Muratov, Oleg (2023). ENTREPRENEUR–INVESTOR INFORMATION DESIGN. International economic review, 64(4), pp. 1431-1467. Wiley 10.1111/iere.12634
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Int_Economic_Review_-_2023_-_Muratov_-_ENTREPRENEUR_INVESTOR_INFORMATION_DESIGN.pdf - Published Version Available under License Creative Commons: Attribution-Noncommercial (CC-BY-NC). Download (1MB) | Preview |
I consider an environment in which an entrepreneur generates information about the quality of his project prior to contracting with an investor. The investor faces a moral-hazard problem since the entrepreneur may divert the funding for private consumption. I find that the efficient amount of information is generated if and only if the bargaining power of the entrepreneur is high enough. I interpret this result in terms of investors' tightness, competitiveness, and generosity measures. I also show that the investor prefers not to have all the bargaining power when the project costs are high enough.
Item Type: |
Journal Article (Original Article) |
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Division/Institute: |
03 Faculty of Business, Economics and Social Sciences > Department of Economics |
UniBE Contributor: |
Muratov, Oleg |
Subjects: |
300 Social sciences, sociology & anthropology > 330 Economics |
ISSN: |
1468-2354 |
Publisher: |
Wiley |
Language: |
English |
Submitter: |
Dino Collalti |
Date Deposited: |
21 Jul 2023 09:21 |
Last Modified: |
07 Nov 2023 00:13 |
Publisher DOI: |
10.1111/iere.12634 |
BORIS DOI: |
10.48350/184971 |
URI: |
https://boris.unibe.ch/id/eprint/184971 |
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