The tragedy of the commons in evolutionary biology

Rankin, Daniel J; Bargum, Katja; Kokko, Hanna (2007). The tragedy of the commons in evolutionary biology. Trends in ecology & evolution, 22(12), pp. 643-651. Amsterdam: Elsevier Current Trends 10.1016/j.tree.2007.07.009

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Garrett Hardin's tragedy of the commons is an analogy that shows how individuals driven by self-interest can end up destroying the resource upon which they all depend. The proposed solutions for humans rely on highly advanced skills such as negotiation, which raises the question of how non-human organisms manage to resolve similar tragedies. In recent years, this question has promoted evolutionary biologists to apply the tragedy of the commons to a wide range of biological systems. Here, we provide tools to categorize different types of tragedy and review different mechanisms, including kinship, policing and diminishing returns that can resolve conflicts that could otherwise end in tragedy. A central open question, however, is how often biological systems are able to resolve these scenarios rather than drive themselves extinct through individual-level selection favouring self-interested behaviours.

Item Type:

Journal Article (Original Article)

Division/Institute:

08 Faculty of Science > Department of Biology > Institute of Ecology and Evolution (IEE)

UniBE Contributor:

Rankin, Daniel

ISSN:

0169-5347

Publisher:

Elsevier Current Trends

Language:

English

Submitter:

Factscience Import

Date Deposited:

04 Oct 2013 14:58

Last Modified:

17 Mar 2015 22:08

Publisher DOI:

10.1016/j.tree.2007.07.009

Web of Science ID:

000251922500006

URI:

https://boris.unibe.ch/id/eprint/25157 (FactScience: 56043)

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