultural traits have an innate tendency to connect with their in-group and see their identity as superior to that of culturally distinct out-groups (Tajfel, 1974; Tajfel & Turner, 1979). As identity-based trust relies on demarcation from other groups, individuals with high levels of identity-based trust declare people from other groups as not trustworthy (Kramer, 2018). Thus, identity-based trust "excludes persons with specific characteristics" which increases in-group favouritism and out-group derogation thereby challenging social integration (Torpe & Lolle, 2011, p. 489).

That being said, identity-based trust does not naturally go hand-in-hand with out-group derogation, as different forms of trust are not necessarily zero-sum games. Moreover, identity-based trust can function as a safety net in times of crisis (Filsinger, Freitag, et al., 2021; Hogg et al., 2010; Navarro-Carrillo et al., 2018). In this regard, identity-based trust can be understood

[23] It has to be noted that one could argue that a strong focus on the immediate environment is accompanied by strong external boundaries (Banfield, 1958). Closed particularised networks potentially promote only their own success and are increasingly delineated from others, which could imply social *disintegration* or at least social separation. However, it seems that such arguments are more likely to apply to group-based forms of trust such as in-group trust rather than trust in family and friends.

as a form of mechanical solidarity in the Durkheimian perspective (Durkheim, [1893] 1964). People will base their decision to trust on ascriptive criteria. That is, they trust those that are similar to them based on nationality, language, or class (Tiryakian, 1994). While this does not imply full *disintegration*, mechanical solidarity is less capable of integrating the society as a whole (Barnes, 1966; Tiryakian, 1994). Applied to identity-based trust, this form of trust is less capable of integrating the society as a whole because (trust) decisions based on ascriptive criteria exclude those that do not fulfil them.

In sum, identity-based trust seems to be an indicator for mechanical solidarity that is less capable of social integration. On the one hand, people with high levels of identity-based trust are likely to be integrated within their in-group. On the other hand, this integration might hinder their integration in the society as a whole. How this plays out politically is explicated in chapters 5.2 and 8 of this book.

4.2.3 Subjective Group Relative Deprivation

Within this subchapter, I focus on subjective group relative deprivation as manifestation of social integration. Subjective relative deprivation offers an encompassing concept to capture the subjective dimension of social integration, in particular acknowledgment and appreciation from other members in society. To that end, it offers additional explanatory value, which in combination with social status and social trust offers a more comprehensive picture of social integration.

Subjective relative deprivation has been a prominent concept in social psychology for decades (Pettigrew, 2015). More than 70 years ago, Stouffer and colleagues investigated the satisfaction of American soldiers in different branches of the military (Stouffer et al., 1949). The study found differences in satisfaction between different branches, for example, soldiers in

the military police were more satisfied than air corpsmen (Stouffer et al., 1949). What is puzzling about these findings is that air corpsmen generally had faster promotion rates than soldiers in the military police, making the higher satisfaction rates of the latter rather unexpected (Pettigrew, 2015). To solve this apparent puzzle, Stouffer et al. (1949) advanced a post-hoc explanation and argued that the faster promotion of air corpsmen are irrelevant to soldiers in the military police. Put differently, for members of the military police the air corpsmen are not the relevant comparison group. Consequently, the faster promotions in this branch of the military are not relevant for soldiers in other branches with whom they have rare contact (Pettigrew, 2015). Rather, the faster rates of the air corpsmen make it more likely that those air corpsmen who do not advance are more likely to feel relatively deprived.

In general, subjective relative deprivation can be regarded as a disadvantaged upward comparison (Smith & Pettigrew, 2014). Relative deprivation "occurs when people compare themselves to those who are better off and conclude that their disadvantage is undeserved" (Smith & Huo, 2014, p. 232). More formally, subjective relative deprivation is defined "as a judgment that one or one's in-group is disadvantaged compared to a relevant referent and that this judgment invokes feelings of anger, resentment, and entitlement" (Pettigrew, 2015, p. 12).

For conceptual clarity, it helps to shortly present the opposite of relative deprivation (Collier & Mahon, 1993; Gerring, 1999; Goertz, 2006; Sartori, 1970). Relative gratification is present when the outcome of a comparison between oneself or one's in-group and a respective referent is positive. Put differently, relative gratification is the "belief that one's group is better off than other groups" (Mols & Jetten, 2016, p. 278). The comparison, therefore, does not result in a feeling of entitlement due to a disadvantage but rather in feeling of status anxiety and the fear that the advantage could be lost (Grofman & Muller, 1973; Guimond & Dambrun, 2002). Interestingly enough, Grofman and Muller (1973) argued that similarly to relative deprivation, relative gratification also inclines people to political violence. This so-called "V-hypothesis"

has gained empirical support since then (Dambrun et al., 2006; Guimond & Dambrun, 2002; Mols & Jetten, 2016).

Scholars have distilled three important requirements for relative deprivation (Pettigrew, 2015; Smith et al., 2012). First, for individuals to feel relatively deprived, they must make a comparison. Without a comparison relative deprivation is not present as it is a relational concept (Smith et al., 2012). This comparison can take different forms. These comparisons can be on the individual-level with a further distinction between intra-personal and inter-personal comparisons. Intra-personal comparisons occur when individuals compare their current situation with their own past situation or their expected future situation. Inter-personal comparisons occur when individuals compare their current situation with the situation of other individuals.

Such comparisons can also take place on the group-level with the same differentiations. With intra-group comparisons occurring when groups (or individuals as member of a group) compare their current situation with their past situation or their expected future situation and inter-group comparisons implying a comparison with the situation of other groups.

Second, the comparison invokes cognitive appraisals that lead to the perception that the individual is at a disadvantage (Smith et al., 2012). This is crucial as it implies a relative disadvantage compared to a relevant referent rather than discrimination or injustice (Smith et al., 2012). These first two components are regarded as the cognitive part of subjective relative deprivation as they concern cognitive appraisals of the situation rather than the emotional reaction (de La Sablonnière, Taylor, et al., 2009; de La Sablonnière, Tougas, & Lortie-Lussier, 2009).

Third, the recognised disadvantage has to be perceived as unfair and invoke feelings of entitlement, deservingness, and angry resentment (Smith et al., 2012). A disadvantage does not necessarily have to be regarded as unfair but can be seen as fair given a concrete situation. Yet,

for subjective relative deprivation, individuals have to see the disadvantage as unfair (Smith et al., 2012; Smith & Pettigrew, 2015). The unfairness of the situation is crucial to invoke the feeling that one deserves better resulting in angry resentment, which form crucial components of subjective relative deprivation (Smith et al., 2012).

This third condition is considered the affective component of subjective relative deprivation (de La Sablonnière, Taylor, et al., 2009; de La Sablonnière, Tougas, & Lortie-Lussier, 2009). Crucially, this component is not about the detection of a disadvantage but about how people feel about the disadvantage and whether they judge it as unfair and illegitimate (Smith et al., 2012; Smith & Pettigrew, 2015).

In addition, there are several situational appraisals that are connected to subjective relative deprivation (Smith & Pettigrew, 2014). First, people must care about the issue or area in which they experience relative deprivation (Crosby, 1976). If for example people do not care about money, a relative disadvantage to other groups does not result in relative deprivation. While money or income might be prime examples of an area that people care about, people also tend to care about status and recognition (Ridgeway, 2014). Second, people have to regard the process that led to the outcome as illegitimate. Smith and Pettigrew (2014) give the example of a lottery. If one person does not win in a lottery, she does not experience relative deprivation as long as the process of the lottery is regarded as legitimate and fair.

Third, people have to think that they are not responsible for the situation as relative deprivation rests on the idea that people are not responsible for their disadvantage. Consider the example of youth unemployment in the United States (Smith & Pettigrew, 2014). While some argue that youth unemployment is a result of a lack of skills, others would argue that employers' unwillingness to invest in training is the main reason (Smith & Pettigrew, 2014). Young and unemployed individuals should only feel relatively deprived if they follow the second argument

because then they "do not blame themselves for their situation" (Smith & Pettigrew, 2014, p. 761).

The fourth situational appraisal concerns the question of whether the situation will improve without intervention or not (Crosby, 1976). If people think that there is no possibility of change, they are unlikely to experience relative deprivation but are more likely to feel depressed or sad (Folger, 1987). Conversely, if a change of the situation is likely to happen without any intervention there is no cause for angry resentment but rather hope (Smith & Pettigrew, 2014). If people can imagine a change in the situation but think that the change is unlikely and only occurs with an intervention, people are more likely to feel relative deprivation (Crosby, 1976). Otherwise, they are more likely to withdraw from social life (Crosby, 1976; Smith & Pettigrew, 2014).

There is an important distinction between subjective *individual* and subjective *group* relative deprivation (Runciman, 1966). This distinction concerns the question whether the disadvantage is felt personally as an individual or whether it is felt as a member or representative of a certain group. Subjective *individual* relative deprivation (SIRD) means that an individual compares herself with another individual or with her own past or future situation. Subjective *group* relative deprivation (SGRD) "is an intergroup comparison between an individual's group and another group, or between the group's current situation and that group's past or future situation" (Smith & Huo, 2014, p. 233). While both forms of deprivation can have important implications, collective action or attitudes are only affected "if one feels deprived on behalf of a relevant reference group" (Pettigrew et al., 2008, p. 387). Thus, the focus in this study is on subjective *group* relative deprivation.

Take the example of Anna. Anna compares her salary to that of Sara who works in the same company and Anna finds that Sara earns more. Consequently, Anna experiences SIRD. This feeling of SIRD might spark different responses from Anna. Research has shown that

SIRD can increase the interest in professional development (Zoogah, 2010), but it can also lead to negative emotional reactions such as sadness (Osborne et al., 2012; Smith & Huo, 2014).

Instead of comparing herself to Sara, Anna could also compare her salary as a woman to the salary of all men in her company. In this example, Anna would see herself as member of a group – women in the company – and would feel relatively deprived as member of the group rather than as an individual (Smith & Huo, 2014). This comparison as representative of a group – here women in the company – is likely to foster attitudes directed towards (gender) equality or might even lead to collective action (Pettigrew et al., 2008).

Yet, to experience SGRD, individuals have to see themselves as members of the deprived group (Ellemers, 2009). Following social identity theory, people categorise themselves and others into groups based on the salience of situational circumstances (Tajfel, 1974, 1978; Tajfel & Turner, 1979). To obtain self-esteem, people develop a positive in-group identification that is based on self-categorisation where people define themselves as member of a group (Henry et al., 1999; Tajfel et al., 1971). This categorisation uses characteristics that the individual shares with other group members such gender, ethnicity, or class but it can also relate to more personal or individual characteristics (Henry et al., 1999).

People are more likely to view themselves as part of a group when the membership is important to them and if the context makes group membership more salient (Smith et al., 2012; Smith & Huo, 2014). Thus, group membership can be regarded as a psychological state that often aims at enhancing self-esteem, resulting in collective representation (Henry et al., 1999; Hogg & Abrams, 1988; Zagefka et al., 2013). To that end, "categorizing oneself as a member of a group is an important cognitive source of group identification" (Henry et al., 1999, p. 563).[24]

[24] However, it is important to note that, as pointed out by Henry et al. (1999, p. 560) "identification varies among group members, or members assess group identity differently, or both".

Belonging to a group is an important precursor of group relative deprivation as feeling comparatively disadvantaged on behalf of a group requires identification with the group (van Zomeren et al., 2008; Zagefka et al., 2013; Zubielevitch et al., 2020). Put differently, “group identification provides the foundation from which to appraise intergroup structures” (Zubielevitch et al., 2020, p. 1034). If people perceive themselves as group members they are more likely to notice group differences, are less likely to see possible losses as an individual experience, are more likely to view the behaviour of out-groups as hostile, and are more likely to engage in collective action (Smith & Huo, 2014, p. 233; van Zomeren et al., 2008; Zubielevitch et al., 2020).

What is more is that the benchmark out-group, individuals compare their in-group to, has to be relevant, otherwise, a comparison does not result in relative deprivation (Stephan & Stephan, 1996). While the specification of the relevant referent has sparked ample debate in the literature, Walker and Pettigrew (1984) offer several arguments on how to uncover the relevance of different groups. While one potential criterion could be based on similarity and a potential “upward-push” in the comparisons (Festinger, 1954), Tajfel (1978) emphasises dissimilarity as a potential criterion. Vanneman and Pettigrew (1972) point out that groups are often found in “opposing” pairs such as Black vs. White and employer vs. employee. In this vein, one could also think about natives vs. immigrants or rich vs. poor.

Although these approaches have merit, the question of which is the relevant referent is still unresolved. For the question at hand, however, this is only of minor importance as people would not feel relative deprivation if the group they are comparing themselves to is not relevant (Walker & Pettigrew, 1984). Within this study, I use different comparisons to gauge the fact that people have different relevant out-groups. Next to a general comparison that does not include a particular out-group but focuses on the relative disadvantage of the in-group compared to an unspecified out-group, I use two specific measures that capture important cleavages in

current political and societal discourses: immigration and economic inequality (Kriesi et al., 2012). The first measure focusses on immigrants while the second focuses on rich people as comparison group (see chapter 6.3.2).

As elaborated above, it is important to distinguish between SIRD and SGRD on a conceptual basis. Yet, the distinction is also crucial because both seem to have different consequences for individual and collective behaviour. SIRD is related to internal states, such as depression and anxiety or attitudes directed towards the self, or individual behaviour such as deviant behaviour, gambling, or academic achievement (Smith & Pettigrew, 2014). Conversely, SGRD is related to intergroup attitudes such as prejudice, attitudes towards programmes such as affirmative action as well as collective action, such as strikes or protests (Abrams & Grant, 2012; Meuleman et al., 2020; Osborne & Sibley, 2015; Pettigrew et al., 2008; Rüdig & Karyotis, 2014). Research indicates that SGRD is more important than SIRD when it comes to political attitudes or collective action (Meuleman et al., 2020; Pettigrew et al., 2008; Urbanska & Guimond, 2018; but see Yoxon et al., 2019).

Lastly, it is important to note that relative deprivation is – irrespective of SIRD or SGRD – an individual-level phenomenon. That is, irrespective of the comparison, *individuals* compare themselves to others, either as individuals or as representatives of an in-group (Pettigrew, 2016). In this vein, Pettigrew (2015) and Smith et al. (2012) point out that for a meaningful analysis of subjective relative deprivation (and its consequences) the level of analysis has to match. This is important for two reasons.

First, as subjective relative deprivation is an individual-level phenomenon, aggregate-level analyses are not adequate and could lead to ecological fallacy (Pettigrew, 2015, 2016; Smith et al., 2012). Second, the outcome has to fit conceptually. Individual-level deprivation is related to outcomes on the individual level, i.e., internal states or individual behaviour (Smith & Pettigrew, 2014). Group-level deprivation is related to outcomes on the group level, i.e.,

intergroup attitudes or collective behaviour (Smith & Pettigrew, 2014). If the level of analysis does not fit, relative deprivation might not offer explanatory value (Smith et al., 2012). Therefore, when explaining group-level phenomena or attitudes as is the case in this study, the focus should be on SGRD.

Overall, relative deprivation "occurs when people compare themselves to those who are better off and conclude that their disadvantage is undeserved" (Smith & Huo, 2014, p. 232). Subjective relative deprivation, in this understanding, is "a subjective state that shapes emotions, cognitions, and behaviour" (Pettigrew, 2015, p. 12). Despite its subjective nature, scholars have argued that real-world or objective disadvantages significantly influence subjective relative deprivation. Pettigrew et al. (2008) find that people who have a lower socio-economic status are more likely to feel relatively deprived (see also Rippl & Baier, 2005). It seems that absolute and relative deprivation are related, although it remains unclear why the former does not always translate into the latter (Walker & Pettigrew, 1984).

The relational nature of relative deprivation, however, provides an argument for the fact that people who are not in an economically weak position could feel relatively deprived. "To put it differently: feelings of deprivation or frustration should not just be seen as a reaction to objective conditions, but they arise out of the distance between expectations and experiences" irrespective of whether this difference is felt on an intra-personal, inter-personal, intra-group, or inter-group level (Hooghe et al., 2017, p. 218). Thus, it is important to acknowledge that relative deprivation might stem from disappointed expectations of individuals or groups rather than absolute inequalities (Crosby, 1976; Hooghe et al., 2017; Smith & Pettigrew, 2015).

To that end, subjective relative deprivation reminds us that absolute deprivation is not necessarily the only important factor to explain political attitudes and behaviour. Put differently, relative deprivation "is useful because it explains why those who *should* feel deprived by objective standards often do not, whereas those who are *not* objectively deprived often feel that

they are" (Smith & Huo, 2014, p. 232 italics in original). This has important implications for the explanation of populism (see chapter 5).

How does subjective relative deprivation reflect social integration? I argue that SGRD as conceptualised above meaningfully reflects several dimensions of social integration. SGRD can be regarded as a manifestation of social *disintegration*. First, social integration implies that people see themselves and others as part of a shared normative order which means that members of the society value actions that benefit others rather than self-maximisation. Moreover, a shared normative order is characterised by certain forms of equality.

Conversely, injustices or inequalities that follow from the behaviour of others challenge the shared order, as all members should follow the same common set of norms and rules. SGRD implies an undeserved disadvantage compared to other members of society, which challenges the foundation of a shared order. More importantly, this disadvantage is not caused by bad luck, contextual factors, or own faults. Rather, SGRD is based on the perception that this comparative disadvantage is caused by others who have done something wrong (Smith & Huo, 2014). It is based on the impression that others have actively violated commonly shared norms and thus challenged the shared normative order. To that end, people who feel SGRD do not have the impression that they are part of a shared normative order and in particular, that others have broken the rules underlying this normative order.

Second, interaction with others is regarded as critical for social integration. While SGRD is a perception rather than behaviour, it nevertheless can function as an indicator for the level and quality of social interaction with others in society. Subjective relative deprivation is likely to lead to less cooperation as people feel violated resulting in less positive collective action for the society as a whole. Furthermore, SGRD is often associated with collective action against those that are undeservingly better off or those that are perceived as responsible

(Meuleman et al., 2020; Rüdig & Karyotis, 2014). This may result in confrontational interactions and a polarisation of society rather than societal cooperation.

While SGRD increases in-group interaction and identification, it is often accompanied by out-group demarcation or even derogation (Tajfel, 1974; Tajfel & Turner, 1979; van Zomeren et al., 2008; Zubielevitch et al., 2020). This increased focus on in-group interaction is likely to increase perceived disadvantages (van Zomeren et al., 2008; Zubielevitch et al., 2020). More importantly, such a limited focus on the in-group, in combination with a demarcation towards the out-group is counterproductive to a cooperative society, which is at the heart of social integration theory. In this vein, SGRD is regarded as an indication for a lack of cooperative interactions among the members of society because the in-group focus associated with SGRD hampers inter-group interaction.

Third, as SGRD implies that people feel undeservingly disadvantaged, it clearly contradicts the idea of recognition and respect. The violated entitlement that accompanies SGRD is a clear sign that people who feel SGRD have the impression that others do not recognise them as full members of society. More importantly, they perceive that the respect members of society should be granted, is not extended to them as their rights and preferences are violated. Going further, SGRD might even imply that people feel degraded to watch while others get more than they would deserve. To that end, SGRD is a clear indication that people feel that others in society neither respect them nor recognise their preferences, implying social *disintegration*.

Overall, SGRD functions as suitable concept for social integration. Compared to social status and social trust, it shifts the analytical focus more closely towards *disintegration,* as it is a clear indication of social *disintegration*. Lastly, with its focus on group relationships, SGRD is able to capture the relational and the group-based element of social integration more explicitly.

5 Populism as a Problem of Social Disintegration?

The aim of this book is to contribute to the literature on explanations of populism. To that end, I develop and empirically test a theoretical argument that expands socio-integrational approaches to populism. The theoretical framework builds on and incorporates previous research that aims to combine cultural and economic explanations to populism. In this regard, the theoretical framework starts with assumptions about the context in which respondents form their perceptions and attitudes.

I start from the assumption that globalisation and processes of societal modernisation have brought about cultural and economic changes that affect individuals' perceptions and attitudes. In a nutshell, the argument is that these developments have created a feeling of social *disintegration* for certain parts of society, i.e., some people feel that they have been pushed to the fringes of society (Gidron & Hall, 2020). People feel disintegrated because they fail to keep pace with the changing circumstances. Consequently, they have the impression that they are left-behind culturally and economically. Social *disintegration* makes these people susceptible to populism and populist parties as they provide a political remedy for their situation. Populism offers them a valve to express their discontent by offering seemingly simple solutions to complex problems.

The focus of this study is the relationship between social integration and the support for populism. Nevertheless, in the following, I outline the assumption that economic and cultural processes associated with globalisation and modernisation have resulted in social *disintegration* of a part of society. Subsequently, I argue how social *disintegration* in general translates into populist support. Then, the subchapters 5.1 to 5.3 focus explicitly on the different manifestations of social integration and their relationship with populism.

The starting point of this theoretical framework are the cultural and economic developments of recent decades that are usually associated with globalisation and modernisation. These developments seem to be crucially important as they affect the economy, culture, and political system of countries (Kriesi et al., 2006). Globalisation has put stress on national tax and welfare systems through competition on the open and globalised markets (Milner, 2021). Politically, if countries no longer guarantee safeguards such as welfare systems, globalisation also puts stress on democratic systems (Milner, 2021). Economic developments that are usually mentioned in this context are rising economic inequality (Engler & Weisstanner, 2021), trade exposure (Milner, 2021), and job replacement through technological change (Kurer & Gallego, 2019). How do these developments affect individuals' perceptions of being socially integrated?

While trade has fostered economic growth, it also had significant impacts on parts of the workforce (Milner, 2021). In particular, import shocks from China and other low-wage countries have a profound impact on the wages of domestic workers as well as on their employment opportunities (Barone & Kreuter, 2021; Rodrik, 2018). Rising trade is also often associated with an outsourcing of jobs to low-wage countries, crucially affecting the economic perspectives of domestic workers (Rommel & Walter, 2018). While primarily seen in economic terms, outsourcing and lower wages also shape the social standing of those affected by these changes (Kurer, 2020; Kurer & Palier, 2019). Being affected by outsourcing procedures does not only concern economic aspects. Rather, it is also likely to influence an individual's perception of her social position within society and her perception of whether the society as a whole values her.

In a similar vein, technological change alters the way work and the workforce is structured and thus creates uncertainty for certain parts of the workforce. This restructuring has also distributive consequences that have important political implications (Kurer & Gallego,

2019). These developments affect a specific part of the workforce, namely routine workers in the middle of the earnings and skill distribution (Kurer & Gallego, 2019). Automation and digitalisation pose a threat to this part of the workforce as their skills and competencies might become redundant (Im et al., 2019).

Yet, this transformation does not only affect routine workers' economic situation in terms of job loss, early retirement, or re-qualification but also their (self-) esteem. "Jobs have meaning beyond the income they provide" (Kurer, 2020, p. 1804) and thus a transformation of the occupation threatens the social position within society. Workers have traditionally been regarded as hard-working and able to produce a certain product (Gidron & Hall, 2017). The new emphasis on technological innovation and entrepreneurship highly affects the perceived value that society sees in routine and manual labour (Gidron & Hall, 2017).

Lastly, rising income inequality in recent years is another crucial economic development that might have pushed people to the fringes of society (Engler & Weisstanner, 2021). Increasing inequality widens the gap between poor and rich individuals leaving those with lower incomes in a position of relative material deprivation (Burgoon et al., 2019; Engler & Weisstanner, 2021). Furthermore, income inequality has been connected to worse mental and physical health and societal problems such as higher levels of crime (Wilkinson & Pickett, 2009).

More importantly, however, income inequality affects whether and where people see themselves in society. Increasing income inequality may decrease the perceived social location of individuals while at the same time "enhancing the salience of social comparison and increasing the importance of social status characteristics" (Schneider, 2019, p. 410). Thus, social comparisons in times of rising inequality might result in an impression of deterioration even if the own income stagnates rather than decreases (Lindemann & Saar, 2014; Schneider, 2019).

Besides these economic factors, changes in cultural values and beliefs might have also contributed to the impression of some people that they are no longer part of a shared normative order. Globalisation has not only brought increases in global trade but also increasing mobility. Immigration has become a dominant topic with a particular emphasis on diversity and multiculturalism in elite and public discourses (Norris & Inglehart, 2019). Societies have become increasingly inclusive and diversity is seen more positively. However, others have argued that immigration has made some people in society more wary of social interactions (Putnam, 2007). What is more, some argue that immigration might challenge societal cohesion altogether (Putnam, 2007).

In particular, for those people that see such changes as a zero-sum game – i.e., that more rights and respect for other groups implies less rights and respect for them – changes towards more inclusiveness have resulted in the perception that their views are no longer reflected and that they are marginalised *vis-à-vis* mainstream society (Gidron & Hall, 2017; Norris & Inglehart, 2019).

A similar argument can be made for the shift towards gender equality as well as the promotion of LGBTQ+ rights. Increasing efforts for gender equality and female employment might foster the impression that increasing women's value in society results in decreasing value for men (Gidron & Hall, 2017). Such conflicts about traditional hierarchies often result in a backlash (Ridgeway et al., 1994; Rudman et al., 2012). When the importance of hierarchies in societies decreases, their political salience often increases. Similarly, Kriesi et al. (2006, p. 921) argue with regard to national borders "as they are weakened and reassessed, their political importance increases". This might also transfer to other grievances such as gender, ethnicity, or occupation.

One particular aspect of these cultural changes has been put forward by Norris and Inglehart (2019). They argue that changes in values are based on a shift from material to post-

material values (Norris & Inglehart, 2019). In particular, younger generations focus more strongly on post-material values such as gender equality, multiculturalism, or equality in society due to their high levels of material security (Norris & Inglehart, 2019). Such profound value change within larger parts of society, a decreasing share of people that hold traditional values, and changing elite discourse might produce the impression for certain parts of society that their values and opinions are less accepted in society, resulting in a feeling of social *disintegration* on cultural grounds.

While these economic and cultural developments have often been treated as separate explanatory factors to account for support for populism "individuals do not perceive cultural and material threats as clearly distinct phenomena" (Kriesi et al., 2006, p. 922). While it may be analytically possible to separate economic and cultural factors in explaining support for populism, this does not necessarily answer the question which one is the driving force or whether they operate in tandem (Carreras et al., 2019; Gidron & Hall, 2020). Crucially, those affected by both developments should express a particularly strong discontent (Gidron & Hall, 2020). A potential case in point is high support for populism in the white working class (Cramer, 2016; Gest, 2016).

In this vein, recent ethnographic studies have advanced our understanding of the roots of populism by diving deep into the worldviews and lifestyles of its supporters (Cramer, 2016; Eribon, 2009; Gest, 2016; Hochschild, 2016). For example, Tea Party supporters in Louisiana summarised their impressions as follows "You are a stranger in your own land. You do not recognize yourself in how others see you. It is a struggle to feel seen and honored" (Hochschild, 2016, p. 144). This struggle for recognition is characterised by the impression that others in society are not following the same rules, strengthening the perception of being sidelined to the fringes of society (Hochschild, 2016).

Hochschild (2016) finds that it is neither a bad economic situation nor mere xenophobia that explain people's support for the Tea Party movement in the US. Rather, she uncovers that the supporters of the Tea party share an underlying 'deep story' that reflects their subjective impressions of reality. A key element is that her interview partners have the impression that they are disadvantaged compared to other groups (such as women, people of colour, refugees, unemployed, or government officials). Furthermore, despite being good citizens who follow the rules of society and work hard, they have the impression that they do not get what they deserve (Hochschild, 2016). These feelings of deservingness not only apply to them personally, but more broadly to 'people like them'. More importantly, they have the impression that other groups move by and ahead to achieve the 'American Dream'. While they wait patiently in line and follow the rules, the people who outpace them do not follow the rules but are nonetheless better off.

Studying the white working class in the United Kingdom and the US, Gest (2016) reports a similar story that goes beyond the simple dialectic of culture and economy. The support of radical politics by the white working class is based neither solely on economic hardship nor solely on racial resentment. Instead, long-term demographic and economic developments have changed society and the hierarchies it used to be structured by. Thus, "white working class people are consumed by their loss of social and political status in social hierarchies" (Gest, 2016, p. 16). To put it bluntly, the radicalism of parts of the white working class is driven by a perceived "shift to the periphery of their society" (Gest, 2016, p. 17).

While Gest (2016) reports such a story of social marginalisation for the working class, Koppetsch (2017) shows that this narrative is also present for the middle class. In this regard, she argues that supporters of the *Alternative für Deutschland* in Germany have the impression that their achievements are not regarded as important or have become obsolete (Koppetsch, 2017). She portrays support for right-wing populism as conflict between descending and

ascending factions in the middle class rather than a conflict between lower and upper classes (Koppetsch, 2017). People feel downgraded ("deklassiert"). Yet, this downgrading does not coincide with material hardship. Instead it relates to habitus or lifestyles that have lost relevance through societal modernisation (Koppetsch, 2017). More importantly, this feeling of 'déclassement' is understood collectively rather than individually, inducing a search for a new identity that is found in the anti-establishment position of populism (Koppetsch, 2017).

What unites the findings from these different contributions is that support for populist movements and parties seems to arise from a feeling of marginalisation or *disintegration* that quantitative studies have so far been unable to fully identify. Thus, understanding populism as a consequence of social *disintegration* might lay the cornerstone for capturing these subjective impressions in a quantitative fashion (Gidron & Hall, 2020). In this regard, the theoretical framework of this study sets out to expand our understanding of populism as a problem of social integration by advancing previous scholarly work. In general, I hypothesise that people who feel disintegrated from society – i.e., who have the subjective impression of losing out and being sidelined to the fringes of society – are more likely to support populist politics. Populism resonates well with feelings of social *disintegration*.

First, feeling sidelined to the fringes of society implies a threat to one's own identity as well as to group identities, which both matter for self-esteem. Such (group) identities have been shown to be crucial for political behaviour as they help understand "'who voters are' in their subjective self-understanding" (Bornschier et al., 2021, p. 2099). In this regard, the dualistic nature of populism offers a positive in-group identity that is based on the construction of the *people* as virtuous and homogeneous group. Furthermore, populism offers an out-group against which a positive identity can be formed. The political establishment and horizontal out-groups (such as immigrants) provide adequate culprits for the marginalisation.

Second, populism is particularly suited to address questions of social marginalisation as it "is not politics as usual" and is thus able to "exploit this type of resentment with claims to speak for ordinary people who have been ignored by elites that are described as corrupt or incompetent" (Gidron & Hall, 2020, p. 1033).

Based on these general arguments, the following three subchapters outline how subjective social status, social trust, and subjective group relative deprivation as manifestations of social integration relate to populist attitudes as well as radical left- and right-wing populist party support.

5.1 Subjective Social Status and Populism

In their study, Gidron and Hall (2020) propose subjective social status as indicator for social integration. As argued in chapter 4, social status is best understood as individuals' "beliefs about where they stand relative to others in society", thereby capturing all three dimensions of social integration (Gidron & Hall, 2020, p. 1031). In this regard, subjective social status is likely to be negatively related to populism as higher levels of status indicate higher levels of social integration.

Subjective social status has been shown to be important for psychological and physiological well-being as the search for social esteem is closely tied to self-esteem (Cundiff et al., 2013; Demakakos et al., 2008; Macleod et al., 2005; Operario et al., 2004). "People care about status quite as intensely as they do money and power" (Ridgeway, 2014, p. 2), making status a strong predictor of political behaviour and preferences (Brown-Iannuzzi et al., 2015).

Yet, why should people with lower levels of subjective social status support populist politics? Populism seems a compelling political answer to those who situate themselves at the lower end of the social hierarchy and thus outside of a shared normative order.

First, lower levels of subjective social status imply that people feel that they are not valued in society and more importantly that they stand below others in society. Lack of respect and recognition is likely to spark hostility against those responsible for this situation. This hostility is likely directed against the political establishment as it is regarded as the responsible actor for the processes that result in lower social status or status decline (Gidron & Hall, 2017). Populism with its anti-elite ideology and its self-construction as outsider and challenger to the mainstream is thus a particularly attractive option. Put differently, the fact that populism is not "politics as usual" makes it attractive (Gidron & Hall, 2020, p. 1033).

Second, populists from both ends of the spectrum aim at the restoration of status of their core constituents. Confronted with a feeling of *disintegration*, people look for a positive identity and restoration of their former or deserved status. Populism constructs a virtuous in-group – the people – that has been sidelined to the fringes and deprived of their previous status. Furthermore, populism offers the means to restore status by putting the people first (Engler & Weisstanner, 2021). To that end, populism not only provides a responsible agent for the status decline but also provides a positive construction of the in-group. Put differently, "[e]ven so-called "losers" of economic and social change have distinctive, often positively connoted understandings of group belonging" (Bornschier et al., 2021, p. 2092) which are addressed and strengthened by populist actors.

Third, the dualistic nature of populism is particularly attractive when it comes to status concerns, as it makes boundary-making easier by presenting clear group distinctions. As status challenges and status decline are associated with a backlash against those that drive the change (Ridgeway et al., 1994; Rudman et al., 2012), the Manichean construction of society provides clear markers of those responsible. To that end, it offers groups towards which the backlash can be directed. Thus, populism allows enhancing the status of the in-group trough confrontational

relationships with out-groups and the elite. Based on the reasoning above, hypothesis 1 is formulated as follows:

Hypothesis 1: Subjective social status is negatively related to populist attitudes.

While I argue that subjective social status is negatively related to populist attitudes without a host ideology, the reasons for why people with lower levels of subjective social status support radical left- or right-wing populist parties differ. Given that populist attitudes relate to populism as thin ideology without any specific policy positions, the focus here shifts towards the combination of populist ideas with the respective host ideologies. Thus, I make distinct arguments on how subjective social status relates to left- and right-wing populism. Crucially, I argue that lower levels of subjective social status are positively related to both forms of populism although there might be variation within the group of people with low levels of subjective social status (Burgoon et al., 2019; Engler & Weisstanner, 2021; Gidron & Hall, 2020).

Starting with radical right-wing populism, the focus of this form of populism is directed towards questions of immigration rather than economic concerns. Thus, people who are socially marginalised in cultural terms might find radical right-wing populists particularly attractive (Gidron & Hall, 2020). Put differently, lower status based on developments that are not necessarily accompanied by economic decline or that are based solely on cultural change might make people more likely to support radical right-wing populist parties (Lipset, 1955, 1959). Furthermore, the fear of falling down further on the social ladder is a relevant aspect (Kuziemko et al., 2014). In this regard, radical right-wing populism is a viable political option as it draws sharp boundaries against those that are further down the social ladder, such as immigrants and lazy, poor people from whom those a few rungs up the ladder can distinguish themselves (Burgoon et al., 2019; Engler & Weisstanner, 2021; Gidron & Hall, 2020; Lipset, 1955).

For example, people confronted with a possible automation of their job are confronted with declining status due to the decreasing societal value of their occupation (Kurer, 2020). As they are threatened but not hit by the economic transformation, status concerns are the basis of their grievances (Kurer & Palier, 2019). As these survivors are doing economically rather well, their political preferences are driven by the fear of becoming an outsider in the labour market and society. Such a perceived decline of a previously dominant or respected group in society is a source of discontent (Gidron & Hall, 2017; Im et al., 2019; Kurer & Palier, 2019; Lipset, 1955, 1959).

In this regard, citizens who see their social status challenged "feel attracted by promises to re-establish the values of a bygone era of a more homogenous demography, more rigid hierarchies, and an economic system that protects domestic workers" (Kurer & Palier, 2019, p. 4). Thus, it is less about economic relief but about (symbolic) policies that restore or maintain status, i.e., culturally conservative policies (Kurer, 2020). To that end, radical right-wing populism is a viable political option for those that feel socially marginalised as it mobilises political discontent as well as the desire for a restoration of former social status. Based on the reasoning above, hypothesis 2 is formulated as follows:

Hypothesis 2: Subjective social status is negatively related to support for radical right-wing populist parties.

While radical right-wing populism is mostly concerned with policies that offer a restoration of the perceived loss of status, radical left-wing populism focuses strongly on redistribution and economic relief for those believed to be most disadvantaged by the inequities of modern capitalism. Thus, the focus of this form of populism is directed towards economic questions rather than cultural grievances. Consequently, the argument is that those most

disadvantaged in terms of subjective social status are more likely to support radical left-wing populism as it offers economic relief (Burgoon et al., 2019; Gidron & Hall, 2020).

The crucial difference lies in the motivation as supporters of left-wing populism are not driven by a fear of falling further down but by the desire to obtain relief for their experienced hardship (Gidron & Hall, 2020). Thus, supporters of left-wing populism demand direct economic relief to their situation (Kurer, 2020). Naturally, such a relief might be accompanied by an increase in status and left-wing populists also express a form of nostalgia that aims to restore the status of the working class (March, 2007). Yet, contrary to radical right-wing populism, the boundary-making is directed against the upper class rather than those further down the ladder (Burgoon et al., 2019). To that end, radical left-wing populism is a viable political option for those that feel socially marginalised as it mobilises political discontent while at the same time offering economic relief. Based on the reasoning above, hypothesis 3 is formulated as follows:

Hypothesis 3: Subjective social status is negatively related to support for radical left-wing populist parties.

5.2 Social Trust and Populism

Another manifestation of social integration is social trust. Social trust is a three-dimensional concept that consists of particularised trust (trust in close people), generalised trust (trust in strangers and people in general), and identity-based trust (trust in those who share certain identity-traits). This dimensionality allows formulating distinct arguments for the relationship between the different forms of social trust and the three different forms of populism under study.

Starting with particularised trust, I argue that people who trust their close social environment have the certainty of a backup option of shared values where recognition and

respect are important elements. In this regard, a lack of trust in people within the immediate environment is a sign of severe social *disintegration* and marginalisation, which leaves the individual in need of a new community where they can feel safe and secure (Arendt, 1973; Rydgren, 2009).

Lacking close support networks and interactions leaves individuals detached and alienated. To regain a sense of belonging they require a new (community) identity (Bolet, 2021). Populism offers a compelling answer for those that lack particularised trust by offering such an identity that provides a sense of community (Rydgren, 2009).

First, people centrism acknowledges the virtuousness and honesty of the people that form a homogeneous group. As such, it provides an in-group that can function as an anchor point for those that lack identification otherwise. Moreover, populism acknowledges the struggle of the people while at the same time providing a home in the community of the true people.

Second, anti-elitism offers a responsible agent for the problems and troubles of the people thereby allowing marginalised individuals to shift the blame for their situation to the (political) elite. Third, the Manichean outlook with its strong in- and out-group demarcation provides a group to identify with as well as a group to oppose. Consequently, populism offers a new "quasi-community" to people who show low levels of particularised trust (Kornhauser, 1959; Rydgren, 2009). Thus, hypothesis 4 is formulated as follows:

Hypothesis 4: Particularised trust is negatively related to populist attitudes.

When considering radical left- and right-wing populism, I argue that there are no differences between these two forms of populism with regard to their relationship with particularised trust. Although left- and right-wing populism crucially differ with regard to how they combine their populism with other concepts and thus which groups they regard as out-

groups, both forms of populism offer a new community for those that are looking for identification. I specify the arguments for right- and left-wing populism, albeit the main tenet remains the same: particularised trust is negatively related to both forms of populism. Thus, particularised trust is not capable of explaining why certain people vote for radical right-wing rather than radical left-wing populist parties, as there is not specific relationship with the respective host ideologies.

For people with low levels of particularised trust, radical right-wing populism offers a new community based on the virtuous native people. Thus, social *disintegration* in the form of a lack of particularised trust makes people susceptible to a community founded on common ethnic or national identity. One could argue that this might be particularly true for those that feel marginalised based on cultural developments.

On the contrary, radical left-wing populism is less concerned with ethnic and national identity. Rather, left-wing populism offers those that lack close social ties a community based on social class. Thus, social *disintegration* in the form of a lack of particularised trust might also make people susceptible to a community founded on common economic categories such as occupation or class. One could argue that this might be particularly true for those that feel marginalised based on economic developments. Thus, hypotheses 4a and 4b are formulated as follows:

Hypothesis 4a: Particularised trust is negatively related to support for radical right-wing populist parties.

Hypothesis 4b: Particularised trust is negatively related to support for radical left-wing populist parties.

As opposed to particularised trust, generalised trust is concerned with trusting strangers and thus all members of society without prior knowledge or interaction. Thus, placing

generalised trust in others is a statement of toleration of differing ideas (Uslaner, 2002). As opposed to the other forms of trust, generalised trust is not a trust decision for specific purposes but rather a general and integrative vision of society (Uslaner, 2002). Thus, with its integrative vision, generalised trust allows overcoming boundary-making and strong in-group-out-group distinctions and thereby contradicts the conflictual nature of populism.

People who are generally trusting regard themselves as part of a shared normative order and, more importantly, they have the impression that others share this view and respect the shared norms. Consequently, they do not have a limited understanding of one true populace that is juxtaposed vertically against the conspiring elite. Even more so, generalised trust contradicts a horizontal exclusion of societal out-groups.

Instead, people who have high levels of generalised trust regard society as a shared order in which they are integrated and respected. Unconditionally trusting others without prior knowledge could be regarded as a privilege of those more at the top of society (Newton, 2009). Thus, anti-elitist or people centrist attitudes are contradictory to this form of trust.

Conversely, people who have low levels of generalised trust feel socially marginalised and excluded from society. This increases frustration and anger and makes people susceptible to populist messages which aim to restore a common normative order as depicted in nostalgic versions of the past (Gest, 2016; Gest et al., 2018; Steenvoorden & Harteveld, 2018). Further, generalised trust includes “everyone” which is incompatible with populism’s conflictual and exclusionary vision of society that includes an inherent in-group-out-group distinction. Following these arguments, I formulate hypothesis 5 as follows:

Hypothesis 5: Generalised trust is negatively related to populist attitudes.

For radical left- and right-wing populism, I maintain that generalised trust is negatively related to both. I argue that there are no differences between radical left- and right-wing

populism with regard to the relationship with generalised trust. Although both forms of populism crucially differ with regard to how they combine their populism with other concepts and thus which groups they regard as out-groups, both forms of populism contradict the integrative vision of society that dovetails with generalised trust. I specify the arguments for right- and left-wing populism, albeit the main tenet remains the same: generalised trust is negatively related to both forms of populism.

For right-wing populism, generalised trust is not only at odds with the populist part of the ideology but also with the nativist ideology. Research has shown that generalised trust decreases anti-immigrant attitudes (Berning & Ziller, 2017). Furthermore, as generalised trust relates to people in general, it implies that people see themselves as part of a shared normative order that includes people of a different ethnicity or nationality (Berning & Ziller, 2017). Even more so, generalised trust might imply a transnational normative order of togetherness decreasing the salience of national borders, clearly contradicting the nation-centred positions of radical right-wing populism. In this vein, such a shared order may include the main horizontal out-groups of radical right-wing populism – non-natives and immigrants – that are often regarded as the hostile 'other' (Hameleers & de Vreese, 2020). Hypothesis 5a is thus formulated as follows:

Hypothesis 5a: Generalised trust is negatively related to support for radical right-wing populist parties.

For left-wing populism, the relationship is less straightforward. While I maintain that generalised trust remains at odds with the populist ideology of radical left-wing populism, one can also make an argument that it is at odds with anti-capitalism. Anti-capitalism implies a rejection and abolishment of the current economic system (Fagerholm, 2018a). In particular, it implies a considerable distrust towards economic elites (March, 2007). While the idea of left-

wing populism aims at including poorer segments of society, this inclusion comes at the expense of the exclusion of other groups in society, for example rich individuals or employers (Sanders et al., 2017). In this regard, left-wing populism is also exclusionary, thereby contradicting the integrative view of generalised trust. Hypothesis 5b is thus formulated as follows:

Hypothesis 5b: Generalised trust is negatively related to support for radical left-wing populist parties.

Contrary to generalised trust, identity-based trust challenges the societally shared normative order and implies at least partial social *disintegration*. That is, identity-based trust focuses only on one particular, narrowly definable part of society, usually accompanied by out-group demarcation or even derogation (Kenworthy & Jones, 2009). Accordingly, for people who trust their in-group rather than an out-group, populism is compelling as it provides strong in-group identification through the construction of a virtuous and homogeneous collective, i.e., the people. Following the insights of social identity theory, individuals who share similar cultural traits have an innate tendency to connect with their in-group and see their identity as superior to that of culturally distinct out-groups (Tajfel, 1974; Tajfel & Turner, 1979).

Furthermore, identity-based trust may boost self-esteem due to a positive image of the in-group (Bornschier et al., 2021). People with strong identity-based trust put their interests and their values above a shared normative order and see their interests threatened by out-groups. The higher the perceived threat from the out-group, the higher the focus on the in-group.

In this vein, identity-based trust relies on a demarcation of the in-group from people who belong to a different category. Individuals declare people from other groups to be out-groups that are not trustworthy. Thus, identity-based trust “excludes persons with specific characteristics” (Torpe & Lolle, 2011, p. 489), which increases in-group favouritism and out-

group derogation, thereby making people susceptible to populist messages that resonate with such in-group favouritism and out-group demarcation. Moreover, identity-based trust increases anti-elitism as the political elite is suspected to help out-groups.

Thus, the logic of identity-based trust, which relies on sharp group membership based on identifiable characteristics, resonates well with the good vs. bad logic of populism. Thus, identity-based trust can be understood as a form of mechanical solidarity in a Durkheimian perspective (Durkheim, [1893] 1964). People base their trust decisions on ascriptive criteria and this mechanical solidarity is less capable of integrating the society as a whole because basing decisions on ascriptive criteria excludes those that do not fulfil them resulting in (partial) social *disintegration* (Barnes, 1966; Tiryakian, 1994). Based on this reasoning hypothesis 6 is formulated as follows:

Hypothesis 6: Identity-based trust is positively related to populist attitudes.

For radical left- and right-wing populism, I maintain that identity-based trust is positively related to both forms of populism. Crucially, however, the in-group matters decisively, for which form of populism is supported. Again, the focus here shifts towards the host ideologies that are combined with a populist ideology. Thus, given that populists "color in their people-centrism and anti-elitism" (Rooduijn & Akkerman, 2017, p. 200) with a strong focus on their host ideologies, I argue that the ascriptive criteria on which the respective forms of identity-based trust are founded, shape which form of populism is supported. I make distinct arguments on how different forms of identity-based trust affect left- and right-wing populism.

Put differently, identity-based trust can add to the explanation of different forms of populism if the argument takes the host ideology seriously. To that end, it matters which group in society is excluded from the shared normative order and based on which criteria. For example, Gidron and Hall (2020) point out that people who feel marginalised in economic terms

are more likely to support radical left-wing populism while those marginalised in cultural terms are more likely to support radical right-wing populism.

Radical right-wing populism focuses mainly on questions of immigration and national identity and thereby condemns all non-native elements as a threat to the country's economy and culture (Rooduijn, 2014). Consequently, I argue that people who trust people who share the same nationality or speak the same language – both markers of being members of the same nation-state – are more likely to support radical right-wing populism.

This form of in-group trust signals that people regard themselves as part of a limited shared order that excludes certain parts of the population based on nationality or ethnicity. This understanding resembles mechanical rather than organic solidarity triggering a shift towards the in-group. In other words, trusting people who share the same nationality or language increases in-group identification and strengthens the demarcation *vis-à-vis* people who do not share these criteria.

Insofar as identity-based trust is based on characteristics such as nationality, such a form of trust will go hand in hand with right-wing populism as it implies a form of social integration that does not extend to the whole society. People with high levels of such (ethnic-based) identity-based trust are likely to be integrated within their national in-group. However, this comes at the expense of social integration within society as a whole. In turn, this makes people susceptible to radical right-wing populism that aims to restore society "as it once was" where people with a different nationality are not regarded as part of society (Gest et al., 2018; Steenvoorden & Harteveld, 2018). Thus, hypothesis 6a is formulated as follows:

Hypothesis 6a: Identity-based trust based on nationality and language is positively related to support for radical right-wing populist parties.

Opposed to radical right-wing populism, radical left-wing populism is not concerned with questions of immigration or national identity. Instead, radical left-wing populism focuses on economic topics, in particular the dangers and inequities of (global) capitalism that are a threat to the living conditions of the (hard-working) people. Left-wing populism constructs its people centrism and anti-elitism on the category of (social) class or occupation. Consequently, I argue that people who trust others who share the same class or occupation – both markers of being situated in similar social strata – are more likely to support radical left-wing populism.

This form of in-group trust signals that people regard themselves as part of a limited shared order that is based on class. Again, this resembles mechanical rather than organic solidarity. Put differently, trusting people who share the same class or occupation increases in-group identification and strengthens the demarcation *vis-à-vis* people who do not share these criteria.

Insofar as identity-based trust is based on characteristics such as class, this form of trust will go hand in hand with radical left-wing populism as it implies a form of social integration that does not extend to the whole society. People with high levels of such (class-based) identity-based trust are likely to be integrated within their class-based or socio-economic in-group. This comes at the expense of social integration within society as a whole making them susceptible to radical left-wing populism that aims to restore a "social democratic society before it began to 'rot' under the influence of 20 years of neo-liberalism and betrayal by 'mainstream' social-democratic parties" (March, 2007, p. 67). Thus, hypothesis 6b is formulated as follows:

Hypothesis 6b: Identity-based trust based on class and occupation is positively related to support for radical left-wing populist parties.

5.3 Subjective Relative Deprivation and Populism

As conceptualised in chapter 4, subjective group relative deprivation can be regarded as an indicator of social integration. In this subchapter, I outline how subjective group relative deprivation as a manifestation of social integration relates to support for different forms of populism.

People make comparisons within their socio-economic context and through cognitive appraisals arrive at the conclusion that they are disadvantaged (Pettigrew, 2015; Smith & Pettigrew, 2014). Emotional appraisals lead to the judgment that the disadvantage is unfair and illegitimate, arousing feelings of entitlement, deservingness, and angry resentment (Smith et al., 2012). Focussing on *group* instead of *individual* subjective relative deprivation captures the importance of group membership that has been put forward by recent studies (Cramer Walsh, 2012; Gest et al., 2018; Hochschild, 2016). People see themselves as members of a neglected group that is sidelined to the fringes of society rather than as an individual.

With regard to the relationship with populist attitudes, I argue that subjective group relative deprivation resonates well with the defining characteristics of populism. First, the Manichean outlook on society acknowledges the struggles of the 'good ordinary' people to get what they deserve (Elchardus & Spruyt, 2016; Spruyt et al., 2016). The antagonistic nature of populism divides society into two homogeneous groups. As relative deprivation increases out-group derogation and prejudice, populist attitudes are likely fuelled by feelings of subjective group relative deprivation (Dambrun et al., 2006; Meuleman et al., 2020; Pettigrew et al., 2008). Second, anti-elitism offers a way to externalise the blame for the perceived disadvantage by presenting the elites as culprits (Hameleers & de Vreese, 2020; Marx, 2020). The political elites are held responsible for helping the out-group gain an advantage over the ordinary people (Hochschild, 2016).

Third, subjective group relative deprivation is shown to strengthen positive feelings towards the own in-group (Marchlewska et al., 2018; Pettigrew, 2015; Smith et al., 2012). As populism constructs a homogenous and virtuous group that is disadvantaged, the in-group is valued while the out-group is vilified (Hameleers & de Vreese, 2020; Marchlewska et al., 2018). To that end, populism allows enhancing in-group identification trough confrontational relationships with out-groups and the elite. Furthermore, relative deprivation requires the possibility for change through an (external) intervention. Popular sovereignty is essentially an instrument to overcome the disadvantage so "that where established parties and elites have failed, ordinary folks, common sense, and the politicians who give them a voice can find solutions" (Spruyt et al., 2016, p. 336). Based on the reasoning above, I formulate hypothesis 7 as follows:

Hypothesis 7: Subjective group relative deprivation is positively related to populist attitudes.

While I maintain that subjective relative deprivation is positively related to populist attitudes as they seem as a compelling answer to such feelings (Marchlewska et al., 2018; Spruyt et al., 2016; Urbanska & Guimond, 2018), I argue that there are differences for the two varieties of populism, i.e., radical right- and left-wing populism. Given that populist attitudes relate to populism as thin ideology without any specific policy positions, the focus here shifts towards the combination of populist ideas with ideologies such as nativism or socialism. For example, Rooduijn and Akkerman (2017, p. 200) point out that the way in which populists "color in their people-centrism and anti-elitism is strongly related to their core radical right- and left-wing ideologies".

I make distinct arguments on how different forms of subjective group relative deprivation relate to radical right- and left-wing populism. Put differently, subjective group relative deprivation can add to the explanation of thick populism if the argument takes the host

ideology seriously. For subjective group relative deprivation, the comparison group to which an individual compares their in-group to, is of crucial importance. For example, Gidron and Hall (2020) point out that people who feel marginalised in economic terms are more likely to support radical left-wing populism while those marginalised in cultural terms are more likely to support radical right-wing populism.

More importantly, with regard to social integration it matters which group is seen as the main threat to social integration (Gidron & Hall, 2017). Thus, I argue that the group people compare their in-group to matters decisively for which form of populism is supported at the ballot box. To that end, I argue that the comparison group has to match the conception of the people centrism and anti-elitism provided by the respective form populism.

The focus of right-wing populism is mainly on the dangers of immigration and the contention that all non-native elements are a threat to the country’s economy and culture (Mudde, 2010). Consequently, I argue that people who feel subjective group relative deprivation compared to immigrants are more likely to support a radical right-wing populist party because these parties construct their people centrism and anti-elitism on ethnic categories. If the relevant out-group of relative deprivation is defined on ethnic categories, the respective answer is also likely to be defined on ethnic categories. Right-wing populism offers such a perspective by taking up the disadvantage of the true and good native people.

More specifically, right-wing populism claims that immigrants are being treated better than natives thereby acknowledging the perceived disadvantages of the people (Urbanska & Guimond, 2018). Furthermore, right-wing populism identifies responsible agents for the disadvantage and offers a story that matches the collectively felt disadvantage. The elite favours immigrants which results in a disadvantage for natives (Hochschild, 2016; Marchlewska et al., 2018). In addition, research has convincingly shown that subjective group relative deprivation

increases in-group favouritism and out-group prejudice making it more likely that people who feel subjectively deprived hold anti-immigrant and nativist positions (Pettigrew et al., 2008).

Further, right-wing populism constructs in-group solidarity by putting forward an ethnically homogenous conception of the people. Consequently, the conceptions of society, the people, and the elite match, so that right-wing populism offers a coherent answer for people who feel relatively deprived compared to immigrants. Based on this reasoning, I formulate hypothesis 8 as follows:

Hypothesis 8: Subjective group relative deprivation compared to immigrants is positively related to support for radical right-wing populist parties.

Opposed to right-wing populism, left-wing populism is characterised by economic concerns and in particular the dangers and inequities of (global) capitalism that are a threat to the living conditions of the (hard-working) people. Moreover, only the neo-liberal elites and big businesses profit (March & Mudde, 2005; March & Rommerskirchen, 2015). Left-wing populism constructs its people centrism and anti-elitism on the category of (social) class. The people are honest workers defined on class membership (not ethnicity) and the elite often consists of large businesses and the (neo-liberal) politicians that favour them. Consequently, I argue that people who feel subjective group relative deprivation compared to rich people are more likely to support a radical left-wing populist party.

If the relevant out-group of relative deprivation is defined in economic terms (i.e., class or occupation), the respective answer is also likely to be defined based on such a category. From a left-wing populist perspective, the capitalist system favours the rich at the expense of the hard-working people. Consequently, people who feel relatively deprived compared to the rich find an answer to this situation in the positions of radical left-wing populist parties.

First, radical left-wing populism identifies the inequities of (global) capitalism, which produces economic inequality and only increases welfare for the wealthy (March & Rommerskirchen, 2015). Thus, these parties identify the sources of the disadvantage. More specifically, radical left-wing populism identifies responsible agents for the disadvantage and offers a story that matches the subjective relative deprivation. The elite favours the rich and large businesses compared to the 'hard-working' people and thereby contributes to the perceived disadvantage of the 'good' people (see Hochschild, 2016).

Second, the focus on redistribution and public ownership that is prominent in left-wing populism offers an intervention to change the situation (March & Mudde, 2005). Consequently, the conceptions of society, the people, and the elite match, so that left-wing populism offers a coherent answer for people who feel relatively deprived compared to rich people. Based on this reasoning, I formulate hypothesis 9 as follows:

Hypothesis 9: Subjective group relative deprivation compared to rich people is positively related to support for radical left-wing populist parties.

6 Research Design

In this chapter, I present the research design that is used to analyse the question whether populism is a problem of social *disintegration*. Chapter 6.1 presents the original survey data that is used to analyse the relationships presented above. Chapter 6.2 dives deeper into the case selection, i.e., the countries under study. Chapter 6.3 presents the variables used in the analysis with a particular emphasis on the operationalisation of populism as dependent variable and social integration as independent variable as well as potential control variables. Chapter 6.4 elaborates on the methodological approach used to analyse the data.

6.1 Original Survey Data

The analysis of the research question of this study and the specific hypotheses formulated in the previous chapters require survey data that fulfils certain criteria. First, given the focus of this study on advanced European democracies, the data needs to be available across countries in Europe. While there are several high quality and cross-country surveys for Europe such as the European Social Survey (ESS) or European Value Survey (EVS), these do not include all the variables needed for this study.

Second, the data for this study needs to include measures for populism. On the one hand, I need data that measures party preference or vote choice for radical left- and right-wing populist parties. On the other hand, I need items that measure populist attitudes rather than related concepts such as trust or efficacy. Populist attitudes, in particular, are rare in openly available surveys due to their relatively recent development.

A third requirement for the data is that it needs to include the different measures of social integration. In combination with the previous requirements, this is difficult. For subjective social status, Gidron and Hall (2020) already note that this concept is rarely used in

political science and social science surveys. While the EVS includes the concept in wave 6, this wave does not include populist attitudes. Although social trust is often included in surveys, this only holds for generalised and particularised trust but not for identity-based trust. While the EVS includes identity-based trust, the question is directed towards out-group distrust rather than in-group trust (see chapter 6.3.2). This requires strong assumptions, namely that out-group distrust automatically implies in-group trust (Freitag & Bauer, 2013).

Lastly, subjective group relative deprivation is used seldomly in cross-country surveys that are openly available. While measures of perceived disadvantage are sometimes provided, these items do not account for the particular nature of subjective group relative deprivation. For this study, I require measures for subjective group relative deprivation that include an affective component as well as different comparison groups, in order to paint an adequate picture of the hypothesised relationships.

To my knowledge, no publicly available dataset fulfils these criteria. Thus, I make use of a survey that was specifically designed for this purpose at the Chair of Political Sociology at the University of Bern (Freitag et al., 2020).[25] The members of the Chair designed the survey.[26] The survey questions used in this study were distilled from the literature and translated based on already existing translations or by using different language experts. We programmed the web-based survey in the software Qualtrics of the eponymous survey company. The survey itself was designed to last around 20 minutes to avoid survey fatigue for the respondents. An overview of the survey's characteristics is presented in Appendix A (see tables A-1 – A-2, Appendix A).

[25] The survey project also includes other topics such as national identity and political support as well as given the timing, the political consequences of the Covid-19 pandemic. Yet, one of the original purposes is to design a survey that allows offering an encompassing test of the relationship between social integration and populism.
[26] I am incredibly grateful for the great collaboration with my colleagues Julian Erhardt and Steffen Wamsler and to Markus Freitag for financing this survey.

The survey was in the field between 17th April and 11th May 2020. For sampling and recruiting, we relied on Qualtrics but provided specific criteria and quotas that needed to be fulfilled. First, we conducted the survey in France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom with the target population being residents aged 18 years or older and a target sample size of 1,000 respondents per country (for case selection, see chapter 6.2.). Second, we provided Qualtrics with quotas for sex, age, and education (and language for Switzerland) to allow broader conclusions to the respective populations. The quotas were drawn from the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (2019) and Wirtschaftskammer Österreich (2020).

The full sample consists of 6,028 respondents, with an average age of 48 years and of which 49.6 percent are women. Regarding education, all groups are represented with primary and lower secondary education comprising around 25 percent, upper secondary 39 percent, and tertiary education around 36 percent of respondents. Table A2 shows the demographic characteristics of the respective country samples. Overall, our quotas were fulfilled with the minor exception of Italian speaking respondents in Switzerland. The overall response rate was provided by Qualtrics and was situated at 8.71 percent (RR5/6 Completion Rate, The American Association for Public Opinion Research [AAPOR], 2016).

Overall, this survey provides a high-quality data set that allows studying the relationship between social integration and populism in an encompassing way. The data and the material that support the findings of this study will be made available through the Open Science Framework under the DOI: 10.17605/OSF.IO/EZSW9.

6.2 Case Selection

The survey was conducted in France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. The description of populism in these countries in chapter 2.4 already gave some indication why these countries offer a good sample to study the relationship between social integration and populism. Overall, four important aspects have to be mentioned with regard to the case selection.

First, all six countries have seen a rise in populism in recent years making populism an important topic in political and scientific discussions. Even though populist parties play an important role in national politics in all six countries, the historical trajectory of populism differs considerably between these countries. In four countries, France, Italy, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom radical right-wing populism dates back at least to the 1990s, while in Germany and Spain (radical right-wing) populism is a phenomenon of 2010s. Thus, the cases offer useful variation when it comes to how established populist parties are in the respective political systems and cultures.

Second, the countries offer valuable variation regarding the ideological orientation of populism. In France, the party system includes a sizeable radical left- (*La France Insoumise*) and an even stronger radical right-wing populist party (*Rassemblement National*). Both parties contest in elections and gained substantial vote shares in the parliamentary (and presidential) elections. Although neither party is part of the national government, both parties are viable political choices for a considerable part of the electorate. The same holds true for Germany where *Die Linke* as radical left- and the *Alternative für Deutschland* as radical right-wing populist party also represent serious contestants in national elections that are both able to consistently score seats in the national (and subnational) parliament(s). Furthermore, in Spain, *Podemos* and *Vox* also represent new radical left- and right-wing populist parties that have been able to secure a significant share of votes in recent elections.

Next to these three cases, Switzerland and the United Kingdom only have radical right-wing populist parties. Additionally, Italy provides not only radical right-wing populist party but also an ideologically inconsistent or valence populist party (Mosca & Tronconi, 2019; Zulianello, 2020) making the study of populist attitudes particularly interesting here. To that end, the six countries represent the most important ideological variants of populism that are currently dominant in Northern, Southern, and Western Europe. This allows investigating not only the relationship between social integration and support for different populist parties. It also allows investigating whether the relationship between social integration and populist attitudes differs depending on the ideological orientation of the populist parties and discourse in the respective countries.

Third, with the *Five Star Movement*, the *Lega Nord*, the *Swiss People's Party*, and *Podemos* the sample includes populist parties that are or have been part of the respective national governments thereby signifying the importance of populist parties for governmental decision-making. Thus, next to ideology the sample also addresses variation in governmental participation of populist parties.

Fourth, the selected countries offer useful institutional variation regarding their political and electoral system. Germany and Switzerland are traditionally strong federal countries, in particular regarding the legislative process. Italy, Spain, and the United Kingdom are countries with strong regional autonomy. Lastly, France is a firm unitary state. Additionally, the sample covers different electoral systems that range from the prototypical majoritarian electoral system in the United Kingdom to proportional representation and mixed member proportional representation in Germany. Additionally, the sample includes a semi-presidential system (France) as well as a country with a high degree of direct democracy (Switzerland).

Consequently, the countries included in this study offer useful variation in terms of contextual factors such as the historical trajectories of populism, its ideological manifestation

and governmental experience. Furthermore, the institutional variation regarding political, economic, and institutional factors is also useful when contextualising the findings.

Overall, the sample studied here offers a useful set of cases to investigate the relationship between social integration and populism. Testing the hypotheses in countries with different contexts might potentially allow for broader conclusions. Given the diversity of the context, having robust results across these countries might make it more likely that the findings travel beyond the immediate context studied here.

6.3 Variables

This subchapter presents the operationalisation of the main concepts in this study. Chapter 6.3.1 is dedicated to the dependent variable, populism. I start by outlining the approach to measuring populist attitudes before turning to radical left- and right-wing populist party support. Chapter 6.3.2 is dedicated to the main independent variable social integration, with its three indicators subjective social status, social trust, and subjective group relative deprivation. Lastly, chapter 6.3.3 deals with the control variables included in the analyses.

6.3.1 Populism

This chapter outlines the measurement approach for populism in this study. In particular, chapter 6.3.1.1 describes how I measure populist attitudes in a conceptually consistent and empirically sound way. Chapter 6.3.1.2 deals with the two varieties of populism – radical left- and right-wing populism – by proposing radical left- and right-wing populist party support as operationalisation.

6.3.1.1 Populist Attitudes in this Study

Populist attitudes are defined as "the set of evaluative reactions" to the combination of anti-elitism, people centrism, and a Manichean outlook of society (van Hauwaert et al., 2020, p. 5). In recent years, the study of populist attitudes has become a major topic in the study of populism as well as political science in general. Scholars haven taken up the question whether voters and citizens have populist attitudes, i.e., whether they share a certain conception of society and politics that is populist in nature (Hawkins & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2017b). While there are early attempts to measure populist attitudes (e.g., Axelrod, 1967), these bear little value for today's approach due to their different definition and conceptualisation of populism. In the following, I critically evaluate the main approaches to measure populist attitudes. This evaluation forms the baseline for the measurement of populist attitudes in this study, which is inspired by and based on recent innovative propositions.

Starting with the seminal work of Hawkins et al. (2012) and the follow-up by Akkerman et al. (2014), the investigation of populist attitudes has gained traction in the study of populism. Hawkins et al. (2012) start an early attempt to measure populist attitudes among citizens in the US. They regard populism as a (thin) set of ideas that are centred on the conflict between the people and the elite. The authors originally arrive at a set of four items that measure populist attitudes at the mass level. Using factor analysis to separate populism from elitism and pluralism, they find that five instead of the original four items load on one common latent factor that seems to measure populist as opposed to pluralist and elitist attitudes.

By now the most prominent approach is the one by Akkerman et al. (2014) who refine the approach of Hawkins et al. (2012) and investigate populist attitudes among the Dutch population. The authors propose eight items to measure populist attitudes. Their approach aims to develop a scale that captures the different dimensions of populism simultaneously rather than providing three different subscales that focus on the respective sub-dimensions as done by other

studies (Castanho Silva et al., 2018). Using principal component analysis, Akkerman et al. (2014) end up with six items that tap into populist attitudes as a latent factor. They show that voters who score high on the populism scale are also more likely to identify themselves with Dutch populist parties of the political left as well as the political right.

Overall, the Akkerman et al. (2014) approach fares rather well in studies that evaluate different measures of populist attitudes (Castanho Silva et al., 2020; van Hauwaert et al., 2020; Wuttke et al., 2020). The scale has been used widely in the literature or taken as a starting point for further scale development (e.g., Akkerman et al., 2017; Fatke, 2019; Filsinger, Wamsler, et al., 2021; Geurkink et al., 2020; Hawkins et al., 2018; Loew & Faas, 2019; Rico et al., 2017; Rico & Anduiza, 2019; Spierings & Zaslove, 2017; Spruyt et al., 2016; van Hauwaert & van Kessel, 2018). One particularly important extension to this scale was suggested by van Hauwaert et al. (2020) who propose two additional items that are supposed to increase the informational value and validity of the scale. Even more so, the authors show that one of their newly proposed items has one of the highest informational value (van Hauwaert et al., 2020).

In addition to Akkerman et al. (2014), several other scales have been proposed to measure populist attitudes and by now scholars have a broad range of scales to pick from when investigating populist attitudes (Castanho Silva et al., 2018; Schulz et al., 2018; van Hauwaert et al., 2020).[27] Castanho Silva et al. (2018) and Schulz et al. (2018) depart from a different assumption and provide items for each of the sub-dimensions of populism separately. These subscales are subsequently combined into a populism scale.

[27] I focus on the most prominent approaches that have been used widely in recent literature. An additional argument for focusing on Akkerman et al. (2014), Castanho Silva et al. (2018) and Schulz et al. (2018) is the fact that evaluation studies of populism scales by Castanho Silva et al. (2020), van Hauwaert et al. (2020), and Wettstein et al. (2020) found that these scales – albeit not perfect – seem to be the most appropriate ones to measure populism at the mass level. Other scales by the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (2020), Elchardus and Spruyt (2016), or Oliver and Rahn (2016) fared significantly worse. Others such as Bernhard and Hänggli (2018) or Tsatsanis et al. (2018) have not found any traction in the literature. The study by Kefford et al. (2021) was published after the survey was in the field and also follows a different theoretical approach.

Castanho Silva et al. (2018) depart from a list of 145 survey items that potentially measure some of populism's sub-dimensions. Using exploratory and confirmatory factor analysis, the authors arrive at nine final items that measure people centrism, anti-elitism, and a Manichean outlook on society separately. Aggregating these three subscales into one populism scale is done by multiplying the respective scales. One particular advantage of their scale is that it is the first (and only) approach to measure a Manichean outlook without solely and directly referring to the difference between the people and the elite (Castanho Silva et al., 2018).

Schulz et al. (2018) start with 21 items and survey data from Switzerland. Using factor analytic methods, the authors end up with a final scale that consists of 12 items measuring three sub-dimensions that the authors label: anti-elitism, homogeneity and virtuousness of the people, and popular sovereignty. Next to the construct validity, Wettstein et al. (2020) found that this scale also possesses measurement invariance across countries allowing a comparison of findings across different countries (but see Castanho Silva et al., 2020).

The measurement of populist attitudes in my study is based on this previous research. In this regard, I use three sets of items to measure the respective dimensions of populism: people centrism, anti-elitism, and a Manichean outlook (Akkerman et al., 2014; Castanho Silva et al., 2018; van Hauwaert et al., 2020). As opposed to following just one approach, I combine items of different populist attitudes scales to make use of their distinctive advantages. I start with the items proposed by Castanho Silva et al. (2018). This scale fared good in a recent evaluation of different scales of populist attitudes (Castanho Silva et al., 2020). Next to the good reliability and validity scores, one particularly important advantage is that the scale includes three items that measure a Manichean outlook on society explicitly and without solely referring to the distinction between the political elite and the people. This distinguishes the approach by Castanho Silva et al. (2018) from other scales which often only implicitly account for such a

dualistic vision of politics and society (e.g., Akkerman et al., 2014). Thus, for Manichean outlook, I use the items proposed by Castanho Silva et al. (2018) (POP 7 – POP 9, Table 1).

For people centrism, I use two items proposed by Castanho Silva et al. (2018) but exchange one item from their original scale "Politicians should always listen closely to the problems of the people" with an item from the Akkerman et al. (2014) scale: "The differences between ordinary people and the ruling elite are much greater than the differences between ordinary people" (POP 3, Table 1). This item "focuses on the idea that the people have more in common with one another than with the elite" which reflects the idea of a homogenous populace that is pitted against the elite more clearly (Akkerman et al., 2014, p. 1332). Moreover, from this homogeneity, the general will emerges which should ultimately guide political decision-making. Thus, substituting these items brings increased theoretical consistency. In sum, for people centrism, I use two items from Castanho Silva et al. (2018) (POP 1 – POP 2, Table 1) and one item from Akkerman et al. (2014) (POP 3, Table 1).

For anti-elitism, I keep one item from Castanho Silva et al. (2018) (POP 5, Table 1) but supplement it with one item that is taken from Akkerman et al. (2014) and one item taken from van Hauwaert et al. (2020). First, instead of "Quite a few of the people running the government are crooked" (Castanho Silva et al., 2018, p. 161), I use "I would rather be represented by a citizen than by a specialised politician" (Akkerman et al., 2014, p. 1331, POP 4, Table 1). The latter taps more explicitly into the idea that the current form of government and the governing elites do not represent the people rather than political corruption. Second, instead of "The government is pretty much run by a few big interests looking out for themselves" (Castanho Silva et al., 2018, p. 161), I use an item proposed by van Hauwaert et al. (2020, p. 8): "The particular interests of the political class negatively affect the welfare of the people" (POP 6, Table 1). While being similar in content, namely painting a picture of a self-serving elite that hurts the interests and welfare of the people, the item of van Hauwaert et al. (2020) is shown to

be one of the most informative items. More importantly, contrary to many other items it is able to capture higher levels of populism more accurately (van Hauwaert et al., 2020, p. 14). Thus, for anti-elitism, I use one item from Akkerman et al. (2014) (POP 4, Table 1), one item from Castanho Silva et al. (2018) (POP 5, Table 1), and one item from van Hauwaert et al. (2020) (POP 6, Table 1).

Overall, this implies three items per sub-dimension and nine items in total that measure populist attitudes (Table 1). The advantage of combining different scales is that this allows using different items that may compensate certain weaknesses in the proposed scales. To that end, the proposed nine items meaningfully capture anti-elitism, people centrism, and a Manichean outlook. Furthermore, in combination these items allow me to measure populist attitudes as an attitudinal syndrome on the individual level.

For the aggregation of the items, I follow a theoretical approach that is closely aligned with the conceptualisation presented in chapters 2.1 and 2.3. While the measurement of populist attitudes has been discussed at length in the literature, recently, Wuttke et al. (2020) argued that most studies thus far display a significant discrepancy between the conceptualisation of populist attitudes and their measurement. In particular, as populism is the combination of people centrism, anti-elitism, and a Manichean outlook, Wuttke et al. (2020, p. 358) point out that the "peculiarity of the populist set of ideas lies precisely in the combination of these elements". In this regard, populism is a non-compensatory concept.

Yet, conventionally the literature regards the latent concept (populist attitudes) as a common cause of the indicators that are empirically measured, i.e., a populist attitude is the common cause of the observed measures (Bollen & Lennox, 1991). When conceptualising populism as a non-compensatory concept, this perspective cannot adequately capture populism (for a thorough and excellent discussion see Wuttke et al., 2020).

Table 1 Items for populist attitudes and their respective sub-dimensions

Items	Dimension	Source
"The will of the people should be the highest principle in this country's politics." (POP 1)	People Centrism	Castanho Silva et al., 2018
"Politicians don't have to spend time among ordinary people to do a good job." (POP 2)	People Centrism	Castanho Silva et al., 2018
"The differences between ordinary people and the ruling elite are much greater than the differences between ordinary people." (POP 3)	People Centrism	Akkerman et al. 2014
"I would rather be represented by a citizen than by a specialised politician." (POP 4)	Anti-Elitism	Akkerman et al. 2014
"Government officials use their power to try to improve people's lives." (POP5)	Anti-Elitism	Castanho Silva et al., 2018
"The particular interests of the political class negatively affect the welfare of the people." (POP 6)	Anti-Elitism	van Hauwaert et al., 2020
"The people I disagree with politically are not evil." (POP 7)[a]	Manichean Outlook	Castanho Silva et al., 2018
"You can tell if a person is good or bad if you know their politics." (POP 8)	Manichean Outlook	Castanho Silva et al., 2018
"The people I disagree with politically are just misinformed." (POP 9)	Manichean Outlook	Castanho Silva et al., 2018

Notes: Items adjusted from Akkerman et al. (2014), Castanho Silva et al. (2018) and van Hauwaert et al. (2020). Reversed coded statements are POP 2, POP 5 and POP 7. The inclusion of such items helps to reduce the problem of acquiescence bias. Variables range from 0 (strongly disagree) to 4 (strongly agree). Questions were presented in randomised order.

Wuttke et al. (2020) provide two important reasons. First, the causal approach implies a correlation between the different sub-dimensions and indicators, yet there is no theoretical argument for a correlation between the sub-dimensions of populist attitudes (Wuttke et al., 2020). For populist individuals these sub-dimensions should overlap but others might agree only with some or no parts of populism. "Hence the concept of populist attitudes as an attitudinal syndrome describes attitudinal configurations among individuals, but it is agnostic about correlations between the concept attributes" (Wuttke et al., 2020, p. 359).

Second, disregarding differences between the attributes of the concept as measurement error as done by the causal perspective is not compatible with the non-compensatory nature of populism. Thus, methods such as factor analyses or mean scores are not adequately capturing the nature of populist attitudes (Wuttke et al., 2020).

Figure 5 Boxplot of populist attitudes in the countries under study



Notes: Distribution based on original survey data from April – Mai 2020. Populist attitudes index as geometric mean of the respective sums of the sub-dimensions: anti-elitism, Manichean outlook, and people centrism.

Fortunately, there are ways to measure and aggregate populist attitudes in a conceptually consistent way. Generally, I follow the approach of Mohrenberg et al. (2021) that minimises the problem of high values of one dimension compensating low values on another dimension. Using the items in Table 1, I sum up the items of each sub-dimension separately and then take the geometric mean of all three sub-dimensions (Mohrenberg et al., 2021). Mohrenberg et al. (2021) argue that this procedure ensures that people who score zero on either dimension of populism have an overall zero on the combined populism scale. This approach fits the conceptualisation of populist attitudes as each dimension is a necessary condition and populist attitudes are only the combination of these elements. For ease of interpretation, I rescale the variable to range from 0 (no populism) to 1 (high levels of populism).

Additionally, this approach also allows to investigate populism as a matter of degree (more or less populism) rather than dichotomous concept (van Kessel, 2015; Wuttke et al., 2020). Previous research has successfully used this or similar approaches to reduce the problem that high values on one dimension compensate for low values on another dimension (Castanho Silva et al., 2018; Filsinger, Wamsler, et al., 2021; Mohrenberg et al., 2021).

Figure 5 shows the distribution of populist attitudes across the countries in the sample. The mean is rather similar across countries and relatively low with around .1. Yet, I also find variation within the countries showing that populist attitudes although not being held by the majority of citizens are a common phenomenon in these European countries.

6.3.1.2 Radical Left- and Right-Wing Party Support

Next to populist attitudes that measure populism without a host ideology, the aim of this study is to investigate the two most dominant forms of populism in Europe, radical left- and right-wing populism. To my knowledge, there is no established set of items that is used to measure radical left- or right-wing populist attitudes. In accordance with extant literature, I use populist party support to measure populism in combination with a relevant host ideology to avoid conflating populism with intertwined concepts like nationalism or socialism that present partly overlapping, yet conceptually distinct, ideological frameworks (Bonikowski, 2017; de Cleen, 2017).

This approach has the further advantages. First, populist party support as dependent variable makes my results comparable to other studies using this or a similar measure. Second, instead of developing and testing a new and large battery of different items that needs to be validated and aggregated in a consistent way, I rely on a single measure that is established in the literature. Third, instead of actual vote choice, party support may partly avoid the selection

biases of actual electoral participation as well as problems of retrospectively remembering what an individual voted for in the last election. Fourth, using party support complements the attitudinal approach used for populist attitudes providing additional insights into how populism can be explained.

Table 2 Overview of the populist parties, their election results, and vote share in the survey data from the six countries

Country/Party	Ideology	Vote share in survey	Vote share last election
France		**2020**	**2017**
La France Insoumise	Radical left-wing populist	6.06 %	11.03 %
Rassemblement National	Radical right-wing populist	16.27 %	13.20 %
DEBOUT LA FRANCE	Radical right-wing populist	3.03 %	1.17 %
Germany		**2020**	**2017**
Alternative für Deutschland	Radical right-wing populist	10.82 %	12.6 %
Die Linke	Radical left-wing populist	10.03 %	9.2 %
Italy		**2020**	**2018**
Lega	Radical right-wing populist	19.02 %	17.4 %
Fratelli d'Italia	Radical right-wing populist	10.43 %	4.3 %
Moviemento Cinque Stelle	(Valence) Populist Party	17.67 %	32.7 %
Spain		**2020**	**2019**
Podemos	Radical left-wing populist	11.61 %	12.9 %
Vox	Radical right-wing populist	9.47 %	15.1 %
Switzerland		**2020**	**2019**
Schweizerische Volkspartei	Radical right-wing populist	19.92 %	25.59 %
Lega dei Ticinesi	Radical right-wing populist	1.41 %	0.75 %
Mouvement Citoyens Genevois	Radical right-wing populist	0.13 %	0.22 %
United Kingdom		**2020**	**2019**
Reform UK (Brexit Party)	Radical right-wing populist	1.63 %	2.01%
United Kingdom Independence Party	Radical right-wing populist	1.16 %	0.07%

Notes: Ideological classification by PopuList (Rooduijn et al., 2019) and Zulianello (2020); Election results: France (Ministère de l'intérieur, 2017); Germany (Der Bundeswahlleiter, 2021); Italy (Statista, 2018) Spain (Álvarez-Rivera, 2019); Switzerland (Bundesamt für Statistik, 2019); United Kingdom (Uberoi et al., 2020).

To measure populist party support, I use the following survey question "Which party would you vote for if there was a general election next Thursday?"[28] To categorise the respective parties as radical left- or right-wing populist, I rely on the PopuList which is based on expert coding of populist parties in Europe (Rooduijn et al., 2019).[29] Thus, respondents who said that they would vote for a party categorised as radical left-wing populist were coded as 1 while all others as 0. The same procedure was applied for radical right-wing populist parties.

Table 2 shows the populist parties for the respective countries, their election results in the last election, and the support in our survey. The numbers show that our survey data mostly aligns with the results of the last general elections in the respective countries. Some parties, however, seem to have experienced a growth in support since the last elections. For example, the *Rassemblement National* is three percentage points stronger in our survey than in the last election. Similarly, the *Lega* or *Fratelli d'Italia.* On the contrary, *Vox* seems to have lost in support, at least in our survey. While the data shows that in all countries populist parties play a vital role in the political system and are serious contenders for seats in the national parliament, the United Kingdom might seem like an exception here. Yet, one has to bear in mind that the British majoritarian electoral system favours a two party system making it hard for third parties to obtain votes and seats. Nevertheless, as chapter 2.4 has shown, UKIP has obtained relatively high shares of votes in the past making it a serious contender in the political system in recent years. The Brexit referendum of 2016 as well as the strong results in European Parliament elections are a case in point.

As with most surveys, there might be some underreporting when it comes to radical right-wing populism either because of social desirability bias or because of under-coverage of

[28] In the United Kingdom, general elections are held on a Thursday. We adjusted the question wording for the respective countries. For example, in Germany, general elections are held on a Sunday.
[29] In addition, I also use Zulianello (2020) to cross-check the coding.

these voters. Yet, overall, our data aligns closely with the election results. Thus, it should provide an adequate basis for an analysis of populism in the respective countries.

6.3.2 Social Integration

The measurement of social integration follows along the lines of the conceptualisation presented in chapter 4. To measure social integration, I make use of three distinct concepts from different areas of the social sciences. I use subjective social status and social trust, which are mainly used in sociology and political science as well as subjective group relative deprivation mainly used in social psychology. In this regard, the measurement in this study orients itself on previous research in these respective disciplines.

Starting with subjective social status, I use the classical ladder question, which asks respondents to rate themselves on a ladder depicting their standing in society. The question in our survey reads as follows:

"In our society, there are people who tend to be towards the bottom (0) of our society and people who tend to be towards the top (10) of our society. Thinking about yourself, where would you place yourself in this scale?"

As evident, answers range from bottom (0) to top (10). This measure is widely used and accepted in sociological research (Cundiff et al., 2013; Evans & Kelley, 2004; Lindemann & Saar, 2014) but also increasingly used in political science (Romero-Vidal, 2021). Subjective social status is a measure of where people see themselves in society. People with low levels of subjective status can be assumed to see themselves outside of a shared order while at the same time being awarded less respect and recognition (Gidron & Hall, 2020).

Figure 6 Histogram showing the distribution of subjective social status in the six countries



Notes: Distribution based on original survey data from April – Mai 2020. Survey question: "In our society, there are people who tend to be towards the bottom (0) of our society and people who tend to be towards the top (10) of our society. Thinking about yourself, where would you place yourself in this scale?"

Previous research suggests that most people put themselves in the middle of this scale (Evans & Kelley, 2004). Indeed, Figure 6 shows that this true for all countries in the sample. Yet, there is also a considerable share of people among the lower ranks of this distribution. To check whether subjective social status measures more than just economic status, I follow Gidron and Hall (2020) and estimate a linear regression model (with country fixed-effects) which predicts subjective social status as a function of income situation, occupation status, education, age, and sex (see Table A-4, Appendix A). The results show that higher levels of education, a more satisfactory income situation, and being male predicts higher levels of social status. Yet, there is a considerable amount of unexplained variation (75%) showing that subjective social status has more sources than just education, income, or occupation. Thus, it can be regarded as

a theoretically and empirically adequate measure for social integration (Gidron & Hall, 2020). In the subsequent analyses, I rescale the variable to range from 0 to 1.

Figure 7 Histogram showing the distribution of particularised trust in the six countries

Notes: Distribution based on original survey data from April – Mai 2020. Particularised trust consists of Trust in family and Trust in friends.

The measurement of social trust is mainly in line with previous research. I use different items to gauge the respective dimensions of social trust: particularised, generalised, and identity-based trust (Freitag & Bauer, 2013). In general, people were asked to rate their level of trust in people from various groups. First, particularised trust is measured by two items that refer to people that are known and with one interacts on a daily basis. (1) trust in family and (2) trust in friends. Answers range from 1 “Do not trust at all” to 7 “Trust completely”.

Figure 7 shows the distribution of particularised trust in all six countries. What becomes evident is that most people seem to trust their family and friends. The distribution is highly skewed towards the left and thus higher levels of trust. This tracks with previous research on

particularised trust which shows that levels of particularised trust are usually very high (Newton & Zmerli, 2011). For the analyses, the variable is rescaled from 0 to 1.

Figure 8 Histogram showing the distribution of generalised trust in the six countries



Notes: Distribution based on original survey data from April – Mai 2020. Generalised trust consists of the generalised trust question and trust in people met for the first time.

Second, generalised trust is measured with two questions. The first question is the traditional generalised trust question, which asks people whether they trust people in general: *"Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted, or that you can't be too careful in dealing with people?"* Answers range from 1 "You can't be too careful" to 7 "Most people can be trusted".

Albeit being widely used in the literature on social trust, the generalised trust question has been subject to significant criticism (A. S. Miller & Mitamura, 2003; Robbins, 2019, 2021). A. S. Miller and Mitamura (2003) indicate that the generalised trust question rather measures differences in the levels of caution than trust and Bauer and Freitag (2018) show that "most people" does not unequivocally mean that people think about strangers. To that end, I

supplement this item with a question that asks *how much respondents trust people they meet for the first time*, which specifically prompts survey respondents to think about whether they trust strangers. Answers range from 1 “Do not trust at all” to 7 “Trust completely”.

Figure 8 shows that the combined measure of generalised trust is lower compared to particularised trust. A considerable share of the population is not likely to trust strangers. Yet, a part of the population is willing – at least partly – to place their trust in people they do not know personally. Moreover, there is also variation across countries with France and Italy having a generally less trusting population than Switzerland. For the analyses, the variable is rescaled from 0 to 1.

Figure 9 Histogram showing the distribution of identity-based trust in the six countries



Notes: Distribution based on original survey data from April – Mai 2020. Identity-based trust consists of trust in people with the same nationality, class, or occupation and those who speak the same language.

Third, for identity-based trust, I asked respondents to rate their level of trust in people that they do not know personally and meet for the first time but that share certain characteristics

with the respondent. The question then states *"How much do you trust these people if*" and the answers mention four different groups. I use "*people who speak the same language as you*"; "*people who have the same nationality as you*"; "*people who belong to the same social class as you*"; "*people who have the same occupation as you*". Again, answers range from 1 "Do not trust at all" to 7 "Trust completely" and for the analyses, the variable is rescaled to range from 0 to 1.

These four different groups allow me to test the effects of different in-groups and allow for a more general perspective on group identities. One crucial advantage of this measurement compared to the EVS is that my question is directed towards in-group trust rather than out-group distrust requiring fewer assumptions about the relationship between in-group trust and out-group distrust (Freitag & Bauer, 2013).

Table 3 Factor loadings of social trust based on confirmatory factor analysis

Items	Particularised Trust	Identity-based Trust	Generalised Trust
"Trust in family"	**0.64**		
"Trust in friends"	**0.90**		
"Trust in people with same nationality"		**0.97**	
"Trust in people who speak same language"		**0.94**	
"Trust in people from same social class"		**0.92**	
"Trust in people with same occupation"		**0.86**	
"Generalised Trust"			**0.59**
"Trust in people met for first time"			**0.85**

Notes: N = 5945; Confirmatory factor analysis with maximum-likelihood estimation. Models are based on original survey data collected in April – May 2020 by Qualtrics. Estimations are done with the SEM command implemented in Stata 17. Model fit: $\chi2$= 403.86, df = 17; CFI = .989; RMSEA = .062; TLI= .983. CFI = comparative fit index; RMSEA = root mean square error of approximation; TLI = Tucker-Lewis index. Items range from 1 (do not trust at all) to 7 (trust completely), except for trust in a generalised other, which ranges from 1 (you cannot be too careful) to 7 (most people can be trusted). Coefficients are standardised factor loadings.

Looking at the distribution of identity-based trust, it resembles a normal distribution with most people placing intermediate levels of trust in their in-group (see Figure 9). There is

no discernible difference when distinguishing between trust in national and language in-groups on the one hand and trust in class and occupational in-groups on the other hand (see Figures A-1 – A-2, Appendix A).

To see whether the three-dimensional structure of social trust is also supported by the data, I perform confirmatory factor analyses (CFA) with maximum-likelihood estimation (Freitag & Bauer, 2013; Rammstedt, 2010). Table 3 shows that the items load on three respective dimensions as expected. Trust in family and friends forms particularised trust, trust in people with the same nationality, class, occupation, or those who speak the same language forms identity-based trust, and the generalised trust question and trust in people met for the first time form trust in strangers (generalised trust). Additionally, I test whether this three-dimensional model also fits the data better than a one- or two-dimensional model. In order to do that, I compare the model fit indices of the respective CFA models for one-, two-, and three-dimensional structures. Looking at these model fit indices in table A-5 (Appendix A), it becomes evident that the three-dimensional structure fits the data best and has good model fit (CFI = .989; RMSEA = .062; TLI= .983).

To measure subjective group relative deprivation, I use four different items. The first three items capture the cognitive component of subjective group relative deprivation, i.e., the appraisal that an individual realises that she as a representative of her in-group is disadvantaged compared to members of an out-group. The first item reads as follows, "*People like me have been systematically disadvantaged, while other groups have received more than they deserve*". This is a statement without a concrete reference group to avoid a bias of the results towards, for example, right-wing populism when using immigrants as a reference group (Urbanska & Guimond, 2018). Moreover, this serves as a test of whether perceived disadvantages compared to an out-group relate to populist attitudes, regardless of the host ideology.

Furthermore, I use two concrete comparison groups to account for the complexities of social identities. First, I use immigrants as comparison group: *"People like me have been systematically disadvantaged, while immigrants have received more than they deserve"*. Second, rich people form the second comparison group: *"People like me have been systematically disadvantaged, while rich people have received more than they deserve"*. All three can be regarded as adequate measures of the cognitive component of relative deprivation as they clearly include a comparison between the individual as a representative of a group and an unwarranted advantage of an out-group. In addition, the measures do not necessarily confine to an economic disadvantage but could also relate to a lack of recognition as source of disadvantage.

Figure 10 Boxplots of different forms of subjective group relative deprivation (SGRD) in the six countries



Notes: SGRD = Subjective group relative deprivation. Distribution based on original survey data from April – Mai 2020. Subjective group relative deprivation as geometric mean of the cognitive and affective component.

A necessary condition for subjective relative deprivation to be present, is the affective component signifying the angry resentment evoked by the unfair disadvantage (Smith & Pettigrew, 2014). Studies show that this affective component is crucial for relative deprivation to have an influence on attitudes or behaviour (Smith et al., 2012). To include this component, I combine the statements above with a measure for this affective component: "*It bothers me when other groups are undeservedly better off than people like me"*. To combine both components into three distinct measures, I take the geometric mean of each comparison and the affective component to make sure that people who feel disadvantaged but not angry do not display high values. To that end, I account for the affective component as necessary condition and include this component to capture the emotional element. Overall, this results in three different measures for subjective group relative deprivation which are recoded to range from 0 (low levels of relative deprivation) to 1 (high levels of relative deprivation).

Figure 10 shows the distribution of the three respective measures of subjective group relative deprivation. What becomes evident is that in many countries respondents feel unfairly disadvantaged compared to another group in society. There is considerably more variation when looking at subjective disadvantages compared to immigrants. There are respondents who do not feel any disadvantages compared to immigrants. Disadvantages to rich people seem to be much more common in all six countries.

6.3.3 Control Variables

To control for variables that might influence the relationship between social integration and populism, I include several important control variables. These can be distinguished in socio-demographic, economic, and attitudinal control variables. In the following, I explain why these variables were included and how they were measured in the survey.

Starting with the socio-demographic control variables, I include age and sex as control variables. Previous research has pointed towards the importance of age for explaining support for populism. Norris and Inglehart (2019) argue that older respondents are currently the most likely to support populist movements while Schäfer (2021) shows the opposite. Irrespective of the exact nature, age seems to be an important variable that should be accounted for. Thus, I include self-reported age measured in years. For sex, there is existing evidence that women are less likely to support different forms of populism (Coffé, 2019; Spierings & Zaslove, 2017). Moreover, a lot of the debate about working class support for (right-wing) populism centres on the support of the male working class and their perceived decline due to gender equality (Bornschier & Kriesi, 2013; Gest, 2016). I include sex as control variable with female as the reference category.

The second set of control variables focuses on an individual's economic and social position as this has been shown to influence support for populism (Bornschier & Kriesi, 2013; Ramiro, 2016; Rico & Anduiza, 2019). To tap into this influence, I use three different variables as they all account for different aspects. First, I use education as research has shown that education, especially the distinction between tertiary and non-tertiary is a vital grievance for current political conflict in general and for populism in particular (Bornschier et al., 2021; Spruyt et al., 2016). Furthermore, socialisation effects associated with higher levels of education are also accounted for. The original variable includes nine different education categories that were derived from the OECD (2019) and adapted to every country. To avoid distortions based on small numbers, I combine several categories, which results in an education variable with three categories: (1) primary and lower secondary, (2) upper and post-secondary, and (3) tertiary education.

Second, I use a variable that asks respondents about their current income situation. I opted for this variable instead of the reported income to avoid higher numbers of missing values

as well as to include the subjective component that relates to income. The question reads as follows: “How do you feel about your household's income nowadays?” Answers range from (1) It is very difficult to cope on my current income to (5) I can live comfortably on my current income and can save regularly. The variable is rescaled to range from 0 to 1. Lastly, I use the occupation status as an additional control variable in particular to control for the often cited susceptibility of the working class to populism (Bornschier & Kriesi, 2013; Oesch, 2008; Spies, 2013).

The third set of control variables are political and attitudinal variables. Two items are general in nature while the others aim to account for the specific host ideology of left- and right-wing populism and for political distrust. For the former, I include the left-right self-placement and political interest. Research has shown that populism and in particular populist attitudes without a host ideology are influenced by the left-right ideology of respondents, in particular by their left-right radicalism (Marcos-Marne, Llamazares, & Shikano, 2021; Rooduijn & Akkerman, 2017). To account for this, I include the question *“In political matters, people talk of "left" and "right". How would you place your views on this scale, generally speaking?”* which ranges from 0 (left) to 10 (right). I use the squared term to account for the u-shaped effect of left-right radicalism (Rooduijn & Akkerman, 2017).

Furthermore, while public discourse often regards supporters of populism as disenchanted and generally less interested in politics, recent research has shown that political interest and populism correlate positively (van Hauwaert & van Kessel, 2018; van Kessel et al., 2021). Thus, to avoid any distortion of the relationship under study, I include the question “*Generally speaking, are you very, quite, somewhat, a little or not at all interested in politics?*” Answers range from 1 (very interested) to 5 (not at all interested). Both left-right self-placement and political interest are rescaled to range from 0 to 1.

As I cannot disentangle the exact interplay between these variables and the independent and dependent variables with the data at hand, the following set of control variables are used for robustness checks (see chapter 6.4).[30] For political distrust, I use an additive index of four items that ask whether citizens trust (a) politicians, (b) the national government, (c) the local government, and (d) political parties.

Furthermore, I use items that aim to account for the specific host ideology of left- and right-wing populism. Thus, I use items that measure anti-capitalism for left-wing populism and nativism and authoritarianism for right-wing populism. For nativism, I use three items that focus on the perceived dangers of immigration, namely economic competition for natives, increasing crimes rates, and an undermining of the national culture by non-natives. For authoritarianism, I use three items that measure the components of submission, aggression, and conventionalism.

Table 4 Principal component analysis for ideological positions

Items	Nativism	Authoritarianism	Anti-capitalism
Immigrants take jobs away from the real [country natives]	**0.89**		
Immigrants increase crime rates.	**0.89**		
Immigrants generally undermine the national culture of [country].	**0.91**		
We need strong leaders so that we can live safely in society.		**0.66**	
The welfare of the national community should take precedence over our own individual interests.		**0.65**	
Troublemakers should be made to feel that they are not welcome in society.		**0.84**	
Most politicians care only about the interests of the rich and powerful.			**0.84**
Poor people should have more of a say in politics.			**0.81**

Notes: Principal component analysis with promax rotation. The items range from 0 (completely disagree) to 4 (completely agree). Displayed are rotated factor loadings and blanks represents loading below .5.

Lastly, for anti-capitalism, I rely on two items that focus on the inequities produced by modern capitalism, namely, the idea that political actors seem to favour the rich and powerful as well as big businesses (Hacker & Pierson, 2011) and the idea that poor people are forgotten

[30] Potentially, these variables are mediators that link social integration to populist support.

and not heard in the political process due to their marginal economic situation. Both are crucial aspects of a left-wing populist discourse (March, 2007).

Table 4 shows the items and reports the results of a principal component analysis that shows that the items load on three distinct factors that can be labelled nativism, authoritarianism, and anti-capitalism (H.-G. Wolff & Bacher, 2010). The respective items are thus combined into three different additive indexes that are then rescaled to range from 0 to 1. For all control variables described in this chapter, descriptive statistics can be found in Table A3 in the appendix.

6.4 Methodological Approach

In the following, I outline the methodological approach to test my hypotheses. This includes the method and the specifications for the respective models. To investigate the relationship between the different forms of social integration, populist attitudes, and populist party support in a comparative perspective, I rely on regression analyses that are based on original survey data. Overall, the analyses are structured along the different forms of social integration. First, populist attitudes are regressed on subjective social status. Subsequently, I regress radical right-wing populist party support on subjective social status and lastly radical left-wing populist party support on subjective social status. All models naturally include control variables. The same procedure applies for social trust and subjective group relative deprivation. Generally, for each relationship, I estimate a main model that includes socio-demographic and economic variables (age, sex, education, income situation, and occupation status) as well as two attitudinal control variables (political interest and ideological left-right self-placement (squared)).

Table 5 Summary of model specifications

Independent Variable	Country-by-Country	Pooled Sample	Basic Controls	Attitudinal controls	Ideological controls RWP	Ideological controls LWP	Political Distrust
DV: Populist Attitudes							
Subjective Social Status							
Main Specification	✓	✓	✓	✓			
Robustness 1	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓		
Robustness 2	✓	✓	✓	✓		✓	
Robustness 3	✓	✓	✓	✓			✓
Social Trust							
Main Specification	✓	✓	✓	✓			
Robustness 1	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓		
Robustness 2	✓	✓	✓	✓		✓	
Robustness 3	✓	✓	✓	✓			✓
Subjective Group Relative Deprivation							
Main Specification	✓	✓	✓	✓			
Robustness 1	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓		
Robustness 2	✓	✓	✓	✓		✓	
Robustness 3	✓	✓	✓	✓			✓
DV: Radical right-wing party support							
Subjective Social Status							
Main Specification	✓	✓	✓	✓			
Robustness 1	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓		
Robustness 2	✓	✓	✓	✓			✓
Social Trust							
Main Specification	✓	✓	✓	✓			
Robustness 1	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓		
Robustness 2	✓	✓	✓	✓			✓
Subjective Group Relative Deprivation							
Main Specification	✓	✓	✓	✓			
Robustness 1	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓		
Robustness 2	✓	✓	✓	✓			✓
DV: Radical left-wing party support							
Subjective Social Status							
Main Specification	✓	✓	✓	✓			
Robustness 1	✓	✓	✓	✓		✓	
Robustness 2	✓	✓	✓	✓			✓
Social Trust							
Main Specification	✓	✓	✓	✓			
Robustness 1	✓	✓	✓	✓		✓	
Robustness 2	✓	✓	✓	✓			✓
Subjective Group Relative Deprivation							
Main Specification	✓	✓	✓	✓			
Robustness 1	✓	✓	✓	✓		✓	
Robustness 2	✓	✓	✓	✓			✓

Additionally, I estimate robustness models that are reported in appendices B to D. These include political distrust and ideological orientations (nativism, authoritarianism, and anti-capitalism). These models have the purpose of investigating whether the relationship between different measures of social integration and the different forms of populism hold net of these control variables. It is important to note that these models are only used for robustness, as the nature of the data does not allow disentangling potential mediation relationships between the explanatory variables, distrust, ideology, and populism. [31] Table 5 summarises the different model specifications for each relationship.

For populist attitudes, I rely on ordinary least squares (OLS) regression models as the dependent variable can be regarded as continuous. This approach is common in the literature on populist attitudes (Bernhard & Hänggli, 2018; Filsinger, Wamsler, et al., 2021; Rico & Anduiza, 2019). The following equation (1) formally summarises the general model:

$$PopAtt_i = \alpha + \beta SSS_i + C_i + \varepsilon_i \quad (1)$$

For example, applied to subjective social status and populist attitudes, the equation implies the following: the dependent variable populist attitudes (PopAtt) is regressed on the independent variable subjective social status (SSS) and a vector of different control variables (C). Each model includes heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors (Huber-White standard errors) to account for unequal variance across observation points. I run the regression models for the pooled sample, before separately running them for each country to obtain a comparative perspective. For the pooled sample, I also include country fixed-effects to control for different country-level factors. Country fixed-effects allow controlling for potential (stable) differences between the countries making them useful in instances when country-level variables are not of interest or multi-level models are not an option.

[31] For example, social *disintegration* could affect nativism, which then affects support for right-wing populist parties and in a mediation, social integration would not have a statistically detectable effect on right-wing populism. However, to uncover such a mediation more sophisticated designs are needed.

For populist party support, I rely on linear probability models (Hellevik, 2009). Although, the variables on populist party support are binary (e.g., 0 for supporters of parties that are not right-wing and 1 for supporters of right-wing populist parties), linear probability models allow to estimate linear instead of logistic regressions models.

What makes linear probability models compelling is their intuitive interpretation as coefficients signify differences in the probabilities of the event occurring (in this case support for a populist party, Hellevik, 2009). This advantage is particularly useful given that using logistic regression models does not alter the findings. Thus, I use linear probability models that follow equation (2).

$$PPS_i = \alpha + \beta SSS_i + C_i + \varepsilon_i \tag{2}$$

Applied to subjective social status, equation 2 implies the following: the dependent variable populist party support (PPS) is regressed on the independent variable subjective social status (SSS) and a vector of different control variables (C).

7 Empirical Analysis Part 1: The Role of Subjective Social Status

The first chapter of the empirical analysis of this book is dedicated to the relationship between subjective social status and the different forms of populism. Chapter 7.1 presents how social status is related to populist attitudes without a host ideology. Chapter 7.2 deals with support for radical left- and right-wing populist parties. Chapter 7.3 rounds up the analyses with a discussion of the findings.

7.1 Subjective Social Status and Populist Attitudes

Subjective social status can be thought of in terms of relations of social esteem attached to a certain position or ascribed attributes that imply either superiority, inferiority, or equality depending on the social value (Chan & Goldthorpe, 2004, 2007). Put differently, it is best understood as individuals' "beliefs about where they stand relative to others in society", thereby capturing all three dimensions of social integration (Gidron & Hall, 2020, p. 1031). Populism seems as a compelling political answer to those who situate themselves at the lower end of the social hierarchy and thus outside of a shared normative order.

First, lower levels of subjective social status imply that people feel that they are not valued in society and more importantly that they stand below others in society. Lack of respect and recognition is likely to spark hostility that is directed against the political establishment making populism a particularly attractive option (Gidron & Hall, 2020). Second, confronted with a feeling of detachment and disintegration, people look for a positive identity and restoration of their former or deserved status. Populism constructs a virtuous in-group – the people – that has been sidelined to the fringes and deprived of their previous status. Further, populism offers the means to restore individuals' status by putting the people first (Engler & Weisstanner, 2021). Third, the dualistic nature of populism is particularly attractive when it comes to status concerns as it makes drawing (group-)boundaries easier by presenting a clear

distinction between a glorified in-group and a vilified out-group. To that end, populism allows enhancing the status of the in-group trough confrontational relationships with out-groups and the elite. In this regard, subjective social status is hypothesised to be negatively related to populism as higher levels of status indicate higher levels of social integration.

In the following, I present the results of the linear regression models based on cross-sectional survey data from France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom (UK). I start with data from the pooled sample before investigating the relationship within each of the six countries. The model specification follows the structure outlined in Table 5.

Figure 11 Coefficient plot for the country-wise relationship between subjective social status and populist attitudes



Notes: Estimates are based on Table B-1 in Appendix B. Displayed are coefficients of subjective social status with 99% (light grey bars), 95% (dark grey bars), and 90% (black bars) confidence intervals.

Figure 11 shows the coefficients of subjective social status for the main model specification predicting populist attitudes in the pooled sample as well as in the six countries

separately. With respect to the pooled sample, the results are in line with hypothesis 1. Subjective social status is significantly and negatively related to populist attitudes. In terms of substantiality, the upper left panel in Figure 12 shows the average marginal effect of subjective social status on populist attitudes. A change from the lowest social status to the middle social status corresponds to an increase in populist attitudes of .02 which is around 20 percent of a standard deviation and thus rather modest.

Performing the robustness checks outlined in Table 5 shows that when controlling for additional ideological factors such as nativism and authoritarianism or anti-capitalism the relationship remains significant, although the size of the coefficient of social status decreases slightly (Tables B-2 – B-3, Appendix B). Thus, controlling for issue positions relevant for different forms of populism does not alter the negative relationship between subjective social status and populist attitudes in the pooled sample. However, when controlling for political trust, the coefficient of subjective social status becomes insignificant (Table B-4, Appendix B). This might indicate a potential mediation that is, however, fully in line with the theoretical underpinning of hypothesis 1. Lower levels of subjective social status and thus social *disintegration* makes people less trusting towards political actors and thus more sceptical towards the political system, which in turn increases their proclivity to hold populist attitudes. Yet, the exact nature of this relationship cannot be tested without additional data and a different methodological design.

Additionally, it is prudent to investigate whether these conclusions also hold within the countries or whether there are significant differences between the countries. To do so, I estimate the models separately for France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Switzerland, and the UK. The remainder of Figure 11 shows the coefficients of subjective social status by country. The results show remarkable differences between the countries weakening the support for hypothesis 1. People with lower subjective social status have higher levels of populist attitudes compared to

those with higher subjective social status in France, Germany, and Spain. The relationship between subjective social status and populist attitudes is insignificant in Italy, Switzerland, and the UK. A potential explanation for the variation in the relationship between social status and populist attitudes could be found in the political supply-side of the respective countries (see chapter 7.3).

Figure 12 Average marginal effects of subjective social status on populist attitudes



Notes: Estimates are based on the models in Table B-1 in Appendix B. Displayed are the average marginal effects of subjective social status with 99% (light grey area), 95% (dark grey area), and 90% (black area) confidence intervals.

Regarding the substantiality of the findings in France, Germany, and Spain, the upper right and both lower panels in Figure 12 show the average marginal effects of social status in the respective countries. A change from the lowest social status to the middle social status corresponds to an increase in populist attitudes of .04 in France (around 35 percent of a standard deviation), 0.3 in Germany (around 30 percent of a standard deviation), and of .04 in Spain

(around 50 percent of a standard deviation). All average marginal effects are rather modest in size.

Again, controlling for additional ideological factors such as nativism and authoritarianism or anti-capitalism does not alter the findings substantively (Tables B-2 – B-3, Appendix B). When controlling for political trust, the coefficient for subjective social status remains negative and significant in Spain but is no longer distinguishable from zero in the other countries (Table B-4, Appendix B).

A short note on the control variables that are shown to be related to populist attitudes across the countries. In line with previous studies, men have on average higher levels of populist attitudes. People with tertiary education have less populist attitudes as do people whose income situation is more favourable. Left-right self-placement displays the expected u-shaped relationship. People who place themselves very far to the left or very far to the right have higher levels of populist attitudes. All these findings are in line with the literature.

Overall, the results from these analyses offer mixed support for hypothesis 1. While subjective social status is negatively related to populist attitudes in the pooled sample, country analyses show that this relationship is only prevalent in France, Germany, and Spain but not in Italy, Switzerland, and the UK. Thus, it seems that the relationship between subjective social status and populist attitudes without a host ideology is generally negative as expected. However, the relationship does not manifest itself in every country. Furthermore, while these findings are independent of ideological positions, political trust seems to significantly affect the relationship between subjective social status and populist attitudes and potentially function as a mediator. This offers avenues for future research.

7.2 Subjective Social Status and Radical Left- and Right-Wing Populism

For radical right- and left-wing populism, I maintain that subjective social status is negatively related to both forms of populism. However, I argue that the motivation why people support one or the other party differs. People who have a lower status based on developments that are not necessarily accompanied by economic decline or that are based on cultural developments might be more likely to support radical right-wing populist parties (Gidron & Hall, 2020). Furthermore, the fear of falling down further on the social ladder makes people more inclined to draw sharp boundaries against those perceived to be even lower on the social ladder (Burgoon et al., 2019; Kuziemko et al., 2014). In this regard, radical right-wing populism is a viable political option for those that feel socially marginalised (Engler & Weisstanner, 2021; Gidron & Hall, 2020).

Radical left-wing populism focuses strongly on redistribution and economic relief for those believed to be most disadvantaged by the current inequities of modern capitalism. Thus, the focus of this form of populism is directed towards economic questions rather than cultural grievances. Consequently, the argument is that those most disadvantaged in terms of subjective social status are more likely to support radical left-wing populism as they demand economic relief (Burgoon et al., 2019). In the following, I present the results of the linear probability models that explain (1) radical right-wing populist party support before turning to (2) radical left-wing populist party support. The model specification will follow the structure outlined in Table 5.

Panel A in Figure 13 shows the coefficients of subjective social status predicting support for a radical right-wing populist party. Looking at the results for the pooled sample, it becomes evident that subjective social status significantly decreases the probability of supporting a radical right-wing populist party. In terms of substantiality, a respondent in the lowest category

of social status has a probability of supporting a right-wing populist party of around .2 while a person with a mid-level social status has a probability of around .16 (see upper left panel in Figure 14). Thus, an upward movement of around two and half standard deviations amounts to a decrease of around four percentage points in the likelihood of supporting a radical right-wing populist party. This is comparable to the findings of Gidron and Hall (2020).

Figure 13 Coefficient plot for the relationship between subjective social status and support for a radical right-wing populist party (Panel A) and support for a radical left-wing populist party (Panel B)



Notes: Estimates are based on Table B-5 (panel A) and B-8 (panel B) in Appendix B. Displayed are coefficients of subjective social status with 99% (light grey bars), 95% (dark grey bars), and 90% (black bars) confidence intervals.

Performing the robustness checks outlined in Table 5 shows that when controlling for the relevant ideological orientations of right-wing populism, nativism and authoritarianism, the relationship remains negative and significant in the pooled sample (Table B-6, Appendix B). Yet again, when controlling for political trust, the relationship turns insignificant (Table B-7, Appendix B). Again, it could be argued that political trust mediates the relationship, i.e., political trust connects lower levels of subjective status and right-wing populist party support.

Given the country differences found in the analyses of populist attitudes, I investigate the relationship between subjective social status and right-wing populist party support separately for France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Switzerland, and the UK. Panel A in Figure 13 also plots the coefficients of subjective social status by country. The results show remarkable differences to the analyses of populist attitudes. Subjective social status is only negatively related to right-wing populist party support in Germany and Italy as well as the UK but only on the 10% significance level.

With regard to the substantiality, in Germany, the difference in the probability of supporting a right-wing populist party between a respondent with the lowest social status and a respondent with mid-level social status is around 8 percentage points, in Italy this difference is 10 percentage points, and in the UK around 5 percentage points (Figure 14). The relationship is insignificant in France, Spain, and Switzerland. These results remain relatively consistent when controlling for the relevant ideological orientations for right-wing populism, nativism and authoritarianism (Table B-6, Appendix B). Yet, when controlling for political trust, the relationship turns insignificant in all countries pointing towards a potential mediation (Table B-7, Appendix B).

Regarding the control variables, I find that people with tertiary education are less likely to support radical right-wing populist parties, although this relationship is not consistent across countries. Furthermore, people who are more interested in politics are also more likely to support such parties. Lastly, the most consistent and least surprising finding is that people who see themselves more to the right in the political spectrum are more likely to support radical right-wing populist parties. All other variables remain insignificant across countries or only occasionally gain statistical significance.

Overall, the results from these analyses offer a mixed picture for the relationship between subjective social status and support for radical right-wing populist parties. The country

analyses qualify the support for hypothesis 2 obtained by the pooled sample analyses. The fact that the relationship between social status and radical right-wing populist party support is not consistent across countries contradicts a universal relationship between subjective social status and right-wing populist party support. Furthermore, the vulnerability of the relationship to the inclusion of political trust as control variable demands further attention in future research which should aim to disentangle the paths through which status relates to radical right-wing populist party support.

Figure 14 Average marginal effects of subjective social status on right-wing populist party support



Notes: Estimates are based on the models in Table B-5 in Appendix B. Displayed are average marginal effects of subjective social status with 99% (light grey area), 95% (dark grey area), and 90% (black area) confidence intervals.

For left-wing populism, I have to rely on a smaller set of countries as only France, Germany, and Spain have a significant radical left-wing populist party. Thus, pooled sample analyses are based on the combined samples of these three countries. Panel B in Figure 13

shows the coefficients of subjective social status predicting support for a radical left-wing populist party. Interestingly, in the pooled sample, I find no significant relationship between subjective social status and support for a radical left-wing populist party. This null finding is unchanged when including anti-capitalist attitudes as ideological control variable or political trust into the model (see Tables B-9 – B-10, Appendix B).

Figure 15 Average marginal effects of subjective social status on left-wing populist party support



Notes: Estimates are based on the models in Table B-8 in Appendix B. Displayed are average marginal effects of subjective social status with 99% (light grey area), 95% (dark grey area), and 90% (black area) confidence intervals.

Looking at the three countries (France, Germany, and Spain) that have a sizeable radical left-wing populist party separately, I again find country-level differences. Panel B in Figure 13 shows that as in the pooled sample, the coefficient for subjective social status is indistinguishable from zero in Spain. However, in France and Germany, people with higher levels of subjective social status are significantly less likely to support a radical left-wing

populist party. The difference in the probability of supporting a left-wing populist party between a respondent with the lowest social status and a person with mid-level social status is around 6 percentage points in France and 10 percentage points in Germany (Figure 15). Again, these findings remain robust when including anti-capitalist attitudes as ideological control variable or when including political trust into the model (see Tables B-9 – B-10, Appendix B). Thus, in France and Germany, people with lower subjective social status are drawn towards radical left-wing populist parties. People with lower subjective social status might be motivated by the offer of direct economic relief prominent in radical left-wing populist parties' discourse.

With regard to the control variables, two findings stand out. First, as expected people who situate themselves more to the left of the political spectrum are more likely to support radical left-wing populist parties. The same holds true for people who are more interested in politics. All other variables remain insignificant across countries or only occasionally gain significance.

In sum, subjective social status is consistently and negatively related to support for a radical left-wing populist party in two out of three countries offering support for hypothesis 3. Yet again, the results demand caution as the relationship is not evident in Spain indicating that contextual factors or mobilisation strategies potentially play an important role. For example, *Podemos* in Spain more explicitly focuses on younger and higher educated individuals compared to *Die Linke* in Germany, which has a more traditional focus on the working class (see chapter 7.3).

Overall, the results for the relationship between subjective social status and radical left- and right-wing populist support are similar to those of populist attitudes. There is only partial support for hypotheses 2 and 3. While there are indications that subjective social status is negatively related to these two different manifestations of populism, the relationship is only evident in three out of six for radical right-wing populist party support and in two out of three

countries for radical left-wing populist party support. Thus, while the relationship seems to be negative it is dependent on contextual factors that should be investigated in future studies. Furthermore, in case of radical right-wing populism, there are indications that political trust functions as a mediator between subjective social status and support for radical right-wing populist parties, which warrants further exploration in future research.

7.3 Chapter Discussion

In this chapter, I tested the hypothesis that subjective social status as a manifestation of social integration is negatively related to different forms of populism. The analyses provide mixed support for hypotheses 1, 2, and 3.

I start the discussion with hypothesis 1, which tests the relationship between subjective social status and populist attitudes. The analyses reveal that subjective social status is negatively related to populist attitudes in France, Germany, and Spain but not in Italy, Switzerland, and the UK. While the results for France, Germany, and Spain are in line with the expectations formulated in hypothesis 1, Italy, Switzerland, and the UK demand further attention. One potential explanation for the variation in the relationship between social status and populist attitudes could be found in the supply-side of the respective countries. France, Germany, and Spain are the countries in the sample that have a radical left- and right-wing populist party, while Italy, Switzerland, and the UK only have a radical right-wing populist party.[32]

The presence of left- and right-wing populism might make populism more attractive for people with lower subjective social status in general, while the sole presence of a radical right-wing populist party might make this relationship more complex. Previous research argued that right-wing populist supporters are not those with the lowest status but rather those a few steps

[32] Italy also has a valence populist party potentially making the relationship even more complex.

up from the bottom making the relationship between status and populism more complex (Kurer, 2020; Kurer & Palier, 2019; Kuziemko et al., 2014). Thus, in Italy, Switzerland, and the UK people with the lowest subjective social status might not be drawn to populism, as the populism in these countries does not unequivocally offer a remedy for their situation.

Furthermore, the robustness checks point towards a potential mediation between subjective social status, political trust, and populist attitudes. When including political trust as control variable, the coefficient of social status decreases in size and loses significance which can be interpreted as an indication of a mediation (VanderWeele, 2016). Hypothetically, lower subjective social status leads to less political trust, which in turn increases populist attitudes. Such a mediation is in line with the theoretical underpinnings of hypothesis 1 as social marginalisation is expected to increase a sceptical view towards mainstream political actors and institutions. As political trust is regarded as the extent to which political actors fulfil the expectations of the individual voter, it is likely that social *disintegration* decreases political trust. Subsequently, disappointed expectations of mainstream political actors are often regarded as a source of populist support. Consequently, failures of representation increase suspicion towards the political elite and increase populist attitudes. While the data at hand does not allow disentangling this mediating path empirically, it is certainly a promising task for future research to test this causal chain.

For radical right-wing populist party support, the analyses show a significant and negative coefficient in Germany, Italy, and the UK. These findings are fully in line with hypothesis 2. Studies find some evidence that unskilled workers in the UK and Germany perceive that their subjective social status has decreased compared to their father making status decline a relevant topic and a potentially mobilising issue for radical right-wing populist parties (Oesch & Vigna, 2021). In both countries, the dominant radical right-wing populist parties have specifically aimed at those with lower social status.

UKIP in particular targeted the working class in an effort to gain seats in elections and to sway the Brexit referendum towards “Leave” (Carella & Ford, 2020; Ford & Goodwin, 2014). The *Alternative für Deutschland* similarly focusses on the German working-class which they argue has been neglected by the political elite and disadvantaged by the recent economic transformations, making this party attractive for those on the lower ranks of the status ladder (Tutić & Hermanni, 2018). Lastly, the *Lega* in Italy provided a discourse that pitted hard-working people against a bureaucratic, corrupt, and lazy political establishment. As such, the party clearly aims towards those that work hard but do not get rewarded (Ignazi, 2005).

Contrary to my expectations, subjective social status is unrelated to radical right-wing populist party support in France, Spain, and Switzerland. In Switzerland, the Swiss People’s Party (SVP) does not traditionally mobilise a working-class or lower status clientele. Also due to its development from a rural and centrist party into a modern-day right-wing populist party, it differs from other radical right-wing populist parties.

Furthermore, the SVP traditionally favoured market-liberal policies and less state intervention compared to similar parties in other countries making it less attractive for those with lower levels of subjective social status (Ackermann et al., 2018; Kurella & Rosset, 2018). What is more, low-status working-class men are also less prevalent in Switzerland (Oesch & Vigna, 2021). Oesch and Vigna (2021) recently showed that median income remained rather stable for the working class and that in Switzerland the social status evolved in parallel for the unskilled working class and the upper middle class. Consequently, for people with low levels of subjective social status, the SVP is not the most attractive political option.

The null finding for *Vox* in Spain can be explained in a similar way. As a relatively new radical right-wing populist party, *Vox* differs from other radical right-wing populist parties with regard to its voter base. While common wisdom associates low social status and working-class men with voting for the populist radical right, *Vox’s* “constituents are more bourgeois, with the

party banking significantly more votes among urban residents, those with higher secondary education, and citizens with high income levels" (Turnbull-Dugarte et al., 2020, p. 15). The non-significant coefficient for social status in Spain can thus be interpreted as logical consequence of the specific characteristics of *Vox's* mobilisation strategies given its distinct voter base.

Lastly, the null finding for France is slightly more difficult to explain as the *Rassemblement National* (RN) usually mobilises social strata with lower levels of social status, less education, and members of the working-class (Eribon, 2009). One explanation could be that with *La France Insoumise*, a radical left-wing populist party entered the stage and successfully competed with the RN in lower social strata, in particular the working class and among people with lower levels of subjective social status.

The findings for left-wing populist party support align with this reasoning as lower levels of subjective social status significantly predict support for *La France Insoumise*. To that end, while people with lower subjective status might still vote for the *Rassemblement National,* the electoral competition from the radical left makes this relationship less straightforward. Yet, explanations for why subjective social status does not predict support for the RN in France warrant further detailed investigation.

Overall, this discussion has shown that while lower subjective social status might render people more inclined to support radical right-wing populist parties, this relationship is context-dependent. Economic trajectories of the lower social strata on the one hand and mobilisation strategies of the populist parties on the other hand, are crucial in determining whether subjective social status is a significant predictor of radical right-wing populist party support. In this vein, future research should account for these findings by employing a comparative approach that takes country differences into account.

As with respect to populist attitudes, the robustness checks point towards a potential mediation between subjective social status, political trust, and radical right-wing populist party support. When including political trust as control variable, the coefficient of social status decreases in size and loses significance. It seems that failures of representation in terms of social marginalisation increase suspicion towards the political elite which in turn makes people more likely to support radical right-wing populist parties that function as their 'agents of discontent' (van Kessel, 2015). Unfortunately, the data at hand does not allow disentangling such a potential mediation empirically. Thus, future studies might need to dive deeper into the question whether lower subjective social status leads to less political trust and how this translates into support for radical right-wing populist parties.

For radical left-wing populist party support, the analyses show a significant and negative coefficient in France and Germany but not in Spain. The finding for France and Germany is in line with the expectation that radical left-wing populist parties are able to mobilise those with lower subjective social status as they offer redistribution as a way to obtain relief for their precarious position. *Die Linke* in Germany has been known to mobilise disenchanted working-class voters that formerly supported the Social Democrats. A similar observation can be made for *La France Insoumise*.

The insignificant finding for Spain, however, demands further attention. One potential explanation lies in the characteristics of *Podemos*. *Podemos* mobilises rather higher educated and younger citizens (Marcos-Marne, 2021). Founded as a response to the long-lasting economic crisis and the implementation of harsh austerity politics that were accompanied by high levels of youth unemployment, *Podemos* is less concerned with the issues of the traditional working-class than its radical left-wing pendants in other countries that are rooted in socialist ideology. Furthermore, *Podemos* also focuses on issues of equality that go beyond income and touch upon post-material values such as LGBTQ+ rights making it particularly attractive for

younger, higher educated, and progressive voters (Marcos-Marne, 2021). Lastly, the focus on redistribution makes the party also attractive for higher educated but progressive voters resulting in a less clear characterisation of the voter base in terms of lower levels of social status (Ramiro & Gomez, 2017).

Overall, the analyses regarding the relationship between subjective social status and the different forms of populism offer mixed support for hypotheses 1, 2, and 3. While subjective social status is negatively related to populist attitudes as well as to radical left- and right-wing populist party support, the results are qualified by the fact that the relationship is not evident in every country studied here. It seems that contextual factors such as the political supply-side, party structures, or economic trajectories are important in determining whether social status is related to support for populism or not. As such, my findings echo recent calls for caution when it comes to the alleged decline of subjective social status for the working class and its explanatory power for new political phenomena (Oesch & Vigna, 2021). At the same time, the results call for future research into how social marginalisation in terms of social status affects support for populist politics and what theoretical channels link status and populism.

8 Empirical Analysis Part 2: The Role of Social Trust

The second chapter of the empirical analysis of this book is dedicated to the relationship between social trust and the different forms of populism. Chapter 8.1 presents how the different forms of social trust relate to populist attitudes without a host ideology. Chapter 8.2 deals with the relationship between different forms of social trust and support for radical left- and right-wing populist parties. Chapter 8.3 concludes these analyses with a discussion.

8.1 Social Trust and Populist Attitudes

Social trust is best defined "as expectation that others will contribute to the well-being of a person or a group, or at least will refrain from harmful actions" (Freitag & Traunmüller, 2009, p. 782). Furthermore, trust is regarded as a three-dimensional concept with three distinct but related forms: particularised trust (trust in close people), generalised trust (trust in strangers and people in general), and identity-based trust (trust in those who share certain identity-traits). Regarding the relationship with populism, I make distinct arguments for the respective forms of social trust.

People who lack particularised trust and thus lack close support networks and interactions feel detached and alienated from society leaving them with a need for community and identity (Bolet, 2021). Populism then provides a compelling answer by offering an identity that provides a sense of community as well as culprits for people's frustrating situation (Rydgren, 2009). Put differently, particularised trust is hypothesised to be negatively related to populist attitudes.

People with high levels of generalised trust – with its integrative vision that overcomes boundaries and group distinctions – are socially integrated as they see themselves as part of a shared normative order. More importantly, generalised trust implies that people not only see themselves as part of this shared order but other members of society as well, as this order relies

on mutual recognition and respect. The integrative vision of generalised trust is in stark contrast to the conflictual view on society and politics inherent in a populist ideology. This leads me to expect a negative relationship between generalised trust and populist attitudes.

As opposed to particularised and generalised trust, identity-based trust is hypothesised to be positively related to populist attitudes. Identity-based trust challenges a societally shared order as it excludes parts of society based on ascriptive criteria. To that end, it aligns with a populist conception of society by focusing on a narrowly definable part of society combined with a derogation and exclusion of those that are not part of this preferred group. Populism presents clear group distinctions in terms of a glorified in-group and a vilified out-group, which aligns nicely with identity-based trust.

Figure 16 Coefficient plot for the country-wise relationship between different forms of social trust and populist attitudes



Notes: Estimates are based on the models in Table C-1 in Appendix C. Displayed are coefficients of different forms of social trust with 99% (light grey bars), 95% (dark grey bars), and 90% (black bars) confidence intervals.

Having briefly summarised my theoretical expectations, in the following, I present the results of the linear regression models based on original cross-sectional survey data from France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Switzerland, and the UK. I start with data from the pooled sample before investigating the relationship in each of the six countries. The model specification follows the structure outlined in Table 5.

Starting with particularised trust, Figure 16 shows that particularised trust is negatively related to populist attitudes in the pooled sample analysis. People who have higher levels of trust in their family and friends hold less populist attitudes. Inspecting country-by-country variation shows that this relationship holds in four out of the six countries. The coefficient of particularised trust is indistinguishable from zero only in Germany and Spain

Figure 17 Average marginal effects of particularised trust on populist attitudes



Notes: Estimates are based on the models Table C-1 in Appendix C. Displayed are average marginal effects of particularised trust with 99% (light grey area), 95% (dark grey area), and 90% (black area) confidence intervals.

Regarding the substantiality of the results, Figure 17 shows the average marginal effects of particularised trust on populist attitudes based on the pooled sample as well as for each of the respective countries. The size of the coefficient is around half a standard deviation in the pooled sample, thus a change from no particularised trust to high particularised trust corresponds to a decrease in populist attitudes of .05. In France, Italy, Switzerland, and the UK, the coefficient is similar in size varying between 50 and 60 percent of a standard deviation when looking at a change from no particularised trust to high particularised trust (see Figure 17). These conclusions hold when controlling for additional ideological factors such as nativism and authoritarianism, anti-capitalism, or political trust. Particularised trust remains negatively related to populist attitudes in all countries except Germany and Spain (see Tables C2 – C4, Appendix C). Overall, these findings lend support to hypothesis 4. However, the relationship is not evident in Germany and Spain.

Turning to identity-based trust, the analyses in Figure 16 generally support the contention of hypothesis 6. Identity-based trust is positively and significantly related to populist attitudes in the pooled sample. People who place their trust in those that are similar to them have higher levels of populist attitudes. Note that identity-based trust includes four different groups on which the identification can be based on. Nevertheless, these findings also hold when separating identity-based trust into ethnic-based trust (language and nationality), and class-based trust (social class and occupation; see Tables C-5 – C-6, Appendix C). This crucially strengthens the claim that identity-based trust with its strong group demarcation resonates well with populism and that this relationship seems to be independent of the constructed out-groups. Put differently, the relationship between identity-based trust and populist attitudes seems to be independent of the trusted in-group.

Looking at the country analyses, the results show remarkable consistency. Identity-based trust is positively and significantly related to populist attitudes in all countries but the

UK. Regarding the substantiality of the results, Figure 18 shows the average marginal effects of identity-based trust on populist attitudes based on the pooled sample as well as in the respective countries. The size of the coefficient is around 50 percent of a standard deviation in the pooled sample and ranges from 40 percent in Germany and Spain, 50 percent in Italy, 60 percent in France to 75 percent of a standard deviation in Switzerland. For example, in Italy, a change from no identity-based trust to high identity-based trust corresponds to an increase in populist attitudes from .12 to .18 (see Figure 18).

Figure 18 Average marginal effects of identity-based trust on populist attitudes



Notes: Estimates are based on the models in Table C-1 in Appendix C. Displayed are average marginal effects of identity-based trust with 99% (light grey area), 95% (dark grey area), and 90% (black area) confidence intervals.

Furthermore, these conclusions remain robust when controlling for political trust (see Table C-4, Appendix C). When controlling for nativism and authoritarianism, identity-based trust turns insignificant in Germany and Spain (see Table C-2, Appendix C). Including anti-capitalist attitudes as control variable turns identity-based trust insignificant in Germany (see

Table C-3, Appendix C). While these findings might point towards a potential mediation, the precise interplay is unclear and the data at hand does not allow disentangling such relationships. Overall, the general contention of hypothesis 6 seems to be supported: with the exception of the UK, identity-based trust is positively related to populist attitudes.

Figure 19 Average marginal effects of generalised trust on populist attitudes



Notes: Estimates are based on the models in Table C-1 in Appendix C. Displayed are average marginal effects of generalised trust with 99% (light grey area), 95% (dark grey area), and 90% (black area) confidence intervals.

Lastly, Figure 16 also shows the results for generalised trust and its relationship with populist attitudes. As expected in hypothesis 5, generalised trust is significantly negatively related to populist attitudes in the pooled sample. This finding is consolidated by the patterns found in the respective countries. The coefficient of generalised trust is negative and significant in all countries (at the 10 percent level in the UK). Individuals who regard strangers and people in general as trustworthy hold less populist attitudes than those who regard others as untrustworthy. When looking at the substantiality of these relationships it becomes evident that

generalised trust does not only offer the most consistent picture but also the strongest relationship. The size of the coefficient is around 70 percent of a standard deviation in the pooled sample and ranges from around 90 percent in Germany, Spain, and Switzerland, 80 percent in France, 70 percent in Italy to only 40 percent in the UK. For example, in Germany, a change from no generalised trust to high generalised trust corresponds to a decrease in populist attitudes from .17 to .08 (see Figure 19).

Looking at the robustness analyses, the conclusions mainly hold when controlling for additional ideological factors and political trust (see Tables C-2 – C-4, Appendix C). When controlling for nativism and authoritarianism, generalised trust turns insignificant in Germany and the UK. Including anti-capitalist attitudes as control variable turns identity-based trust insignificant in the UK. The main change in results is observed when including political trust as generalised trust then turns insignificant in France, Germany, and the UK. However, as mentioned above, the precise interplay between these variables cannot be disentangled. Overall, the analyses lend empirical support to hypothesis 5 by showing that people with higher generalised trust have lower levels of populist attitudes.

A short look at the control variables shows that again sex, education, income situation, and left-right self-placement are the main control variables that are shown to be related to populist attitudes across the countries. Men have higher levels of populist attitudes, while people with tertiary education and people whose income situation is more favourable have less populist attitudes. Left-right self-placement displays the expected u-shaped relationship. People who place themselves very far to the left or very far to the right have higher levels of populist attitudes. All these findings are predominantly in line with the literature.

To summarise the empirical results presented in this subchapter, the analyses lend support for hypotheses 4, 5, and 6. Regarding hypothesis 4, particularised trust is negatively related to populist attitudes in four out of the six countries. For hypothesis 6, identity-based

trust is negatively related to populist attitudes in five out of the six countries but is less robust to the inclusion of ideological control variables pointing towards potential mediation relationships. Lastly, the strongest support is found for hypothesis 5 as generalised trust is strongly negatively related to populist attitudes in all six countries under study.

8.2 Social Trust and Left- and Right-Wing Populism

For radical right- and left-wing populism, I offered different arguments on how the dimensions of social trust relate to both forms of populism. With respect to the explanatory power of particularised trust, I argued that there should be no differences between the two forms of populism. While right- and left-wing populism differ with regard to the way they present their populism, both offer a new form of community and identification for those that lack support of their immediate environment and who thus feel disintegrated and detached from society. Thus, I hypothesised that particularised trust is negatively related to radical left- and right-wing populist party support (Hypotheses 4a and 4b).

Similar arguments can be made for generalised trust. Here, I argued that the integrative vision of generalised trust is at odds with both forms of populism. Both radical right- and left-wing populism construct in-group-out-group distinctions that are fundamentally contradictory to an integration of society within a shared normative order as expressed by generalised trust. While this contradiction might be more straightforward for right-wing populism with its exclusionary and nativist positions, radical left-wing populism is also regarded as exclusionary – albeit on different criteria (Sanders et al., 2017). Thus, I hypothesised that generalised trust is negatively related to radical left- and right-wing populist party support (Hypotheses 5a and 5b).

Figure 20 Coefficient plot for the country-wise relationship between different forms of social trust and right-wing populist party support



Notes: Estimates are based on the models in Table C-7 in Appendix C. Displayed are coefficients of different forms of social trust with 99% (light grey bars), 95% (dark grey bars), and 90% (black bars) confidence intervals.

Lastly, for identity-based trust, I maintain that this form of trust is positively related to both forms of populism but that the in-group matters decisively for which form of populism is supported. As right-wing populism is based on nativism and a restrictive understanding of national belonging, I argue that individuals who trust those who have the same nationality or speak the same language (ethnic-based trust), are more likely to support a right-wing populist party (Hypothesis 6a). Conversely, left-wing populism is based on economic questions, making people who trust those who share the same social class or occupation more likely to support this form of populism (Hypothesis 6b).

Figure 20 shows the results of the linear probability models for the pooled sample and the respective countries explaining radical right-wing populist support. Starting with

particularised trust, the analyses show no significant relationship between this form of trust and support for a right-wing populist party in the pooled sample. More importantly, when looking at the six countries individually, the coefficients are all indistinguishable from zero. Thus, the empirical results clearly contradict hypothesis 4a. These null findings hold when introducing additional ideological control variables or political trust (see Tables C-8 – C-9, Appendix C). It seems that a lack of particularised trust is not related to radical right-wing populist party support. Potentially, this form of social *disintegration* sparks alienation rather than political engagement and support at the ballot box (see chapter 8.3).

Turning to identity-based trust – here ethnic-based identity-based trust – the analyses show that ethnic-based trust is not significantly related to support for a right-wing populist party in the pooled sample (Figure 20). Looking at the countries separately, the results are supported in Germany, Italy, Spain, and the UK. Only in France and Switzerland does ethnic-based trust increase the probability of supporting a right-wing populist party. To be precise, the difference in the probability of supporting a right-wing populist party between a respondent with no ethnic-based trust and a respondent with high ethnic-based trust is around 16 percentage points in France and around 20 percentage points in Switzerland. Both are rather strong relationships that seem to be country-specific.

When introducing additional ideological control variables relevant for right-wing populism, these relationships in France and Switzerland disappear pointing towards a mediation running from ethnic-based trust to anti-immigration attitudes to right-wing populist party support (see Table C-8, Appendix C). Irrespective, these findings cannot be regarded as strong support for hypothesis 6a. Thus, surprisingly ethnic-based trust and thus partial social *disintegration* is not consistently positively related to support for right-wing populism.

Figure 21 Coefficient plot for the country-wise relationship between different forms of social trust and left-wing populist party support



Notes: Estimates are based on the models in Table C-10 in Appendix C. Displayed are coefficients of different forms of social trust with 99% (light grey bars), 95% (dark grey bars), and 90% (black bars) confidence intervals.

Lastly, the findings for generalised trust are the most consistent albeit far from unequivocally supporting hypothesis 5a. The analyses in the lower part of Figure 20 show that generalised trust is significantly and negatively related to support for right-wing populist parties in the pooled sample. Furthermore, this finding is persistent in France, Germany, and Switzerland. However, generalised trust is not related to radical right-wing populist party support in Italy, Spain, and the UK. These findings remain largely robust when including ideological control variables (except for Switzerland) but not when including political trust (see Tables C-11 – C-12, Appendix C). While the significant relationships are sizeable, (around 20-percentage point differences between no and high generalised trust) they only provide partial evidence for hypothesis 5a. While it seems that in France, Germany, and to some extent

Switzerland, the integrative power of generalised trust protects against right-wing populism, this is not true in the other three countries.

With regard to the control variables, only two results are worth noting. First, people who are more interested in politics are also more likely to support radical right-wing populist parties. Second, the most consistent and least surprising finding is that people who see themselves more to the right in the political spectrum are more likely to support radical right-wing populist parties. All other variables remain insignificant or only occasionally gain statistical significance.

After the rather inconsistent findings for right-wing populism, the analyses of left-wing populism offer a more consistent picture. The consistency lies in the fact that out of the 12 relevant coefficients presented in Figure 21, only one is significantly different from zero. Starting with particularised trust, the analyses show no significant relationship between this form of social trust and support for a left-wing populist party in France, Germany, and Spain (or the pooled sample of these three countries). Hypotheses 4b is clearly refuted. The same holds true for class-based trust, which is also not significantly related to support for a left-wing populist party, refuting hypothesis 6b. Lastly, there is no significant relationship between generalised trust and support for a left-wing populist party in Germany, Spain, or the pooled sample. Yet, there is positive and significant relationship in France implying that people who are more trusting towards strangers and people in general – i.e., people with higher levels of social integration – are more likely to support the radical left-wing party, *La France Insoumise*. All these (non-)findings remain robust when including anti-capitalist attitudes or political trust and as such provide a clear refutation of hypotheses 4b, 5b, and 6b.

With regard to the control variables, two variables are worth noting. First, as expected people who situate themselves more to the left of the political spectrum are more likely to support radical left-wing populist parties. The same holds true for people who are more

interested in politics. All other variables remain insignificant or only occasionally gain significance.

Overall, while the results for populist attitudes in chapter 8.1 were largely supportive of the hypotheses, there is only scant evidence for the relationship between the different dimensions of social trust and radical left- and right-wing populist party support. The clearest result is that generalised trust is negatively related to support for right-wing populism in three out of the six countries. Furthermore, there is some indication that ethnic-based trust is driving support for right-wing populism in France and Switzerland. Generally, the analyses presented in chapter 8.2 do not offer support for hypotheses 4a, 4b, 5b, and 6b. However, there is some support for hypotheses 5a and 6a. It seems that social *disintegration* in the form of a lack of social trust does not always predict populist party support. The results of chapter 8.1 offer a potential interpretation. While a lack of social trust might spark populist attitudes, this form of social *disintegration* inclines disenchantment and alienation with politics rather than active support and engagement at the ballot box. The next chapter discusses this in more detail.

8.3 Chapter Discussion

The analyses in this chapter are dedicated to the relationship between the three dimensions of social trust and the different forms of populism. In general, the analyses offer support for the hypotheses regarding populist attitudes, but show only scant evidence for a relationship between the different forms of social trust and radical left- and right-wing populist party support.

With regard to the role of particularised trust, the analyses offer mixed evidence. With the exception of Germany and Spain, people who lack trust in their immediate environment have higher levels of populist attitudes without a host ideology. As such, I find solid empirical

support for hypothesis 4. While social *disintegration* in terms of a lack of particularised trust seems to breed populist attitudes in four out of the six countries, this does not translate into populist party support. People who do not trust family and friends are not more likely to support radical left- or right-wing populist parties in any of the six countries. Put differently, while social *disintegration* breeds populist attitudes, it does not lead to party support, at least in the case of particularised trust. Hypotheses 4a and 4b are thus not supported.

A potential explanation for this discrepancy is that a lack of particularised trust and the accompanying social *disintegration* might lead to a withdrawal from society and politics rather than a mobilisation at the ballot box. Thus, while such a lack of even the closest social interactions fosters exclusionary attitudes such as populist attitudes, it does not translate into a mobilisation of party support. Instead of political mobilisation, social *disintegration* might breed alienation and disenchantment. This aligns with the findings of Gidron and Hall (2020) who report that social *disintegration* predicts abstention. My analyses add to that by showing that *disintegration* fosters populist attitudes but not party support.

For identity-based trust, the relationship with populist attitudes seems clear: higher levels of identity-based trust are positively related to populist attitudes in five out of the six countries. People who base their trust in those similar to them and exclude others based on ascriptive criteria undermine social solidarity and a shared order. In this vein, group-based thinking, in-group favouritism, and out-group derogation resonate well with populism accounting for the positive relationship between identity-based trust and populist attitudes.

Turning to the relationship with radical right-wing populist party support, the findings are less conclusive. In France and Switzerland, ethnic-based trust is positively related to support for radical right-wing populist parties. In the other four countries, there is no significant relationship. While it is always difficult to explain such country variation with only very few countries, the finding for France and Switzerland are straightforward as the *Rassemblement*

National and the *Schweizerische Volkspartei* are both prototypical radical right-wing populist parties that mobilise strongly on an ethnic and nationalist agenda. Moreover, both parties present themselves as political alternative for the nation and the 'true natives' making it plausible that people who base their trust decisions on nationality are attracted by this political agenda.

Looking at the other countries, a potential explanation for the null findings can be found in the characteristics of the respective parties and political systems. In Italy, the *Lega* emerged as a secessionist party and might thus have more difficulty mobilising on a nationality-based in-group platform. In the beginnings of the party, people from the South of Italy were regarded as outsiders making it potentially more difficult to mobilise voters in these regions (Ignazi, 2005). Furthermore, supporters of the *Lega* might not trust those with the same nationality precisely because they might still be drawn to the foundation of a separate state in Northern Italy. In this vein, their in-group might be more narrowly restricted to Northern Italians. A similar aspect might hamper the relationship between ethnic-based trust and support for *Vox* in Spain. As Spain is characterised by strong regional and territorial conflicts (Vampa, 2020), these might make it difficult to mobilise voters through a focus on trust that is based on nationality or language.

Lastly, for the UK, the explanation for the null finding could also be that the conservatives under the leadership of Boris Johnson have successfully mobilised on the idea of national greatness and thereby regained significant parts of the electorates that voted for UKIP or the Brexit Party. In this regard, the null finding might also be due to the low numbers of supporters for UKIP in the survey.

Surprisingly, the analyses do not show a significant finding for the *Alternative für Deutschland* in Germany which has successfully mobilised on German identity and the

virtuousness of the true German people. This demands further attention in future studies as it clearly contradicts the reasoning above.

Turning to the relationship with radical left-wing populist party support, the findings show that there is no relationship with class-based trust. While this form of identity-based trust was focused on social and occupational class, it seems that radical left-wing populist parties are less focused on class boundaries. Instead, they appeal to a broader electorate than traditional socialist parties. In particular, higher educated and younger citizens are often found among the supporters. *Podemos* in Spain mobilises a younger and higher educated voter base that might be less occupied with class differences (Ramiro & Gomez, 2017). Thus, it seems that these parties appeal to a broader cross-class coalition, which potentially explains the null findings. To that end, other forms of group-based trust that are more concerned with post-material aspects might be important for this form of populism. Future studies might dive deeper into such different group identities and their political implications (Bornschier et al., 2021).

Lastly, generalised trust with its integrative vision that overcomes boundaries and group distinctions seems to act as deterrent for populist attitudes in all countries. People who believe that others are trustworthy seem to see themselves and other members of society as part of a shared normative order and are thus less likely to hold populist attitudes with their exclusionary and conflictive nature. Indeed, social integration in the form of generalised trust seems to counteract populism.

This finding partially persists for radical right-wing populist party support. The coefficient for generalised trust is negative and significant in France, Germany, and Switzerland. The insignificant relationship between generalised trust and right-wing populist party support in Italy, Spain, and the UK is difficult to explain as in all three countries, radical right-wing populist parties are exclusionary and contradict an integrative vision of society. A potential explanation could relate to the different trust cultures in these countries that make the

emergence of an integrative vision more difficult. Thus, future research should certainly pay a closer look at this relationship and potentially at specific characteristics of the parties in these countries.

Lastly, for generalised trust and radical left-wing populism, there is no indication for a negative relationship as hypothesised in hypothesis 5b. One potential explanation is that although scholars have argued that left-wing populism is exclusionary, it seems this exclusion is less contradictory to an integrative vision of society as emphasised by generalised trust. Even more so, one might argue that left-wing populism is more exclusionary on a vertical (*vis-à-vis* the elites) than on a horizontal level (*vis-à-vis* societal out-groups). One indication for such a contention could be the positive relationship between generalised trust and support for *La France Insoumise*. People who are more trusting towards others are more likely to support this radical left-wing populist party. In this vein, radical left-wing populism seems to be less exclusionary and thus potentially less driven by social *disintegration* than radical right-wing populism.

Generally, I obtain significant and consistent findings that particularised and generalised trust prevent people from having populist attitudes while identity-based trust does the opposite. It seems that social *disintegration* in the form of a lack of social trust is conducive to populist attitudes and that group-based thinking and thus partial social *disintegration* fosters populist attitudes. Yet, regarding populist party support, the evidence points to a more complex relationship and a potentially disenchanting but demobilising influence of social *disintegration*. While social *disintegration* based on social trust is conducive to exclusionary attitudes, it seems to breed populist alienation rather than populist mobilisation.

9 Empirical Analysis Part 3: The Role of Subjective Group Relative Deprivation

The final chapter of the empirical analysis of this book is dedicated to the relationship between subjective group relative deprivation and the different forms of populism. Chapter 9.1 presents how subjective group relative deprivation relates to populist attitudes without a host ideology. Chapter 9.2 deals with the relationship between different forms of subjective group relative deprivation and support for radical left- and right-wing populist parties. Chapter 9.3 concludes these analyses with a discussion of the findings.

9.1 Subjective Group Relative Deprivation and Populist Attitudes

Subjective relative deprivation is best understood "as a judgment that one or one's in-group is disadvantaged compared to a relevant referent and that this judgment invokes feelings of anger, resentment, and entitlement" (Pettigrew, 2015, p. 12). I argued that subjective group relative deprivation and populist attitudes are positively related as populism seems as a compelling answer to feelings of unfair disadvantage. As subjective relative deprivation has been shown to increase out-group derogation and prejudice (Dambrun et al., 2006; Elchardus & Spruyt, 2016; Pettigrew et al., 2008; Yoxon et al., 2019), it is likely that the dualistic vision of society inherent to populism is attractive for those that feel unfairly disadvantaged. In a similar vein, subjective group relative deprivation does not only increase negative feelings towards the out-group but also strengthens positive feelings towards the in-group, resonating with the construction of a homogenous and virtuous populace.

Furthermore, the anti-elitism of populism offers a culprit for the perceived disadvantage and thereby externalises the blame. The political elites are held responsible for helping the out-group gain an advantage over the ordinary people. To overcome the disadvantage and to punish the responsible elites, the will of the people should guide political decisions so "that where

established parties and elites have failed, ordinary folks, common sense, and the politicians who give them a voice can find solutions" (Spruyt et al., 2016, p. 336). Thus, subjective group relative deprivation is hypothesised to be positively related to populist attitudes.

In the following, I present the results of the linear regression models based on original cross-sectional survey data from France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Switzerland, and the UK. I start with data from the pooled sample before investigating the relationship in the six countries. The model specification follows the structure outlined in Table 5.

Figure 22 Coefficient plot for the country-wise relationship between subjective group relative deprivation and populist attitudes



Notes: Estimates are based on the models in Table D-1 in Appendix D. Displayed are coefficients of subjective group relative deprivation with 99% (light grey bars), 95% (dark grey bars), and 90% (black bars) confidence intervals.

Figure 22 shows the results of the linear regression models. From the displayed coefficients, it becomes evident that subjective group relative deprivation is positively and significantly related to populist attitudes. Put differently, people who have the impression that

they and people like them are unfairly disadvantaged have higher levels of populist attitudes. When looking at the six different countries, Figure 22 shows a remarkable consistency for the relationship as the coefficient is significant, positive, and similar in size in all six countries.

Figure 23 Average marginal effects of subjective group relative deprivation on populist attitudes



Notes: Estimates are based on the models in Table D-1 in Appendix D. Displayed are average marginal effects of subjective group relative deprivation with 99% (light grey area), 95% (dark grey area), and 90% (black area) confidence intervals.

With regard to the substantiality of the results, Figure 23 shows the average marginal effects of subjective group relative deprivation on populist attitudes in the pooled sample as well as in the respective countries. The size of the coefficient is around a standard deviation in the pooled sample, thus a change from no perceived disadvantage to high levels of perceived disadvantage corresponds to an increase in populist attitudes from .09 to .2. Within the respective countries, the size of the coefficient ranges from 80 percent of a standard deviation in Italy and Spain, around 90 percent of a standard deviation in France and the UK to 110

percent in Switzerland, and 130 percent in Germany. This lends strong support to hypothesis 7. Subjective group relative deprivation is positively related to populist attitudes and the relationship is substantial. What is more, controlling for additional ideological factors such as nativism and authoritarianism, anti-capitalism, or political trust does not alter the conclusions of the analyses (see Tables D-2 – D-4, Appendix D). Moreover, these findings hold when including other forms of relative deprivation into the model (see Table D-5, Appendix D).

Again, a short note on the control variables. The main variables that are shown to be related to populist attitudes across the countries are sex, education, income situation, and left-right self-placement. On average men have higher levels of populist attitudes. People with tertiary education have less populist attitudes as do people whose income situation is more favourable. Left-right self-placement displays the expected u-shaped relationship with people who place themselves to the far left or to the far right having higher levels of populist attitudes. All these findings are in line with the literature.

Overall, the analyses presented in this subchapter lend strong support for hypothesis 7. Subjective group relative deprivation is positively related to populist attitudes in all six countries. Furthermore, the relationship is substantial and robust to the inclusion of ideological control variables. The next subchapter offers insights into whether different forms of subjective relative deprivation are also suitable in explaining support for radical left- and right-wing populist parties.

9.2 Subjective Group Relative Deprivation and Left- and Right-Wing Populism

For radical right-wing and radical left-wing populism, I offered slightly different arguments for the influence of subjective group relative deprivation. While I maintained that subjective group

relative deprivation is positively related to both forms of populism, I argued that the comparison group matters decisively for which form of populism is supported. Put differently, the group compared to which individuals feel disadvantaged influences which form of populism they support.

In particular, I argue that people who experience subjective group relative deprivation compared to immigrants are more likely to support radical right-wing populist parties due to these parties' strong focus on nativism. As the relevant out-group of relative deprivation is defined on ethnic categories, the respective political 'answer' is also likely to be substantiated on ethnic categories. In this vein, radical right-wing populism constructs its populism in ethnic terms. The virtuous people are defined as 'true' and 'good' natives. Furthermore, the elites are regarded as culprits that favour immigrants over the natives and thereby contribute to the perceived disadvantages. Consequently, the conceptions of society, the people, and the elite match so that radical right-wing populism offers a coherent answer for people who feel relatively deprived compared to immigrants rather than those who feel deprived compared to other groups.

Conversely, from the perspective of people who feel relatively deprived compared to rich people, radical left-wing populism offers a fruitful remedy for their frustrating situation. Left-wing populism constructs its people centrism and anti-elitism on the category of (social) class. The people are honest workers based on their class membership and the elite often consists of large businesses and the (neo-liberal) politicians who favour them. In this vein, the elite favours the rich rather than the hard-working people. Thus, for people who feel relatively deprived compared to the rich, left-wing populism provides a coherent conception of society, making it more likely that they support radical left-wing populist parties.

Figure 24 Coefficient plot for the country-wise relationship between subjective group relative deprivation (immigrants) and right-wing populist party support



Notes: Estimates are based on the models in Table D-6 in Appendix D. Displayed are coefficients of subjective group relative deprivation (immigrants) with 99% (light grey bars), 95% (dark grey bars), and 90% (black bars) confidence intervals.

In the following, I present the results of the linear probability models. I start with radical right-wing populist party support before turning to left-wing populist party support. The model specification follows the structure outlined in Table 5.

The analyses displayed in Figure 24 reveal that subjective group relative deprivation compared to immigrants is significantly and positively related to the support for a radical right-wing populist party in the pooled sample. In terms of substantiality, an increase in disadvantage of one standard deviation amounts to an increase of around five percentage points in the likelihood of supporting a radical right-wing populist party. Comparing a respondent with no perceived disadvantage to immigrants and a respondent with a strongly perceived disadvantage to immigrants results in a difference of 19 percentage points in the likelihood of supporting a

radical right-wing populist party (see upper left panel in Figure 25). These estimates signify a strong relationship.

Given the variety of radical right-wing populist parties in the six countries, it is important to investigate whether this relationship also holds within the respective countries. Figure 24 shows a remarkably consistent and positive relationship between subjective group relative deprivation compared to immigrants and support for a radical right-wing populist party. In all countries, subjective group relative deprivation compared to immigrants is positively and significantly related to supporting a radical right-wing populist party. Regarding the substantiality of the relationship, an increase in disadvantage of one standard deviation amounts to an increase of around seven (France), five (Germany, Italy), four (Spain), six (Switzerland), and two (UK) percentage points in the likelihood of supporting a radical right-wing populist party (see Figure 25). These relationships can be regarded as substantial given that many of these parties only receive around 10 percent of the votes in the survey.

These findings hold when including other forms of disadvantage into the model (Table D-9, Appendix D). Relative deprivation compared to immigrants remains the most important predictor for radical right-wing populist party support while deprivation to other groups (such as rich people) only plays a minor role. When controlling for political trust, subjective group relative deprivation compared to immigrants remains a significant and substantial predictor of right-wing populist party support (Table D-8, Appendix D).

While the analyses lend strong support to hypothesis 8, it is also important to investigate whether ideological positions that are relevant for radical right-wing populist parties – i.e., nativism and authoritarianism – affect the relationship between subjective group relative deprivation and radical right-wing populist party support. Including these ideological positions into the models, shows that the relationship between subjective group relative deprivation compared to immigrants turns insignificant in all countries except the pooled sample and

Switzerland (Table D-7, Appendix D). While one could argue that this weakens the support for hypothesis 8, it rather points to a potential mediation that is fully in line with the theoretical argument presented above. People who feel subjectively deprived compared to immigrants are drawn to radical right-wing populist parties based on the grounds of populism and nativism that is characteristic of these parties. Put differently, subjective group relative deprivation compared to immigrants might increase nativist attitudes, which in turn make people more likely to support a right-wing populist party.

Figure 25 Average marginal effects of subjective group relative deprivation (immigrants) on right-wing populist party support



Notes: Estimates are based on the models in Table D-6 in Appendix D. Displayed are average marginal effects of subjective group relative deprivation (immigrants) with 99% (light grey area), 95% (dark grey area), and 90% (black area) confidence intervals.

For the control variables, the main findings from previous models hold: left-right self-placement and political interest are significantly and positively related to support for radical right-wing populist parties.

Overall, the results from these analyses offer support for hypothesis 8 as subjective group relative deprivation compared to immigrants is positively related to support for a right-wing populist party in the pooled sample and all six countries. Yet, the analyses also show some indication of a mediating effect of nativist attitudes offering avenues for future research.

Figure 26 Coefficient plot for the country-wise relationship between subjective group relative deprivation (rich people) and left-wing populist party support



Notes: Estimates are based on the models in Table D-10 in Appendix D. Displayed are coefficients of subjective group relative deprivation (rich people) with 99% (light grey bars), 95% (dark grey bars), and 90% (black bars) confidence intervals.

The analyses for left-wing populism, again, rely on a smaller set of countries as only France, Germany, and Spain have a significant radical left-wing populist party. Thus, pooled sample analyses are based on these three countries. Figure 26 shows the coefficients of subjective group relative deprivation compared to rich people in predicting support for a radical left-wing populist party. In the pooled sample, I find no significant relationship between this form of relative deprivation and supporting a radical left-wing populist party.

Looking at France, Germany, and Spain, the analyses show that this null finding is replicated in France and Spain where the coefficient of subjective group relative deprivation compared to rich people is indistinguishable from zero. However, in Germany, people who feel subjectively deprived compared to rich people are significantly more likely to support a radical left-wing populist party (*Die Linke*). Yet, the difference in the probability of supporting a left-wing populist party between a respondent with no perceived disadvantage and a respondent with strong perceived disadvantage to rich people is only 3 percentage points making this a rather negligible relationship. These results hold when including anti-capitalist attitudes, political trust, or different forms of relative deprivation in the model (Tables D-11 – D-13, Appendix D). Given that in only one of three countries, relative deprivation compared to rich people reaches significance but remains rather negligible in size, these analyses lead to a rejection of hypothesis 9. Subjective group relative deprivation compared to rich people does not advance the explanation of support for radical left-wing populist parties.

For the control variables, the main findings of the other chapters are replicated. People who see themselves more to the left are more likely to support radical left-wing populist parties. Furthermore, people who are more interested in politics are also more likely to support such parties while all other variables remain insignificant.

Overall, while the results for populist attitudes in chapter 9.1 and the analyses for radical right-wing populist party support were largely supportive of hypotheses 7 and 8, there is no evidence for hypothesis 9 and a relationship between subjective group relative deprivation compared to rich people and radical left-wing populist party support.

9.3 Chapter Discussion

In this chapter, I tested the hypothesis that subjective group relative deprivation understood as disadvantaged upward group comparison and as an indication of social *disintegration* is positively related to different manifestations of populism. With regard to the explanation of populist attitudes without a host ideology, my analyses reveal that the relationship between perceived disadvantages and populist attitudes is strong and positive across the six countries under study. This is strong support for hypothesis 7. Furthermore, given that the measure does not include a specific comparison group, this points towards the importance of impressions of disadvantage in general rather than the importance of particular ideologically constructed groups such as immigrants. Thus, subjective group relative deprivation as perceived exclusionary disadvantage is positively related to populism as a thin ideology and not (only) the ideological package of specific (populist) parties.

In sum, when people see themselves disadvantaged and outside of a shared normative order as they do not get what they deserve, they are more likely to follow a dualistic vision of politics and society that blames the elites for the current state of society. Thus, subjective group relative deprivation as explicit manifestation of social *disintegration* is positively related to the attitudes underlying populism in Europe. According to these findings, populism is a problem of social *disintegration*.

Next to populist attitudes, my analyses reveal that perceived disadvantages compared to immigrants are positively related to support for radical right-wing populist parties across the six countries. For this exclusionary form of populism with its nativist construction of the people, disadvantages compared to immigrants matter more than other disadvantages. Rather than by a general feeling of disadvantage, supporters of right-wing populism are driven by a perceived disadvantage that is directed towards immigrants. To that end, radical right-wing populism

offers a coherent political answer to those who perceive immigrants to have received an unwarranted advantage.

The analyses in chapter 9.2 also offer some indication of a potential mediation between subjective group relative deprivation compared to immigrants, anti-immigrant (nativist) attitudes, and radical right-wing populist party support. One could argue that perceiving immigrants as being undeservingly advantaged sparks anti-immigrant attitudes, which are a strong predictor for radical right-wing populist party support as they form the ideological basis of these parties. While such a causal chain is in line with the theoretical reasoning of hypothesis 8, the exact nature of this potential mediation remains unclear. Whether anti-immigrant attitudes are the consequence or the cause of subjective relative deprivation and how they influence radical right-wing populist party support is something for future research to uncover (see chapter 10.3).

Overall, the analyses in chapter 9.2 lend support to hypothesis 8 as subjective group relative deprivation compared to immigrants is significantly and positively related to radical right-wing populist party support. Again, social *disintegration* is clearly positively related to populist support. More importantly, however, for people whose impression of social *disintegration* is based on a cultural understanding that non-natives are advantaged and do not play by the rules, radical right-wing populism is the preferred ideological orientation.

While the analyses reveal that perceived disadvantages compared to immigrants foster support for right-wing populism, the analyses show no support for hypothesis 9 that subjective group relative deprivation compared to rich people predicts support for radical left-wing populist parties. Put differently, people who feel an unwarranted relative disadvantage compared to rich people are not more likely to support radical left-wing populist parties than those who do not feel disadvantaged. Three potential explanations come to mind. First, disadvantages compared to rich people might also be prevalent for others in society who do not

share the ideological characteristics of radical left-wing populism with its anti-establishment logic. For example, economic and social inequality have also been lamented by Social Democratic and Conservative or Christian Democratic parties, making such parties a political option for those that feel deprived compared to rich people but who do not share the dualistic vision of left-wing populism.

Second, one could also argue that the grievances that are important for radical left-wing populism are more complex than the simple distinction between rich and poor. Although one focus of radical left-wing populist parties is on economic inequality and the inequities of modern capitalism, their electoral coalition is broader than just the working- or lower social classes. In particular, higher educated and younger citizens are often found among the supporters, in particular of *Podemos* but also *Die Linke* in recent years. Thus, it seems that these parties appeal to a broader cross-class segment, which makes different grievances more important. One could argue that radical left-wing populism is more concerned with the power of big businesses and their produced disadvantages rather than a simple distinction between poor and rich people.

Third, radical left-wing populism has been characterised as inclusionary version of populism. In this vein, exclusionary disadvantages such as subjective group relative deprivation might not resonate with this form of populism. Even more so, it would be less likely that people who are socially disintegrated are more likely to support this form of populism given its inclusionary perspective that integrates lager segments of society into the construction of the people.

In sum, the analyses have lent no support to hypothesis 9 as subjective group relative deprivation compared to rich people is not significantly related to radical left-wing populist party support. It seems that social *disintegration* in the form of perceived disadvantages does not predict this form of populism. These findings call for more research into these parties and

their supporters, which compared to research on the more dominant radical right-wing populist parties is lacking behind.

Overall, the analyses of the relationship between subjective group relative deprivation and different forms of populism show that populism is a problem of social *disintegration*. People who perceive an unfair disadvantage compared to others do not see themselves as part of a shared normative order. Consequently, they are more likely to hold populist attitudes, which resonate well with such feelings, as they do not only provide a virtuous in-group to identify with, but also an out-group to blame. Furthermore, if such impressions of social *disintegration* include a cultural component related to immigrants, people turn towards radical right-wing populist parties as their political advocates to change the situation. This cannot be reported for radical left-wing populist parties, as subjective group relative deprivation compared to rich people does not increase support for these parties. Once again, social *disintegration* does not seem to be a predictor for support for radical left-wing populist parties.

10 General Discussion

The question underlying this book is whether populism constitutes a problem of social *disintegration*. Following the claims of a recent study by Gidron and Hall (2020), I investigate whether populism in six European countries can be explained by different manifestations of social integration. Within this chapter, I situate the findings from chapters 7, 8, and 9 in a broader discussion. Subchapter 10.1 contextualises the empirical findings of this study. To that end, I argue that populism can be understood as a problem of social *disintegration* but that several aspects should be kept in mind. In this vein, subchapter 10.2 deals with the limitations of the present study. Subchapter 10.3 discusses avenues for future research to understand populist politics and its socio-integrational underpinnings better. Lastly, subchapter 10.4 presents practical implications of my study that transcend the academic debate.

10.1 Is Populism a Problem of Social Disintegration?

The main tenet of this dissertation is that social integration with its different manifestations helps explaining support for populism. Put differently, I hypothesised that people who feel socially *disintegrated* – i.e., who have the subjective impression of losing out and being sidelined to the fringes of society – are more likely to support populism. Using three different manifestations of populism – subjective social status, social trust, and subjective group relative deprivation – I aimed to offer an empirical answer to the question of whether populism is a problem of social *disintegration*. In this subchapter, I discuss the answer to this question.

The main assumption of this book is that the transformations of economy and society driven by globalisation and modernisation have created a feeling of marginalisation for parts of society. Some people feel socially disintegrated and thus look for a political answer that accommodates their perceived exclusion. Populism is a compelling answer to social

disintegration as it offers a positive group identity in terms of a homogeneous and virtuous populace. Furthermore, populism provides culprits for the negative developments in society by presenting the elite as self-serving and corrupt group that advances its own benefits at the expense of the people. Using subjective social status, social trust, and subjective group relative deprivation as manifestations of social integration, the analyses of original survey data collected in France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Switzerland and the UK reveal several important aspects to take away.

First, in a more general perspective, social *disintegration* is far less able to explain radical left-wing populist party support than radical right-wing populist party support or populist attitudes. From a theoretical perspective, this is rather surprising given that I offered distinct arguments for the three different forms of populism. Thus, the question arises how to explain the lower empirical value of social integration for support for radical left-wing populism. One could argue that compared to material grievances, immaterial grievances put forward by social integration theory, such as respect and recognition are less relevant for radical left-wing populism. Studies have argued that those who are severely hit by economic transformations are more likely to demand economic relief and are thus driven by material rather than status concerns (Kurer, 2020). A potential indication for such an interpretation is that subjective social status as the concept most aligned with material grievances has the most predictive value for radical left-wing populist party support.

A different interpretation is that radical left-wing populism is considered as more inclusive than radical right-wing populism, at least on the horizontal level, i.e., towards societal out-groups (Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2013). To that end, the inclusiveness of radical left-wing populism might not be an attractive political option for those that feel violated and outside of a shared normative order. Thus, it could be that the analyses focussed on the wrong grievances. In this vein, social *disintegration* and norm violation might take different forms for

those that support radical left-wing populism. The conflict lines might be drawn between big businesses and neoliberal politicians on the one side and the people on the other side, rather than between rich and poor segments of the population.

Relatedly, one might argue that the group identities included in the analyses are too focussed on the traditional labour vs. capital cleavage, i.e., based on class and occupation. As left-wing populism also often advances progressive values such as solidarity and diversity, such group identities and the accompanying grievances might be more based on such values than previously assumed. Furthermore, one could argue that such identities of class and occupation are not solely relevant for radical left-wing populism. Instead, the working-class has often been associated with the radical right, potentially affecting the findings presented here (Bornschier & Kriesi, 2013). Given that recent research has pointed towards the importance of social identities for political preference formation, future studies should dive deeper in the distinct social identities of radical left-wing supporters (Bornschier et al., 2021).

Lastly, one might argue that the reason for the weak link between social *disintegration* and radical left-wing populist party support is based on problems of mobilisation that these parties experience. Given that social *disintegration* consistently predicts populist attitudes such an explanation seems plausible. Social *disintegration* makes people susceptible to populism and thus the missing link to radical left-wing populism might be found on the supply-side. Looking at *Podemos* and *Die Linke* as radical left-wing populist parties, both parties have experienced decreasing vote shares in national elections pointing towards mobilisation problems (see chapter 2.4, Figure 4). Even more so, in recent years different parties from the centre left as well as Conservative or Christian Democrats have prioritised the topic of income inequality.

Issue positions still play a major role in determining vote choices and populist attitudes are rather a motivational substitute for those that have different policy positions (Loew & Faas, 2019; van Hauwaert & van Kessel, 2018). As such, the reason for the lower predictive power

of social integration for radical left-wing populist party support might be found on the supply-side. Thus, future research might benefit from an explicit inclusion of such supply-side factors.

Second, with regard to the different manifestations of social integration, it has to be noted that they vary with regard to their explanatory power for the different forms of populism. The relationship between subjective social status and the different forms of populism is relatively inconsistent across countries. I find that subjective social status is negatively related to populist attitudes in three out of six countries. The same holds true for the relationship with radical right-wing populist party support while for radical left-wing populist party support the relationship is present in two out of three countries. Such cross-country variation points towards the importance of contextual factors.

The political supply-side might play a crucial role. Whether parties aim to mobilise those at the lower end of the social ladder might vary across different parties. The Spanish case offers two important examples. *Vox* differs from other radical right-wing populist parties with regard to the voter base, as *Vox's* "constituents are more bourgeois, with the party banking significantly more votes among urban residents, those with higher secondary education, and citizens with high income levels" (Turnbull-Dugarte et al., 2020, p. 15). Similarly, *Podemos* is characterised by a younger and more educated constituency making a sole mobilisation of low status working-class men less attractive for the party (Ramiro & Gomez, 2017). To that end, both parties exemplify that mobilising individuals with lower social status is a conscious and strategic decision made by the parties and thus, supply-side factors crucially influence the role of social integration. Future research should incorporate such factors not only in the empirical analysis but also already in the theoretical model.

Furthermore, economic and societal trajectories of different countries might influence how social status and social integration develop and whether they transform into grievances that are relevant for politics. In this vein, one could argue that the inconsistent findings for

social status in the analyses echo recent calls for caution with regard to the explanatory value of social status for populism (Oesch & Vigna, 2021). Subjective social status of the working class is not necessarily declining in all countries equally or even declining at all. Such an observation questions the whole causal chain of globalisation as a driver of status decline and the subsequent relationship between subjective social status and support for populist politics (Oesch & Vigna, 2021). To that end, status decline (of the working class) might not function as an explanation, in particular for radical right-wing populist support (Oesch & Vigna, 2021). Potentially, status decline and recognition of being a part of the society need to be investigated in a broader perspective with regard to whose status is investigated (Koppetsch, 2017).

Similarly, it might also be important to broaden the scope beyond social status as another explanation for these inconsistent findings might be rooted in the concept of subjective social status itself, the survey question, and its ability to capture social integration. Subjective social status may not be able to capture social integration fully but rather only a part of it. As social status places an individual within the wider ladder of society, it does not relate her position explicitly to the position of others in society. Yet, ethnographic research shows that comparisons between different members in society are crucial. Individuals do not only regard their own position as important but also how their position evolved compared to others (Gest, 2016; Hochschild, 2016). A stagnation or even an increase in status might feel like a degradation if others rise faster. To that end, subjective social status might not fully capture where people see themselves compared to a relevant referent.

Furthermore, subjective social status is focused on the individual and her position within society rather than on individuals within certain groups and their position in society. Hence, subjective social status does not capture the group element of social integration. Given the importance of groups and their integration within society, subjective social status neglects a crucial element of social integration that has important political ramifications.

Although lower levels of subjective social status might imply that people feel that the norms of society are violated or do not extend to them, this does not necessarily have to be the case. People with lower levels of status might feel as part of a shared normative order without regarding themselves as central in society. Direct violations of shared norms and the common order, however, are not explicitly captured by lower levels of social status. Thus, perceptions of social *disintegration* that fuel anti-establishment politics are not grasped potentially explaining the inconsistent relationship between subjective social status and populism. In sum, subjective social status alone does not allow for a full test of the socio-integrational underpinnings of populism, as it only represents one manifestation of social integration.

Nevertheless, subjective social status is shown to be related to populism in some countries and the findings for these countries are rather robust. Consequently, it seems that social status as one manifestation of social integration matters for populism. However, based on the cross-country variation two important implications arise. First, combining different countries into a pooled analysis might omit important variation across countries. Hence, a comparative perspective that considers country-specific aspects is warranted. Second, the variation offers room for future studies that should investigate contextual factors that might influence the relationship between social status and different forms of populism, such as economic trajectories, political supply-side factors, or status hierarchies (see chapter 10.3).

To accommodate some of the weaknesses of social status, I proposed social trust as an additional manifestation of social integration. With its multidimensional nature, social trust allows to formulate nuanced arguments that account for different aspects of social integration. One particular advantage is the possibility of distinguishing different group identities through the lens of identity-based trust. Secondly, with generalised trust it is possible to test the relationship between an integrative vision of society and populism. Put differently, with generalised trust I use an indicator that clearly captures positive social integration.

Unfortunately and similar to social status, the results for the different forms of trust are not unequivocally supportive of my hypotheses. Again, the findings vary with regard to the form of populism. The most consistent results are found for populist attitudes. Yet, the results are less consistent for radical right-wing populist party support and not consistent for radical left-wing populist party support. Starting with particularised trust, there is a relatively consistent and negative relationship with populist attitudes. Thus, people who are socially integrated in their immediate environment are less likely to adopt anti-establishment attitudes and follow a dualistic vision of society.

Yet, for radical left- and right-wing populist party support, particularised trust plays no role. Social *disintegration* from the immediate personal environment does not incline people to support populist parties from the left or the right. On the one hand, one could make the argument that social *disintegration* does lead to populist disenchantment rather than populist mobilisation. Lack of particularised trust and thus social *disintegration* might make people more likely to blame the establishment for their worries, i.e., they are more likely to hold populist attitudes. Yet, at the same time, this *disintegration* might make them less likely to participate politically and support a populist party in elections. On the other hand, one could argue that there is no difference between supporters of populist parties and supporters of non-populist parties in terms of particularised trust, given that most people place rather high levels of trust in their immediate environment. In this vein, future studies might dive deeper into the found difference between populist attitudes and populist party support when it comes to particularised trust.

Conversely, identity-based trust, as an indicator for partial *disintegration*, is consistently and positively related to populist attitudes. Identity-based trust aligns with a populist conception of society by focusing on a narrowly definable part in society combined with a derogation and exclusion of those that are not part of this preferred group. Thus, it is important whether the

form of social integration goes hand in hand with distinguishing, safeguarding, and pursuing one's own interests *vis-à-vis* out-groups or whether social integration is understood as an integrative vision that includes out-group members in the shared normative order. As identity-based trust follows the former path, its positive relationship with populist attitudes is in line with the theoretical argument.

Yet again, the results for radical right-wing populist party support are less consistent. Only in France and Switzerland does ethnic-based identity-based trust have a positive relationship with this form of populism. Radical left-wing populist party support and class-based identity-based trust are not significantly related. While the finding for radical right-wing populism in France and Switzerland fits with the respective parties characteristics, the null findings for the other countries and for radical left-wing populism demand further attention.

Although the analyses of populist attitudes indicated that group thinking in the form of identity-based trust is positively related to exclusionary attitudes, this is not the case for right-wing and left-wing populism. While recent research acknowledged the political importance of different social and group identities, we know relatively little about how these identities motivate political attitudes and behaviour (Bornschier et al., 2021). Based on the results from this study, group identities and in-group trust seem to motivate populist attitudes but not populist party support. In this vein, it might be promising to investigate which identities matter.

A potential explanation for the divergent findings could be that the identities included in the analyses are not the ones that matter for the respective supporters of left- and right-wing populism. Instead, the mere in-group-out-group thinking might motivate the adoption of populist attitudes but for populist party support, the relevant in-groups are different from those used here. Hence, while the results for populist attitudes show that group identities matter, future research should pay attention to the question of which identities matter, the importance of these different group identities, and their political ramifications.

Lastly, the findings for generalised trust consistently support the notion that populist attitudes are a problem of social *disintegration*. People who trust strangers and are thus socially integrated hold less populist attitudes. Generalised trust is a rather abstract attitude toward people in general, encompassing those beyond one's immediate familiarity, including strangers (e.g., random people one meets on the street). It is precisely this form of social trust that is understood as the driving force for efficient and constructive cooperation and which is in the eyes of many seen as the bedrock of democracy (Almond & Verba, 1963; Paxton, 2002; Putnam, 1993; Whiteley, 2000). To that end, generalised trust as a positive form of social integration that promises recognition, respect, and belonging to a shared normative order entails a certain protection against exclusionary positions such as populist attitudes.

For radical right-wing populism, the analyses show that people with an integrative vision of society are not drawn to this exclusionary form of populism, albeit this is only true for France, Germany, and Switzerland. One potential explanation for why this relationship is not present in Italy or Spain could be the respective trust cultures that are more strongly directed towards the family and the immediate personal environment as opposed to the society as a whole. Both countries are characterised by strong familial networks that might hamper the building of generalised trust and an integrative vision of society. Similarly, the UK with its strong liberal and individualistic tradition might also prove a hard case for building generalised trust. To that end, generalised trust might have a different and less inclusive meaning in these countries, which might explain the divergent empirical results.

The question of different cultures of trust is closely related to the aspect of who is regarded as generalised other or stranger (Delhey et al., 2011, 2014). The question of who belongs to the generalised other has been discussed in trust research for a long time (Bauer & Freitag, 2018; Robbins, 2019, 2021). People do not unequivocally think about strangers when confronted with the generalised trust question (Bauer & Freitag, 2018). Thus, while broader in

its radius of trust, generalised trust does not necessarily imply that all groups and people in society are included in this vision. This might also explain why generalised trust is not always a barrier against radical right-wing populism. For some people, there is no contradiction between generalised trust and the exclusionary ideology of populist parties, precisely because they have a narrower understanding of the generalised other.

Overall, social trust as manifestation of social integration helps explaining the support for populism. In particular, social trust consistently relates to populist attitudes. While particularised and especially generalised trust are negatively, identity-based trust is positively related to populist attitudes. For populist party support, the analyses provide mixed evidence, calling for future investigation of people's group identities as well as their understanding of a generalised other (see chapter 10.3).

As a third manifestation of social integration, I proposed subjective group relative deprivation (SGRD). It becomes evident that such perceived exclusionary disadvantages are the most consistent predictor of populist attitudes. This is in line with qualitative studies that find that feelings of neglect, disadvantage, and marginalisation are very prevalent among supporters of radical and populist politics (Cramer, 2016; Gest, 2016; Hochschild, 2016).

Furthermore, the findings align with the fact that SGRD is the most evident indicator of social *disintegration*. SGRD implies a strong break with the shared normative order as individuals have the impression that they and people like them are disadvantaged. It implies an undeserved disadvantage compared to other members of society. More importantly, this disadvantage is not caused by bad luck, contextual factors or own faults. Rather, SGRD is based on the perception that this comparative disadvantage is caused by others who have done something wrong, thereby challenging the foundation of a shared normative order. The violated entitlement that accompanies SGRD is a clear sign that people have the impression that others do not recognise them as full members of society. More importantly, they perceive that the

respect members of society should be granted is not extended to them as their rights and preferences are ignored. As SGRD is significantly and positively related to populist attitudes in a consistent manner, social *disintegration* is conducive to the expression of populist attitudes.

What is more is that a cultural interpretation of violations of the normative order helps explain support for radical right-wing populist parties. Put differently, people who experience SGRD compared to immigrants are more likely to support radical right-wing populist parties. Thus, if people perceive that immigrants violate the shared normative order, they turn towards exclusionary populism. As radical right-wing populist parties focus on immigration and national identity, they offer a suitable political home. To that end, social *disintegration* does not only explain populist attitudes. Rather, a cultural interpretation also allows a better understanding of radical right-wing populism.

Interestingly, for radical left-wing populist party support, a violation of the shared normative order by rich people does not seem to matter. People who perceive relative disadvantages compared to the rich are not more likely to support radical left-wing populist parties. A potential explanation might lie in the fact that the conflict between rich and poor has transcended beyond the radical left, as in recent years different parties from the centre left as well as Conservative or Christian Democrats have prioritised the topic of income inequality. In this vein, the disadvantages used in the analyses might not capture the perceptions of supporters of the populist left. Instead, other violations of the shared normative order might make people support radical left-wing populism.

Hochschild (2016), for example, points towards a "liberal deep story" in the United States where people see the wealthy occupy the public sphere through privatisation. Yet, a deep qualitative understanding of such perceptions is missing as most qualitative studies focus on the supporters of the radical right. Consequently, a deep and qualitative understanding of the

deep story of radical left-wing populists might be an avenue for future studies to grasp the disadvantages and violations these people perceive (see chapter 10.3).

Based on these discussions, the answer to the defining research question of this book – whether populism is a problem of social *disintegration* – has to be: it depends. What speaks against the idea that populism is a problem of social *disintegration* is that not all forms of social integration are negatively related to populism. Furthermore, the explanatory value varies between the different forms of populism with populist attitudes being the best and radical left-wing populism the worst explained form of populism.

Yet, one could argue that the encompassing approach used here shows that the different aspects of social integration are decisive for the explanation of populism. Essentially, the results show that one crucial aspect for the explanation of populism is norm violation, which is particularly prevalent on the group level. Perceived disadvantages that directly tap into norm violations and the perception of being outside of a shared normative order are crucial predictors of populist attitudes. More importantly, such measures allow accommodating different forms of populism by adjusting the groups that are perceived to violate the norms of a shared order.

Furthermore, the analyses of identity-based trust echo recent calls for the importance of social and group identities for political preferences and voting behaviour (Bornschier et al., 2021). While the results here are not supportive of the idea that group-based trust increases support for radical right- and left-wing populist party support, the analyses do show that identity-based trust is positively related with populist attitudes and thus an exclusionary set of attitudes.

The explanatory value of the socio-integrational approach offered here lies also in the fact that it does allow for a more fine-grained analysis by overcoming a distinction between integration and disintegration. Instead, identity-based trust can be regarded as a form of mechanical solidarity that implies an integration in a smaller group that is, however, not

integrated in the broader society. Such a form of social integration is conducive to the adoption of populist attitudes. Thus, people who feel that they and those similar to them are not part of a shared order are more likely to support populism because they are not regarded as socially integrated despite their in-group integration. To that end, societies might be socially compartmentalised rather than disintegrated.

Lastly, a generalised and integrative vision of society is negatively related to populism. With its abstract perspective that includes people in general – encompassing those beyond immediate familiarity, including strangers (e.g., random people one meets on the street, members of "traditional out-groups") – generalised trust can be regarded as a protective shield against populism. Considered as a bedrock of democracy, generalised trust shows that positive social integration which promises recognition, respect, and belonging to a shared normative order can offer a certain protection against exclusionary positions such as populist attitudes.

Generally, populism can be regarded as problem of social *disintegration*. However, it is important to include several manifestation of social integration to obtain an encompassing picture of the relationship. Future research needs to dive deeper into certain aspects that could not be touched upon in this study. The advantage of the socio-integrational approach advanced here is that it allows fine-grained yet encompassing empirical tests while at the same time being theoretically flexible and extendible (see chapter 10.3). In particular, given that populist attitudes are a thin ideology and thus allow testing the support for populism itself rather than the ideological package of parties, populism itself can be regarded a problem of social *disintegration*. Whether and how this translates into full-fledged populist party support remains less clear and may be answered by future studies.

10.2 Limitations

Like every scientific study, the analyses and results presented in this book are not without limitations. In this chapter, I discuss these potential limitations. More importantly, I discuss what they imply for the interpretation of the results. These limitations also form the basis for the avenues for future research discussed in chapter 10.3. There are four major limitations to this study. First, the number and the selection of countries used in the analysis must be critically discussed. The second limitation concerns the cross-sectional nature of data and thus the need to avoid of any causal claims. Third, I discuss limitations regarding the measurement of contextual factors of social integration, different grievances, and different social identities. Fourth, I also discuss limitations regarding the absence of a complete test of the entire causal chain.

First, starting with the limitations regarding the selection and the number of countries used in the analysis. As both resources and time were limited, I was prohibited from fielding the survey in a very large number of countries. The final sample consists of six countries in Western and Southern Europe. Although these countries offer useful variation in terms of populism, institutional, and economic factors, a generalisation of my findings beyond these six cases remains difficult (see chapter 6.2). Even within Europe, it remains unclear whether the findings from my analysis travel to other countries, for example to Northern European countries such as Denmark or Sweden. While these countries are as economically developed and democratic as the countries in my sample, they differ in other aspects. Most importantly, the Scandinavian countries are characterised by more economic equality compared to their Western European counterparts making it possible that the relationship between social integration and populism plays out differently (see Engler & Weisstanner, 2021). Additionally, the transfer of the results to Central and Eastern European countries might be even more difficult. These countries differ not only in terms of economic development but also with regard to institutional

arrangement as well as political competition. To that end, explanatory models for populism from Western Europe might not travel well to this context (Rydgren, 2011; Santana et al., 2020). Lastly, travelling beyond this European context might prove difficult due to the lack of an adequate database. While the theory of social integration established here can theoretically be transferred to other countries, these specific contexts certainly influence how the relationship plays out empirically. The country variation found in the analyses is already an indication for that.

One aspect of this country selection has less to do with the countries themselves than with the number of countries. Using six countries does not to allow to use multi-level modelling techniques (Hox, 2010). Thus, it is impossible to test the influence of different macro-level factors on populism or on the relationship between social integration and populism. For example, the data at hand does not allow including explanatory factors that account for the influence of the supply-side. Mobilisation efforts of populist parties or their ideological positions are important aspects in explaining support for populism that could not be included in this analysis (Golder, 2016). This also holds for macro-level factors that are not related to the political supply-side but rather to the socio-economic context. To that end, I am unable to directly control for or test the influence of social, economic, or structural macro-level factors such as immigration, economic decline, or social cohesion that may influence my results. Although the inclusion of country fixed-effects is partly a remedy, as they control for unobserved and stable country differences, they do not allow for a test of the influence of such variables nor do they control for all potential factors.

Second, the cross-sectional nature of the data has to be critically discussed. Given that the survey data does include neither an experimental manipulation nor a panel design, it only allows evaluating the relationship between social integration and populism cross-sectionally. This means that no causal claims can be substantiated from the results. Put differently, I cannot

causally establish the impact that social integration has on the formation of populist attitudes or populist party support. While I theoretically maintain that social *disintegration* causes the activation of populist attitudes and populist party support, the empirical analysis cannot show that social *disintegration* is a cause of populist attitudes or populist party support.

Additionally, this also means that empirically I cannot test the direction of the relationship. One might argue that the relationship between social integration and populism could run in both directions. For example, for social trust I argued that less trust towards strangers leads people to support populism. However, one could also argue that people who support populist parties are less trusting towards strangers as the cues of populist parties make them wary of strangers and out-groups. Yet, various studies show that, for example, trust changes rather slowly at the societal and individual levels, thus holding that trust is generally a rather stable property (Uslaner, 2002). If, in turn, interpersonal trust can be considered as a rather stable part of the individual while populist attitudes are not, this would indicate a causal direction from trust to populist attitudes. Unfortunately, the data at hand does not allow for a test of such competing arguments.

For subjective group relative deprivation as another example, there is one empirical analysis that considers the issue of reversed causality (Filsinger, 2021b). While the main argument of the study is that subjective group relative deprivation is positively related to populist attitudes, it also accounts for the possibility that populist attitudes positively affect feelings of disadvantage, as populism is essentially a narrative of disadvantage and betrayal fuelling subjective impressions of disadvantage (Filsinger, 2021b). The analysis shows that although subjective group relative deprivation and populist attitudes affect each other reciprocally, the relationship mainly flows from subjective group relative deprivation to populist attitudes rather than vice versa (Filsinger, 2021b). While supporting the arguments put

forward in this dissertation, the results of this study also caution strong claims for a one-directional relationship (Filsinger, 2021b).

Relatedly, the cross-sectional nature of the data makes it impossible to uncover whether the positive relationship between social *disintegration* and the different forms of populism is based on an individual's decreasing social integration. Thus, with the data at hand, I cannot substantiate the claim that a decline in social integration increases the likelihood of supporting populism.

While I am unable to establish a causal impact of social integration on populism, my analyses reveal that social *disintegration* and populism are positively related. Even more so, theoretical arguments and empirical findings from other studies substantiate the direction of the relationship. To that end, my study – with its detailed elaboration of a theory of the socio-integrational underpinnings of populism – functions as a stepping-stone for future studies that may substantiate these findings with (quasi-)experimental or time-series data (see chapter 10.3).

Third, several aspects regarding the measurement of contextual factors of social integration, different grievances, and different social identities have to be discussed. One important aspect that could not be included in the analysis is the importance of community-level aspects of social integration. In a recent study, Bolet (2021) showed the importance of community pub closures for support for UKIP in the UK. In this vein, she shows that socio-cultural degradation of communities might function as a breeding ground for the support for populist parties. More importantly, such a contextual *disintegration* might also be important for individual-level social integration. Given the importance that recent studies attribute to the political geography of being left-behind, this is a crucial aspect (Adler & Ansell, 2020; Bolet, 2021; Carreras et al., 2019). In this vein, my study is unable to incorporate such local level aspects and how they affect individual-level social integration and its relationship with

populism. Future studies should incorporate such contextual factors both theoretically and empirically.

Furthermore, my analyses only included two distinct conflict lines that founded the basis for subjective group relative deprivation. Following theoretical arguments, I focused on immigrants and rich people as the assumedly most relevant sources of grievances. Yet, modern societies might have additional conflict lines that matter for citizens and are relevant for the respective populist parties. For example, societal conflicts based on an increasing educational divide might provide a new breeding ground for political preferences (Bornschier et al., 2021). While it seems that immigration matters for supporters of radical right-wing populism, the conflict line for supporters of radical left-wing populism seems less clear. Here, the results certainly show room for improvement, as the driving conflict lines for radical left-wing populism remain to be identified.

Relatedly, my study was only able to focus on a few different social identities. Social and group identities are of crucial importance not only for self-esteem but also for political preference formation. In this vein, the identities included in this study in the form of identity-based trust might not be encompassing enough to understand "'who voters are' in their subjective self-understanding" (Bornschier et al., 2021, p. 2099). To that end, people might have a different self-understanding than offered with the items in the survey. Furthermore, the group identities might also have a narrower scope or additional qualifying characteristics. Thus, while recent research acknowledged the political importance of different social and group identities, we know relatively little about which identities are important and how exactly these different identities motivate political behaviour and attitude formation (Bornschier et al., 2021).

The fourth and final limitation of this study concerns the causal chain underlying the theoretical argument. My theoretical argument starts with the assumption that globalisation and processes of societal modernisation have brought about cultural and economic changes that

affect individuals' perceptions and attitudes. Concisely, the argument is that these developments have created a feeling of social *disintegration*, i.e., some people feel that they have been pushed to the fringes of society. Following from this, I hypothesised that people who feel disintegrated from society – i.e., who have the subjective impression of losing out and being sidelined – are more likely to support populism as populism resonates well with such feelings of social *disintegration*. Unfortunately, my study design and dataset does not allow for a complete test of this causal chain. In particular, I cannot test whether the transformations of society and economy based on globalisation and modernisation have resulted in social *disintegration* for a certain segment of the population. Instead, I focus on the second part of this causal chain and investigate the relationship between social integration and different forms of populism. While it remains an open question whether social *disintegration* is a consequence of the transformatory processes triggered by globalisation, my results show that social *disintegration* and feelings of detachment are on average positively related to populism. Thus, future studies should aim for a full test of this explanatory model of the socio-integrational underpinnings of populism (see chapter 10.3).

10.3 Avenues for Future Research

Based on the discussion of the results and the limitations of my study, there are several suggestion for avenues for future research. The results of this study already hint at several empirical advancements that should be addressed by future studies. However, there are also theoretical extensions that future research should tackle.

First, given the limitations of cross-sectional survey data used here, it has become evident that there is an increasing need for high quality longitudinal survey data. From the perspective of this book, it would be desirable if these surveys include several aspects of social integration and different political attitudes. One particular advantage of social integration theory

as advanced in this study is that it can be transferred to many political phenomena related to radical politics or exclusionary attitudes such as nationalism, regime preference or out-group attitudes. Furthermore, if such data were to be panel data, this would alleviate the problems of causal identification to a certain extent. Furthermore, using panel data would allow investigating the relationship over time including modelling the dynamics of the relationship as well as accounting for potentially reciprocal relationships (see Filsinger, 2021b).

Besides these rather large data collection efforts, researchers might also use experimental data to strengthen causal claims. Using survey experiments to treat perceptions of social *disintegration* might validate the causal claims underlying social integration theory. In this vein, research in social psychology has successfully treated perceptions of subjective group relative deprivation and linked them to exclusionary attitudes (Dambrun et al., 2006). A similar route might be taken for trust decisions as well as perception of status decline (Carlin & Love, 2013). Similarly, quasi-experimental designs or other methods allowing for causal inference might be useful in testing the causal chain ranging from globalisation to social *disintegration* to populism. (Quasi-) experimental designs might also offer the possibility to disentangle the mediation effects discussed in the analyses of this book.

An additional fruitful task for future research would be to replicate the findings in different contexts and countries. In particular, Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) might be an important context for the relationship between social integration and populism. The transformation from state socialism to modern capitalism has also left a strain on civil society and social cohesion making CEE a particularly relevant context to test the influence of social integration. Furthermore, researchers might go beyond Europe to test the applicability of the social integration theory in contexts such as Latin America, which is also interesting given the importance of radical left-wing populism in the region. While such cross-sectional variation does not necessarily increase confidence in causal claims, it is nevertheless crucially important

to test the empirical value of the theory. Overall, one major avenue for future research is the collection of data that allows for more robust causal claims and external validity than the data used here or in other studies.

Second, future studies should take a closer look at the different grievances underlying the support for populism. In particular, one suggestion for qualitative research would be to extend its focus beyond right-wing populism. By now, there are several qualitative studies that aim to better understand the grievances and subjective impressions of supporters of radical right-wing populist parties and movements (Cramer, 2016; Eribon, 2009; Gest, 2016; Hochschild, 2016). To that end, we seem to have a rather good understanding of their subjective impressions.

Conversely, radical left-wing populist supporters are less well researched and thus remain more of a mystery. Thus, qualitative research might be very well suited to tease out the subjective impressions of reality and uncover whether radical left-wing populist supporters are also driven by a particular ‘deep story’. Beyond the distinctions of radical left- and right-wing populism, qualitative studies offer an extremely important view into the grievances and the resentment of supporters of radical politics that can inform quantitative research and policy-making. Mixed-methods designs deepen our understanding of the perceptions thereby advancing our understanding of the causes of populism (see Gest, 2016; Gest et al., 2018).

In a similar vein, future research should increasingly be concerned with social identities and their importance. The question of who voters are, as whom they see themselves as well as which self-ascribed identity matters to them, may be of crucial importance (see Bornschier et al., 2021). In this regard, qualitative research might shed light on the different social identities that individuals hold. Furthermore, researchers might uncover how and why certain identities matter for individuals as well as what follows from these different identities. Similarly, quantitative research might help uncovering different group or social identities trough large-

scale surveys with open responses. To that end, future research can advance our empirical understanding of different social identities and their political and social ramifications.

Third, this book also offers future avenues for theory development. By including several aspects, one might arrive at a full explanatory model of populism. So far, the theory of social integration offered in this book, is focused on the demand-side and does not include any supply-side factors. Yet, supply-side factors such as mobilisation by parties, party positioning, or party communication are important in explaining support for populism. The fact that subjective perceptions play a particularly important role for social integration makes the inclusion of the supply-side crucial. For example, research has shown that populist communication and messages might influence people's perceptions and attitudes (Bos et al., 2020; Hameleers et al., 2018; Hameleers & Fawzi, 2020). Thus, including parties' positions and communication might show how parties affect people's perceptions of social *disintegration* and reveal how communication and perceptions influence each other. To that end, a full explanatory model of social integration can benefit from including supply-side factors.

Besides political supply-side factors, recent research has pointed towards the importance of the local social context (Bolet, 2021). The inclusion of socio-cultural degradation of communities could advance the theoretical and empirical value of theories of social integration (cf. Bolet, 2021). Contextual social *disintegration* might advance our understanding of individual-level social *disintegration* and offer additional explanatory leverage for empirical studies. Given the importance that recent studies attribute to the political geography of being left-behind (Adler & Ansell, 2020; Carreras et al., 2019), neglecting the local social context might explain the inconsistent findings for individual-level social integration (cf. Oesch & Vigna, 2021). More importantly, accounting for the local context allows accounting for the complexities of modern societies where people are located in different socio-economic contexts that crucially shape their perceptions, attitudes, and behaviour.

This aspect also relates to the study of different social identities, which are influenced by the local social context. In particular, the question arises whether some forms of social *disintegration* are better understood as social *compartmentalisation* where people are integrated within a group that, however, is not integrated in society. Qualitative research has indicated that supporters are integrated in their community but alienated from society (Gest, 2016; Hochschild, 2016). In this context, the idea of mechanical solidarity might prove useful, as it implies solidarity and social integration based on similarity. Social integration in the community is based on the common narrative of being left-behind but comes at the expense of an integration in the broader normative order of society. While the similarity can be based on aspects such as ethnicity or nationality, it might also take different shades in modern societies such as the same political opinion. Commonly shared social identities can be powerful drivers of group formation accompanied by out-group demarcation and social *disintegration* from society. Even more, if such group identities follow a logic of (affective) polarisation, they might prove challenging for political stability and societal cohesion.

In this vein, my future research objective is to include both aspects as they resonate well with each other. First, I aim to include the community (and society) level into the theory of social integration, thereby offering a fully explicated model of social integration. Second, this extension of the social integration theory will also entail a stronger focus on different social and group identities that matter for political attitudes and behaviour.

An additional extension on the theoretical level would be to follow Rhodes-Purdy et al. (2021) and put a particular focus on individual emotional responses. For example, including how people react to their perceived social *disintegration* might advance our understanding of why people develop populist attitudes or why some vote for populist parties. If people react with fear, they might be less prone to populism as “the populist worldview is at odds with the appraisal and behavioral tendencies that characterize fear” (Rico et al., 2017, p. 448).

Conversely, anger sparked by social *disintegration* might lead to a populist response in the form of populist attitudes (Filsinger, 2021a; Rico et al., 2017) or vote choice (Vasilopoulos et al., 2019).

Relatedly, including emotions also sparks the question whether different aspects of social *disintegration* lead to different emotional responses. Rhodes-Purdy et al. (2021) show that anger links economic and cultural threat to populist attitudes and thus demonstrate the importance of emotional reactions (see also Rico et al., 2017). Social *disintegration* can also be seen as a threat to the individual that might spark emotional reactions. To that end, it might be possible to extend the socio-integrational model of populism by investigating whether social *disintegration* is linked to different manifestations of populism through different emotional responses.

Lastly, regarding the explanation of populism, this study also offers avenues for future research. There has been ample research on (radical right-wing) populism. Yet, recent research showed that many of the quantitative findings “do not directly touch-upon the resentments that qualitative reporting has found to prevail among political supporters of radical parties: a feeling of ‘losingout’ compared with one’s own past and compared with other groups in society” (Burgoon et al., 2019, p. 52). In this tradition and based on previous advancements in the literature (Gidron & Hall, 2020), I tested the socio-integrational underpinnings of populism to tap into the resentment uncovered by qualitative findings and to overcome the dichotomy of economic and cultural explanation of populism.

Future research should continue on this path. This might be particularly important for the explanation of populist attitudes, which is less developed than the explanation of populist vote choice or party support. To that end, explaining populist attitudes might advance our understanding of populism beyond institutionalised parties. Furthermore, better understanding populist attitudes might also increase our understanding of vote choice given that populist

attitudes are shown to be an important predictor for vote choice as well as interact with substantive policy positions in predicting vote choice (Loew & Faas, 2019; van Hauwaert & van Kessel, 2018).

The findings of this book also call for more analyses regarding radical left-wing populism. This form of populism is less common in Europe and thus seems to be less well researched. Consequently, our understanding of the drivers of radical left-wing populism is lacking behind the one of radical right-wing populism. In this vein, future research should deepen our understanding of radical left-wing populist support and its drivers. The rather inconclusive findings of this study should be a motivation for future research. To that end, qualitative and quantitative research is needed to offer a better understanding of this relevant form of populism.

10.4 Implications

Although not the primary purpose of this book, the analyses conducted have important implications beyond the scientific debate. One particular aspect that has become clear is that populism is not solely based on economic and cultural transformation but can be understood as problem of social integration and thus of societal structure. This relates to structural aspects such as the quality of relationships, or the possibility to meet friends and neighbours. Yet, it importantly also relates to subjective elements such as the impression of being integrated in society. In this vein, places where people have the possibility to meet and exchange are crucial. Local social infrastructure such as youth or community centres can provide places where people meet and build relationships. It is here that positive externalities from these interactions and relationship might spill over into other domains of (social) life (Putnam, 2000).

Conversely, if such places do not exist or degrade over time, regions and their citizens become detached from the rest of society fostering *disintegration* and political conflict. Recent research has emphasised the importance of place for populist support and how local degradation can provide a breeding ground for radical politics (Adler & Ansell, 2020; Bolet, 2021; Carreras et al., 2019). This seems to be particularly relevant if group perceptions of *disintegration* become important as districts or cities share the same underlying feeling of being left-behind.

To that end, a combination of symbolic and structural polices might improve the situation of those that are confronted with economic hardship that is accompanied by social degradation in terms of vanishing meeting places such as local pubs, youth or community centres (Bolet, 2021). Similarly, traditional policies of increasing welfare might not work for those that are driven by societal recognition rather than economic hardship (Kurer, 2020). People who see themselves outside of a shared normative order might not care about increased social welfare. Instead, they demand policies that address their perceived social decline.

Problematically, the answer to such perceptions is thus far offered by the symbolic policies of anti-establishment parties that come at the expense of the inclusion of other parts of society, most notably immigrants and ethnic or other minorities. Thus, the difficulty for policy-makers is to provide policies that do not exclude other members of society. One aspect of such policies must be that granting additional rights to other groups in society does not necessarily imply fewer rights for others, i.e., not all aspects of social rights and social recognition are zero-sum games. While some rights such as freedom of speech and integrity of personal live might have trade-offs, these have to be moderated in a consensual way that at the same condemns anti-democratic, racist, xenophobic, homophobic, sexist, or other discriminatory positions.

11 Conclusion

Populism has been an omnipresent topic in political science for several years. Yet, scholars are still debating its causes and consequences. The aim of this dissertation was to contribute to the explanation of populism by offering a comparative test of the socio-integrational underpinnings of different forms of populism. Following and extending recent work by Gidron and Hall (2020), I investigated whether support for different forms of populism can be considered as a consequence of social *disintegration*. In particular, my argument is based on the assumption that globalisation and societal modernisation have brought about cultural and economic changes that affect individuals' perceptions and attitudes (Gidron & Hall, 2017). More precisely, the argument goes that – for certain people in society – these developments have created a feeling of social *disintegration* (Gidron & Hall, 2017, 2020).

Going beyond previous research, I argued that the multidimensionality of social integration requires a multifaceted approach to investigate the socio-integrational underpinnings of populism. I proposed subjective social status, social trust, and subjective group relative deprivation as manifestations of social integration. Using these three different manifestations, my study allows accounting for three crucial aspects of social integration in more detail: a) the relational nature of social integration, b) the importance of groups, and c) the subjective impression of social *disintegration*. To that end, I offer a) a more detailed and comprehensive conceptualisation of social integration and thus b) a more encompassing theoretical framework, and c) empirical test of the relationship between social integration and populism.

Overall, I argued that social *disintegration* is generally positively related to populist attitudes as well as radical left- and right-wing populist party support. Furthermore, I use the dimensionality and flexibility of social integration to propose distinct arguments for radical left- and right-wing populism. For example, regarding identity-based trust, I argue that the in-group

is crucial in determining which form of populism is supported. While an in-group based on nationality and language (ethnic-based trust) is conducive for radical right-wing populism, an in-group focus on class and occupation (class-based trust) is argued to foster radical left-wing populism. Similar arguments are made for subjective group relative deprivation, although here the focus is on the out-group that is perceived to be advantaged. Again, a focus on immigration is expected to be conducive for radical right-wing populism while a focus on rich people matters for radical left-wing populism.

To investigate these relationships, I rely on original survey data from France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. Results from regression models offer a mixed evidence. In particular, the analyses show that the relationship between social integration and populism varies a) across countries and b) for the different forms of populism as well as the different manifestations of social integration. Subjective social status is negatively related to all three forms of populism. However, this relationship is not evident in all six countries calling for future attention to country differences. For particularised trust, I find the expected negative relationship with populist attitudes but no relationship with radical left- or right-wing populist party support. Generalised trust is negatively related to populist attitudes and radical right-wing populist party support while there is no indication that this form of social integration is related to radical left-wing populism.

For identity-based trust, the analyses reveal an expected positive relationship of such a group-based thinking with populist attitudes. Surprisingly, identity-based trust with different in-groups does not predict radical left- or right-wing populist party support. Subjective group relative deprivation offers the strongest evidence. This form of social *disintegration* is strongly related to populist attitudes in all countries. Furthermore, feeling disadvantaged compared to immigrants significantly predicts support for a right-wing populist party. Interestingly, feeling

disadvantaged compared to rich people is not related to support for a left-wing populist party contrary to my expectations.

Overall, with this dissertation I contributed to the literature in six important ways. First, by refining the socio-integrational approach to populism with three different manifestations of social integration, I offer a more encompassing analysis of the relationship between social integration and populism. In particular, I am able to account for the relational element of social integration by capturing not only an individual's degree of social integration but also her relative position compared to other members and groups in society. Relatedly, I am able to measure inter-group relationships and their quality as well as in-group identification more explicitly. Lastly, my refined approach allows tapping into subjective impressions of *disintegration* and disadvantage more explicitly than previous research. In sum, the first contribution lies in the more encompassing theoretical approach to social integration, which allows offering more nuanced theoretical arguments with regard to the relationship between social integration and populism.

Second, based on the refined approach to social integration, I advance previous research by presenting a more accurate quantitative application of recent ethnographic studies. By offering three different manifestations of social integration, I capture the different subjective impressions of populist supporters – their 'deep story' – and thus their grievances and resentment more accurately. To that end, I am able to show how deeply such subjective perceptions are rooted in society and whether they translate into support for different forms of populism.

Third, I advance previous research by explicating a more detailed theory of social integration that is able to explain populist attitudes as well as radical left- and right-wing populist party support. In particular, the relationship between social integration and populist attitudes has so far received no attention in the literature.

Fourth, as opposed to previous research, I investigate populist attitudes as well as the two dominant forms of populism in Europe, radical left- and right-wing populism in one study to give an exhaustive account of the explanation of populism. Investigating populist attitudes reveals whether the explanatory power of social integration holds for the attitudes underlying populism itself. In this vein, I take a step back and investigate the relationship between social integration and populism as a thin ideology. This is the crucial advantage of an attitudinal approach as “voters are always recruited on the basis of several issues and concerns”, which makes it difficult to extract support for populism from vote choice (Spruyt et al., 2016, p. 336). Furthermore, studying populist attitudes provides information about support for populism beyond institutionalised parties. I complement these analyses by investigating radical left- and right-wing populist party preference, which allows assessing the explanatory power of the socio-integrational approach for two very different forms of populism. More importantly, I show that different inter-group dynamics, inter-group comparisons, and in-group identifications are crucial aspects of social integration that matter decisively for which form of populism is supported.

Fifth, by using original survey data, my study is one of the first to combine different important measures of social integration with measures of populism and in particular populist attitudes. To that end, my data allows to cover this relationship in its depth but at the same time across six different countries. Sixth, my comparative approach to the survey data goes beyond the mere analysis of pooled samples but takes country differences into account, which reveals that the relationship between social integration and populism might also be context-dependent calling for future research into these contextual differences.

Appendix A

Table A-1 Detailed description of the survey

Survey Period	April 17, 2020 to May 11,2020
Countries	Germany, France, Italy, Switzerland, Spain and the United Kingdom
Target population	Residents aged 18 years or older
Target sample size	1,000 per country
Sample size	6,028 respondents
Quotas	Age, Sex, Education (Language for Switzerland)
Survey mode	Online
Sampling	Qualtrics online access panel
Survey company	Qualtrics
Interview language	German, French, Italian, Spanish, English
Response rate	8.71% (RR5/6)*

*The American Association for Public Opinion Research (AAPOR) (2016). *Standard Definitions: Final Dispositions of Case Codes and Outcome Rates for Surveys. Online:* https://www.aapor.org/AAPOR_Main/media/publications/Standard-Definitions20169theditionfinal.pdf [accessed: 15.10.2020].

Table A-2 Demographics per country (Survey April – Mai 2020)

	N	Mean	SD	Min	Max
Germany					
Age	1,006	48.84	16.19	18	82
Sex	1,006	.5	.5	0	1
Education	1,006			1	3
Primary, lower secondary (1)	142	.14			
Upper, post-secondary (2)	575	.57			
Tertiary (3)	289	.29			
France					
Age	1,010	49.07	16.01	18	83
Sex	1,010	.5	.5	0	1
Education	1,010			1	3
Primary, lower secondary (1)	197	.20			
Upper, post-secondary (2)	432	.43			
Tertiary (3)	381	.37			
Italy					
Age	1,001	48.46	16.59	18	87
Sex	1,001	.5	.5	0	1
Education	1,001			1	3
Primary, lower secondary (1)	375	.37			
Upper, post-secondary (2)	430	.43			
Tertiary (3)	196	.20			
Switzerland					
Age	1,005	49.16	17	18	85
Sex	1,005	.5	.5	0	1
Education	1,005			1	3
Primary, lower secondary (1)	96	.10			
Upper, post-secondary (2)	460	.46			
Tertiary (3)	449	.44			
Spain					
Age	1,000	47.95	16.09	18	88
Sex	1,000	.51	.5	0	1
Education	1,000				
Primary, lower secondary (1)	380	.38			
Upper, post-secondary (2)	238	.24			
Tertiary (3)	382	.38			
United Kingdom					
Age	1,006	47.26	17.34	18	84
Sex	1,006	.49	.5	0	1
Education	1,006				
Primary, lower secondary (1)	333	.33			
Upper, post-secondary (2)	208	.21			
Tertiary (3)	465	.46			

Notes: For categorical variables, the mean represents the percentage of respondents indicating the response; Base category for sex: Female. Source: Original survey data collected from April 2020 to May 2020 by Qualtrics

Table A-3 Summary Statistics

	N	Mean	SD	Min	Max
Populism					
Populist attitudes	5945	.15	.11	0	1
Radical right-wing populist party support	5117	.15	.36	0	1
Radical left-wing populist party support	5117	.05	.22	0	1
Social Integration					
Subjective social status	5945	.53	.19	0	1
Particularised trust	5945	.76	.21	0	1
Generalised trust	5945	.38	.22	0	1
Identity-based trust	5945	.45	.23	0	1
Ethnic-based trust	5945	.45	.24	0	1
Class-based trust	5945	.46	.24	0	1
Subjective group relative deprivation	5945	.54	.29	0	1
Subjective group relative deprivation (immigrants)	5945	.48	.32	0	1
Subjective group relative deprivation (rich people)	5945	.58	.29	0	1
Control Variables					
Age	5945	48.54	16.55	18	88
Sex	5945	.50	.50	0	1
Education	5945	2.1	.78	1	3
Occupation status	5907	4.04	2.81	1	9
Income situation	5907	.48	.27	0	1
Left-right self-placement	5945	.49	.24	0	1
Political interest	5945	.61	.29	0	1
Political trust	5945	.42	.24	0	1
Anti-capitalist attitudes	5945	.65	.21	0	1
Nativist attitudes	5945	.49	.29	0	1
Authoritarian attitudes	5945	.71	.19	0	1
Observations	5945				

Source: Original survey data collected from April 2020 to May 2020 by Qualtrics.

Table A-4 OLS-Regression of determinants of subjective social status

	Model 0
DV: Subjective Social Status	
Age	0.000
	(0.000)
Sex	
Male	0.014**
	(0.004)
Education	
Upper, post-secondary	0.014*
	(0.006)
Tertiary	0.054***
	(0.006)
Income situation	0.297***
	(0.010)
Occupation status	
Manual worker	-0.015
	(0.010)
In public service	-0.002
	(0.010)
Self-employed with no employees	0.003
	(0.011)
Self-employed with employees	0.072***
	(0.017)
Retired	-0.014
	(0.007)
Student or otherwise in training	0.006
	(0.011)
Unemployed	-0.059***
	(0.009)
Other	-0.052***
	(0.013)
Constant	0.336***
	(0.013)
Observations	5871
Country fixed-effects	✓
R^2	0.25
Adjusted R^2	0.25

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Reference Category (RF) for sex: female; RF Education: lower secondary or less; RF Occupation status: Employee. Source: Original survey data collected from April 2020 to May 2020 by Qualtrics.

Figure A-1 Histogram showing the distribution of ethnic-based identity-based trust in the six countries



Notes: Distribution of ethnic-based identity-based trust, which consists of trust in people with the same nationality, and trust in people who speak the same language. Source: Original survey data collected from April 2020 to May 2020 by Qualtrics.

Figure A-2 Histogram showing the distribution of class-based identity-based trust in the six countries



Notes: Distribution of class-based identity-based trust, which consists of trust in people with the same class, and trust in people with the same occupation. Source: Original survey data collected from April 2020 to May 2020 by Qualtrics.

Table A-5 Dimensionality of Social Trust - Model Fit Comparison

Model	χ2	DF	P >	RMSEA	Δ RMSEA	CFI	Δ CFI	TLI	Δ TLI
One Dimension	3568.05	20	.000	.173	-	.903	-	.864	-
Two dimensions	3030.33	19	.000	.163	-.01	.918	.015	.879	.015
Three Dimensions	403.86	17	.000	.062	-.101	.989	.071	.983	.104

Notes: N = 5945; DF = degrees of freedom; RMSEA = root mean square error of approximation; CFI = comparative fit index; TLI = Tucker-Lewis index; CFI = comparative fit index. Models are based on original survey data collected by Qualtrics from April 2020 to May 2020. Estimations are done with the SEM command implemented in Stata 17. I added an adjustment to the original model by introducing a term for correlated errors between Trust in people who share the same class and who share the same occupation.

Appendix B

Table B-1 Linear regression on the relationship between subjective social status and populist attitudes (Main Model)

	Pooled Sample	France	Germany	Italy	Spain	Switzerland	United Kingdom
DV: Populist attitudes							
Subjective social status	-0.044*	-0.073**	-0.057**	-0.028	-0.085**	0.009	-0.012
	(0.013)	(0.025)	(0.021)	(0.022)	(0.026)	(0.018)	(0.028)
Age	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	0.001*	-0.000	0.000	-0.001**
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Sex							
Male	0.009*	-0.004	0.003	0.010	0.018*	0.012	0.014
	(0.003)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.009)	(0.006)	(0.007)
Education							
Upper, post-secondary	-0.003	-0.006	0.004	0.001	0.003	-0.006	-0.024**
	(0.003)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.008)	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.009)
Tertiary	-0.008**	-0.014	-0.004	-0.004	-0.003	-0.016	-0.017*
	(0.002)	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.009)
Income situation	-0.054***	-0.071***	-0.068***	-0.044**	-0.047**	-0.046***	-0.030*
	(0.007)	(0.017)	(0.014)	(0.016)	(0.017)	(0.014)	(0.012)
Occupation Status							
Manual worker	0.010	-0.003	0.005	0.025	0.001	0.037	0.018
	(0.005)	(0.020)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.017)	(0.023)	(0.016)
In public service	-0.008	0.005	-0.041***	0.040	-0.030	0.024	-0.038*
	(0.012)	(0.015)	(0.012)	(0.048)	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.015)
Self-employed with no employees	-0.007	0.005	-0.007	0.012	-0.028	-0.003	-0.010
	(0.005)	(0.016)	(0.019)	(0.016)	(0.020)	(0.013)	(0.014)
Self-employed with employees	0.001	-0.004	-0.000	0.093**	-0.036	0.004	-0.036
	(0.015)	(0.028)	(0.023)	(0.032)	(0.022)	(0.024)	(0.035)
Retired	-0.004	0.002	-0.018	0.000	0.004	-0.004	-0.003
	(0.003)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.014)	(0.011)	(0.010)
Student or otherwise in training	-0.024**	-0.013	-0.038**	-0.009	-0.032	-0.013	0.001
	(0.005)	(0.028)	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.017)	(0.013)	(0.018)
Unemployed	0.002	-0.019	-0.019	0.017	0.009	0.007	0.005
	(0.006)	(0.014)	(0.021)	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.017)
Other	0.003	0.013	-0.018	0.009	-0.011	0.014	0.034
	(0.006)	(0.024)	(0.017)	(0.015)	(0.018)	(0.015)	(0.021)
Political interest	0.017**	0.011	0.029	0.016	0.028	0.018	0.009
	(0.003)	(0.016)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.017)	(0.012)	(0.012)
Left-right self-placement	-0.244***	-0.262***	-0.232**	-0.198***	-0.235***	-0.157**	-0.393***
	(0.026)	(0.054)	(0.072)	(0.049)	(0.053)	(0.055)	(0.079)
Left-right self-placement (squared)	0.250***	0.244***	0.313***	0.223***	0.273***	0.166**	0.321***
	(0.015)	(0.049)	(0.076)	(0.046)	(0.056)	(0.052)	(0.070)
Constant	0.243***	0.333***	0.231***	0.155***	0.275***	0.149***	0.301***
	(0.023)	(0.024)	(0.023)	(0.025)	(0.026)	(0.022)	(0.024)
Observations	5871	1002	993	983	986	914	993
Country fixed-effects	✓	-	-	-	-	-	-
R^2	0.122	0.108	0.124	0.094	0.086	0.059	0.131
Adjusted R^2	0.118	0.093	0.109	0.078	0.070	0.041	0.115

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Reference Category (RF) for sex: female; RF Education: lower secondary or less; RF Occupation status: Employee. Source: Original survey data collected April 2020 to May 2020 by Qualtrics.

Table B-2 Linear regression on the relationship between subjective social status and populist attitudes (Robustness 1)

	Pooled Sample	France	Germany	Italy	Spain	Switzerland	United Kingdom
DV: Populist attitudes							
Subjective social status	-0.043***	-0.074**	-0.045*	-0.033	-0.086***	0.011	-0.012
	(0.009)	(0.025)	(0.020)	(0.021)	(0.026)	(0.018)	(0.027)
Age	-0.000*	-0.001	-0.000	0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.001**
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Sex							
Male	0.008**	-0.004	0.003	0.010	0.019*	0.010	0.013
	(0.003)	(0.008)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.006)	(0.007)
Education							
Upper, post-secondary	-0.000	-0.006	0.015	0.002	0.005	-0.003	-0.021*
	(0.004)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.008)	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.009)
Tertiary	-0.000	-0.009	0.008	0.005	0.005	-0.007	-0.011
	(0.004)	(0.012)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.008)
Income situation	-0.046***	-0.062***	-0.041**	-0.036*	-0.039*	-0.040**	-0.027*
	(0.006)	(0.017)	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.017)	(0.013)	(0.013)
Occupation status							
Manual worker	0.011	0.000	0.007	0.025*	0.002	0.035	0.019
	(0.006)	(0.020)	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.017)	(0.024)	(0.016)
In public service	-0.008	0.005	-0.033**	0.040	-0.032*	0.020	-0.038*
	(0.007)	(0.015)	(0.012)	(0.042)	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.015)
Self-employed with no employees	-0.001	0.009	0.002	0.013	-0.017	0.000	-0.007
	(0.007)	(0.016)	(0.017)	(0.016)	(0.020)	(0.013)	(0.014)
Self-employed with employees	0.004	0.000	0.014	0.093**	-0.023	0.003	-0.041
	(0.011)	(0.029)	(0.023)	(0.031)	(0.023)	(0.021)	(0.037)
Retired	-0.002	0.004	-0.014	0.005	0.012	-0.003	-0.003
	(0.005)	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.014)	(0.011)	(0.010)
Student or otherwise in training	-0.014*	-0.001	-0.016	-0.003	-0.021	-0.005	0.005
	(0.006)	(0.028)	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.017)	(0.013)	(0.018)
Unemployed	0.005	-0.013	-0.012	0.019	0.015	0.011	0.005
	(0.006)	(0.014)	(0.020)	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.017)
Other	0.006	0.023	-0.017	0.013	-0.009	0.014	0.032
	(0.007)	(0.024)	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.017)	(0.016)	(0.020)
Political interest	0.022***	0.011	0.045**	0.017	0.042*	0.023	0.011
	(0.006)	(0.016)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.017)	(0.012)	(0.012)
Left-right self-placement	-0.269***	-0.282***	-0.272***	-0.236***	-0.245***	-0.196***	-0.401***
	(0.024)	(0.055)	(0.073)	(0.049)	(0.052)	(0.055)	(0.080)
Left-right self-placement (squared)	0.236***	0.236***	0.269***	0.219***	0.242***	0.171***	0.314***
	(0.023)	(0.049)	(0.075)	(0.046)	(0.057)	(0.051)	(0.069)
Nativist attitudes	0.072***	0.037*	0.135***	0.077***	0.092***	0.071***	0.032*
	(0.006)	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.016)	(0.017)	(0.014)	(0.016)
Authoritarian attitudes	0.013	0.042	-0.012	0.020	0.019	-0.017	0.008
	(0.009)	(0.025)	(0.021)	(0.022)	(0.026)	(0.021)	(0.023)
Constant	0.207***	0.294***	0.154***	0.126***	0.226***	0.138***	0.284***
	(0.011)	(0.027)	(0.026)	(0.027)	(0.031)	(0.023)	(0.026)
Observations	5871	1002	993	983	986	914	993
Country fixed-effects	✓	-	-	-	-	-	-
R^2	0.150	0.123	0.214	0.130	0.120	0.090	0.138
Adjusted R^2	0.147	0.106	0.198	0.112	0.103	0.071	0.121

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Reference Category (RF) for sex: female; RF Education: lower secondary or less; RF Occupation status: Employee. Source: Original survey data collected April 2020 to May 2020 by Qualtrics.

Table B-3 Linear regression on the relationship between subjective social status and populist attitudes (Robustness 2)

	Pooled Sample	France	Germany	Italy	Spain	Switzerland	United Kingdom
DV: Populist attitudes							
Subjective social status	-0.020*	-0.045*	-0.013	-0.017	-0.066**	0.031	-0.007
	(0.009)	(0.021)	(0.018)	(0.020)	(0.024)	(0.017)	(0.026)
Age	-0.000	-0.000	0.000	0.001	-0.000	0.000	-0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Sex							
Male	0.009***	0.006	0.002	0.009	0.020*	0.008	0.014*
	(0.003)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Education							
Upper, post-secondary	-0.001	0.003	0.010	0.001	0.005	-0.002	-0.020*
	(0.004)	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.008)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.008)
Tertiary	0.001	0.014	0.011	-0.000	0.005	-0.012	-0.006
	(0.004)	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.008)
Income situation	-0.028***	-0.026	-0.045***	-0.027	-0.027	-0.021	-0.011
	(0.006)	(0.015)	(0.012)	(0.016)	(0.017)	(0.012)	(0.011)
Occupation status							
Manual worker	0.010	-0.004	0.008	0.026*	0.002	0.022	0.012
	(0.006)	(0.019)	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.016)	(0.021)	(0.014)
In public service	-0.002	0.011	-0.028*	0.053	-0.033*	0.022	-0.011
	(0.006)	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.043)	(0.015)	(0.013)	(0.012)
Self-employed with no employees	-0.002	0.023	-0.010	0.018	-0.037*	0.005	-0.011
	(0.006)	(0.013)	(0.016)	(0.015)	(0.019)	(0.012)	(0.014)
Self-employed with employees	0.013	0.020	0.000	0.087**	-0.015	0.013	-0.013
	(0.010)	(0.029)	(0.019)	(0.028)	(0.025)	(0.018)	(0.034)
Retired	-0.002	0.005	-0.013	0.004	0.002	-0.003	0.001
	(0.004)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.013)	(0.010)	(0.009)
Student or otherwise in training	-0.011	0.015	-0.019	-0.007	-0.011	-0.011	0.009
	(0.006)	(0.021)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.017)	(0.012)	(0.015)
Unemployed	0.003	-0.008	-0.010	0.015	0.010	-0.000	0.008
	(0.005)	(0.012)	(0.019)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.014)
Other	-0.003	0.006	-0.023	0.012	-0.018	-0.003	0.018
	(0.007)	(0.021)	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.018)	(0.015)	(0.018)
Political interest	0.012*	0.008	0.019	0.005	0.031	0.015	0.004
	(0.006)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.011)	(0.011)
Left-right self-placement	-0.161***	-0.143**	-0.102	-0.163***	-0.154**	-0.090	-0.301***
	(0.022)	(0.048)	(0.065)	(0.046)	(0.051)	(0.052)	(0.076)
Left-right self-placement (squared)	0.184***	0.155***	0.171*	0.184***	0.214***	0.118*	0.276***
	(0.021)	(0.044)	(0.070)	(0.043)	(0.054)	(0.048)	(0.065)
Anticapitalist attitudes	0.218***	0.271***	0.233***	0.165***	0.223***	0.173***	0.219***
	(0.007)	(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.020)	(0.021)	(0.015)	(0.018)
Constant	0.052***	0.043	0.017	0.033	0.066*	0.008	0.100***
	(0.011)	(0.025)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.029)	(0.023)	(0.029)
Observations	5871	1002	993	983	986	914	993
Country fixed-effects	✓	-	-	-	-	-	-
R^2	0.263	0.319	0.297	0.166	0.199	0.198	0.295
Adjusted R^2	0.260	0.306	0.284	0.151	0.184	0.182	0.282

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Reference Category (RF) for sex: female; RF Education: lower secondary or less; RF Occupation status: Employee. Source: Original survey data collected April 2020 to May 2020 by Qualtrics.

Table B-4 Linear regression on the relationship between subjective social status and populist attitudes (Robustness 3)

	Pooled Sample	France	Germany	Italy	Spain	Switzerland	United Kingdom
DV: Populist attitudes							
Subjective social status	-0.010	-0.031	-0.013	-0.008	-0.055*	0.019	0.022
	(0.009)	(0.024)	(0.020)	(0.022)	(0.026)	(0.018)	(0.027)
Age	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	0.001*	-0.000	0.000	-0.001*
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Sex							
Male	0.008**	-0.003	0.005	0.010	0.015	0.011	0.011
	(0.003)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.006)	(0.007)
Education							
Upper, post-secondary	-0.004	-0.004	0.006	-0.001	0.004	-0.002	-0.024**
	(0.004)	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.008)	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.009)
Tertiary	-0.009*	-0.010	-0.000	-0.007	-0.004	-0.015	-0.018*
	(0.004)	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.008)
Income situation	-0.047***	-0.051**	-0.063***	-0.040*	-0.050**	-0.027*	-0.029*
	(0.006)	(0.016)	(0.014)	(0.016)	(0.017)	(0.013)	(0.012)
Occupation status							
Manual worker	0.010	0.003	0.006	0.023	-0.000	0.038	0.021
	(0.006)	(0.019)	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.017)	(0.022)	(0.016)
In public service	-0.011	-0.003	-0.039**	0.041	-0.032*	0.024	-0.038*
	(0.007)	(0.014)	(0.012)	(0.047)	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.016)
Self-employed with no employees	-0.009	0.002	-0.007	0.009	-0.023	-0.004	-0.018
	(0.006)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.016)	(0.019)	(0.012)	(0.014)
Self-employed with employees	-0.004	-0.007	-0.006	0.092**	-0.039	0.006	-0.053
	(0.011)	(0.027)	(0.023)	(0.032)	(0.024)	(0.020)	(0.033)
Retired	-0.001	0.009	-0.012	-0.000	0.011	-0.001	-0.001
	(0.004)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.013)	(0.010)	(0.009)
Student or otherwise in training	-0.017**	0.004	-0.028*	-0.004	-0.038*	-0.011	0.006
	(0.006)	(0.025)	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.017)	(0.013)	(0.018)
Unemployed	0.002	-0.023	-0.019	0.016	0.012	0.011	0.004
	(0.005)	(0.013)	(0.019)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.016)
Other	0.002	0.009	-0.021	0.008	-0.009	0.013	0.032
	(0.007)	(0.023)	(0.016)	(0.015)	(0.019)	(0.015)	(0.020)
Political interest	0.031***	0.028	0.043**	0.028	0.047**	0.027*	0.020
	(0.006)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.017)	(0.011)	(0.012)
Left-right self-placement	-0.221***	-0.195***	-0.197**	-0.185***	-0.252***	-0.163**	-0.337***
	(0.023)	(0.051)	(0.068)	(0.048)	(0.051)	(0.054)	(0.074)
Left-right self-placement (squared)	0.222***	0.178***	0.257***	0.203***	0.270***	0.167**	0.295***
	(0.022)	(0.047)	(0.072)	(0.045)	(0.054)	(0.051)	(0.066)
Political trust	-0.135***	-0.170***	-0.127***	-0.071***	-0.153***	-0.129***	-0.142***
	(0.007)	(0.017)	(0.015)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.018)
Constant	0.267***	0.335***	0.248***	0.160***	0.304***	0.194***	0.312***
	(0.010)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.023)	(0.023)
Observations	5871	1002	993	983	986	914	993
Country fixed-effects	✓	-	-	-	-	-	-
R^2	0.189	0.199	0.203	0.112	0.156	0.139	0.208
Adjusted R^2	0.185	0.185	0.188	0.096	0.140	0.122	0.194

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Reference Category (RF) for sex: female; RF Education: lower secondary or less; RF Occupation status: Employee. Source: Original survey data collected April 2020 to May 2020 by Qualtrics.

Table B-5 Linear probability model on the relationship between subjective social status and right-wing populist party support (Main Model)

	Pooled Sample	France	Germany	Italy	Spain	Switzerland	United Kingdom
DV: Right-wing populist party support							
Subjective social status	-0.116*	-0.062	-0.155**	-0.199*	-0.002	0.067	-0.083
	(0.040)	(0.084)	(0.059)	(0.080)	(0.066)	(0.095)	(0.044)
Age	-0.000	-0.002	-0.001	0.002	-0.001	0.002	-0.000
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Sex							
Male	-0.004	0.045	-0.036	0.002	0.011	-0.024	-0.004
	(0.010)	(0.026)	(0.021)	(0.029)	(0.020)	(0.029)	(0.011)
Education							
Upper, post-secondary	-0.018	-0.031	-0.049	-0.036	-0.021	0.012	-0.029
	(0.014)	(0.038)	(0.035)	(0.031)	(0.025)	(0.050)	(0.016)
Tertiary	-0.053*	-0.121**	-0.026	-0.052	-0.043	-0.102*	-0.015
	(0.020)	(0.041)	(0.038)	(0.043)	(0.024)	(0.051)	(0.015)
Income situation	-0.026	-0.225***	-0.039	0.201**	0.016	-0.075	0.008
	(0.051)	(0.062)	(0.042)	(0.068)	(0.043)	(0.061)	(0.021)
Occupation status							
Manual worker	0.010	0.046	0.067	-0.023	-0.011	0.189*	0.052
	(0.031)	(0.080)	(0.054)	(0.050)	(0.041)	(0.090)	(0.045)
In public service	-0.001	0.070	-0.045	0.039	-0.028	-0.060	-0.021*
	(0.025)	(0.044)	(0.041)	(0.108)	(0.043)	(0.058)	(0.009)
Self-employed with no employees	0.027 (0.028)	0.081 (0.067)	0.023 (0.057)	0.110 (0.068)	-0.081* (0.034)	0.009 (0.051)	-0.030** (0.011)
Self-employed with employees	-0.040 (0.044)	-0.110 (0.090)	-0.072 (0.067)	0.019 (0.125)	0.045 (0.099)	-0.232* (0.115)	0.064 (0.071)
Retired	0.012	0.039	0.001	0.029	-0.004	-0.042	0.005
	(0.010)	(0.044)	(0.034)	(0.051)	(0.030)	(0.049)	(0.020)
Student or otherwise in training	-0.069* (0.019)	-0.200*** (0.049)	-0.069* (0.029)	-0.010 (0.059)	-0.008 (0.050)	-0.093 (0.057)	-0.029* (0.013)
Unemployed	-0.052	-0.100*	0.056	-0.095*	0.009	-0.047	-0.043**
	(0.030)	(0.040)	(0.058)	(0.047)	(0.030)	(0.054)	(0.014)
Other	0.008	-0.067	0.012	0.077	-0.030	-0.038	0.050
	(0.024)	(0.086)	(0.082)	(0.066)	(0.052)	(0.059)	(0.055)
Political interest	0.087*	0.028	0.158***	0.110*	0.106**	0.155**	-0.002
	(0.025)	(0.044)	(0.047)	(0.050)	(0.034)	(0.047)	(0.021)
Left-right self-placement	0.559** (0.115)	0.544*** (0.048)	0.543*** (0.063)	0.893*** (0.044)	0.425*** (0.047)	0.822*** (0.059)	0.069* (0.030)
Constant	-0.099	0.155*	-0.071	-0.277**	-0.109*	-0.304***	0.068
	(0.097)	(0.071)	(0.065)	(0.085)	(0.055)	(0.084)	(0.035)
Observations	5071	885	879	805	879	773	850
Country fixed-effects	✓	-	-	-	-	-	-
R^2	0.214	0.188	0.145	0.336	0.156	0.262	0.033
Adjusted R^2	0.210	0.173	0.129	0.322	0.140	0.246	0.014

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Reference Category (RF) for sex: female; RF Education: lower secondary or less; RF Occupation status: Employee. Source: Original survey data collected April 2020 to May 2020 by Qualtrics.

Table B-6 Linear probability model on the relationship between subjective social status and right-wing populist party support (Robustness 1)

	Pooled Sample	France	Germany	Italy	Spain	Switzerland	United Kingdom
DV: Right-wing populist party support							
Subjective social status	-0.115*	-0.067	-0.118*	-0.207**	-0.008	0.048	-0.085
	(0.038)	(0.079)	(0.057)	(0.079)	(0.065)	(0.093)	(0.044)
Age	-0.001	-0.002*	-0.000	0.002	-0.001	0.001	-0.001
	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Sex							
Male	-0.004	0.050*	-0.037	0.002	0.014	-0.031	-0.006
	(0.011)	(0.025)	(0.020)	(0.029)	(0.019)	(0.029)	(0.011)
Education							
Upper, post-secondary	-0.008	-0.024	-0.025	-0.032	-0.018	0.029	-0.022
	(0.014)	(0.037)	(0.034)	(0.031)	(0.025)	(0.050)	(0.015)
Tertiary	-0.024	-0.083*	-0.001	-0.029	-0.027	-0.049	-0.003
	(0.017)	(0.040)	(0.036)	(0.042)	(0.024)	(0.051)	(0.015)
Income situation	0.007	-0.174**	0.027	0.219***	0.038	-0.039	0.015
	(0.045)	(0.059)	(0.042)	(0.066)	(0.043)	(0.059)	(0.021)
Occupation status							
Manual worker	0.013	0.072	0.071	-0.022	-0.009	0.180*	0.054
	(0.030)	(0.077)	(0.052)	(0.049)	(0.040)	(0.088)	(0.044)
In public service	0.001	0.076	-0.023	0.038	-0.032	-0.073	-0.021*
	(0.026)	(0.041)	(0.041)	(0.118)	(0.043)	(0.057)	(0.009)
Self-employed with no employees	0.045	0.107	0.037	0.114	-0.059	0.036	-0.022*
	(0.027)	(0.066)	(0.054)	(0.067)	(0.034)	(0.050)	(0.010)
Self-employed with employees	-0.027	-0.077	-0.037	0.024	0.069	-0.223*	0.053
	(0.039)	(0.080)	(0.064)	(0.123)	(0.100)	(0.103)	(0.069)
Retired	0.020	0.049	0.014	0.042	0.010	-0.039	0.007
	(0.011)	(0.042)	(0.032)	(0.051)	(0.029)	(0.047)	(0.020)
Student or otherwise in training	-0.038*	-0.109*	-0.018	0.009	0.012	-0.056	-0.021
	(0.014)	(0.055)	(0.030)	(0.057)	(0.050)	(0.055)	(0.014)
Unemployed	-0.041	-0.073	0.068	-0.092*	0.023	-0.044	-0.044**
	(0.032)	(0.040)	(0.058)	(0.047)	(0.029)	(0.052)	(0.014)
Other	0.019	-0.009	0.027	0.094	-0.028	-0.037	0.043
	(0.025)	(0.074)	(0.082)	(0.066)	(0.050)	(0.059)	(0.053)
Political interest	0.103*	0.047	0.195***	0.113*	0.133***	0.177***	0.001
	(0.029)	(0.042)	(0.046)	(0.050)	(0.035)	(0.048)	(0.021)
Left-right self-placement	0.429**	0.351***	0.361***	0.771***	0.344***	0.631***	0.032
	(0.102)	(0.054)	(0.063)	(0.054)	(0.046)	(0.067)	(0.030)
Nativist attitudes	0.257**	0.364***	0.328***	0.245***	0.179***	0.325***	0.080***
	(0.046)	(0.043)	(0.042)	(0.053)	(0.038)	(0.059)	(0.023)
Authoritarian attitudes	0.009	-0.015	-0.085	-0.016	0.050	0.051	0.009
	(0.026)	(0.066)	(0.055)	(0.071)	(0.045)	(0.076)	(0.036)
Constant	-0.201	0.034	-0.215**	-0.332***	-0.202***	-0.412***	0.038
	(0.100)	(0.076)	(0.075)	(0.091)	(0.061)	(0.082)	(0.033)
Observations	5071	885	879	805	879	773	850
Country fixed-effects	✓	-	-	-	-	-	-
R^2	0.248	0.248	0.205	0.353	0.183	0.300	0.051
Adjusted R^2	0.245	0.232	0.188	0.338	0.166	0.283	0.030

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Reference Category (RF) for sex: female; RF Education: lower secondary or less; RF Occupation status: Employee. Source: Original survey data collected April 2020 to May 2020 by Qualtrics.

Table B-7 Linear probability model on the relationship between subjective social status and right-wing populist party support (Robustness 2)

	Pooled Sample	France	Germany	Italy	Spain	Switzerland	United Kingdom
DV: Right-wing populist party support							
Subjective social status	-0.051	0.008	-0.010	-0.140	0.047	0.071	-0.067
	(0.030)	(0.083)	(0.059)	(0.081)	(0.065)	(0.095)	(0.043)
Age	0.000	-0.002	-0.000	0.002*	-0.000	0.002	-0.000
	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Sex							
Male	-0.005	0.047	-0.035	0.004	0.008	-0.024	-0.006
	(0.009)	(0.025)	(0.019)	(0.029)	(0.019)	(0.029)	(0.011)
Education							
Upper, post-secondary	-0.020	-0.027	-0.051	-0.043	-0.019	0.013	-0.029
	(0.013)	(0.038)	(0.034)	(0.031)	(0.025)	(0.051)	(0.016)
Tertiary	-0.055***	-0.109**	-0.025	-0.058	-0.045	-0.102*	-0.016
	(0.013)	(0.040)	(0.037)	(0.042)	(0.024)	(0.051)	(0.015)
Income situation	-0.010	-0.185**	-0.015	0.206**	0.012	-0.068	0.008
	(0.020)	(0.062)	(0.040)	(0.067)	(0.042)	(0.062)	(0.021)
Occupation status							
Manual worker	0.010	0.060	0.069	-0.028	-0.015	0.189*	0.053
	(0.022)	(0.078)	(0.051)	(0.049)	(0.040)	(0.090)	(0.044)
In public service	-0.002	0.063	-0.041	0.055	-0.026	-0.059	-0.020*
	(0.021)	(0.044)	(0.036)	(0.114)	(0.043)	(0.058)	(0.010)
Self-employed with no employees	0.024	0.070	0.015	0.104	-0.071*	0.009	-0.034**
	(0.022)	(0.066)	(0.057)	(0.067)	(0.032)	(0.051)	(0.012)
Self-employed with employees	-0.048	-0.119	-0.094	0.020	0.042	-0.230*	0.056
	(0.038)	(0.091)	(0.061)	(0.127)	(0.098)	(0.114)	(0.074)
Retired	0.019	0.054	0.014	0.030	0.006	-0.040	0.007
	(0.015)	(0.043)	(0.031)	(0.051)	(0.029)	(0.049)	(0.020)
Student or otherwise in training	-0.057**	-0.171**	-0.038	0.005	-0.013	-0.093	-0.026
	(0.019)	(0.052)	(0.030)	(0.059)	(0.050)	(0.057)	(0.014)
Unemployed	-0.051**	-0.109**	0.049	-0.098*	0.016	-0.045	-0.044**
	(0.017)	(0.041)	(0.056)	(0.047)	(0.029)	(0.054)	(0.015)
Other	0.007	-0.075	0.043	0.073	-0.027	-0.037	0.048
	(0.028)	(0.088)	(0.073)	(0.066)	(0.052)	(0.059)	(0.054)
Political interest	0.110***	0.051	0.199***	0.142**	0.133***	0.158***	0.001
	(0.017)	(0.043)	(0.046)	(0.051)	(0.035)	(0.048)	(0.021)
Left-right self-placement	0.549***	0.549***	0.484***	0.870***	0.395***	0.819***	0.082**
	(0.020)	(0.047)	(0.058)	(0.045)	(0.045)	(0.059)	(0.030)
Political trust	-0.249***	-0.293***	-0.409***	-0.205**	-0.210***	-0.046	-0.068*
	(0.021)	(0.057)	(0.048)	(0.066)	(0.038)	(0.071)	(0.029)
Constant	-0.042	0.182*	0.021	-0.248**	-0.074	-0.287**	0.077*
	(0.029)	(0.071)	(0.062)	(0.085)	(0.054)	(0.087)	(0.036)
Observations	5071	885	879	805	879	773	850
Country fixed-effects	✓	-	-	-	-	-	-
R^2	0.236	0.212	0.242	0.344	0.182	0.263	0.040
Adjusted R^2	0.233	0.196	0.227	0.330	0.165	0.246	0.021

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses: * $p<0.05$, ** $p<0.01$, *** $p<0.001$. Reference Category (RF) for sex: female; RF Education: lower secondary or less; RF Occupation status: Employee. Source: Original survey data collected April 2020 to May 2020 by Qualtrics.

Table B-8 Linear probability model on the relationship between subjective social status and left-wing populist party support (Main Model)

	Pooled Sample	France	Germany	Spain
DV: Left-wing populist party support				
Subjective social status	-0.105	-0.122*	-0.196**	0.063
	(0.082)	(0.049)	(0.064)	(0.072)
Age	-0.001	-0.001	-0.000	-0.002
	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Sex				
Male	-0.002	-0.014	0.013	0.000
	(0.007)	(0.017)	(0.020)	(0.022)
Education				
Upper, post-secondary	0.017	0.002	0.036	-0.000
	(0.011)	(0.020)	(0.026)	(0.029)
Tertiary	0.020	-0.024	0.057*	0.013
	(0.023)	(0.024)	(0.029)	(0.029)
Income situation	-0.016	0.041	-0.054	-0.028
	(0.028)	(0.034)	(0.048)	(0.043)
Occupation status				
Manual worker	-0.012	-0.008	-0.048	0.020
	(0.026)	(0.046)	(0.034)	(0.049)
In public service	-0.007	0.005	-0.005	0.014
	(0.007)	(0.040)	(0.042)	(0.046)
Self-employed with no employees	-0.012	-0.016	-0.036	0.000
	(0.006)	(0.037)	(0.046)	(0.048)
Self-employed with employees	0.033	0.116	0.054	-0.028
	(0.045)	(0.094)	(0.067)	(0.027)
Retired	0.006	-0.038	0.001	0.050
	(0.024)	(0.030)	(0.032)	(0.037)
Student or otherwise in training	-0.054	-0.091***	-0.076*	-0.003
	(0.019)	(0.025)	(0.037)	(0.059)
Unemployed	0.045	-0.014	0.050	0.098**
	(0.036)	(0.030)	(0.059)	(0.037)
Other	-0.051	-0.095***	-0.053	-0.007
	(0.028)	(0.025)	(0.056)	(0.049)
Political interest	0.127*	0.125***	0.076*	0.153***
	(0.017)	(0.029)	(0.039)	(0.038)
Left-right self-placement	-0.369	-0.203***	-0.571***	-0.443***
	(0.104)	(0.039)	(0.061)	(0.045)
Constant	0.279*	0.210***	0.418***	0.246***
	(0.056)	(0.055)	(0.063)	(0.059)
Observations	2643	885	879	879
Country fixed-effects	✓	-	-	-
R^2	0.125	0.092	0.183	0.140
Adjusted R^2	0.119	0.075	0.168	0.124

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Reference Category (RF) for sex: female; RF Education: lower secondary or less; RF Occupation status: Employee. Source: Original survey data collected April 2020 to May 2020 by Qualtrics.

Table B-9 Linear probability model on the relationship between subjective social status and left-wing populist party support (Robustness 1)

	Pooled Sample	France	Germany	Spain
DV: Left-wing populist party support				
Subjective social status	-0.089	-0.110*	-0.153*	0.069
	(0.076)	(0.048)	(0.062)	(0.072)
Age	-0.001	-0.001	0.000	-0.001
	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Sex				
Male	-0.000	-0.009	0.009	0.002
	(0.005)	(0.017)	(0.020)	(0.022)
Education				
Upper, post-secondary	0.019	0.007	0.041	0.000
	(0.013)	(0.020)	(0.026)	(0.029)
Tertiary	0.028	-0.011	0.070*	0.015
	(0.024)	(0.025)	(0.029)	(0.028)
Income situation	0.002	0.061	-0.030	-0.019
	(0.029)	(0.035)	(0.047)	(0.044)
Occupation status				
Manual worker	-0.011	-0.008	-0.045	0.021
	(0.026)	(0.046)	(0.034)	(0.050)
In public service	-0.004	0.009	0.012	0.011
	(0.003)	(0.039)	(0.042)	(0.046)
Self-employed with no employees	-0.011	-0.007	-0.041	-0.003
	(0.007)	(0.037)	(0.045)	(0.048)
Self-employed with employees	0.041	0.126	0.055	-0.020
	(0.044)	(0.095)	(0.070)	(0.028)
Retired	0.007	-0.034	0.004	0.048
	(0.022)	(0.030)	(0.031)	(0.038)
Student or otherwise in training	-0.041	-0.078**	-0.057	0.004
	(0.017)	(0.025)	(0.037)	(0.059)
Unemployed	0.050	-0.009	0.060	0.099**
	(0.035)	(0.030)	(0.058)	(0.037)
Other	-0.054	-0.097***	-0.067	-0.009
	(0.029)	(0.025)	(0.056)	(0.050)
Political interest	0.125*	0.122***	0.064	0.155***
	(0.020)	(0.029)	(0.038)	(0.038)
Left-right self-placement	-0.358	-0.191***	-0.575***	-0.433***
	(0.105)	(0.038)	(0.060)	(0.044)
Anticapitalist attitudes	0.131	0.112**	0.228***	0.079
	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.043)	(0.049)
Constant	0.165*	0.095	0.232**	0.173*
	(0.033)	(0.067)	(0.071)	(0.074)
Observations	2643	885	879	879
Country fixed-effects	✓	-	-	-
R^2	0.133	0.101	0.205	0.143
Adjusted R^2	0.126	0.083	0.190	0.126

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Reference Category (RF) for sex: female; RF Education: lower secondary or less; RF Occupation status: Employee. Source: Original survey data collected April 2020 to May 2020 by Qualtrics.

Table B-10 Linear probability model on the relationship between subjective social status and left-wing populist party support (Robustness 2)

	Pooled Sample	France	Germany	Spain
DV: Left-wing populist party support				
Subjective social status	-0.102	-0.119*	-0.155*	0.045
	(0.067)	(0.048)	(0.065)	(0.073)
Age	-0.001	-0.001	-0.000	-0.002
	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Sex				
Male	-0.002	-0.014	0.014	0.002
	(0.007)	(0.017)	(0.020)	(0.022)
Education				
Upper, post-secondary	0.017	0.002	0.035	-0.001
	(0.011)	(0.020)	(0.026)	(0.029)
Tertiary	0.020	-0.023	0.057*	0.013
	(0.023)	(0.024)	(0.029)	(0.029)
Income situation	-0.016	0.043	-0.047	-0.027
	(0.027)	(0.036)	(0.048)	(0.043)
Occupation status				
Manual worker	-0.012	-0.008	-0.048	0.021
	(0.026)	(0.046)	(0.035)	(0.049)
In public service	-0.007	0.005	-0.004	0.013
	(0.007)	(0.039)	(0.042)	(0.046)
Self-employed with no employees	-0.012	-0.016	-0.038	-0.004
	(0.006)	(0.037)	(0.046)	(0.048)
Self-employed with employees	0.032	0.116	0.048	-0.027
	(0.044)	(0.094)	(0.067)	(0.029)
Retired	0.006	-0.037	0.005	0.047
	(0.023)	(0.030)	(0.031)	(0.038)
Student or otherwise in training	-0.053	-0.089***	-0.067	-0.001
	(0.016)	(0.026)	(0.038)	(0.059)
Unemployed	0.045	-0.015	0.048	0.095**
	(0.036)	(0.031)	(0.059)	(0.037)
Other	-0.051	-0.096***	-0.044	-0.008
	(0.028)	(0.025)	(0.054)	(0.050)
Political interest	0.128**	0.126***	0.088*	0.144***
	(0.012)	(0.030)	(0.039)	(0.038)
Left-right self-placement	-0.370	-0.203***	-0.587***	-0.432***
	(0.107)	(0.039)	(0.062)	(0.045)
Political trust	-0.012	-0.014	-0.117**	0.077
	(0.058)	(0.040)	(0.036)	(0.046)
Constant	0.282	0.211***	0.444***	0.233***
	(0.069)	(0.055)	(0.064)	(0.060)
Observations	2643	885	879	879
Country fixed-effects	✓	-	-	-
R^2	0.125	0.092	0.191	0.143
Adjusted R^2	0.118	0.074	0.175	0.126

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Reference Category (RF) for sex: female; RF Education: lower secondary or less; RF Occupation status: Employee. Source: Original survey data collected April 2020 to May 2020 by Qualtrics.

Appendix C

Table C-1 Linear regression on the relationship between different forms of social trust and populist attitudes (Main Model)

	Pooled Sample	France	Germany	Italy	Spain	Switzerland	United Kingdom
DV: Populist attitudes							
Particularised trust	-0.049**	-0.056**	-0.020	-0.053**	-0.019	-0.083***	-0.065**
	(0.010)	(0.021)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.022)	(0.017)	(0.022)
Identity-based trust	0.056***	0.073***	0.046*	0.054*	0.048*	0.074***	0.016
	(0.007)	(0.021)	(0.018)	(0.021)	(0.022)	(0.020)	(0.020)
Generalised trust	-0.086***	-0.089***	-0.089***	-0.073**	-0.115***	-0.084***	-0.040
	(0.007)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.022)	(0.025)	(0.022)	(0.021)
Age	0.000	-0.000	0.000	0.001**	0.000	0.000	-0.001*
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Sex							
Male	0.009*	-0.005	0.004	0.012	0.018*	0.011	0.014*
	(0.003)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.006)	(0.007)
Education							
Upper, post-secondary	-0.002	-0.004	0.008	0.001	0.001	-0.004	-0.023**
	(0.003)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.008)	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.009)
Tertiary	-0.007**	-0.011	-0.001	-0.004	-0.007	-0.015	-0.014
	(0.001)	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.008)
Income situation	-0.056**	-0.083***	-0.073***	-0.048**	-0.062***	-0.023	-0.025
	(0.010)	(0.016)	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.012)	(0.013)
Occupation status							
Manual worker	0.010	-0.001	0.009	0.020	-0.000	0.036	0.017
	(0.004)	(0.021)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.017)	(0.024)	(0.016)
In public service	-0.007	0.007	-0.039**	0.046	-0.028	0.022	-0.039*
	(0.012)	(0.015)	(0.013)	(0.051)	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.015)
Self-employed with no employees	-0.008	0.005	-0.005	0.007	-0.027	-0.004	-0.013
	(0.005)	(0.016)	(0.019)	(0.016)	(0.020)	(0.013)	(0.014)
Self-employed with employees	-0.002	-0.018	-0.003	0.093**	-0.034	0.001	-0.038
	(0.015)	(0.029)	(0.024)	(0.031)	(0.022)	(0.021)	(0.035)
Retired	-0.007	0.001	-0.016	-0.004	0.003	-0.011	-0.005
	(0.003)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.014)	(0.011)	(0.010)
Student or otherwise in training	-0.021**	-0.012	-0.034**	-0.007	-0.030	-0.009	0.004
	(0.005)	(0.028)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.017)	(0.012)	(0.018)
Unemployed	0.003	-0.016	-0.012	0.015	0.011	0.005	0.004
	(0.005)	(0.014)	(0.019)	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.017)
Other	0.005	0.034	-0.019	0.008	-0.018	0.010	0.036
	(0.007)	(0.024)	(0.016)	(0.015)	(0.019)	(0.014)	(0.020)
Political interest	0.018**	0.009	0.027	0.015	0.033	0.023	0.009
	(0.004)	(0.016)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.017)	(0.012)	(0.012)
Left-right self-placement	-0.243***	-0.259***	-0.247***	-0.210***	-0.224***	-0.167**	-0.386***
	(0.026)	(0.053)	(0.072)	(0.049)	(0.053)	(0.055)	(0.077)
Left-right self-placement (squared)	0.241***	0.232***	0.309***	0.231***	0.251***	0.164**	0.319***
	(0.016)	(0.048)	(0.076)	(0.046)	(0.056)	(0.052)	(0.070)
Constant	0.258***	0.329***	0.229***	0.182***	0.263***	0.198***	0.334***
	(0.022)	(0.026)	(0.025)	(0.026)	(0.028)	(0.024)	(0.031)
Observations	5871	1002	993	983	986	914	993
Country fixed-effects	✓	-	-	-	-	-	-
R^2	0.142	0.127	0.138	0.113	0.101	0.111	0.153
Adjusted R^2	0.139	0.110	0.121	0.095	0.083	0.092	0.137

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Reference Category (RF) for sex: female; RF Education: lower secondary or less; RF Occupation status: Employee. Source: Original survey data collected April 2020 to May 2020 by Qualtrics.

Table C-2 Linear regression on the relationship between different forms of social trust and populist attitudes (Robustness 1)

	Poled Sample	France	Germany	Italy	Spain	Switzerland	United Kingdom
DV: Populist attitudes							
Particularised trust	-0.043***	-0.056**	0.001	-0.042*	-0.012	-0.080***	-0.064**
	(0.008)	(0.021)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.023)	(0.017)	(0.022)
Identity-based trust	0.045***	0.070***	0.020	0.040	0.035	0.060**	0.015
	(0.008)	(0.021)	(0.018)	(0.021)	(0.022)	(0.020)	(0.020)
Generalised trust	-0.067***	-0.080***	-0.037	-0.054*	-0.098***	-0.066**	-0.034
	(0.009)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.022)	(0.025)	(0.022)	(0.021)
Age	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	0.001*	-0.000	0.000	-0.001*
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Sex							
Male	0.008**	-0.005	0.004	0.011	0.019*	0.010	0.013
	(0.003)	(0.008)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.006)	(0.007)
Education							
Upper, post-secondary	0.000	-0.003	0.015	0.002	0.002	-0.002	-0.021*
	(0.004)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.008)	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.009)
Tertiary	-0.001	-0.007	0.008	0.003	0.000	-0.008	-0.010
	(0.004)	(0.012)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.008)
Income situation	-0.050***	-0.077***	-0.053***	-0.044**	-0.057***	-0.020	-0.024
	(0.006)	(0.016)	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.016)	(0.012)	(0.013)
Occupation status							
Manual worker	0.011	0.003	0.010	0.022	-0.001	0.035	0.017
	(0.006)	(0.021)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.017)	(0.024)	(0.016)
In public service	-0.008	0.008	-0.031*	0.046	-0.030*	0.019	-0.039*
	(0.007)	(0.015)	(0.012)	(0.046)	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.015)
Self-employed with no employees	-0.003	0.008	0.004	0.009	-0.017	-0.001	-0.010
	(0.007)	(0.016)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.019)	(0.013)	(0.014)
Self-employed with employees	0.001	-0.015	0.011	0.092**	-0.022	0.001	-0.041
	(0.011)	(0.030)	(0.024)	(0.030)	(0.022)	(0.019)	(0.037)
Retired	-0.004	0.002	-0.012	0.001	0.010	-0.009	-0.004
	(0.005)	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.014)	(0.010)	(0.010)
Student or otherwise in training	-0.014*	-0.002	-0.016	-0.002	-0.021	-0.003	0.007
	(0.006)	(0.028)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.017)	(0.012)	(0.018)
Unemployed	0.006	-0.010	-0.007	0.018	0.017	0.008	0.004
	(0.006)	(0.014)	(0.019)	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.017)
Other	0.007	0.042	-0.016	0.012	-0.014	0.010	0.035
	(0.007)	(0.024)	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.018)	(0.015)	(0.020)
Political interest	0.021***	0.008	0.040**	0.016	0.044**	0.026*	0.010
	(0.006)	(0.016)	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.017)	(0.012)	(0.012)
Left-right self-placement	-0.265***	-0.276***	-0.281***	-0.242***	-0.236***	-0.197***	-0.393***
	(0.024)	(0.054)	(0.073)	(0.049)	(0.052)	(0.056)	(0.077)
Left-right self-placement (squared)	0.231***	0.227***	0.271***	0.227***	0.227***	0.170**	0.314***
	(0.023)	(0.048)	(0.075)	(0.046)	(0.057)	(0.052)	(0.069)
Nativist attitudes	0.061***	0.028	0.131***	0.067***	0.086***	0.058***	0.022
	(0.006)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.018)	(0.014)	(0.016)
Authoritarian attitudes	0.011	0.043	-0.017	0.017	0.008	-0.017	0.013
	(0.009)	(0.025)	(0.021)	(0.022)	(0.026)	(0.020)	(0.022)
Constant	0.224***	0.292***	0.150***	0.148***	0.220***	0.189***	0.317***
	(0.012)	(0.029)	(0.028)	(0.027)	(0.034)	(0.025)	(0.032)
Observations	5871	1002	993	983	986	914	993
Country fixed-effects	✓	-	-	-	-	-	-
R^2	0.162	0.137	0.212	0.138	0.128	0.130	0.157
Adjusted R^2	0.158	0.119	0.195	0.120	0.109	0.110	0.139

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Reference Category (RF) for sex: female; RF Education: lower secondary or less; RF Occupation status: Employee. Source: Original survey data collected April 2020 to May 2020 by Qualtrics.

Table C-3 Linear regression on the relationship between different forms of social trust and populist attitudes (Robustness 2)

	Poled Sample	France	Germany	Italy	Spain	Switzerland	United Kingdom
DV: Populist attitudes							
Particularised trust	-0.049***	-0.059**	-0.011	-0.057**	-0.039	-0.073***	-0.062**
	(0.008)	(0.018)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.020)	(0.016)	(0.021)
Identity-based trust	0.036***	0.053**	0.024	0.038	0.038	0.051**	0.001
	(0.008)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.020)	(0.022)	(0.019)	(0.018)
Generalised trust	-0.048***	-0.057**	-0.043*	-0.042*	-0.076**	-0.048*	-0.016
	(0.008)	(0.018)	(0.019)	(0.021)	(0.024)	(0.021)	(0.019)
Age	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.001*	0.000	0.000	-0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Sex							
Male	0.009***	0.005	0.002	0.011	0.020*	0.008	0.013*
	(0.003)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Education							
Upper, post-secondary	0.000	0.005	0.012	0.000	0.004	-0.002	-0.020*
	(0.004)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.008)
Tertiary	0.002	0.016	0.013	-0.000	0.003	-0.011	-0.004
	(0.004)	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.007)
Income situation	-0.026***	-0.031*	-0.043***	-0.029*	-0.037*	0.001	-0.007
	(0.006)	(0.014)	(0.012)	(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.011)	(0.012)
Occupation status							
Manual worker	0.009	-0.002	0.010	0.023	0.000	0.023	0.010
	(0.006)	(0.020)	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.016)	(0.022)	(0.014)
In public service	-0.001	0.014	-0.027*	0.056	-0.032*	0.022	-0.012
	(0.006)	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.046)	(0.015)	(0.013)	(0.012)
Self-employed with no employees	-0.004	0.023	-0.009	0.015	-0.037*	0.004	-0.014
	(0.006)	(0.012)	(0.016)	(0.015)	(0.019)	(0.012)	(0.014)
Self-employed with employees	0.011	0.008	0.000	0.088**	-0.015	0.012	-0.015
	(0.010)	(0.030)	(0.020)	(0.027)	(0.024)	(0.018)	(0.035)
Retired	-0.004	0.004	-0.013	0.001	0.000	-0.008	-0.001
	(0.004)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.013)	(0.010)	(0.009)
Student or otherwise in training	-0.009	0.018	-0.018	-0.004	-0.011	-0.007	0.012
	(0.006)	(0.021)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.017)	(0.012)	(0.015)
Unemployed	0.003	-0.007	-0.008	0.014	0.011	-0.001	0.006
	(0.005)	(0.012)	(0.019)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.014)
Other	-0.003	0.020	-0.025	0.011	-0.022	-0.006	0.020
	(0.007)	(0.021)	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.018)	(0.014)	(0.018)
Political interest	0.013*	0.007	0.020	0.004	0.034*	0.018	0.005
	(0.006)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.016)	(0.011)	(0.011)
Left-right self-placement	-0.162***	-0.140**	-0.110	-0.174***	-0.148**	-0.108*	-0.295***
	(0.022)	(0.047)	(0.064)	(0.046)	(0.051)	(0.052)	(0.073)
Left-right self-placement (squared)	0.180***	0.146***	0.172*	0.192***	0.198***	0.128**	0.275***
	(0.021)	(0.043)	(0.069)	(0.044)	(0.053)	(0.048)	(0.065)
Anticapitalist attitudes	0.213***	0.269***	0.227***	0.161***	0.219***	0.159***	0.215***
	(0.007)	(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.020)	(0.022)	(0.015)	(0.018)
Constant	0.078***	0.054*	0.024	0.067*	0.071*	0.070**	0.136***
	(0.012)	(0.026)	(0.028)	(0.026)	(0.030)	(0.025)	(0.037)
Observations	5871	1002	993	983	986	914	993
Country fixed-effects	✓	-	-	-	-	-	-
R^2	0.275	0.334	0.301	0.179	0.208	0.224	0.312
Adjusted R^2	0.272	0.320	0.287	0.162	0.191	0.207	0.298

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Reference Category (RF) for sex: female; RF Education: lower secondary or less; RF Occupation status: Employee. Source: Original survey data collected April 2020 to May 2020 by Qualtrics.

Table C-4 Linear regression on the relationship between different forms of social trust and populist attitudes (Robustness 3)

	Pooled Sample	France	Germany	Italy	Spain	Switzerland	United Kingdom
DV: Populist attitudes							
Particularised trust	-0.040***	-0.043*	-0.004	-0.048**	-0.026	-0.071***	-0.052*
	(0.008)	(0.019)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.021)	(0.016)	(0.022)
Identity-based trust	0.084***	0.107***	0.079***	0.069**	0.085***	0.089***	0.050*
	(0.008)	(0.020)	(0.019)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.019)	(0.020)
Generalised trust	-0.045***	-0.029	-0.040	-0.056*	-0.073**	-0.057**	-0.001
	(0.009)	(0.020)	(0.021)	(0.022)	(0.025)	(0.021)	(0.021)
Age	0.000	-0.000	-0.000	0.001**	-0.000	0.000	-0.001
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Sex							
Male	0.007**	-0.004	0.005	0.011	0.013	0.010	0.009
	(0.003)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.006)	(0.007)
Education							
Upper, post-secondary	-0.003	-0.003	0.008	-0.002	0.003	-0.003	-0.024**
	(0.004)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.009)
Tertiary	-0.010*	-0.009	0.000	-0.007	-0.007	-0.015	-0.017*
	(0.004)	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.008)
Income situation	-0.045***	-0.058***	-0.063***	-0.040**	-0.060***	-0.009	-0.024
	(0.006)	(0.015)	(0.013)	(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.012)	(0.013)
Occupation status							
Manual worker	0.010	0.006	0.010	0.019	-0.001	0.036	0.016
	(0.006)	(0.019)	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.017)	(0.022)	(0.015)
In public service	-0.008	0.003	-0.035**	0.046	-0.027	0.024	-0.038*
	(0.007)	(0.014)	(0.012)	(0.049)	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.016)
Self-employed with no employees	-0.008	0.006	-0.004	0.007	-0.023	-0.006	-0.017
	(0.006)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.019)	(0.012)	(0.014)
Self-employed with employees	-0.005	-0.015	-0.006	0.093**	-0.036	0.001	-0.048
	(0.011)	(0.027)	(0.022)	(0.030)	(0.023)	(0.018)	(0.033)
Retired	-0.002	0.007	-0.009	-0.004	0.011	-0.007	-0.001
	(0.004)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.013)	(0.010)	(0.009)
Student or otherwise in training	-0.015*	0.009	-0.026*	-0.002	-0.033	-0.007	0.008
	(0.006)	(0.025)	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.017)	(0.013)	(0.018)
Unemployed	0.004	-0.014	-0.011	0.015	0.015	0.011	-0.000
	(0.005)	(0.013)	(0.019)	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.016)
Other	0.004	0.020	-0.024	0.007	-0.010	0.010	0.032
	(0.007)	(0.023)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.019)	(0.014)	(0.020)
Political interest	0.030***	0.027	0.037*	0.025	0.050**	0.028*	0.019
	(0.006)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.017)	(0.011)	(0.012)
Left-right self-placement	-0.221***	-0.181***	-0.207**	-0.196***	-0.242***	-0.170**	-0.341***
	(0.023)	(0.050)	(0.069)	(0.048)	(0.051)	(0.054)	(0.073)
Left-right self-placement (squared)	0.218***	0.162***	0.253***	0.211***	0.250***	0.168***	0.303***
	(0.022)	(0.046)	(0.072)	(0.045)	(0.054)	(0.051)	(0.067)
Political trust	-0.144***	-0.198***	-0.143***	-0.074***	-0.161***	-0.124***	-0.147***
	(0.007)	(0.018)	(0.017)	(0.018)	(0.019)	(0.018)	(0.018)
Constant	0.273***	0.317***	0.236***	0.186***	0.288***	0.228***	0.338***
	(0.011)	(0.025)	(0.024)	(0.025)	(0.028)	(0.023)	(0.030)
Observations	5871	1002	993	983	986	914	993
Country fixed-effects	✓	-	-	-	-	-	-
R^2	0.207	0.228	0.218	0.130	0.167	0.175	0.220
Adjusted R^2	0.203	0.213	0.202	0.112	0.150	0.157	0.204

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Reference Category (RF) for sex: female; RF Education: lower secondary or less; RF Occupation status: Employee. Source: Original survey data collected April 2020 to May 2020 by Qualtrics.

Table C-5 Linear regression on the relationship between different forms of social trust and populist attitudes (Robustness 4)

	Pooled Sample	France	Germany	Italy	Spain	Switzerland	United Kingdom
DV: Populist attitudes							
Particularised trust	-0.047**	-0.053*	-0.019	-0.050**	-0.018	-0.082***	-0.064**
	(0.010)	(0.021)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.022)	(0.017)	(0.022)
Ethnic-based trust	0.047***	0.062**	0.041*	0.042*	0.039	0.069***	0.008
	(0.007)	(0.020)	(0.018)	(0.019)	(0.023)	(0.018)	(0.018)
Generalised trust	-0.081***	-0.083***	-0.086***	-0.066**	-0.110***	-0.082***	-0.035
	(0.007)	(0.021)	(0.020)	(0.022)	(0.025)	(0.022)	(0.021)
Age	0.000	-0.000	0.000	0.001**	0.000	0.000	-0.001*
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Sex							
Male	0.009*	-0.005	0.004	0.013	0.018*	0.011	0.014*
	(0.003)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.006)	(0.007)
Education							
Upper, post-secondary	-0.002	-0.004	0.007	0.001	0.001	-0.004	-0.023**
	(0.003)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.008)	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.009)
Tertiary	-0.007**	-0.011	-0.001	-0.004	-0.006	-0.014	-0.014
	(0.001)	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.008)
Income situation	-0.056**	-0.082***	-0.074***	-0.048**	-0.062***	-0.023	-0.025
	(0.010)	(0.016)	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.012)	(0.013)
Occupation status							
Manual worker	0.010	0.000	0.009	0.021	-0.001	0.036	0.017
	(0.004)	(0.021)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.017)	(0.024)	(0.016)
In public service	-0.007	0.007	-0.038**	0.045	-0.028	0.023	-0.039*
	(0.012)	(0.015)	(0.013)	(0.051)	(0.016)	(0.014)	(0.015)
Self-employed with no employees	-0.008	0.005	-0.005	0.007	-0.027	-0.003	-0.013
	(0.005)	(0.016)	(0.019)	(0.016)	(0.020)	(0.013)	(0.014)
Self-employed with employees	-0.002	-0.018	-0.002	0.092**	-0.033	-0.001	-0.039
	(0.015)	(0.029)	(0.024)	(0.031)	(0.022)	(0.021)	(0.035)
Retired	-0.006	0.001	-0.016	-0.003	0.003	-0.011	-0.005
	(0.003)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.014)	(0.011)	(0.010)
Student or otherwise in training	-0.021**	-0.011	-0.033**	-0.006	-0.030	-0.010	0.004
	(0.005)	(0.028)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.017)	(0.013)	(0.018)
Unemployed	0.002	-0.017	-0.013	0.015	0.011	0.005	0.004
	(0.006)	(0.014)	(0.019)	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.017)
Other	0.005	0.033	-0.019	0.008	-0.018	0.009	0.036
	(0.007)	(0.024)	(0.016)	(0.015)	(0.019)	(0.014)	(0.021)
Political interest	0.018**	0.010	0.027	0.015	0.032	0.024*	0.010
	(0.004)	(0.016)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.017)	(0.012)	(0.012)
Left-right self-placement	-0.244***	-0.260***	-0.247***	-0.209***	-0.227***	-0.165**	-0.385***
	(0.025)	(0.053)	(0.072)	(0.049)	(0.053)	(0.055)	(0.076)
Left-right self-placement (squared)	0.242***	0.234***	0.310***	0.230***	0.254***	0.163**	0.319***
	(0.016)	(0.048)	(0.075)	(0.046)	(0.056)	(0.052)	(0.070)
Constant	0.258***	0.330***	0.231***	0.181***	0.264***	0.197***	0.335***
	(0.022)	(0.026)	(0.025)	(0.026)	(0.028)	(0.024)	(0.031)
Observations	5871	1002	993	983	986	914	993
Country fixed-effects	✓	-	-	-	-	-	-
R^2	0.141	0.124	0.137	0.110	0.100	0.110	0.153
Adjusted R^2	0.137	0.107	0.121	0.093	0.082	0.091	0.136

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Reference Category (RF) for sex: female; RF Education: lower secondary or less; RF Occupation status: Employee. Source: Original survey data collected April 2020 to May 2020 by Qualtrics.

Table C-6 Linear regression on the relationship between different forms of social trust and populist attitudes (Robustness 5)

	Pooled Sample	France	Germany	Italy	Spain	Switzerland	United Kingdom
DV: Populist attitudes							
Particularised trust	-0.050**	-0.057**	-0.020	-0.054**	-0.020	-0.083***	-0.067**
	(0.010)	(0.021)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.022)	(0.017)	(0.022)
Class-based trust	0.054***	0.072***	0.044*	0.058**	0.049*	0.063***	0.022
	(0.006)	(0.020)	(0.018)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.019)	(0.020)
Generalised trust	-0.084***	-0.087***	-0.088***	-0.074***	-0.115***	-0.076***	-0.043*
	(0.007)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.022)	(0.024)	(0.022)	(0.021)
Age	0.000	-0.000	0.000	0.001**	-0.000	0.000	-0.001*
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Sex							
Male	0.009*	-0.005	0.004	0.012	0.017*	0.011	0.014*
	(0.003)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.006)	(0.007)
Education							
Upper, post-secondary	-0.002	-0.004	0.008	0.000	0.001	-0.004	-0.023**
	(0.003)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.008)	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.009)
Tertiary	-0.008**	-0.012	-0.001	-0.005	-0.007	-0.015	-0.014
	(0.001)	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.008)
Income situation	-0.056**	-0.084***	-0.073***	-0.048***	-0.062***	-0.023	-0.026
	(0.010)	(0.016)	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.012)	(0.013)
Occupation status							
Manual worker	0.010	-0.002	0.010	0.019	-0.000	0.036	0.017
	(0.004)	(0.021)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.017)	(0.024)	(0.016)
In public service	-0.008	0.007	-0.040**	0.047	-0.028	0.022	-0.039**
	(0.012)	(0.015)	(0.013)	(0.051)	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.015)
Self-employed with no employees	-0.008	0.004	-0.005	0.007	-0.026	-0.004	-0.012
	(0.004)	(0.016)	(0.019)	(0.016)	(0.019)	(0.013)	(0.014)
Self-employed with employees	-0.002	-0.018	-0.003	0.093**	-0.035	0.003	-0.038
	(0.016)	(0.030)	(0.024)	(0.031)	(0.021)	(0.022)	(0.035)
Retired	-0.007	0.001	-0.016	-0.005	0.003	-0.011	-0.005
	(0.003)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.014)	(0.010)	(0.010)
Student or otherwise in training	-0.022**	-0.012	-0.035**	-0.008	-0.031	-0.008	0.004
	(0.005)	(0.028)	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.017)	(0.012)	(0.018)
Unemployed	0.003	-0.016	-0.011	0.015	0.011	0.005	0.004
	(0.005)	(0.014)	(0.019)	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.017)
Other	0.005	0.035	-0.019	0.007	-0.018	0.010	0.036
	(0.007)	(0.023)	(0.016)	(0.015)	(0.019)	(0.014)	(0.020)
Political interest	0.018**	0.008	0.028	0.015	0.033	0.023	0.009
	(0.004)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.017)	(0.012)	(0.012)
Left-right self-placement	-0.243***	-0.258***	-0.245***	-0.211***	-0.223***	-0.169**	-0.387***
	(0.026)	(0.053)	(0.072)	(0.049)	(0.053)	(0.055)	(0.077)
Left-right self-placement (squared)	0.241***	0.231***	0.307***	0.231***	0.249***	0.165**	0.320***
	(0.016)	(0.048)	(0.076)	(0.046)	(0.056)	(0.052)	(0.070)
Constant	0.258***	0.330***	0.229***	0.184***	0.263***	0.199***	0.334***
	(0.022)	(0.026)	(0.025)	(0.026)	(0.028)	(0.024)	(0.031)
Observations	5871	1002	993	983	986	914	993
Country fixed-effects	✓	-	-	-	-	-	-
R^2	0.143	0.128	0.138	0.115	0.101	0.108	0.154
Adjusted R^2	0.139	0.111	0.121	0.097	0.083	0.089	0.137

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Reference Category (RF) for sex: female; RF Education: lower secondary or less; RF Occupation status: Employee. Source: Original survey data collected April 2020 to May 2020 by Qualtrics.

Table C-7 Linear probability model on the relationship between different forms of social trust and right-wing populist party support (Main Model)

	Poled Sample	France	Germany	Italy	Spain	Switzerland	United Kingdom
DV: Right-wing populist party support							
Particularised trust	-0.027	-0.101	0.073	0.017	-0.070	0.067	-0.055
	(0.032)	(0.064)	(0.055)	(0.076)	(0.050)	(0.082)	(0.031)
Ethnic-based trust	0.059	0.162*	0.022	-0.018	-0.005	0.201*	-0.000
	(0.037)	(0.066)	(0.064)	(0.078)	(0.054)	(0.083)	(0.026)
Generalised trust	-0.172**	-0.204**	-0.250***	-0.086	-0.084	-0.264**	-0.020
	(0.032)	(0.074)	(0.064)	(0.092)	(0.058)	(0.085)	(0.034)
Age	0.000	-0.002	-0.000	0.002*	-0.000	0.002	-0.000
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Sex							
Male	-0.002	0.045	-0.030	0.003	0.014	-0.032	-0.004
	(0.009)	(0.025)	(0.021)	(0.029)	(0.019)	(0.029)	(0.011)
Education							
Upper, post-secondary	-0.017	-0.025	-0.043	-0.038	-0.020	0.014	-0.030
	(0.015)	(0.038)	(0.035)	(0.031)	(0.025)	(0.050)	(0.016)
Tertiary	-0.052*	-0.108**	-0.013	-0.058	-0.039	-0.093	-0.016
	(0.019)	(0.041)	(0.038)	(0.042)	(0.024)	(0.051)	(0.015)
Income situation	-0.040	-0.219***	-0.060	0.141*	0.029	-0.040	-0.002
	(0.043)	(0.056)	(0.040)	(0.062)	(0.039)	(0.054)	(0.021)
Occupation status							
Manual worker	0.012	0.051	0.076	-0.025	-0.013	0.181*	0.057
	(0.033)	(0.081)	(0.053)	(0.050)	(0.040)	(0.090)	(0.042)
In public service	-0.000	0.072	-0.039	0.065	-0.031	-0.053	-0.023*
	(0.025)	(0.044)	(0.042)	(0.112)	(0.044)	(0.058)	(0.010)
Self-employed with no employees	0.026	0.084	0.030	0.104	-0.081*	0.016	-0.030**
	(0.027)	(0.066)	(0.059)	(0.068)	(0.034)	(0.051)	(0.011)
Self-employed with employees	-0.047	-0.131	-0.080	0.009	0.041	-0.245*	0.055
	(0.044)	(0.091)	(0.066)	(0.121)	(0.096)	(0.110)	(0.072)
Retired	0.010	0.035	0.012	0.022	-0.008	-0.054	0.006
	(0.010)	(0.044)	(0.033)	(0.051)	(0.030)	(0.049)	(0.021)
Student or otherwise in training	-0.067*	-0.196***	-0.066*	-0.010	-0.014	-0.088	-0.027*
	(0.019)	(0.050)	(0.030)	(0.060)	(0.049)	(0.058)	(0.013)
Unemployed	-0.049	-0.100*	0.065	-0.091	0.004	-0.052	-0.035**
	(0.030)	(0.040)	(0.059)	(0.048)	(0.029)	(0.055)	(0.012)
Other	0.014	-0.029	0.018	0.073	-0.038	-0.040	0.060
	(0.025)	(0.084)	(0.080)	(0.067)	(0.054)	(0.058)	(0.056)
Political interest	0.087*	0.030	0.149**	0.111*	0.113**	0.165***	-0.006
	(0.027)	(0.044)	(0.046)	(0.051)	(0.034)	(0.048)	(0.021)
Left-right self-placement	0.544**	0.529***	0.507***	0.887***	0.423***	0.796***	0.062*
	(0.115)	(0.048)	(0.060)	(0.045)	(0.046)	(0.058)	(0.029)
Constant	-0.101	0.174*	-0.107	-0.339***	-0.046	-0.341***	0.077*
	(0.103)	(0.076)	(0.071)	(0.089)	(0.060)	(0.092)	(0.039)
Observations	5071	885	879	805	879	773	850
Country fixed-effects	✓	-	-	-	-	-	-
R^2	0.219	0.199	0.164	0.332	0.164	0.271	0.033
Adjusted R^2	0.215	0.182	0.147	0.317	0.146	0.254	0.012

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Reference Category (RF) for sex: female; RF Education: lower secondary or less; RF Occupation status: Employee. Source: Original survey data collected April 2020 to May 2020 by Qualtrics.

Table C-8 Linear probability model on the relationship between different forms of social trust and right-wing populist party support (Robustness 1)

	Pooled Sample	France	Germany	Italy	Spain	Switzerland	United Kingdom
DV: Right-wing populist party support							
Particularised trust	-0.001	-0.075	0.131*	0.046	-0.057	0.083	-0.049
	(0.038)	(0.060)	(0.056)	(0.075)	(0.050)	(0.082)	(0.031)
Ethnic-based trust	0.024	0.134*	-0.028	-0.051	-0.033	0.115	-0.002
	(0.035)	(0.064)	(0.062)	(0.076)	(0.053)	(0.083)	(0.026)
Generalised trust	-0.109**	-0.153*	-0.144*	-0.037	-0.048	-0.138	-0.002
	(0.020)	(0.071)	(0.062)	(0.090)	(0.058)	(0.088)	(0.034)
Age	-0.000	-0.002	-0.001	0.002	-0.001	0.001	-0.000
	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Sex							
Male	-0.003	0.050*	-0.031	0.001	0.015	-0.037	-0.006
	(0.010)	(0.025)	(0.020)	(0.029)	(0.019)	(0.028)	(0.011)
Education							
Upper, post-secondary	-0.008	-0.020	-0.026	-0.034	-0.017	0.029	-0.024
	(0.015)	(0.037)	(0.034)	(0.031)	(0.025)	(0.050)	(0.015)
Tertiary	-0.027	-0.076	0.005	-0.035	-0.025	-0.046	-0.005
	(0.017)	(0.040)	(0.037)	(0.042)	(0.024)	(0.051)	(0.015)
Income situation	-0.017	-0.180***	-0.007	0.151*	0.046	-0.027	0.003
	(0.038)	(0.054)	(0.040)	(0.060)	(0.039)	(0.053)	(0.021)
Occupation status							
Manual worker	0.014	0.076	0.079	-0.021	-0.012	0.175*	0.058
	(0.031)	(0.079)	(0.052)	(0.050)	(0.040)	(0.088)	(0.042)
In public service	0.001	0.078	-0.021	0.061	-0.037	-0.067	-0.023*
	(0.026)	(0.041)	(0.042)	(0.119)	(0.044)	(0.057)	(0.010)
Self-employed with no employees	0.044	0.110	0.043	0.113	-0.060	0.039	-0.022*
	(0.026)	(0.065)	(0.056)	(0.067)	(0.034)	(0.050)	(0.011)
Self-employed with employees	-0.035	-0.096	-0.047	0.015	0.063	-0.231*	0.046
	(0.039)	(0.082)	(0.063)	(0.119)	(0.098)	(0.101)	(0.069)
Retired	0.019	0.045	0.024	0.038	0.006	-0.045	0.008
	(0.011)	(0.042)	(0.032)	(0.051)	(0.029)	(0.048)	(0.021)
Student or otherwise in training	-0.039*	-0.110*	-0.026	0.007	0.006	-0.055	-0.019
	(0.014)	(0.055)	(0.029)	(0.058)	(0.050)	(0.055)	(0.014)
Unemployed	-0.038	-0.072	0.071	-0.085	0.018	-0.046	-0.035**
	(0.031)	(0.040)	(0.058)	(0.048)	(0.029)	(0.053)	(0.012)
Other	0.023	0.020	0.034	0.089	-0.036	-0.037	0.054
	(0.025)	(0.074)	(0.080)	(0.067)	(0.052)	(0.058)	(0.054)
Political interest	0.101*	0.046	0.180***	0.114*	0.136***	0.181***	-0.004
	(0.031)	(0.042)	(0.045)	(0.050)	(0.035)	(0.048)	(0.021)
Left-right self-placement	0.424**	0.346***	0.353***	0.771***	0.345***	0.630***	0.025
	(0.102)	(0.054)	(0.061)	(0.054)	(0.046)	(0.066)	(0.031)
Nativist attitudes	0.246**	0.351***	0.322***	0.245***	0.172***	0.312***	0.074**
	(0.047)	(0.043)	(0.043)	(0.054)	(0.039)	(0.059)	(0.024)
Authoritarian attitudes	-0.002	-0.018	-0.113*	-0.030	0.052	0.042	0.016
	(0.029)	(0.065)	(0.055)	(0.072)	(0.045)	(0.076)	(0.036)
Constant	-0.210	0.042	-0.257**	-0.409***	-0.147*	-0.454***	0.038
	(0.107)	(0.080)	(0.080)	(0.095)	(0.065)	(0.092)	(0.038)
Observations	5071	885	879	805	879	773	850
Country fixed-effects	✓	-	-	-	-	-	-
R^2	0.248	0.254	0.216	0.348	0.189	0.303	0.048
Adjusted R^2	0.244	0.237	0.197	0.332	0.170	0.285	0.025

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Reference Category (RF) for sex: female; RF Education: lower secondary or less; RF Occupation status: Employee. Source: Original survey data collected April 2020 to May 2020 by Qualtrics.

Table C-9 Linear probability model on the relationship between different forms of social trust and right-wing populist party support (Robustness 2)

	Pooled Sample	France	Germany	Italy	Spain	Switzerland	United Kingdom
DV: Right-wing populist party support							
Particularised trust	-0.008	-0.076	0.120*	0.033	-0.077	0.070	-0.046
	(0.034)	(0.064)	(0.054)	(0.075)	(0.050)	(0.081)	(0.031)
Ethnic-based trust	0.103*	0.209**	0.103	0.026	0.037	0.203*	0.014
	(0.034)	(0.065)	(0.061)	(0.080)	(0.054)	(0.083)	(0.026)
Generalised trust	-0.094*	-0.102	-0.085	-0.025	-0.032	-0.256**	-0.001
	(0.029)	(0.076)	(0.057)	(0.091)	(0.060)	(0.086)	(0.033)
Age	0.000	-0.002	-0.001	0.002*	-0.000	0.002	-0.000
	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Sex							
Male	-0.005	0.046	-0.031	0.002	0.009	-0.033	-0.006
	(0.010)	(0.025)	(0.020)	(0.029)	(0.019)	(0.029)	(0.011)
Education							
Upper, post-secondary	-0.019	-0.025	-0.049	-0.045	-0.015	0.014	-0.030
	(0.016)	(0.038)	(0.034)	(0.031)	(0.025)	(0.050)	(0.016)
Tertiary	-0.055*	-0.099*	-0.019	-0.063	-0.039	-0.093	-0.017
	(0.017)	(0.041)	(0.037)	(0.042)	(0.024)	(0.051)	(0.015)
Income situation	-0.019	-0.175**	-0.023	0.159**	0.034	-0.037	-0.001
	(0.038)	(0.055)	(0.038)	(0.062)	(0.039)	(0.055)	(0.021)
Occupation status							
Manual worker	0.012	0.066	0.076	-0.028	-0.014	0.182*	0.057
	(0.033)	(0.080)	(0.051)	(0.049)	(0.039)	(0.090)	(0.042)
In public service	0.002	0.071	-0.030	0.073	-0.027	-0.052	-0.021*
	(0.023)	(0.044)	(0.036)	(0.113)	(0.043)	(0.058)	(0.011)
Self-employed with no employees	0.025	0.082	0.026	0.104	-0.074*	0.015	-0.032**
	(0.026)	(0.065)	(0.056)	(0.068)	(0.032)	(0.051)	(0.012)
Self-employed with employees	-0.051	-0.129	-0.092	0.013	0.040	-0.244*	0.050
	(0.040)	(0.094)	(0.059)	(0.123)	(0.096)	(0.110)	(0.073)
Retired	0.018	0.049	0.021	0.027	0.001	-0.052	0.008
	(0.011)	(0.042)	(0.031)	(0.051)	(0.029)	(0.049)	(0.021)
Student or otherwise in training	-0.055*	-0.162**	-0.038	0.005	-0.015	-0.088	-0.023
	(0.020)	(0.053)	(0.031)	(0.060)	(0.049)	(0.058)	(0.013)
Unemployed	-0.047	-0.099*	0.057	-0.092	0.011	-0.051	-0.037**
	(0.032)	(0.041)	(0.056)	(0.048)	(0.029)	(0.055)	(0.012)
Other	0.012	-0.055	0.034	0.073	-0.027	-0.039	0.056
	(0.023)	(0.088)	(0.072)	(0.067)	(0.053)	(0.059)	(0.055)
Political interest	0.106*	0.051	0.177***	0.141**	0.134***	0.166***	-0.003
	(0.028)	(0.043)	(0.044)	(0.052)	(0.035)	(0.048)	(0.021)
Left-right self-placement	0.541**	0.542***	0.470***	0.866***	0.398***	0.796***	0.075*
	(0.108)	(0.047)	(0.057)	(0.045)	(0.044)	(0.058)	(0.030)
Political trust	-0.258**	-0.317***	-0.433***	-0.238***	-0.200***	-0.029	-0.071*
	(0.055)	(0.064)	(0.051)	(0.070)	(0.042)	(0.074)	(0.029)
Constant	-0.063	0.177*	-0.052	-0.314***	-0.019	-0.333***	0.078*
	(0.099)	(0.075)	(0.069)	(0.088)	(0.059)	(0.095)	(0.039)
Observations	5071	885	879	805	879	773	850
Country fixed-effects	✓	-	-	-	-	-	-
R^2	0.239	0.222	0.252	0.342	0.184	0.271	0.039
Adjusted R^2	0.235	0.205	0.235	0.326	0.166	0.253	0.017

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Reference Category (RF) for sex: female; RF Education: lower secondary or less; RF Occupation status: Employee. Source: Original survey data collected April 2020 to May 2020 by Qualtrics.

Table C-10 Linear probability model on the relationship between different forms of social trust and left-wing populist party support (Main Model)

	Pooled Sample	France	Germany	Spain
DV: Left-wing populist party support				
Particularised trust	-0.040	-0.056	-0.052	-0.002
	(0.014)	(0.044)	(0.054)	(0.056)
Class-based trust	-0.024	0.019	-0.022	-0.066
	(0.028)	(0.037)	(0.049)	(0.055)
Generalised trust	0.058	0.118*	0.034	0.023
	(0.027)	(0.048)	(0.055)	(0.064)
Age	-0.001	-0.001	-0.000	-0.001
	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Sex				
Male	-0.003	-0.015	0.015	0.003
	(0.007)	(0.017)	(0.020)	(0.022)
Education				
Upper, post-secondary	0.015	-0.002	0.029	0.001
	(0.010)	(0.020)	(0.026)	(0.029)
Tertiary	0.014	-0.038	0.044	0.018
	(0.023)	(0.025)	(0.029)	(0.028)
Income situation	-0.049	-0.010	-0.121**	-0.011
	(0.040)	(0.034)	(0.042)	(0.041)
Occupation status				
Manual worker	-0.012	0.002	-0.045	0.021
	(0.023)	(0.045)	(0.034)	(0.048)
In public service	-0.006	0.014	-0.001	0.009
	(0.005)	(0.039)	(0.042)	(0.047)
Self-employed with no employees	-0.011	-0.007	-0.031	-0.001
	(0.004)	(0.038)	(0.046)	(0.048)
Self-employed with employees	0.025	0.106	0.037	-0.029
	(0.038)	(0.093)	(0.068)	(0.029)
Retired	0.007	-0.037	0.007	0.048
	(0.023)	(0.030)	(0.032)	(0.038)
Student or otherwise in training	-0.048	-0.080***	-0.071	-0.008
	(0.017)	(0.024)	(0.037)	(0.059)
Unemployed	0.050	0.001	0.068	0.094*
	(0.029)	(0.032)	(0.060)	(0.037)
Other	-0.046	-0.096***	-0.039	-0.011
	(0.025)	(0.026)	(0.052)	(0.050)
Political interest	0.118*	0.111***	0.058	0.157***
	(0.023)	(0.028)	(0.039)	(0.038)
Left-right self-placement	-0.373	-0.200***	-0.590***	-0.437***
	(0.107)	(0.039)	(0.064)	(0.044)
Constant	0.264*	0.165**	0.405***	0.285***
	(0.059)	(0.054)	(0.069)	(0.064)
Observations	2643	885	879	879
Country fixed-effects	✓	-	-	-
R^2	0.123	0.098	0.173	0.141
Adjusted R^2	0.116	0.079	0.156	0.123

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Reference Category (RF) for sex: female; RF Education: lower secondary or less; RF Occupation status: Employee. Source: Original survey data collected April 2020 to May 2020 by Qualtrics.

Table C-11 Linear probability model on the relationship between different forms of social trust and left-wing populist party support (Robustness 1)

	Pooled Sample	France	Germany	Spain
DV: Left-wing populist party support				
Particularised trust	-0.043	-0.058	-0.043	-0.009
	(0.011)	(0.044)	(0.054)	(0.056)
Class-based trust	-0.035	0.010	-0.042	-0.071
	(0.029)	(0.037)	(0.049)	(0.055)
Generalised trust	0.084	0.134**	0.087	0.039
	(0.025)	(0.049)	(0.055)	(0.065)
Age	-0.001	-0.001	0.000	-0.001
	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Sex				
Male	-0.002	-0.010	0.009	0.004
	(0.005)	(0.017)	(0.020)	(0.022)
Education				
Upper, post-secondary	0.017	0.002	0.033	0.002
	(0.011)	(0.020)	(0.026)	(0.029)
Tertiary	0.024	-0.024	0.058*	0.021
	(0.023)	(0.025)	(0.029)	(0.028)
Income situation	-0.025	0.017	-0.085*	-0.000
	(0.035)	(0.034)	(0.041)	(0.042)
Occupation status				
Manual worker	-0.010	0.003	-0.044	0.021
	(0.023)	(0.044)	(0.033)	(0.049)
In public service	-0.002	0.020	0.017	0.006
	(0.003)	(0.039)	(0.042)	(0.046)
Self-employed with no employees	-0.011	0.003	-0.039	-0.005
	(0.009)	(0.039)	(0.046)	(0.049)
Self-employed with employees	0.035	0.118	0.041	-0.022
	(0.039)	(0.094)	(0.072)	(0.030)
Retired	0.008	-0.033	0.009	0.046
	(0.020)	(0.029)	(0.031)	(0.038)
Student or otherwise in training	-0.034	-0.064*	-0.051	-0.000
	(0.014)	(0.025)	(0.036)	(0.059)
Unemployed	0.054	0.007	0.073	0.095*
	(0.028)	(0.032)	(0.059)	(0.037)
Other	-0.051	-0.101***	-0.056	-0.012
	(0.027)	(0.026)	(0.053)	(0.050)
Political interest	0.116*	0.108***	0.047	0.158***
	(0.026)	(0.028)	(0.038)	(0.038)
Left-right self-placement	-0.357	-0.184***	-0.583***	-0.427***
	(0.107)	(0.038)	(0.061)	(0.044)
Anticapitalist attitudes	0.149	0.131***	0.258***	0.079
	(0.043)	(0.036)	(0.044)	(0.049)
Constant	0.139	0.036	0.197*	0.216**
	(0.051)	(0.065)	(0.076)	(0.077)
Observations	2643	885	879	879
Country fixed-effects	✓	-	-	-
R^2	0.133	0.110	0.202	0.143
Adjusted R^2	0.126	0.090	0.184	0.124

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Reference Category (RF) for sex: female; RF Education: lower secondary or less; RF Occupation status: Employee. Source: Original survey data collected April 2020 to May 2020 by Qualtrics.

Table C-12 Linear probability model on the relationship between different forms of social trust and left-wing populist party support (Robustness 2)

	Pooled Sample	France	Germany	Spain
DV: Left-wing populist party support				
Particularised trust	-0.038	-0.049	-0.033	0.002
	(0.010)	(0.045)	(0.054)	(0.056)
Class-based trust	-0.016	0.035	0.014	-0.090
	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.050)	(0.055)
Generalised trust	0.070	0.149**	0.102	-0.007
	(0.047)	(0.052)	(0.059)	(0.065)
Age	-0.001	-0.001	-0.000	-0.001
	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Sex				
Male	-0.003	-0.014	0.014	0.006
	(0.007)	(0.017)	(0.020)	(0.022)
Education				
Upper, post-secondary	0.015	-0.002	0.027	-0.002
	(0.010)	(0.020)	(0.026)	(0.029)
Tertiary	0.014	-0.036	0.041	0.018
	(0.022)	(0.025)	(0.029)	(0.028)
Income situation	-0.046	0.003	-0.105*	-0.014
	(0.033)	(0.035)	(0.042)	(0.041)
Occupation status				
Manual worker	-0.011	0.006	-0.045	0.021
	(0.022)	(0.044)	(0.034)	(0.048)
In public service	-0.006	0.014	0.001	0.007
	(0.005)	(0.039)	(0.042)	(0.046)
Self-employed with no employees	-0.011	-0.008	-0.032	-0.005
	(0.003)	(0.038)	(0.046)	(0.049)
Self-employed with employees	0.024	0.107	0.031	-0.028
	(0.037)	(0.092)	(0.069)	(0.031)
Retired	0.008	-0.032	0.011	0.043
	(0.021)	(0.030)	(0.032)	(0.038)
Student or otherwise in training	-0.046	-0.069**	-0.061	-0.006
	(0.011)	(0.025)	(0.037)	(0.059)
Unemployed	0.051	0.002	0.066	0.089*
	(0.029)	(0.032)	(0.059)	(0.037)
Other	-0.046	-0.103***	-0.032	-0.017
	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.053)	(0.051)
Political interest	0.122*	0.117***	0.071	0.145***
	(0.017)	(0.029)	(0.038)	(0.038)
Left-right self-placement	-0.375	-0.196***	-0.606***	-0.424***
	(0.109)	(0.039)	(0.064)	(0.044)
Political trust	-0.041	-0.098*	-0.181***	0.113*
	(0.090)	(0.046)	(0.042)	(0.048)
Constant	0.271	0.166**	0.427***	0.270***
	(0.065)	(0.054)	(0.068)	(0.065)
Observations	2643	885	879	879
Country fixed-effects	✓	-	-	-
R^2	0.124	0.104	0.190	0.146
Adjusted R^2	0.117	0.084	0.172	0.127

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses: * $p<0.05$, ** $p<0.01$, *** $p<0.001$. Reference Category (RF) for sex: female; RF Education: lower secondary or less; RF Occupation status: Employee. Source: Original survey data collected April 2020 to May 2020 by Qualtrics.

Appendix D

Table D-1 Linear regression on the relationship between subjective group relative deprivation and populist attitudes (Main Model)

	Pooled Sample	France	Germany	Italy	Spain	Switzerland	United Kingdom
DV: Populist attitudes							
Subjective group	0.110***	0.110***	0.135***	0.088***	0.104***	0.102***	0.106***
relative deprivation	(0.007)	(0.015)	(0.011)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.012)	(0.016)
Age	-0.000	-0.000	0.000	0.001*	-0.000	0.000	-0.001*
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Sex							
Male	0.009*	0.000	0.002	0.008	0.019*	0.013*	0.011
	(0.003)	(0.008)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.006)	(0.007)
Education							
Upper, post-	-0.003	-0.009	0.012	-0.002	0.004	-0.007	-0.018*
secondary	(0.003)	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.009)
Tertiary	-0.006*	-0.014	0.001	-0.003	-0.007	-0.011	-0.009
	(0.002)	(0.012)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.008)
Income situation	-0.028*	-0.054**	-0.031*	-0.024	-0.045**	0.002	0.001
	(0.010)	(0.017)	(0.013)	(0.015)	(0.017)	(0.012)	(0.014)
Occupation status							
Manual worker	0.011*	0.003	0.005	0.022	0.001	0.029	0.021
	(0.004)	(0.020)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.017)	(0.021)	(0.015)
In public service	-0.010	0.002	-0.031**	0.043	-0.030*	0.019	-0.038**
	(0.010)	(0.014)	(0.012)	(0.047)	(0.015)	(0.013)	(0.013)
Self-employed with	0.000	0.014	-0.004	0.016	-0.019	0.006	-0.005
no employees	(0.005)	(0.016)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.019)	(0.013)	(0.014)
Self-employed with	0.006	0.004	-0.004	0.087**	-0.025	0.014	-0.030
employees	(0.013)	(0.027)	(0.020)	(0.033)	(0.022)	(0.021)	(0.035)
Retired	-0.001	0.005	-0.013	-0.003	0.007	-0.002	0.001
	(0.004)	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.014)	(0.010)	(0.010)
Student or otherwise	-0.015	-0.002	-0.025*	-0.003	-0.030	-0.003	0.014
in training	(0.006)	(0.024)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.017)	(0.013)	(0.017)
Unemployed	0.008	-0.008	-0.015	0.018	0.015	0.006	0.017
	(0.006)	(0.014)	(0.019)	(0.011)	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.016)
Other	0.007	0.027	-0.015	0.005	-0.012	0.019	0.032
	(0.007)	(0.023)	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.018)	(0.015)	(0.021)
Political interest	0.015*	0.010	0.031*	0.009	0.026	0.018	0.006
	(0.004)	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.017)	(0.012)	(0.012)
Left-right self-	-0.238***	-0.248***	-0.199**	-0.205***	-0.238***	-0.184***	-0.370***
placement	(0.022)	(0.052)	(0.065)	(0.048)	(0.052)	(0.054)	(0.077)
Left-right self-	0.232***	0.214***	0.245***	0.226***	0.257***	0.181***	0.303***
placement (squared)	(0.013)	(0.047)	(0.069)	(0.045)	(0.054)	(0.051)	(0.069)
Constant	0.149***	0.212***	0.100***	0.088***	0.174***	0.083***	0.205***
	(0.017)	(0.025)	(0.023)	(0.024)	(0.026)	(0.022)	(0.027)
Observations	5871	1002	993	983	986	914	993
Country fixed-effects	✓	-	-	-	-	-	-
R^2	0.182	0.151	0.237	0.127	0.121	0.142	0.199
Adjusted R^2	0.179	0.137	0.223	0.112	0.106	0.126	0.185

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Reference Category (RF) for sex: female; RF Education: lower secondary or less; RF Occupation status: Employee. Source: Original survey data collected April 2020 to May 2020 by Qualtrics.

Table D-2 Linear regression on the relationship between subjective group relative deprivation and populist attitudes (Robustness 1)

	Pooled Sample	France	Germany	Italy	Spain	Switzerland	United Kingdom
DV: Populist attitudes							
Subjective group relative deprivation	0.097***	0.102***	0.106***	0.076***	0.084***	0.094***	0.104***
	(0.006)	(0.016)	(0.012)	(0.016)	(0.017)	(0.012)	(0.016)
Age	-0.000	-0.000	0.000	0.000	-0.000	0.000	-0.001*
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Sex							
Male	0.009**	-0.000	0.002	0.008	0.019*	0.012*	0.011
	(0.003)	(0.008)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.006)	(0.007)
Education							
Upper, post-secondary	-0.001	-0.009	0.017	-0.001	0.005	-0.005	-0.017
	(0.004)	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.009)
Tertiary	-0.002	-0.012	0.008	0.004	-0.002	-0.005	-0.007
	(0.004)	(0.012)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.008)
Income situation	-0.027***	-0.053**	-0.023	-0.023	-0.044**	0.002	0.001
	(0.006)	(0.017)	(0.013)	(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.012)	(0.014)
Occupation status							
Manual worker	0.011	0.004	0.007	0.023	0.000	0.028	0.021
	(0.006)	(0.020)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.017)	(0.022)	(0.015)
In public service	-0.009	0.002	-0.027*	0.044	-0.031*	0.017	-0.038**
	(0.006)	(0.014)	(0.012)	(0.043)	(0.015)	(0.013)	(0.013)
Self-employed with no employees	0.003	0.015	0.001	0.017	-0.012	0.007	-0.003
	(0.007)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.017)	(0.020)	(0.013)	(0.014)
Self-employed with employees	0.007	0.005	0.006	0.087**	-0.019	0.013	-0.031
	(0.011)	(0.027)	(0.020)	(0.031)	(0.022)	(0.019)	(0.036)
Retired	-0.000	0.005	-0.011	0.002	0.013	-0.002	0.002
	(0.004)	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.014)	(0.010)	(0.010)
Student or otherwise in training	-0.010	0.002	-0.014	0.001	-0.022	0.001	0.015
	(0.006)	(0.024)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.017)	(0.013)	(0.017)
Unemployed	0.009	-0.006	-0.011	0.020	0.019	0.009	0.017
	(0.006)	(0.013)	(0.019)	(0.011)	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.017)
Other	0.008	0.031	-0.015	0.009	-0.010	0.019	0.032
	(0.007)	(0.024)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.018)	(0.015)	(0.021)
Political interest	0.018**	0.009	0.042**	0.011	0.035*	0.022	0.006
	(0.006)	(0.016)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.017)	(0.012)	(0.012)
Left-right self-placement	-0.254***	-0.259***	-0.232***	-0.237***	-0.246***	-0.205***	-0.373***
	(0.023)	(0.052)	(0.067)	(0.048)	(0.052)	(0.054)	(0.078)
Left-right self-placement (squared)	0.225***	0.213***	0.229**	0.222***	0.237***	0.183***	0.301***
	(0.022)	(0.048)	(0.069)	(0.045)	(0.056)	(0.050)	(0.068)
Nativist attitudes	0.046***	0.014	0.093***	0.068***	0.066***	0.049***	0.007
	(0.006)	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.016)	(0.018)	(0.014)	(0.016)
Authoritarian attitudes	0.005	0.025	-0.016	0.008	0.011	-0.026	0.013
	(0.009)	(0.025)	(0.020)	(0.022)	(0.026)	(0.019)	(0.022)
Constant	0.137***	0.199***	0.079**	0.073**	0.154***	0.088***	0.197***
	(0.011)	(0.027)	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.030)	(0.022)	(0.031)
Observations	5871	1002	993	983	986	914	993
Country fixed-effects	✓	-	-	-	-	-	-
R^2	0.193	0.154	0.271	0.152	0.137	0.156	0.200
Adjusted R^2	0.189	0.138	0.257	0.136	0.120	0.138	0.185

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Reference Category (RF) for sex: female; RF Education: lower secondary or less; RF Occupation status: Employee. Source: Original survey data collected April 2020 to May 2020 by Qualtrics.

Table D-3 Linear regression on the relationship between subjective group relative deprivation and populist attitudes (Robustness 2)

	Pooled Sample	France	Germany	Italy	Spain	Switzerland	United Kingdom
DV: Populist attitudes							
Subjective group relative deprivation	0.068***	0.052***	0.081***	0.058***	0.075***	0.066***	0.068***
	(0.006)	(0.013)	(0.011)	(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.012)	(0.015)
Age	-0.000	-0.000	0.000	0.001*	0.000	0.000	-0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Sex							
Male	0.009***	0.007	0.001	0.008	0.020**	0.009	0.012*
	(0.003)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Education							
Upper, post-secondary	-0.001	0.001	0.014	-0.001	0.006	-0.004	-0.017*
	(0.004)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.008)
Tertiary	0.001	0.012	0.012	-0.000	0.002	-0.008	-0.002
	(0.004)	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.007)
Income situation	-0.013*	-0.024	-0.022	-0.016	-0.028	0.012	0.007
	(0.006)	(0.015)	(0.012)	(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.011)	(0.013)
Occupation status							
Manual worker	0.010	-0.001	0.007	0.024*	0.001	0.020	0.014
	(0.006)	(0.020)	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.016)	(0.020)	(0.014)
In public service	-0.003	0.009	-0.025*	0.053	-0.033*	0.020	-0.014
	(0.006)	(0.013)	(0.011)	(0.043)	(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.011)
Self-employed with no employees	0.001	0.027*	-0.008	0.020	-0.030	0.010	-0.008
	(0.006)	(0.013)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.019)	(0.012)	(0.014)
Self-employed with employees	0.015	0.022	-0.001	0.083**	-0.009	0.020	-0.011
	(0.010)	(0.028)	(0.016)	(0.028)	(0.024)	(0.018)	(0.034)
Retired	-0.000	0.007	-0.011	0.001	0.004	-0.002	0.003
	(0.004)	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.011)	(0.013)	(0.010)	(0.009)
Student or otherwise in training	-0.007	0.018	-0.015	-0.003	-0.011	-0.004	0.017
	(0.006)	(0.019)	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.017)	(0.012)	(0.015)
Unemployed	0.006	-0.003	-0.011	0.016	0.015	0.000	0.015
	(0.005)	(0.012)	(0.019)	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.014)
Other	-0.001	0.014	-0.021	0.009	-0.019	0.003	0.019
	(0.007)	(0.021)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.018)	(0.014)	(0.018)
Political interest	0.012*	0.007	0.024	0.001	0.029	0.016	0.003
	(0.006)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.016)	(0.011)	(0.011)
Left-right self-placement	-0.166***	-0.144**	-0.105	-0.172***	-0.163**	-0.125*	-0.296***
	(0.022)	(0.047)	(0.062)	(0.046)	(0.050)	(0.053)	(0.075)
Left-right self-placement (squared)	0.180***	0.146***	0.157*	0.190***	0.206***	0.142**	0.269***
	(0.021)	(0.043)	(0.066)	(0.043)	(0.052)	(0.048)	(0.065)
Anticapitalist attitudes	0.193***	0.256***	0.188***	0.146***	0.207***	0.142***	0.195***
	(0.007)	(0.016)	(0.017)	(0.020)	(0.022)	(0.016)	(0.018)
Constant	0.018	-0.002	-0.018	0.003	0.006	-0.002	0.059*
	(0.011)	(0.024)	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.028)	(0.022)	(0.030)
Observations	5871	1002	993	983	986	914	993
Country fixed-effects	✓	-	-	-	-	-	-
R^2	0.284	0.326	0.333	0.180	0.216	0.227	0.322
Adjusted R^2	0.282	0.314	0.320	0.164	0.201	0.211	0.310

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Reference Category (RF) for sex: female; RF Education: lower secondary or less; RF Occupation status: Employee. Source: Original survey data collected April 2020 to May 2020 by Qualtrics.

Table D-4 Linear regression on the relationship between subjective group relative deprivation and populist attitudes (Robustness 3)

	Pooled Sample	France	Germany	Italy	Spain	Switzerland	United Kingdom
DV: Populist attitudes							
Subjective group relative deprivation	0.090***	0.081***	0.115***	0.081***	0.084***	0.083***	0.087***
	(0.006)	(0.015)	(0.011)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.012)	(0.015)
Age	-0.000	-0.000	0.000	0.001*	-0.000	0.000	-0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Sex							
Male	0.009*	0.000	0.003	0.008	0.016*	0.012*	0.009
	(0.003)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Education							
Upper, post-secondary	-0.003	-0.007	0.013	-0.004	0.005	-0.005	-0.019*
	(0.003)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.008)
Tertiary	-0.007**	-0.010	0.005	-0.005	-0.007	-0.010	-0.009
	(0.002)	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.007)
Income situation	-0.020	-0.034*	-0.023	-0.017	-0.046**	0.011	0.001
	(0.009)	(0.016)	(0.013)	(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.012)	(0.014)
Occupation status							
Manual worker	0.010	0.007	0.005	0.021	-0.000	0.031	0.021
	(0.004)	(0.019)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.017)	(0.020)	(0.015)
In public service	-0.012	-0.005	-0.031**	0.043	-0.032*	0.020	-0.038**
	(0.010)	(0.014)	(0.012)	(0.046)	(0.015)	(0.013)	(0.013)
Self-employed with no employees	-0.002	0.009	-0.006	0.013	-0.016	0.004	-0.013
	(0.004)	(0.017)	(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.019)	(0.011)	(0.014)
Self-employed with employees	0.002	0.001	-0.005	0.087**	-0.030	0.015	-0.042
	(0.016)	(0.026)	(0.020)	(0.032)	(0.024)	(0.018)	(0.033)
Retired	0.001	0.010	-0.009	-0.003	0.012	-0.000	0.002
	(0.004)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.013)	(0.010)	(0.009)
Student or otherwise in training	-0.011	0.011	-0.020	0.001	-0.037*	-0.003	0.015
	(0.006)	(0.023)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.017)	(0.013)	(0.017)
Unemployed	0.006	-0.015	-0.018	0.016	0.015	0.010	0.010
	(0.006)	(0.013)	(0.019)	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.016)
Other	0.004	0.018	-0.020	0.004	-0.011	0.017	0.029
	(0.007)	(0.023)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.018)	(0.014)	(0.020)
Political interest	0.029**	0.027	0.045**	0.021	0.045**	0.025*	0.017
	(0.005)	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.017)	(0.011)	(0.011)
Left-right self-placement	-0.218***	-0.189***	-0.172**	-0.190***	-0.253***	-0.187***	-0.327***
	(0.021)	(0.050)	(0.062)	(0.047)	(0.050)	(0.054)	(0.073)
Left-right self-placement (squared)	0.211***	0.161***	0.210**	0.204***	0.258***	0.181***	0.288***
	(0.018)	(0.046)	(0.066)	(0.044)	(0.052)	(0.050)	(0.066)
Political trust	-0.114***	-0.155***	-0.099***	-0.062***	-0.142***	-0.102***	-0.118***
	(0.013)	(0.017)	(0.014)	(0.016)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.016)
Constant	0.192***	0.252***	0.137***	0.102***	0.224***	0.135***	0.240***
	(0.021)	(0.025)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.027)	(0.022)	(0.026)
Observations	5871	1002	993	983	986	914	993
Country fixed-effects	✓	-	-	-	-	-	-
R^2	0.230	0.226	0.284	0.142	0.181	0.190	0.253
Adjusted R^2	0.227	0.211	0.271	0.126	0.166	0.174	0.239

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Reference Category (RF) for sex: female; RF Education: lower secondary or less; RF Occupation status: Employee. Source: Original survey data collected April 2020 to May 2020 by Qualtrics.

Table D-5 Linear regression on the relationship between subjective group relative deprivation and populist attitudes (Robustness 4)

	Pooled Sample	France	Germany	Italy	Spain	Switzerland	United Kingdom
DV: Populist attitudes							
Subjective group relative deprivation	0.067**	0.025	0.051*	0.055*	0.107***	0.063**	0.079*
	(0.010)	(0.025)	(0.023)	(0.024)	(0.028)	(0.023)	(0.033)
Subjective group relative deprivation (immigrants)	0.014	-0.035*	0.075***	0.005	0.027	0.027	-0.014
	(0.016)	(0.017)	(0.016)	(0.021)	(0.024)	(0.018)	(0.020)
Subjective group relative deprivation (rich people)	0.039	0.135***	0.027	0.037	-0.028	0.021	0.046
	(0.021)	(0.022)	(0.019)	(0.021)	(0.026)	(0.019)	(0.030)
Age	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	0.001*	-0.000	0.000	-0.001*
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Sex							
Male	0.009*	-0.000	0.003	0.008	0.019*	0.012*	0.011
	(0.003)	(0.008)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.006)	(0.007)
Education							
Upper, post-secondary	-0.003	-0.008	0.014	-0.003	0.005	-0.005	-0.019*
	(0.003)	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.009)
Tertiary	-0.005	-0.015	0.007	-0.003	-0.006	-0.006	-0.011
	(0.002)	(0.012)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.008)
Income situation	-0.027*	-0.052**	-0.029*	-0.023	-0.044**	0.002	0.002
	(0.010)	(0.017)	(0.013)	(0.015)	(0.017)	(0.012)	(0.014)
Occupation status							
Manual worker	0.011*	-0.001	0.005	0.023	0.001	0.029	0.021
	(0.004)	(0.019)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.017)	(0.021)	(0.015)
In public service	-0.010	-0.002	-0.030*	0.046	-0.029	0.019	-0.040**
	(0.010)	(0.014)	(0.012)	(0.047)	(0.015)	(0.013)	(0.013)
Self-employed with no employees	0.001	0.016	0.000	0.014	-0.016	0.007	-0.006
	(0.005)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.020)	(0.013)	(0.014)
Self-employed with employees	0.007	0.016	0.002	0.087**	-0.023	0.014	-0.027
	(0.014)	(0.028)	(0.022)	(0.032)	(0.023)	(0.020)	(0.034)
Retired	-0.001	0.003	-0.011	-0.003	0.009	-0.002	0.002
	(0.003)	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.014)	(0.010)	(0.010)
Student or otherwise in training	-0.012	0.013	-0.019	-0.004	-0.026	-0.000	0.015
	(0.005)	(0.023)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.017)	(0.012)	(0.017)
Unemployed	0.008	-0.010	-0.012	0.018	0.017	0.008	0.018
	(0.005)	(0.013)	(0.019)	(0.011)	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.016)
Other	0.007	0.019	-0.014	0.005	-0.011	0.019	0.033
	(0.007)	(0.023)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.018)	(0.015)	(0.021)
Political interest	0.015*	0.007	0.035*	0.010	0.028	0.019	0.005
	(0.005)	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.017)	(0.012)	(0.012)
Left-right self-placement	-0.238***	-0.215***	-0.230***	-0.200***	-0.246***	-0.194***	-0.360***
	(0.020)	(0.051)	(0.066)	(0.047)	(0.052)	(0.055)	(0.079)
Left-right self-placement (squared)	0.230***	0.200***	0.250***	0.220***	0.254***	0.185***	0.304***
	(0.014)	(0.047)	(0.069)	(0.045)	(0.055)	(0.051)	(0.069)
Constant	0.144***	0.188***	0.103***	0.082***	0.178***	0.082***	0.195***
	(0.015)	(0.025)	(0.023)	(0.024)	(0.027)	(0.021)	(0.026)
Observations	5871	1002	993	983	986	914	993
Country fixed-effects	✓	-	-	-	-	-	-
R^2	0.186	0.180	0.258	0.130	0.124	0.147	0.205
Adjusted R^2	0.183	0.165	0.243	0.113	0.107	0.129	0.190

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Reference Category (RF) for sex: female; RF Education: lower secondary or less; RF Occupation status: Employee. Source: Original survey data collected April 2020 to May 2020 by Qualtrics.

Table D-6 Linear probability model on the relationship between subjective group relative deprivation (immigrants) and right-wing populist party support (Main Model)

	Pooled Sample	France	Germany	Italy	Spain	Switzerland	United Kingdom
DV: Right-wing populist party support							
Subjective group relative deprivation (immigrants)	0.185***	0.243***	0.204***	0.170***	0.139***	0.215***	0.069**
	(0.022)	(0.040)	(0.036)	(0.048)	(0.033)	(0.048)	(0.021)
Age	-0.000	-0.002	-0.000	0.002	-0.001	0.002	-0.000
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Sex							
Male	-0.003	0.054*	-0.036	-0.007	0.016	-0.024	-0.005
	(0.011)	(0.025)	(0.020)	(0.029)	(0.019)	(0.028)	(0.011)
Education							
Upper, post-secondary	-0.016	-0.030	-0.036	-0.041	-0.016	0.021	-0.026
	(0.015)	(0.037)	(0.034)	(0.031)	(0.025)	(0.051)	(0.016)
Tertiary	-0.041	-0.101*	-0.014	-0.050	-0.035	-0.063	-0.010
	(0.019)	(0.040)	(0.037)	(0.042)	(0.024)	(0.052)	(0.015)
Income situation	-0.005	-0.172**	-0.010	0.179**	0.043	0.014	0.011
	(0.040)	(0.055)	(0.040)	(0.062)	(0.039)	(0.052)	(0.021)
Occupation status							
Manual worker	0.014	0.054	0.074	-0.027	-0.004	0.171	0.062
	(0.031)	(0.078)	(0.054)	(0.050)	(0.041)	(0.092)	(0.044)
In public service	0.005	0.078	-0.021	0.062	-0.025	-0.049	-0.023*
	(0.025)	(0.042)	(0.040)	(0.106)	(0.042)	(0.057)	(0.010)
Self-employed with no employees	0.042	0.107	0.042	0.115	-0.062	0.023	-0.022*
	(0.027)	(0.064)	(0.055)	(0.066)	(0.034)	(0.051)	(0.010)
Self-employed with employees	-0.037	-0.078	-0.073	-0.001	0.067	-0.219*	0.049
	(0.041)	(0.089)	(0.071)	(0.122)	(0.096)	(0.107)	(0.071)
Retired	0.019	0.049	0.015	0.018	0.004	-0.038	0.011
	(0.010)	(0.043)	(0.033)	(0.051)	(0.029)	(0.048)	(0.021)
Student or otherwise in training	-0.040	-0.162**	-0.029	0.012	0.017	-0.056	-0.020
	(0.018)	(0.050)	(0.030)	(0.058)	(0.048)	(0.056)	(0.013)
Unemployed	-0.033	-0.074	0.081	-0.085	0.021	-0.043	-0.024*
	(0.030)	(0.040)	(0.057)	(0.047)	(0.030)	(0.055)	(0.011)
Other	0.018	-0.039	0.034	0.065	-0.026	-0.035	0.061
	(0.024)	(0.081)	(0.080)	(0.068)	(0.050)	(0.056)	(0.055)
Political interest	0.092*	0.040	0.166***	0.107*	0.116***	0.171***	-0.003
	(0.027)	(0.043)	(0.048)	(0.050)	(0.034)	(0.048)	(0.021)
Left-right self-placement	0.483**	0.441***	0.420***	0.829***	0.376***	0.742***	0.037
	(0.112)	(0.051)	(0.060)	(0.050)	(0.045)	(0.063)	(0.029)
Constant	-0.227	-0.005	-0.233***	-0.427***	-0.180**	-0.394***	0.005
	(0.095)	(0.067)	(0.069)	(0.079)	(0.057)	(0.078)	(0.030)
Observations	5071	885	879	805	879	773	850
Country fixed-effects	✓	-	-	-	-	-	-
R^2	0.233	0.218	0.175	0.340	0.174	0.283	0.041
Adjusted R^2	0.229	0.204	0.160	0.327	0.159	0.268	0.023

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Reference Category (RF) for sex: female; RF Education: lower secondary or less; RF Occupation status: Employee. Source: Original survey data collected April 2020 to May 2020 by Qualtrics.

Table D-7 Linear probability model on the relationship between subjective group relative deprivation (immigrants) and right-wing populist party support (Robustness 1)

	Pooled Sample	France	Germany	Italy	Spain	Switzerland	United Kingdom
DV: Right-wing populist party support							
Subjective group relative deprivation (immigrants)	0.083***	0.070	0.078	0.086	0.068	0.108*	0.038
	(0.006)	(0.050)	(0.047)	(0.056)	(0.037)	(0.052)	(0.021)
Age	-0.001	-0.002*	-0.000	0.002	-0.001	0.001	-0.001
	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Sex							
Male	-0.004	0.052*	-0.036	-0.004	0.015	-0.030	-0.006
	(0.011)	(0.025)	(0.020)	(0.029)	(0.019)	(0.028)	(0.011)
Education							
Upper, post-secondary	-0.010	-0.025	-0.027	-0.037	-0.016	0.031	-0.023
	(0.015)	(0.036)	(0.034)	(0.031)	(0.025)	(0.050)	(0.015)
Tertiary	-0.027	-0.085*	-0.004	-0.035	-0.027	-0.038	-0.005
	(0.017)	(0.040)	(0.036)	(0.042)	(0.024)	(0.052)	(0.015)
Income situation	-0.009	-0.181***	0.003	0.168**	0.045	0.006	0.008
	(0.040)	(0.053)	(0.040)	(0.061)	(0.039)	(0.051)	(0.022)
Occupation status							
Manual worker	0.015	0.072	0.075	-0.024	-0.006	0.173	0.063
	(0.030)	(0.077)	(0.052)	(0.049)	(0.040)	(0.089)	(0.044)
In public service	0.003	0.078	-0.015	0.061	-0.029	-0.065	-0.022*
	(0.026)	(0.041)	(0.040)	(0.115)	(0.043)	(0.057)	(0.009)
Self-employed with no employees	0.048	0.112	0.043	0.118	-0.054	0.040	-0.019
	(0.026)	(0.066)	(0.054)	(0.066)	(0.035)	(0.050)	(0.010)
Self-employed with employees	-0.032	-0.076	-0.048	0.011	0.075	-0.216*	0.045
	(0.039)	(0.082)	(0.066)	(0.119)	(0.099)	(0.101)	(0.070)
Retired	0.022	0.051	0.021	0.032	0.011	-0.037	0.010
	(0.011)	(0.042)	(0.032)	(0.051)	(0.029)	(0.047)	(0.021)
Student or otherwise in training	-0.031	-0.110*	-0.011	0.016	0.020	-0.042	-0.018
	(0.015)	(0.054)	(0.030)	(0.058)	(0.050)	(0.055)	(0.013)
Unemployed	-0.032	-0.067	0.081	-0.083	0.026	-0.042	-0.028*
	(0.031)	(0.040)	(0.057)	(0.047)	(0.029)	(0.053)	(0.011)
Other	0.024	-0.004	0.036	0.082	-0.027	-0.036	0.055
	(0.024)	(0.073)	(0.083)	(0.067)	(0.049)	(0.057)	(0.054)
Political interest	0.099*	0.046	0.186***	0.108*	0.131***	0.182***	-0.003
	(0.030)	(0.043)	(0.046)	(0.050)	(0.034)	(0.048)	(0.022)
Left-right self-placement	0.417**	0.345***	0.339***	0.765***	0.337***	0.623***	0.018
	(0.103)	(0.054)	(0.061)	(0.054)	(0.046)	(0.067)	(0.031)
Nativist attitudes	0.208**	0.322***	0.281***	0.202**	0.139**	0.271***	0.056*
	(0.045)	(0.054)	(0.054)	(0.062)	(0.043)	(0.065)	(0.024)
Authoritarian attitudes	-0.001	-0.026	-0.097	-0.036	0.044	0.043	0.014
	(0.028)	(0.067)	(0.055)	(0.071)	(0.045)	(0.075)	(0.036)
Constant	-0.254*	-0.008	-0.255***	-0.424***	-0.221***	-0.435***	-0.003
	(0.096)	(0.075)	(0.075)	(0.087)	(0.061)	(0.080)	(0.030)
Observations	5071	885	879	805	879	773	850
Country fixed-effects	✓	-	-	-	-	-	-
R^2	0.248	0.249	0.205	0.349	0.186	0.304	0.048
Adjusted R^2	0.245	0.233	0.188	0.334	0.169	0.287	0.027

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Reference Category (RF) for sex: female; RF Education: lower secondary or less; RF Occupation status: Employee. Source: Original survey data collected April 2020 to May 2020 by Qualtrics.

Table D-8 Linear probability model on the relationship between subjective group relative deprivation (immigrants) and right-wing populist party support (Robustness 2)

	Pooled Sample	France	Germany	Italy	Spain	Switzerland	United Kingdom
Subjective group relative deprivation (immigrants)	0.156***	0.214***	0.113***	0.151**	0.121***	0.217***	0.064**
	(0.021)	(0.040)	(0.034)	(0.048)	(0.032)	(0.049)	(0.021)
Age	-0.000	-0.002	-0.000	0.002*	-0.001	0.002	-0.000
	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Sex							
Male	-0.004	0.054*	-0.036	-0.003	0.013	-0.024	-0.006
	(0.011)	(0.025)	(0.019)	(0.029)	(0.019)	(0.028)	(0.011)
Education							
Upper, post-secondary	-0.017	-0.027	-0.042	-0.047	-0.014	0.021	-0.026
	(0.016)	(0.037)	(0.034)	(0.030)	(0.025)	(0.051)	(0.016)
Tertiary	-0.043	-0.091*	-0.015	-0.055	-0.035	-0.063	-0.010
	(0.017)	(0.040)	(0.036)	(0.042)	(0.024)	(0.052)	(0.015)
Income situation	0.018	-0.128*	0.020	0.199**	0.046	0.012	0.013
	(0.037)	(0.056)	(0.038)	(0.062)	(0.038)	(0.053)	(0.021)
Occupation status							
Manual worker	0.013	0.063	0.071	-0.031	-0.006	0.171	0.062
	(0.032)	(0.077)	(0.051)	(0.049)	(0.040)	(0.092)	(0.044)
In public service	0.004	0.071	-0.030	0.072	-0.024	-0.050	-0.021*
	(0.023)	(0.043)	(0.036)	(0.112)	(0.042)	(0.057)	(0.010)
Self-employed with no employees	0.037	0.094	0.024	0.108	-0.056	0.023	-0.026*
	(0.025)	(0.063)	(0.056)	(0.066)	(0.032)	(0.051)	(0.011)
Self-employed with employees	-0.043	-0.086	-0.087	0.003	0.062	-0.219*	0.043
	(0.037)	(0.090)	(0.062)	(0.125)	(0.096)	(0.108)	(0.073)
Retired	0.024	0.061	0.018	0.022	0.011	-0.039	0.012
	(0.011)	(0.043)	(0.031)	(0.050)	(0.029)	(0.048)	(0.021)
Student or otherwise in training	-0.034	-0.142**	-0.020	0.025	0.007	-0.056	-0.017
	(0.018)	(0.053)	(0.031)	(0.058)	(0.048)	(0.056)	(0.013)
Unemployed	-0.038	-0.088*	0.057	-0.091	0.023	-0.044	-0.028*
	(0.032)	(0.041)	(0.055)	(0.047)	(0.029)	(0.055)	(0.012)
Other	0.014	-0.054	0.049	0.063	-0.024	-0.035	0.057
	(0.022)	(0.084)	(0.071)	(0.067)	(0.051)	(0.056)	(0.055)
Political interest	0.114*	0.060	0.207***	0.141**	0.140***	0.170***	0.001
	(0.029)	(0.042)	(0.046)	(0.051)	(0.035)	(0.049)	(0.021)
Left-right self-placement	0.489**	0.458***	0.428***	0.813***	0.360***	0.742***	0.055
	(0.103)	(0.050)	(0.058)	(0.050)	(0.044)	(0.063)	(0.030)
Political trust	-0.222**	-0.246***	-0.371***	-0.209**	-0.186***	0.016	-0.068*
	(0.045)	(0.056)	(0.046)	(0.065)	(0.037)	(0.071)	(0.029)
Constant	-0.144	0.055	-0.065	-0.367***	-0.124*	-0.401***	0.021
	(0.099)	(0.067)	(0.067)	(0.079)	(0.057)	(0.083)	(0.031)
Observations	5071	885	879	805	879	773	850
Country fixed-effects	✓	-	-	-	-	-	-
R^2	0.251	0.236	0.252	0.349	0.195	0.283	0.049
Adjusted R^2	0.248	0.221	0.237	0.335	0.179	0.267	0.029

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Reference Category (RF) for sex: female; RF Education: lower secondary or less; RF Occupation status: Employee. Source: Original survey data collected April 2020 to May 2020 by Qualtrics.

Table D-9 Linear probability model on the relationship between subjective group relative deprivation (immigrants) and right-wing populist party support (Robustness 3)

	Pooled Sample	France	Germany	Italy	Spain	Switzerland	United Kingdom
DV: Right-wing populist party support							
Subjective group	-0.005	0.047	0.009	-0.175*	0.085	0.015	0.039
relative deprivation	(0.040)	(0.067)	(0.054)	(0.079)	(0.062)	(0.095)	(0.027)
Subjective group	0.184**	0.213***	0.235***	0.215***	0.114**	0.285***	0.044
relative deprivation (immigrants)	(0.038)	(0.051)	(0.043)	(0.058)	(0.038)	(0.060)	(0.026)
Subjective group	0.007	0.006	-0.058	0.096	-0.050	-0.126	0.001
relative deprivation (rich people)	(0.037)	(0.063)	(0.049)	(0.083)	(0.061)	(0.080)	(0.029)
Age	-0.000	-0.002	-0.000	0.002	-0.001	0.002	-0.000
	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Sex							
Male	-0.003	0.055*	-0.034	-0.006	0.017	-0.024	-0.005
	(0.011)	(0.025)	(0.020)	(0.029)	(0.019)	(0.028)	(0.011)
Education							
Upper, post-	-0.016	-0.031	-0.037	-0.041	-0.016	0.020	-0.025
secondary	(0.015)	(0.037)	(0.035)	(0.031)	(0.025)	(0.051)	(0.016)
Tertiary	-0.041	-0.102*	-0.015	-0.051	-0.037	-0.063	-0.010
	(0.018)	(0.040)	(0.037)	(0.042)	(0.024)	(0.052)	(0.015)
Income situation	-0.005	-0.162**	-0.016	0.159*	0.051	-0.008	0.017
	(0.038)	(0.057)	(0.040)	(0.063)	(0.039)	(0.055)	(0.022)
Occupation status							
Manual worker	0.015	0.056	0.075	-0.023	-0.006	0.170	0.062
	(0.031)	(0.079)	(0.054)	(0.050)	(0.041)	(0.091)	(0.044)
In public service	0.005	0.076	-0.019	0.068	-0.025	-0.040	-0.022*
	(0.025)	(0.042)	(0.040)	(0.104)	(0.042)	(0.057)	(0.010)
Self-employed with	0.042	0.108	0.044	0.109	-0.060	0.014	-0.021*
no employees	(0.026)	(0.065)	(0.056)	(0.066)	(0.034)	(0.051)	(0.010)
Self-employed with	-0.037	-0.075	-0.076	0.003	0.067	-0.227*	0.055
employees	(0.042)	(0.089)	(0.071)	(0.120)	(0.097)	(0.106)	(0.070)
Retired	0.019	0.049	0.015	0.022	0.004	-0.042	0.011
	(0.011)	(0.043)	(0.033)	(0.051)	(0.029)	(0.048)	(0.021)
Student or otherwise	-0.040	-0.160**	-0.028	0.009	0.009	-0.061	-0.018
in training	(0.018)	(0.051)	(0.030)	(0.058)	(0.049)	(0.056)	(0.013)
Unemployed	-0.033	-0.074	0.082	-0.083	0.020	-0.045	-0.023*
	(0.030)	(0.040)	(0.057)	(0.048)	(0.030)	(0.055)	(0.011)
Other	0.018	-0.039	0.034	0.070	-0.028	-0.043	0.059
	(0.024)	(0.082)	(0.081)	(0.067)	(0.050)	(0.056)	(0.056)
Political interest	0.091*	0.039	0.171***	0.115*	0.116***	0.178***	-0.007
	(0.029)	(0.044)	(0.048)	(0.051)	(0.034)	(0.049)	(0.021)
Left-right self-	0.484**	0.447***	0.410***	0.821***	0.374***	0.719***	0.047
placement	(0.108)	(0.054)	(0.062)	(0.051)	(0.047)	(0.063)	(0.033)
Constant	-0.228*	-0.032	-0.216**	-0.394***	-0.187***	-0.338***	-0.014
	(0.083)	(0.077)	(0.071)	(0.085)	(0.057)	(0.086)	(0.032)
Observations	5071	885	879	805	879	773	850
Country fixed-effects	✓	-	-	-	-	-	-
R^2	0.233	0.219	0.177	0.343	0.176	0.287	0.044
Adjusted R^2	0.229	0.203	0.159	0.328	0.159	0.269	0.023

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Reference Category (RF) for sex: female; RF Education: lower secondary or less; RF Occupation status: Employee. Source: Original survey data collected April 2020 to May 2020 by Qualtrics.

Table D-10 Linear probability model on the relationship between subjective group relative deprivation (rich people) and left-wing populist party support (Main Model)

	Pooled Sample	France	Germany	Spain
DV: Left-wing populist party support				
Subjective group relative deprivation (rich people)	0.035 (0.020)	0.040 (0.028)	0.070* (0.035)	-0.007 (0.041)
Age	-0.001 (0.000)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.000 (0.001)	-0.002 (0.001)
Sex				
Male	-0.002 (0.006)	-0.012 (0.017)	0.014 (0.020)	0.001 (0.022)
Education				
Upper, post-secondary	0.016 (0.011)	0.001 (0.020)	0.035 (0.026)	0.001 (0.029)
Tertiary	0.017 (0.022)	-0.028 (0.024)	0.053 (0.029)	0.016 (0.028)
Income situation	-0.038 (0.034)	0.016 (0.033)	-0.095* (0.043)	-0.014 (0.041)
Occupation status				
Manual worker	-0.011 (0.023)	-0.003 (0.045)	-0.043 (0.034)	0.023 (0.049)
In public service	-0.006 (0.006)	0.005 (0.039)	0.003 (0.042)	0.013 (0.047)
Self-employed with no employees	-0.008 (0.003)	-0.010 (0.038)	-0.027 (0.046)	-0.001 (0.048)
Self-employed with employees	0.032 (0.041)	0.115 (0.094)	0.044 (0.067)	-0.029 (0.028)
Retired	0.008 (0.023)	-0.036 (0.030)	0.012 (0.032)	0.049 (0.037)
Student or otherwise in training	-0.048 (0.016)	-0.084*** (0.025)	-0.067 (0.037)	-0.006 (0.059)
Unemployed	0.052 (0.032)	-0.006 (0.031)	0.071 (0.059)	0.095** (0.037)
Other	-0.045 (0.022)	-0.083*** (0.023)	-0.038 (0.053)	-0.007 (0.050)
Political interest	0.119* (0.025)	0.118*** (0.029)	0.052 (0.038)	0.157*** (0.038)
Left-right self-placement	-0.377 (0.107)	-0.208*** (0.039)	-0.601*** (0.064)	-0.438*** (0.044)
Constant	0.221* (0.046)	0.133* (0.053)	0.324*** (0.069)	0.275*** (0.065)
Observations	2643	885	879	879
Country fixed-effects	✓	-	-	-
R^2	0.122	0.087	0.176	0.140
Adjusted R^2	0.116	0.070	0.161	0.124

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Reference Category (RF) for sex: female; RF Education: lower secondary or less; RF Occupation status: Employee. Source: Original survey data collected April 2020 to May 2020 by Qualtrics.

Table D-11 Linear probability model on the relationship between subjective group relative deprivation (rich people) and left-wing populist party support (Robustness 1)

	Pooled Sample	France	Germany	Spain
DV: Left-wing populist party support				
Subjective group relative	-0.000	0.004	-0.004	-0.022
deprivation (rich people)	(0.005)	(0.032)	(0.037)	(0.043)
Age	-0.001	-0.001	0.000	-0.002
	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Sex				
Male	-0.000	-0.008	0.011	0.003
	(0.004)	(0.017)	(0.020)	(0.022)
Education				
Upper, post-secondary	0.018	0.006	0.037	0.001
	(0.012)	(0.020)	(0.026)	(0.029)
Tertiary	0.025	-0.015	0.063*	0.019
	(0.023)	(0.025)	(0.029)	(0.028)
Income situation	-0.024	0.028	-0.081	-0.004
	(0.033)	(0.034)	(0.042)	(0.041)
Occupation status				
Manual worker	-0.010	-0.004	-0.041	0.023
	(0.023)	(0.045)	(0.033)	(0.049)
In public service	-0.003	0.010	0.018	0.009
	(0.002)	(0.039)	(0.041)	(0.047)
Self-employed with no	-0.009	-0.004	-0.035	-0.005
employees	(0.006)	(0.038)	(0.045)	(0.048)
Self-employed with	0.037	0.119	0.042	-0.022
employees	(0.039)	(0.095)	(0.071)	(0.029)
Retired	0.009	-0.033	0.011	0.048
	(0.021)	(0.030)	(0.031)	(0.038)
Student or otherwise in	-0.038	-0.077**	-0.054	0.000
training	(0.015)	(0.026)	(0.037)	(0.059)
Unemployed	0.055	-0.002	0.076	0.096**
	(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.059)	(0.037)
Other	-0.050	-0.086***	-0.060	-0.009
	(0.023)	(0.024)	(0.052)	(0.050)
Political interest	0.118*	0.116***	0.044	0.158***
	(0.027)	(0.028)	(0.037)	(0.038)
Left-right self-placement	-0.363	-0.193***	-0.592***	-0.428***
	(0.107)	(0.039)	(0.062)	(0.044)
Anti-capitalist attitudes	0.138	0.118**	0.249***	0.082
	(0.040)	(0.040)	(0.047)	(0.052)
Constant	0.132	0.047	0.186**	0.212**
	(0.040)	(0.061)	(0.070)	(0.071)
Observations	2643	885	879	879
Country fixed-effects	✓	-	-	-
R^2	0.130	0.095	0.199	0.142
Adjusted R^2	0.124	0.077	0.183	0.125

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Reference Category (RF) for sex: female; RF Education: lower secondary or less; RF Occupation status: Employee. Source: Original survey data collected April 2020 to May 2020 by Qualtrics.

Table D-12 Linear probability model on the relationship between subjective group relative deprivation (rich people) and left-wing populist party support (Robustness 2)

	Pooled Sample	France	Germany	Spain
DV: Left-wing populist party support				
Subjective group relative deprivation (rich people)	0.033	0.036	0.047	-0.000
	(0.010)	(0.029)	(0.035)	(0.041)
Age	-0.001	-0.001	-0.000	-0.002
	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Sex				
Male	-0.002	-0.012	0.014	0.003
	(0.006)	(0.017)	(0.020)	(0.022)
Education				
Upper, post-secondary	0.016	0.002	0.034	0.000
	(0.011)	(0.020)	(0.026)	(0.029)
Tertiary	0.017	-0.027	0.053	0.016
	(0.023)	(0.025)	(0.029)	(0.028)
Income situation	-0.036	0.019	-0.081	-0.016
	(0.029)	(0.034)	(0.043)	(0.041)
Occupation status				
Manual worker	-0.011	-0.003	-0.043	0.023
	(0.023)	(0.045)	(0.034)	(0.049)
In public service	-0.006	0.004	0.002	0.012
	(0.007)	(0.039)	(0.042)	(0.046)
Self-employed with no employees	-0.008	-0.011	-0.032	-0.004
	(0.004)	(0.038)	(0.046)	(0.048)
Self-employed with employees	0.031	0.114	0.039	-0.027
	(0.040)	(0.093)	(0.067)	(0.030)
Retired	0.009	-0.035	0.013	0.046
	(0.023)	(0.030)	(0.032)	(0.038)
Student or otherwise in training	-0.047	-0.083**	-0.060	-0.003
	(0.014)	(0.026)	(0.038)	(0.059)
Unemployed	0.052	-0.007	0.063	0.093*
	(0.032)	(0.031)	(0.059)	(0.037)
Other	-0.045	-0.084***	-0.032	-0.009
	(0.022)	(0.023)	(0.051)	(0.051)
Political interest	0.121*	0.120***	0.070	0.145***
	(0.017)	(0.029)	(0.038)	(0.038)
Left-right self-placement	-0.378	-0.207***	-0.612***	-0.428***
	(0.109)	(0.039)	(0.064)	(0.045)
Political trust	-0.019	-0.020	-0.129***	0.082
	(0.065)	(0.042)	(0.036)	(0.045)
Constant	0.229	0.140*	0.380***	0.248***
	(0.062)	(0.055)	(0.072)	(0.068)
Observations	2643	885	879	879
Country fixed-effects	✓	-	-	-
R^2	0.122	0.087	0.187	0.143
Adjusted R^2	0.116	0.069	0.171	0.126

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Reference Category (RF) for sex: female; RF Education: lower secondary or less; RF Occupation status: Employee. Source: Original survey data collected April 2020 to May 2020 by Qualtrics.

Table D-13 Linear probability model on the relationship between subjective group relative deprivation (rich people) and left-wing populist party support (Robustness 3)

	Pooled Sample	France	Germany	Spain
DV: Left-wing populist party support				
Subjective group relative deprivation	0.060	0.078	-0.020	0.097
	(0.021)	(0.047)	(0.074)	(0.079)
Subjective group relative deprivation (immigrants)	-0.085	-0.078	0.024	-0.197***
	(0.058)	(0.045)	(0.050)	(0.058)
Subjective group relative deprivation (rich people)	0.046*	0.035	0.070	0.041
	(0.007)	(0.048)	(0.062)	(0.072)
Age	-0.001	-0.001	-0.000	-0.001
	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Sex				
Male	-0.002	-0.011	0.014	-0.001
	(0.006)	(0.017)	(0.020)	(0.022)
Education				
Upper, post-secondary	0.014	-0.001	0.036	-0.002
	(0.012)	(0.020)	(0.026)	(0.029)
Tertiary	0.012	-0.033	0.054	0.006
	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.030)	(0.028)
Income situation	-0.039	0.020	-0.094*	-0.020
	(0.034)	(0.033)	(0.045)	(0.041)
Occupation status				
Manual worker	-0.012	-0.001	-0.043	0.014
	(0.022)	(0.045)	(0.034)	(0.047)
In public service	-0.009	0.001	0.004	0.008
	(0.004)	(0.039)	(0.042)	(0.046)
Self-employed with no employees	-0.013	-0.013	-0.026	-0.018
	(0.004)	(0.037)	(0.046)	(0.048)
Self-employed with employees	0.027	0.113	0.045	-0.046
	(0.044)	(0.095)	(0.067)	(0.028)
Retired	0.006	-0.038	0.012	0.038
	(0.021)	(0.030)	(0.032)	(0.037)
Student or otherwise in training	-0.057*	-0.089***	-0.065	-0.040
	(0.008)	(0.025)	(0.037)	(0.057)
Unemployed	0.048	-0.008	0.072	0.082*
	(0.029)	(0.030)	(0.059)	(0.037)
Other	-0.048	-0.085***	-0.038	-0.017
	(0.021)	(0.023)	(0.053)	(0.047)
Political interest	0.114*	0.115***	0.054	0.146***
	(0.022)	(0.028)	(0.038)	(0.037)
Left-right self-placement	-0.350	-0.185***	-0.610***	-0.382***
	(0.110)	(0.041)	(0.068)	(0.046)
Constant	0.215	0.115*	0.325***	0.270***
	(0.050)	(0.054)	(0.072)	(0.065)
Observations	2643	885	879	879
Country fixed-effects	✓	-	-	-
R^2	0.126	0.092	0.176	0.154
Adjusted R^2	0.119	0.073	0.159	0.136

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Reference Category (RF) for sex: female; RF Education: lower secondary or less; RF Occupation status: Employee. Source: Original survey data collected April 2020 to May 2020 by Qualtrics.

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Bern, 11.02.2022 Maximilian Filsinger

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