Board Overlap, Seat Accumulation and Share Prices

Loderer, Claudio; Peyer, Urs (2002). Board Overlap, Seat Accumulation and Share Prices. European Financial Management, 8(2), pp. 165-192. Wiley-Blackwell

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We examine the board overlap among firms listed in Switzerland. Collusion, managerial entrenchment, and financial participation cannot explain it. The overlap appears to be induced by banks and by the accumulation of seats by the most popular directors. We also document that seat accumulation is negatively related to firm value, possibly because of the conflicts of interest that multiple directorships induce and the time constraints directors face. Contrary to popular beliefs, however, the directors of traded firms do not generally hold more than one mandate in other traded firms. They do hold multiple seats in non-traded firms.

Item Type:

Journal Article (Original Article)

Division/Institute:

03 Faculty of Business, Economics and Social Sciences > Department of Business Management > Institute of Financial Management

UniBE Contributor:

Loderer, Claudio and Peyer, Urs

Subjects:

300 Social sciences, sociology & anthropology > 330 Economics

ISSN:

1468-036X

Publisher:

Wiley-Blackwell

Language:

English

Submitter:

Karin Dolder

Date Deposited:

09 Dec 2013 16:27

Last Modified:

12 Jan 2015 03:44

BORIS DOI:

10.7892/boris.39510

URI:

https://boris.unibe.ch/id/eprint/39510

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